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Abstract
This thesis concerns the relationship between English and
European Community administrative law. The main aim is to
draw out the nature of this relationship by comparing the
development of two principles, the principles of
legitimate expectations and proportionality, within
English and European Community administrative law. A
secondary aim is to assess the challenge presented by
European Community law for English law. The emphasis is
on the distinct visions of law or legal traditions which
have influenced both systems of administrative law rather
than specific substantive laws.
Chapter 2 identifies the nature of the English and
Continental traditions of administrative law and the
development of English and European Community
administrative law. More specifically, English law is
based on the common law approach while Continental and
European Community administrative law has a more
purposive orientation. Chapter 3 examines the pressures
for the adoption of the two principles in English law.
These pressures have been both internal, through the role
of Lord Diplock, and external, through the influence of
European Community law.
In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 the principles are examined in
depth in both European Community and English
administrative law. Comparative observations of the
articulation of the principles in European Community law
and their development in English law are made in chapters
5 and 7. In this respect the identification of the
different traditions of administrative law becomes
crucial in assessing the success of the principles as
legal transplants in English law.
The conclusion draws together these themes in order to
identify the relationship between English and European
Community law. An assessment is also made of the
challenge presented by European Community law and
suggestions are made as to what English law ought to do
in order to respond effectively.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Why Study Legitimate Expectations and
Proportionality?
The principal aim of this thesis is to explore
the complex relationship between English and
European Community administrative law. Whilst
issues of constitutional and administrative law are
closely related, the primary focus is on
administrative law. In examining the relationship
between English and European Community
administrative law I have selected the principles
of legitimate expectations and proportionality for
detailed consideration. These two principles are
undoubtedly "European" in nature and form part of
the general principles of Community law. It is
suggested that comparative study of the case-law of
the European Court of Justice and the English
courts concerning the principles of legitimate
expectations and proportionality can enable
understanding of the developing interaction between
Community and English administrative law for the
following reasons. First, the English courts have
attempted to adopt these two principles into
1
English law. Analysis of how successful English law
has been in this project can provide insights into
the different conceptions of administrative law
that exist between English and Community law.
Secondly, the English courts are under an
obligation to apply such principles when acting as
Community courts and increasingly a spill-over
effect of Community law is being felt by the
national legal systems. The principles of
legitimate expectations and proportionality have
been applied by the English courts in their role as
Community courts which has created a corresponding
pressure to recognise them as independent
principles of English law. A comparative analysis
can attempt to assess the viability of the
principles as legal transplants from one legal
system to another and form a means of examining the
developing law of English judicial review in the
light of the challenge of Community administrative
law.
While there has been similar comparative work
undertaken, the amount of research has not been
extensive and neither has it attempted to place
such a comparison within the different traditions
2
of English and European administrative law.1 The
purpose of my study is to fill the gap in the
existing literature by providing a detailed
comparison of the development of the principles in
English administrative law with their articulation
in European Community administrative law. The study
will begin with an examination of the different
approaches to judicial review which exist in
England and Europe. This is necessary in order to
understand the case-law of the European Court of
Justice and the English courts. The factors which
have influenced the adoption of the European
principles by English law will then be analysed. It
1 Lord Mackenzie Stuart "Legitimate Expectations and
Estoppel in Community and English Administrative Law"
[1983/1] L.I.E.I. 53; C. Graham "Towards a European
Administrative Law? The English Case" [1993] Rivista
Trimstrala di Diritto Pubblico 3; D. Wyatt "European
Community Law and Public Law in the United Kingdom" in
B.S. Markesinis (ed.), The Gradual Convergence. Foreign
Ideas, Foreign Influences and English Law on the Eve of
the 21st Century. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) page
188; Y. Cripps "Some Effects of European Law on English
Law" (1994) 2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
(http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol2/cripps.html); J.E.
Levitsky "The Europeanization of British Legal Style"
(1994) 42 A.J.C.L. 347; A. O'Neill Decisions of the
European Court of Justice and their Constitutional
Implications (London: Butterworths, 1994) chapter 5; N.
Grief "The Pervasive Influence of European Community Law
in the United Kingdom" in P. Birks (ed.), Pressing
Problems in the Law Volume 2: What are Law Schools for?
(Oxford: University Press, 1996) page 97; P.P. Craig
"The Impact of Community Law on Domestic Public Law" in
P. Leyland and T. Woods (eds.), Administrative Law
Faping the Future: Old Constraints & New Horizons
(London: Blackstone, 1997) page 271; J.A. Usher General
Principles of EC Law (London: Longman, 1998) chapter 9.
3
will be seen that the pressures for the English
courts to develop the principles in English law
have come from both internal and external sources
which are respectively the role of Lord Diplock and
the challenge of Community law. The elaboration of
the principles in the case-law of the European
Court of Justice and the English courts will form
the detailed body of the study. An analysis of the
case-law will enable comparisons to be made and
conclusions to be drawn over how the English courts
have responded to the principles and the
suitability of their adoption into English law.
Through an analysis of the English case-law it
should be possible, viewing the principles as legal
transplants and in light of Community law
obligations to apply the principles, to gain a
better understanding of the relationship between
English and European Community administrative law.
Finally, I will suggest what the English courts
should do if they are to respond effectively to the
challenges presented by Community law in regard to
substantive principles of law.
2. Legal Transplants
4
Comparative law can be used to attain a deeper
understanding of problems faced in the national
legal order and provide possible solutions which
can be adopted through the transplantation of
foreign law. A legal transplant involves the
transfer of a legal rule, principle or institution
from one legal system to another. Accordingly,
lawyers considering transplantation need to
consider two questions: first, has the solution
proved satisfactory in its country of origin and,
second, will it work in the country which proposes
to adopt it?2 However, debate has arisen on the
nature and possibility of legal transplants.
In the 18th century Montesquieu warned against
the transplantation of laws from one country to
another as laws are particular to their
environment.3 Montesquieu argued that law was the
product of human reason in relation to various
factors, such as the "nature and principle of each
government" ,4 "the climate of each country", 5 which
together constitute the "Spirit of the Laws". In
updating this thesis Kahn-Freund has argued that
2 K. Zweigert and H. Katz An Introduction to Comparative
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) page 16.
3 C. Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws [1748](New York,
1949, translated by T. Nugent) book 1, chapter 3, pages
6-7.
4 Ibid.
5
environmental factors - geographical, social,
economic and cultural elements - have reduced in
importance whereas political factors had become
more significant.6 This was justified by the fact
that economic, social and cultural integration
amongst the developed countries had been
accompanied by a political differentiation.? This
process had affected the possibility of legal
transplants. Accordingly, Kahn-Freund stated that
there is a continuum of legal rules with varying
degrees of transferability. The closer a rule is
linked with the foreign power structure then the
less susceptible it is of transplantation because
of the political differentiation. As public law
rules concern the control of political power Kahn-
Freund considered them to be the least transferable
rules:
"All rules which organise constitutional,
legislative, administrative or judicial
institutions and procedures are designed to
allocate power, rule-making, decision-making,
above all, policy making power. These are the
5 Ibid.
6 O. Kahn-Freund "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative
Law" (1974) 37 M.L.R. 1.
? Ibid., 8.
6
rules which are closest to the 'organic' end
of our continuum, they are the ones most
resistant to transplantation."8
In general Kahn-Freund cautioned lawyers
considering a transplantation not to be informed by
a purely legalistic spirit but to have a "knowledge
not only of the foreign law, but also of its
social, and above all its political, context."9
Alternatively, Watson has argued that the recipient
legal system does not need to have any knowledge of
the political and other contexts of the origin and
growth of the rule10 but such views have been
subjected to telling criticism.ll
In assessing the viability of transplanting
rules which organise public power the impact of the
European Community on the exercise of public power
must be addressed. Under the competences given to
8 Ibid., 17.
9 Ibid., 27.
10 A. Watson Legal Transplants: An Approach to
Comparative Law (Edinburgh, 1974); A. Watson "Legal
Transplants and Law Reform" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 79, 80-81.
See also E. Stein "Uses, Misuses - and Nonuses of
Comparative Law" (1977) 72 N.W.U.L.R. 198; W. Ewald
"Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal
Transplants" (1995) 43 A.J.C.L. 487.
11 See R.L. Abel "Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory
of Law" (1982) 80 Michigan L.R. 785, 793; J.W.F. Allison
A Continental Distinction in the Common Law. A
Historical and Comparative Perspective on English Public
Law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) pages 14-16; P.
7
them by the European Treaties the Community
institutions have powers previously exercised by
the Member States. Also the Member States now
exercise public power by virtue of Community law.
Profound shifts in power have been occurring due to
the organic development of the European Community.12
Public power is no longer the preserve of the
sovereign nation-state but is exercised at a
variety of levels. Such changes have helped to
undermine the traditional view of legal
sovereignty13 and have affected the judicial
controls to be placed on their exercise. The
European Court enforces Community standards of
legality on measures adopted by the Community
institutions and on measures of the Member States
required or permitted by Community law.14 The
transplantation of the principles of
Legrand "The Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants'" (1997)
4 M.J. 11l.
12 See J. Morison and S. Livingstone Reshaping Public
Power: Northern Ireland and the British Constitutional
Crisis (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) pages 13-17, 54-
62. See also W.C. Muller and V. Wright "Reshaping the
State in Western Europe: The Limits to Retreat" (1994)
17 West European Politics 1 (Special Issue on The State
in Western Europe: Retreat or Redefinition?) .
13 N. MacCormick "Beyond the Sovereign State" (1993) 56
M.L.R. 1.
14 See J. Temple Lang "The Sphere in Which Member States
are Obliged to Comply with the General Principles of Law
and Community Fundamental Rights Principles" [1991/2]
L.I.E.I. 23; R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
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proportionality and legitimate expectations cannot
be viewed solely as the adoption of legal
principles that apply to a foreign power structure
as the United Kingdom now forms part of that power
structure by virtue of its Treaty obligations and
the principles apply to measures of the Member
State adopted under Community law.is In the complex
emerging picture of interdependence and
globalisation, the transplantation of the European
principles could be viewed as an attempt to provide
the individual with an equal level of legal
protection against purely national administrative
decisions compared with that which is enjoyed as a
European citizen against the Community
administration. The principles are already linked
to the national and Community power structure by
virtue of Community law. As the normative
importance of the Community and the "new legal
order" 16 increases, the strength of arguments
against successful transplantation based upon the
principles being linked to a foreign power
and Food ex parte First City Trading Ltd. [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 250.
is See D. Williams "The Influence of European Union Law
upon United Kingdom Administration" in G. Richardson and
H. Genn (eds.), Administrative Law & Government Action.
The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms of Review.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) page 233.
9
structure will diminish and calls for their
recognition as independent principles of English
law will become stronger. Such changes suggest a
new role for comparative law of national legal
systems within the European Community. According to
Lord Goff, European Community law forms one
influence towards comparative study which is bound
to lead to "an enrichment of ... [English] ...legal
culture on an unparalleled scale" .17
However, this is not to overlook the potential
hazards of transplantation. According to Atiyah and
Summers "legal transplants ...require careful study
of their possible ramifications."ls Transplants may
not be impossible19 but it will be necessary that
the environment be carefully prepared and that
their possible second-stage effects be fully
considered. Legal transplants may only become
16 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12.
17 Lord Goff "Judge, Jurist and Legislature" [1987]
Denning L.J. 79, 93. See also J. Bell "The English
Lawyer in the Europe of 1993" (1991/2) 34 University of
Leeds Review 181; T.H. Bingham "'There is a World
Elsewhere': The Changing Perspectives of English Law"
(1992) 41 1.C.L.Q. 513; R. Dehousse "Comparing National
and EC Law: The Problem of the Level of Analysis" (1994)
42 A.J.C.L. 761; 1. ward "The Limits of Comparativism:
Lessons from UK-EC Integration" (1995) 2 M.J. 23; P.
Legrand "How to compare now" [1996] L.S. 232.
1S P.S. Atiyah and R.S. Summers Form and Substance in
Anglo-American Law. A Comparative Study of Legal
Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987) page 428.
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effective if at least some of the norms and
philosophy of the native legal system are also
incorporated.20 Transplanting principles from one
legal system to another will require detailed
knowledge and study of the context in which they
operate and preparation for their reception into
another legal system. In relation to the
transplantation of proportionality and legitimate
expectations this requires examination of whether
the model of judicial review and the conception of
law underpinning it are appropriate to the
development of such principles.
The method proposed is to compare the case-law
of the English courts with that of the European
Court concerning proportionality and legitimate
expectations in order to evaluate whether the
transplantation of the principles was well
considered and suited to English administrative
law. In conducting this comparison it is to be
borne in mind that as the common law develops on a
gradual case by case basis it will be unable to
adopt the whole principle in one case. The scope of
that principle will be examined, defined and re-
19 Contra P. Legrand "The Impossibility of 'Legal
Transplants'" (1997) 4 M.J. Ill.
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defined in subsequent cases. Judicial decisions are
made in respect of specific disputes and tend to
depend on their own facts. Furthermore, while some
judges may have considered the principles as
transplants from European law, other judges may
not. If judges do not have regard to comparative
materials in order to guide the development of a
transplant then it is unlikely to be wholly
succees ruL."
The above views concerning the contingency of
successful transplantation of legal principles from
one legal system to another suggest that
comparative lawyers should not view law as a
subject capable of rendering universal principles
through a "general jurisprudence". 22 Rather they
suggest that comparative law should focus on the
particular nature of legal systems within the
societies in which they operate as the basis of
comparison. For example, Atiyah and Summers, in
20 F.s. C. Northrop "The Comparative Philosophy of
Comparative Law" (1960) 45 Cornell L.O. 617, 657.
21 See B.s. Markesinis "Comparative Law - A Subj ect in
Search of an Audience" (1990) 53 M.L.R. 1, 3-4. See also
B.S. Markesinis "Judge, Jurist and the Study and Use of
Foreign Law" (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 622; T. Allen and B.
Anderson "The Use of Comparative Law by Common Law
Judges" (1994) 23 Anglo-American L.R. 435; T. Koopmans
"Comparative Law and the Courts" (1996) 45 I.C.L.O. 545.
22 J. Austin Lectures on Jurisprudence or The Philosophy
of Positive Law (London, 4th edn., R. Campbell (ed.),
12
their comparison of Anglo-American legal systems,
identify, within the same legal family of the
common law, different "visions of law" which those
legal systems vindicate; in England a more formal
approach to law is typically adopted compared with
the substantive approach of the United States. A
"vision of law" is composed of "a set of
inarticulate and perhaps even unconscious beliefs
held by the general public at large, and to some
extent, also by politicians, judges, and legal
practitioners, as to the nature and function of law
- how and by whom it should be made, interpreted
and enforced.,,23 Similarly Bell has argued that "law
is best viewed as a tradition within a legal
community, rather than essentially as rules or
norms of conduct. Within such a view of law, the
central interplay between a community and its norms
of conduct can be appreciated.,,24
1879) page 1106 "On the Uses of the Study of
Jurisprudence".
23Atiyah and Summers, op. cit. supra no. 18, page 411.
24J. Bell "Comparative Law and Legal Theory" in W.
Krawietz, N. MacCormick and G. von Wright (eds.),
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in
Modern Legal Systems. Festschrift for Robert S. Summers.
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994) page 19, 20. See also,
in this context, J. Bell "Mechanisms for Cross-
festilisation of Administrative Law in Europe" in J.
Beatson and T. Tridimas (eds.), New Directions in
European Public Law (Oxford: Hart, 1998) page 147.
13
Law then is to be viewed as an artefact of
tradition and culture and comparative law should
look not only to the cultural, social and economic
context of a legal system but also to the specific
legal tradition which will have a significant
effect upon the way functions are performed.25 Only
by identifying the cultural and legal traditions of
a community, is it possible to examine how meaning
is given to legal principles and doctrines. It
might be argued that this method is particularly
appropriate in the context of public law because
the development of public law involves the impact
of politics and history within specific cultural
t r-add t.Lons c "
This method of comparing how different legal
systems attempt to solve the similar problems
enables the study of comparative law to concentrate
upon "relatively narrow and manageable problems"
thereby avoiding the problems associated with
25 Ibid., page 31. See also M. Krygier "Law as Tradition"
(1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 237; Legrand, op. cit. supra
no. 17; D. Nelken (ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures
(Dartmouth, 1997).
26 See J.S. Mill "Bentham" (1838) in J.S. Mill and J.
Bentham Utilitarianism and Other Essays (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, A Ryan (ed.), 1987) page 132, 164; J.D.B.
Mitchell "Law, Democracy and Political Institutions" in
M. Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives For a Common Law
of Europe (Florence, 1978) page 361, 363; M. Loughlin
"The Importance of Elsewhere" (1993) 4 P.L.R. 44, 57.
14
large-scale comparison of legal systems.27 A
comparison of the principles of legitimate
expectations and proportionality in English and
Community law must therefore be set within the
specifically legal context of the different
traditions of public law. It must seek to assess
the interplay between the specific "vision of law"
or legal tradition and the transplantation of the
principles.
27 B.S. Markesinis "An Expanding Tort Law - The Price of
a Rigid Contract Law" (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 354, 396.
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Chapter 2: English and Continental Approaches to
Administrative Law
1. The English Tradition of Administrative Law
The traditional account of English public law
is well known.1 The defining features of this
account have been that Parliament is sovereign and
that the Rule of Law requires all individuals and
public bodies to be subject to the ordinary
processes of the law. Public authorities are not
entitled to be treated any differently than private
individuals and the exercise of all public power is
to be channelled through Parliament. A distinctive
feature of English government has been the value
placed upon the traditions, conventions and
established practices in the business of government
which can only make sense when interpreted in the
light of innumerable tacit understandings.
Traditional practices have served the purpose of
accommodating new developments and ensuring a sense
1 A.V. Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution [1885](London: Macmillan, 10th edn., 1959).
See P.P. Craig Public Law and Democracy in the United
Kingdom and the United States of America (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990) chapter 2; M. Loughlin Public Law
and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)
pages 140-162.
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of continuity between past and present.2 The
dominant political culture has placed great value
on the practical experience of the governing class.
According to Keeton "Parliament was
omnipotent ...but it was in no danger of abusing its
powers because it was a combination of diverse
elements, linked together by an intricate set of
'checks and balances' ...and also because Englishmen
possessed, to a markedly greater degree than other
peoples, a mysterious political instinct.,,3 In
contrast to Continental states with bureaucratic
state structures, British Government has been
described by Bagehot as "club government,,4 with
public administration being viewed as an art form
rather than as a distinct science.
In relation to law such traditions are
reflected in the common law method which is not a
theoretical science based on reason but is founded
2 See J. Millar An Historical View of the English
Government, From the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain
to the Revolution in 1688. Volume IV. [1787] (London:
Mawman, 1803) chapter VII "The Progress of Science
Relative to Law and Government"; the distinction made by
W. Bagehot The English Constitution [1867] (London:
Fontana, 1993) page 63 between the "dignified" and
"efficient" parts of the constitution.
3 G.W. Keeton "The Twilight of the Common Law" (1949)
The Nineteenth Century and After 230, 234.
4 Bagehot, op. cit. supra no. 2, page 158.
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on "artificial reason"s and practical knowledge.
Uninfluenced by Roman law,6 England developed the
common law with its distinctive "common law mind,,7
against the backcloth of the myth of the ancient
constitution. Law was seen as the result of
immemorial custom and the accumulated wisdom of
continual experience being constantly applied by
the courts. In this way the common law was viewed
as having the advantages of both continuity and
innovation in that it was capable of being up to
date but also existed "time out of mind of man".s
Underpinning this cultural heritage of political
tradition and the common law is the adoption of an
essentially anti-rationalist approach that places
importance in practical experience which is
acquired by an education within this tradition of
behaviour.9 The adoption of an anti-rationalist
approach can be seen clearly in the common law
5 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65 per Sir
Edward Coke C.J.
6 See Millar, op. cit. supra no. 2, Volume II, Chapter
VII, section 3.
7 See J.G.A. Pocock The Ancient Constitution and the
Feudal Law: A Study of the English Historical Thought in
the Seventeenth Century. (Cambridge: University Press,
1957) chapter 2.
8 Sir Edward Coke C.J. The Third Part of the Reports of
Edward Coke (Revised edn., 1738) page vii.
9 Loughlin, op. cit. supra no. I, pages 64-83 drawing
upon the work of M. Oakeshott, in particular Rationalism
in Politics and other essays (Liberty Fund, new and
extended edn., 1991).
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method by the use of precedent by judges educated
within the practices and culture of the common law.
It was against this background that Dicey, being
"the first to apply the analytical method to
English public law", 10 formulated the general
principles of law of the constitution. For Dicey,
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty was "an
undoubted legal fact"ll and the Rule of Law was to
be expressed by the ordinary courts drawing upon
the ordinary law of the land.
As a result of this cultural heritage English
lawyers have not been required to develop a legal
conception of the State relevant to modern
governmene2 but instead have preferred to use the
concept of the crown" or the doctrine of
Parliamentary sovereignty14 to explain the exercise
of public power. The comment of Redlich and Hirst
that the England of the late nineteenth century was
10 W.I. Jennings "In Praise of Dicey 1885-1935" (1935) 13
Public Administration 123, 133.
11 Dicey, op. cit. supra no. I, page 68.
12 K.H.F. Dyson The State Tradition in Western Europe. A
Study of an Idea and Institution. (Oxford: Martin
Robertson, 1980) pages viii, 36-44. See also E. Barker
"The 'Rule of Law'" (1914) 2 Political Quarterly 117,
118-119; H.J. Laski "The Responsibility of the State in
England" (1919) 32 Harv. L.R. 447; P. Allott "The Theory
of the British Constitution" in H. Gross and R. Harrison
(eds.), Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992) page 173, 186.
13 See F.W. Maitland "The Crown as Corporation" (1901) 17
L.Q.R. 131.
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uninformed about an abstract legal theory of the
State and its jurisprudence was unequipped with a
theory of general administration remains true
today:" Despite the vast changes in the role and
size of the State and the gradual extension of
democratic politics, the basic institutional and
cultural heritage has remained the same. Rather
than re-conceptualising the role of law in view of
the changing relationship between the individual
and the State, the dominant tradition of public law
has preferred to accommodate such developments
within the established arrangements. The emergence
of a more rationalist and ideological politics
within an essentially anti-rationalist
constitutional framework has inevitably caused
strains. These new tensions have been viewed by
some as the passing away of traditions and the
development of an "elective dictatorship" 16 and by
others as a failure to develop a constitution
14 Dicey, op , cit. supra no. 1, chapter 1.
15 J. Redlich and F.W. Hirst Local Government in England
Volume II (London: Macmillan, 1903) pages 376-377.
16 N. Johnson "Constitutional Reform: Some Dilemmas for a
Conservative Philosophy" in Z. Layton-Henry (ed.),
Conservative Party Politics (London, 1980) pages 126,
128-9; Lord Hailsham The Dilemma of Democracy. Diagnosis
and Prescription. (London: Collins, 1978) chapter xx
"Elective Dictatorship".
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suitable to contemporary needs and demands.1? As the
growth in the scale and complexity of the State has
been achieved by a vast increase in legislation,
statutes have come to displace the common law as
the source of law. However, a corresponding change
has not occurred at the level of the conception of
legality. The dominant view of law has remained at
a common law conception despite the vast growth and
change in the State over the last century. The
result has been that law is viewed merely as a
means of controlling the exercise of public power
and not as a means of facilitating or evaluating
administrative action. The role of law in the
British administrative state has therefore been
distinctively influenced by British constitutional
traditions.
The development of judicial review of
administrative action by the English courts may be
viewed as the gradual articulation of the
traditional account of English public law as it has
attempted to respond to such challenges. As the
basic conception of the structure of the State is
reflected in the means used to control the
1? D. Marquand The Unprincipled Society. New Demands and
Old Politics. (London, 1988) chapter 7; W. Hutton The
22
administration,18 the lack of a legal definition of
the State has shaped the entire structure of
English administrative law. Rather than being
subject to special legal controls, disputes between
public authorities and individuals have been
resolved by applying the ordinary principles of the
common law. Dicey declared that the Rule of Law
meant that the common law was the supreme law of
the land and that all classes of people were to be
subject to the equal application of the law. Under
this universal conception of legality, public
authorities were not to be allowed to "shelter
behind a droit administratif. ,,19 According to Dicey,
the existence of a separate administrative law,
like that which existed in Continental countries,
and particularly in France, rested on "ideas
foreign to the fundamental assumptions of our
English common law, and especially ...the rule of
law.,,20A separate administrative law would, it was
thought, undermine the universality and equality of
State We're In (London: Vintage, new edn., 1996) chapter
1I.
18 B. Chapman The Profession of Government. The Public
Service in Europe. (London, 1966) page 185. See also C.
Harlow and R. Rawlings Law and Administration (London:
Butterworths, 2nd edn., 1997) page 1.
19 Ministry of Housing and Local Government v. Sharp
[1970] 2 Q.B. 223, 266D per Lord Denning M.R. See also
Salmon L.J. at 275B.
20 Dicey, Ope cit. supra no. 1, page 329.
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the common law, place the state in a privileged
position and require the establishment of special
courts thereby breaching the principle of the
separation of judicial and executive powers. This
rejection proceeded upon the assumption that a
separate administrative law would in fact treat
public authorities more favourably than private
individuals which arose because the state was not
viewed as having its own distinct functions and
therefore requiring distinct legal consideration.
Dicey drew a sharp distinction between the regular
law of the land and the existence of arbitrary
power and viewed the two as incompatible. The
existence of a separate administrative law was
viewed as enshrining rather than constraining
arbitrary power.
Though Dicey both failed to recognise the
scope of administrative law which existed at the
time he wrote,21 misunderstood French administrative
law,22 and later began to revise his views, 23 his
21H.W. Arthurs "Jonah and the Whale: The Appearance,
Disappearance, and Reappearance of Administrative Law"
(1980) 30 University of Toronto L.J. 225; H.W. Arthurs
'Without the Law': Administrative Justice and Legal
Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (Toronto, 1985).
22 E.M. Parker "State and Official Liability" (1905/6) 19
Harv. L.R. 335, 347-9; W.I. Jennings The Law and the
Constitution (London, 5th edn., 1959) pages 232-238. See
also J.W. Garner "Anglo-American and Continental
European Administrative Law" (1929) 7 N.Y.U.L.Q.R. 387;
24
influence has been immense both in terms of
moulding the scope of the subject24 and in defining
the dominant tradition.25 According to Loughlin:
"By denying the existence of administrative
law in the face of the structural pressure for
growth in administration, the influence which
Dicey's theory had on political and legal thought
served to shield us from the realities and prevent
us from addressing the issues raised by these
developments in a constructive fashion."26
England could not develop a separate administrative
law with its own philosophy that was not contrary
to the Rule of Law as articulated by Dicey. In this
way Dicey could be viewed as constructing a
positivistic style which enabled the anti-
R. Errera "Dicey and French Administrative Law: A Missed
Encounter?" [1985] P.L. 695.
23A.V. Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution (London, 8th edn., 1915) page xlviii; A.V.
Dicey "The Development of Administrative Law in England"
(1915) 31 L.Q.R. 148.
24 See the "outline of subject" in Introduction to the
Study of the Law of the Constitution where Dicey
explained the "true nature of constitutional law". See
also R. Blackburn "Dicey and the Teaching of Public Law"
[1985] P.L. 679; Loughlin, op. cit. supra no. 1, pages
14-23, 159.
25 Jennings, op. cit. supra no. 10; H.W. Arthurs
"Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey
Business" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; N. Johnson and
P. McAuslan "Dicey and His Influence on Public Law"
[1985] P.L. 679; Craig, op. cit. supra no. 1; Loughlin,
op. cit. supra no. 1, pages 140-162.
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rationalist culture of the common law and the
British Constitution to become established as the
dominant tradition of public law. Furthermore,
because most public lawyers in this century have
continued to work within this style of analytical
jurisprudence, this has exercised a profound
influence in bolstering the dominant paradigm of
the subject and in preventing them from critically
assessing its normative authority.
However, not every lawyer agreed with either
Dicey's views or his approach. During the inter-war
period some writers applied a functionalist
approach to the role of law in public
administration and sought to constructively meet
the challenges for law presented by the growth of
administrative power.27 Robson's work Justice and
Administrative La~8 was written in order to dispel
the illusion that in Britain there was no
administrative law.29 Robson examined in detail the
exercise of judicial functions by administrators
and tribunals and sought to rationalise the
26 Loughlin, op. cit. supra no. 1, page 160.
27 See generally Loughlin, op. cit. supra no. 1, pages
165-176; Harlow and Rawlings, op. cit. supra no. 18,
chapter 3.
28 W.A. Robson Justice and Administrative Law. A Study of
the British Constitution. (London: Stevens, 3rd edn.,
1951) .
26
haphazard arrangements into a system of public law.
Jennings argued that that Dicey's writings could
only be understood against his Whig individualism30
and sought to re-define the role of the lawyer in
view of the growth of administrative power:
"The task of the lawyer as such is not to declare
that modern intervention is pernicious, but,
seeing that all modern States have adopted the
policy, to advise as to the technical devices
which are necessary to make the policy efficient
and to provide justice for individuals.,,3l
Such writers argued that the growth of
administrative discretion required new ideas and
new institutions rather than disapproval of the
extension of government combined with complacent
29 W.A. Robson "Justice and Administrative Law
Reconsidered" (1979) 32 C.L.P. 107.
30 Jennings, op. cit. supra no. 10, 124-133. In Lectures
on the Relationship Between Law and Opinion in England
during the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 2nd
edn., 1963) pages 257-258 Dicey articulated his distrust
of social legislation: "[t]he beneficial effects of
State intervention, especially in the form of
legislation, is direct, immediate, and, so to speak,
visible, whilst its evil effects are gradual and
indirect ...State help kills self-help."
31 W.I. Jennings "Courts and Administrative Law - The
Experience of English Housing Law Legislation" (1936) 49
Harv. L.R. 426, 430.
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nostalgia for past constitutional arrangements.32
Therefore, both Robson and Jennings argued for a
special administrative jurisdiction in order to
hear appeals from administrative tribunals.33 To be
effective in resolving disputes concerning the
application of policy it was argued that such an
appellate body should be separate from the
traditions of the common law which were
incompatible with the philosophy underlying social
legislation and be staffed by those with knowledge
and experience of public administration. However,
this functionalist style has never been able to
displace the dominant tradition. The idea of a
separate administrative jurisdiction was rejected
by the Committee on Ministers' powers34 which was
set up to consider the issues of delegated
legislation and administrative adjudication. As the
terms of reference for the Committee were to
32 See W.A. Robson Public Administration Today (London:
Stevens, 1948) pages 15-17.
33 Robson, Ope cit. supra no. 28, pages 426-429; W.I.
Jennings "The Report on Ministers' Powers" (1932) 10
Public Administration 333, 348-351. See also J. Willis
The Parliamentary Powers of Government Departments
(Cambridge, 1933) page 172.
34 The Report of the Commi ttee on Ministers' Powers
Report Cmd. 4060, (London: HMSO, Donoughmore Report,
1932). See W.A. Robson "The Report of the Committee on
Ministers' Powers" (1932) 3 Political Quarterly 346;
Jennings, Ope cit. supra no. 33; D.G.T. Williams "The
Donoughmore Report in Retrospect" (1982) 60 Public
Administration 273.
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"report what safeguards are desirable or necessary
to secure the constitutional principles of the
sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of the
Law",35 Robson considered it to have "started life
with the dead hand of Dicey lying frozen on its
neck. ,,36
In the first part of this century the courts
sometimes exercised great restraint when met with
challenges to the use of administrative power37 and
concerns were expressed over the growth of
administrative law or "administrative
lawlessness".38 In the absence of a separate
administrative jurisdiction, it was left to the
ordinary courts to fill the gap. It was during this
period that functionalist writers argued that the
courts displayed a distrust of administrative power
against the protection of private right and lacked
the institutional ability to resolve such issues.39
However, despite early disagreements over whether
35 Ibid., section 1, paragraph 1.
36Robson, op. cit. supra no. 28, page 423.
37 See, e.g., Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915]
A.C. 120.
38 Lord Hewart of Bury The New Despotism (London, 1929)
page 13. See also C.K. Allen Law in the Making (London,
1927); C.K. Allen Bureaucracy Triumphant (London, 1931).
39 See H.J. Laski "Judicial Review of Social Policy in
England" (1926) 39 Harv. L.R. 832; J. Willis "Three
Approaches to Administrative Law: the Judicial, the
Conceptual and the Functional" (1935) 1 University of
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they were capable of controlling the exercise of
public power,40 the courts gradually became willing
to referee disputes between individuals and public
authorities. In a process which is only discernible
in hindsight, the courts re-discovered "their
historic but long-neglected role as protectors of
the private citizen against unlawful or unjust
treatment by the executive branch of government,,41
by subjecting the "crooked cord" of unlawful
administrative discretion to the "golden and
straight metwand" of the common law. 42 This was
achieved by resurrecting the old prerogative writs43
and removing obstacles to the control of
administrative power. For instance, in R. v.
Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal ex
Toronto L.J. 53; Jennings, op. cit. supra no. 31;
Robson, op. cit. supra no. 28.
40 A. Denning Freedom Under the Law (London, The Hamlyn
Lectures, 1949) page 126 argued in favour of the courts
rising to the challenge. Contra P. Devlin "The Common
Law, Public Policy and the Executive" (1956) 9 C.L.P. I,
14-15. See also Keeton, op. cit. supra no. 3; H.W.R.
Wade "Law, Opinion and Administration" (1962) 78 L.Q.R.
188, 198-199.
41 Lord Diplock "Administrative Law: Judicial Review
Reviewed" (1974) 33 C.L.J. 233.
42 C.F. Forsyth and I. Hare (eds.), The Golden Metwand
and the Crooked Cord. Essays on Public in Honour of Sir
William Wade QC. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) page
vii. The language is that of Sir Edward Coke C.J. 4 Inst
41.
43 See S.A. deSmith "The Prerogative Writs" (1950) 11
C.L.J. 40; E.G. Henderson The Foundations of English
Administrative Law. Certiorari and Mandamus in the
Seventeenth Century. (Cambridge Mass., 1963).
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parte Shaw44 the Court of King's Bench revived its
inherent power to review for errors of law on the
face of the record. The House of Lords in Ridge v.
Baldwin45 eroded the distinction between
administrative and judicial decision-making in
relation to the right to be heard. The concept of
jurisdiction was opened up to cover all errors of
Law" and in Padfield v. Ministry of Agricul ture,
Fisheries and Foo~7 it was held that discretionary
power should not be exercised for an improper
purpose. The revival of principles and remedies by
the English courts is undeniable. However, this
development has taken place within terms of the
traditional account of public law and the culture
of the common law. While it has been accepted that
the existence of administrative law is no longer
"fundamentally inconsistent"48 with the British
constitution, the values and beliefs articulated by
Dicey still exist and can be found in leading
textbooks and court judgements.49
44 [1951] 1 K.B. 711 (D.C.); [1952] 1 K.B. 338 (C.A.).
45 [1964] A.C. 40.
46 Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission
[1969] 2 A.C. 147.
47 [1968] A.C. 997.
48 Dicey, op. ci t. supra no. 1, page 203.
49 See, e.g., H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth Administrative
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 7th edn., 1994). Cf. the
"conservative normativism" described by Loughlin, op.
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The courts therefore came to develop, within
the Diceyan tradition, the traditional model of
judicial review. 50 Under this model the role of the
courts was to enforce the intention of Parliament,
thereby fulfilling Parliamentary sovereignty, and
to protect private law remedies. The conceptual
tool used to ensure that public authorities did not
go beyond their powers was the ultra vires rule.51
The courts also required observance of the
established common law rules. The role of the
courts was therefore limited to determining whether
the body had acted outside the limits of its
jurisdiction. Any other forms of control were to be
sought in Parliament. Underpinning this model is a
positivist 'top-down' conception of law. Whether
law is viewed as a comrnand'"or as a system of
primary and secondary rules53 matters little; law is
cit. supra no. 1 which has become the normal discourse
of public law.
50 P.P. Craig Administrative Law (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 3rd edn., 1994) pages 4-17; R. Cotterrell
"Judicial Review and Legal Theory" in G. Richardson and
H. Genn (eds.), Administrative Law and Government
Action. The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms of Review.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) page 13.
51 Wade and Forsyth, op. cit. supra no. 49, pages 41-49.
See also A. Rubenstein Jurisdiction and Illegality. A
Study in Public Law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).
52 J. Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and
the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence [1832](H.L.A.
Hart (ed.), London, 1954).
53 H.L .A . Hart The Concep t of Law (Oxford : Clarendon
Press, 1961).
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viewed as rules emanating from a sovereign. This
conception of law requires the courts to apply the
law, as it originates in the will of a sovereign
legislature, to the exercise of public power
delegated to public authorities by Parliament. The
courts were also to apply the common law Rule of
Law to the actions of public authorities in order
to protect private rights. It is this model of
judicial review which has become dominant in
English law.
The principles which the courts have
articulated through the "artificial reason" of the
common law have been justified as supplying "the
omission of the legislature". 54 However, the courts
have not developed a coherent body of
administrative law55 and no consistent principles
have emerged as to when the judiciary will
intervene or adopt a more formalist model of
judicial restraint. 56 The concentration on
parliamentary methods of control during a time when
54 Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth
District (1863) 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180, 194 per Byles J.
55 Lord Scarman "The Development of Administrative Law:
Obstacles and Opportunities" [1990] P.L. 490, 491.
56 See M. Loughlin "Procedural Fairness: A Study of the
Crisis in Administrative Law Theory" (1978) 28
University of Toronto L.J. 215; J. Jowell and A. Lester
"Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of
Administrative Law" [1987] P.L. 368; T.R.S. Allan
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the emergence of the positive state rendered
Parliament progressively less capable of overseeing
the exercise of public power has prevented the
development of a coherent body of administrative
law. According to Mitchell "public law is all too
often regarded as a series of unfortunate
exceptions to the desirable generality or
universality of the rules of private law, and is
not seen as a rational system with its own
justification, and perhaps its own philosophy. ,,57
The introduction of a special procedure for
applications for judicial review58 has served to
highlight the lack of a distinct public law
jurisprudence.
The vision of administrative law which the
English legal system typically adopts is
characterised by the absence of a justification for
a separate administrative law with distinct
principles to regulate the relationship between the
individual and the State. Instead English law has
preferred to adopt a common law conception of
"Pragmatism and Theory in Public Law" (1988) 104 L.Q.R.
422.
57 J.D.B. Mitchell "The Causes and Effects of the Absence
of a System of Public Law in the United Kingdom" [1965]
P.L. 95, 96.
58 Order 53 R.S.C., S.l. 1977 No. 1955; section 31
Supreme Court Act 1981. See L. Blom-Cooper "The New Face
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administrative legality with the judges drawing
upon the accumulated wisdom of the common law with
its anti-rationalism and distaste for system. In
response to the increase in administrative power,
this common law conception of legality has been
retained. As legislation has come to supplant the
common law as the primary source of law, this has
resulted in law coming to be seen as the will of
the legislature rather than from traditional custom
and administrative legality has come to be
expressed in a crude formula whereby public
authorities can do as they please within the limits
of their powers so long as it is not unreasonable.
It is against this developing vision of law that
the English courts began to refer to the principles
of legitimate expectations and proportionality.
2. The Continental Tradition of Administrative Law
Continental conceptions of administrative law,
particularly French and German administrative law,
have exerted a pervasive influence over European
of Judicial Review: Administrative Changes in Order 53"
[1982] P.L. 250.
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Community administrative law.59 In order to define
the rules of law relating to the application of the
Treaty60 the European Court has adopted a
comparative method.61 In drawing upon the national
legal orders the European Court has not been
content to adopt those principles of national law
59 See W.P. Gormley "The Significant Role of French
Administrative Jurisprudence as Presently Applied by the
Court of European Communities, With Emphasis on the
Administrative Law Remedies Available to Private
Litigants" (1963) 8 South Dakota L.R. 32; M. Fromont
"L'influence du droit fran9ais et du droit allemand sur
les conditions de recevabilite du recours en annulation
devant la Cour de Justice des Communautes europeennes"
(1966) 2 R.T.D.E. 47; Lord Mackenzie Stuart "The Court
of Justice of the European Communities and the Control
of Discretion" [1974-5] J.S.P.T.L. 16; T. Koopmans "The
Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal
Traditions" (1991) 39 A.J.C.L. 493; J. Schwarze European
Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992) page
1434; L. Neville Brown and J.S. Bell French
Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 4th edn.,
1993) pages 262-267; G. Nolte "General Principles of
German and European Administrative Law - A Comparison in
Historical Perspective" (1994) 57 M.L.R. 191, 211.
60See Articles 173 and 215(2) of the EC Treaty.
61 See L. Neville Brown "Comparative Law and the Court of
Justice of the European Communities" (1976) 7 Cambrian
L.R. 65; A. Bredimas "Comparative Law in the Court of
Justice of the European Communities" in The Yearbook of
World Affairs 1978 Volume 32 (London: Stevens & Sons,
1978) page 320; P. Pescatore "Le Recours, dans la
Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautes
Europeennes, a des Normes Deduites de la Comparison des
Droits des Etats Membres" (1980) 32 R.I.D.C. 337; M.
Akehurst "The Application of General Principles of Law
by the Court of Justice of the European Communities"
[1981] B.Y.I.L. 29; M. Hilf "The Role of Comparative Law
in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities" in A. de Mestral et al. (eds.),
The Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative
Constitutional Law (Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc., 1986)
page 549; F. Jacobs "The Uses of Comparative Law in the
Law of the European Communities" in R. Plender (ed.),
Legal History and Essays in Honour of Albert Kiralfy
(London: Frank Cass, 1990) page 99.
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which are "arithmetical 'common denominators'"
between the Member States but has chosen those
principles which seem to it to be the most
"progressive" having regard to the objects of the
Treaty.62 The purpose of this comparative method has
not been to create a synthesis or "compromis
juridique,,63 of the various national legal orders
but to adopt the "most carefully considered" 64
national solution which is suited to the purposes
of Community law. According to Advocate General
Dutheillet de Lamothe, the principles of the
national legal systems "contribute to forming that
philosophical, political and legal substratum
common to the Member States from which through the
case-law an unwritten Community law emerges". 65 As
62Case 14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en
Staalfabrieken N.V. v. High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community [1962] E.C.R 253, 283-4 of the
opinion of Advocate General Lagrange. See also Case 5/71
Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Sch6ppenstedt v. council [1971]
E.C.R. 975, 989 (col. 2) of Advocate General Roemer's
opinion; H. Kutscher "Methods of Interpretation as seen
by a Judge as the Court of Justice" in Judicial and
Academic Conference 27-28 September 1976 (Luxembourg,
1976) I-s, 29; Y. Galmot "Reflexions sur Ie recourse au
droit compare par la Cour de Justice des Communautes
europeenes" (1990) 6 R.F.D.A. 255, 258.
63M. Lagrange "L'Ordre Juridique de la C.E.C .A. vu a
Travers Jurisprudence de sa Cour de Justice" (1958) 64
R.D.P. 841, 857.
64Joined Cases 63 to 69/72 Wilhelm Wehahn Hansamtihle v.
Council [1973] E.C.R. 1229, 1260 (col. 1) of Advocate
General Romer's opinion.
65Case 11/70 Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ftirGetreide und Futtermittel
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French and German administrative law have been the
predominant sources of Community administrative
law, compared with the more limited influence of
English law,66 it is necessary to examine the
differences between English and Continental
conceptions of administrative law.
Continental administrative law has developed
within a different tradition to English
administrative law.67 In comparison with English
law, Continental administrative law is
characterised by a tradition of theorising over the
role of the State, a division between public and
private law, the rationale underlying judicial
review and the existence of special administrative
courts.
[1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1146 (col. 2) of the opinion of the
Advocate General.
66 See Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint Association v.
Commission [1974] E.C.R. 1063; Case 155/79 AM & S Europe
Limited v. Commission [1982] E.C.R. 1575. See also E.
Petersen "L'influence possible du droit anglais sue Ie
recours en annulation aupres de la Cour de Justice des
Communautes europeennes" (1966) 2 R.T.D.E. 256; J.A.
Usher "The Influence of National Concepts on Decisions
of the European Court" (1976) 1 E.L.Rev. 359, 370-373;
J. Bell "The English Lawyer in the Europe of 1993"
(1991/2) 34 University of Leeds Review 181.
67On the history of the development of Continental
public law see J.H. Merryman "The Public Law - Private
Law Distinction in European and American Law" (1968) 17
Journal of Public Law 3, 5-14; C. Szladits "The
Distinction Between Public Law and Private Law" in
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, II-2
paragraphs 25-57 ; A.E. Tay and E. Karnenka "Public Law -
Private Law" in S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus (eds.), Public
and Private in Social Life (London, 1983) page 67.
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The lack of an English State tradition
contrasts sharply with Continental approaches to
the idea of the state. Both France of Germany have
strong traditions of theorising over the role and
purpose of the State68 and its relationship to law.69
The significance of the State tradition is that it
formed the intellectual background for French and
German administrative law.70 Continental
administrative law is also conceptualised in a
different manner to English law. The administration
is viewed as the institution which realises the
purposes of the State and a systematic and rational
body of law is therefore required to control the
exercise of such power. Administration is seen as
the application of law and has developed upon the
basis of a legal-rational model of bureaucracy with
legally trained administrators using formalised
68 Dyson, op. cit. supra no. 12, chapter 6. See also P.
A110tt "The Crisis of European Constitutionalism:
Reflections on the Revolution in Europe" (1997) 34
C.M.L.Rev. 439.
69 See L. Duguit "The Law and the State" (1917/18) 31
Harv. L.R. 1; N. Johnson "Law as the Articulation of the
State in Western Germany: A German tradition seen from a
British perspective" (1978) 1 West European Politics
177: Dyson, op. cit. supra no. 12, pages 107-117; H.S.
Jones The French State in Question. Public Law and
Political Argument in the Third Republic. (Cambridge:
University Press, 1993) chapter 2.
70 See J.W.F. Allison "Theoretical and Institutional
Underpinnings of a Separate Administrative Law" in M.
Taggart (ed.), The Province of Administrative Law
(Oxford: Hart, 1997) page 71.
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"objective" methods of administrative decision-
making.71 Law provides the values and principles to
inform public action. Continental jurists
recognised that the State possessed great powers
over its citizens which resulted in an inequality
between the two. 72As the State pe rfio.rtnaunique
tasks, for which it exercises discretionary power,
a distinct body of public law is needed to control
its activities. The distinction between public law
and private law, which had its roots in Roman law,73
became fundamental to the Civil law tradition. A
substantive distinction was therefore made in the
principles regulating the state as opposed to
private indi~iduals. For example, in the Blanco
case74 the French Tribunal des Conflits declared
that the liability of the state was not governed by
private law but by a separate set of rules of
public law: "...cette responsabilit~ n'est ni
g~n~rale, ni absolue; qu'elle a ses regles
71For a comparison between British and Continental
approaches to administration see C.H. Sisson The Spirit
of British Administration with some European Comparisons
(London, 1959).
72Szladits, op. cit. supra no. 67, paragraphs 32-39;
Merryman, op. cit. supra no. 67, 13.
73 See J.W.F. Allison A Continental Distinction in the
Common Law. A Historical and Comparative Perspective on
English Public Law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
Rages 109-112.
40
speciales qui varient suivant les besoins du
service et la necessite de concilier les droits de
l'~tat avec les droits prives ...".'s The conceptual
structure of the law differs according to whether a
dispute arises under public or private law. Under a
system of public law effective judicial protection
must be available in order to protect the
individual against the State. In this way judicial
review is correlative to the extent of
administrative power. In the Continental tradition
administrative law therefore developed as a
distinct and independent area of law supporting the
idea of the modern constitutional State based on
the Rule of Law. 76
As the Continental tradition viewed the State
as having distinct purposes, this came to be
reflected in administrative law. A rule which
governs the whole of administrative law is the
7. T.e. 8th February 1873 in M. Long et: 0111. (eds.), Les
grand arr~ts de la jurisprudence administrative (Sirey,
10th edn., 1993) page 1.
75 Ibid.: "...this liability is neither general nor
absolute; that it has its own rules which vary according
to the needs of the service and the necessity to
reconcile the rights of the state with private
rights ...H.
76 This underlies the Gernlan idea that administrative law
is concretised constitutional law: F. Werner
"Verwaltungsrecht als konkretisiertes VerfassungsrechtH
[1959] D.V.B1 527. See also E. Schmidt-A1?,mann "Basic
Principles of German Administrative Law" (1993) 35
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 65, 67-69.
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principle of the purpose pursued.77 As the
administration acts in the public interest it has
special powers for that end. As a former member of
the Conseil d'Etat, Letourner, has stated:
"[a]dministrative law is, by its very nature, an
unequal law; for the general interest must be
accorded supremacy over private rights. ,,78 The
essential role of the administrative judge is to
limit this supremacy by reconciling the imperative
requirements of the general interest with the
legitimate interests of the individual. The
underlying purpose of judicial control of
administrative action is to recognise the different
needs of the State and the individual and to
balance them. According to Advocate General
Lagrange:
"...in each case the public interest and
legitimate private interests should be
balanced against each other: that, moreover, is
77 L. Duguit Law in the Modern State (trans. by F. and
H.J. Laski) (London, 1921) pages 142-144; Case 3/54
Associazone Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v.
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
[1954-56] E.C.R. 63, 76 of the opinion of Advocate
General Lagrange.
78 M. Letourner "The Concept of Equity in French Public
Law" in R.A. Newman (ed.), Equity in the World's Legal
Systems. A Comparative Study. (Brussels, 1973) page 261,
262.
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one of the fundamental concepts of administrative
law, and is without doubt the chief justification
for the very existence of administrative
courts. ,,79
The purpose of the balancing test is to ensure that
in the exercise of its powers, the State does not
act arbitrarily. The administrative court cannot
replace its assessment of the discretionary choices
with that of the administrator but can only
intervene if the decision is unreasonable or badly
thought-out. This forces administrators to give
serious and plausible justifications for their
decisions.80 The balancing test is a relative
exercise dependent on the competing strengths of
79 Case 14/61 Hoogovens, supra no. 62, 283 (col. 1) of
the Advocate General's opinion. See also Case 2/57
Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v. High
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
[1957-58] E.C.R. 199, 228; Joined Cases 14, 16, 17, 20,
24, 26 and 27/60 and 1/61 Meroni & Co. v. High Authority
of the European Coal and Steel Community [1961] E.C.R.
161, 174 (col. 1) of the opinion of Advocate General
Lagrange; M. Letourner "L'erreur manifeste
d'appreciation dans la jurisprudence du Conseil D'Etat
Franc;::ais"in Miscellanea W.J. Ganshof Van Der Meersch.
Tome Troisieme. (Brussels, 1972) page 563; F. Ewald "A
Concept of Social Law" in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of
Law in the Welfare State (Berlin/New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 1986) pages 40, 61-71; J. Bell "The Expansion
of Judicial Review Over Discretionary Powers in France"
[1986] P.L. 99, 100i Schmidt-Agmann, op. cit. supra no.
76, 69.
80 See the opinion of Commissaire du Gouvernement
Braibant in C.E. 28th May 1971 Ville Nouvelle Est [1971]
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the various interests involved. According to
Advocate General Lagrange: "[i]n general, it is the
public interest, represented ...by respect for
legality which should prevail. The only exception
is where that respect may demand such a sacrifice
in the part of the private interests that the
public interest involved cannot justify it. ,,81 If
the public interest predominates then the
administrative act/is lawful, whereas if the
private interest is sufficiently weighty then the
public interest should similarly be of a competing
weight otherwise it will not justify the
restriction. As the nature of the interests
involved vary so will the nature of the balancing
test to be undertaken. When the public interest is
an important and pressing one compared with a
marginal impact on the private interest, then the
administrative judge will adopt a less intense
control on the appropriate balance. Whereas if the
private interest infringed is an important one,
such as personal liberty, then the judge may
require an important competing public interest to
A.J.D.A. 463, 467 quoted in Brown and Bell, op. cit.
supra no. 59, pages 248-249.
81 Case 14/61 Hoogovens, supra no. 62, 286 (col. 2) of
the Advocate General's opinion.
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justify the restriction.82 Indeed, as the nature of
the interests involved may change, the balance
accomplished may be superseded and need to be
repeated.S3 There are no straightforward solutions
as to how the balance should be struck and judicial
and administrative views of what constitutes "good
administration" may not necessarily coincide. 84 The
weighing up and balancing of competing interests is
a flexible judgment in view of the changing needs
of public administration which is oriented towards
the goal the administration wishes to achieve. Once
the administrative court has reviewed the
administration's concept of the legal nature of the
interests then the administration is free to
exercise its discretionary power. ss
82 Cf. the difference between "minimum" and "normal"
review by the Conseil d'Etat see Brown and Bell, op.
cit. supra no. 59, pages 250-251.
83 Letourner, op. cit. supra no. 79, page 563.
84 Bell, op. cit. supra no. 79, page 100.
85 Case 14/61 Hoogovens, supra no. 62, 284 (col. 2) of
the Advocate General's opinion; Lord Mackenzie Stuart
The European Communities and the Rule of Law (London:
The Hamlyn Lectures, 1977) page 55. On the judicial
control of discretionary power in Continental legal
systems see E.K. Pakuscher "The Use of Discretion in
German Law" (1976-77) 44 University of Chicago L.R. 94;
J. Kahn "Discretionary Power and the Administrative
Judge" (1980) 29 r.C.L.Q. 521; Bell, op. cit. supra no.
79; C.J. Bax "Judicial Control on the Administration in
the Netherlands" (1992) 4 E.R.P.L. 71; F. Stroink
"Judicial Control of the Administration's Discretionary
Power (le bilan - juge administratif)" in R. Bakker
(ed.), Judicial Control: Comparative Essays on Judicial
Review (Antwerpen: MAKLU, 1995) page 81.
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One of the techniques used to enable the
administrative court to balance the competing
public and private interests has been to develop
general principles of law which enforce an
administrative morality - "the idea that the state
is an honest man and must behave properly towards
l'administre.,,86 Such principles of law are
specifically designed to resolve disputes between
the State and the individual. The general
principles of law test the internal legality of the
administrative act as opposed to its external
legality which concerns whether the act was within
the grant of power given to the public body. 87 The
principles of proportionality and legitimate
expectation are, along with equality, legal
certainty, the right to be heard and fundamental
86 Brown and Bell, Ope cit. supra no. 59, page 203. On
French administrative law see M. Letourner "Les
principes generaux du droit dans la jurisprudence du
Conseil d'Etat", Etudes et Documents du Conseil d'Etat
1951, page 19; Brown and Bell, ibid., pages 205-223. On
German administrative law see M.P. Singh German
Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective (Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1985) chapters 5 and 6; Nolte, Ope cit.
supra no. 59, 199-201.
87 J. Mertens de Wilmars "The Case-Law of the Court of
Justice in Relation to the Review of the Legality of
Economic policy in Mixed-Economy Systems" [1982/1]
L.LE.L I, 5.
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human rights, central to the European Court's
review of internal administrative legality.ss
On the Continent separate administrative
jurisdictions grew up to deal with administrative
law. In France the Conseil d'Etat gradually evolved
as an independent jurisdiction for administrative
law adj udd ca t ion'" with inquisitorial procedures. 90
In Germany an independent system of administrative
courts has developed.91 Such separate jurisdictions
have allowed a degree of specialisation in
governmental processes that was unattainable in the
88 Ibid., 8-9, 11-16. See also A. Arnull General
Principles of EEC Law and the Individual (Leicester:
University Press, 1990); J. Schwarze European
Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992); J.A.
Usher General Principles of EC Law (London: Longman,
1998) .
S9 Brown and Bell, op. cit. supra no. 59, pages 42-47;
Allison, op. cit. supra no. 73, pages 142-152. See also
C. J. Hamson Executive Discretion and Judicial Control:
An Aspect of the French Conseil d'Etat (London: The
Hamlyn Lectures, 1954); N. Questiaux "Administration and
the Rule of Law: The Preventive Role of the French
Conseil d'~tat" [1995] P.L. 247.
90 J. Bell "Reflections on the Procedure of the Conseil
d'~tat" in G. Hand and J. McBride (eds.), Droit Sans
Frontiers. Essays in Honour of L. Neville Brown.
(Birmingham: Holdsworth Club, 1991) page 211; Brown and
Bell, op. cit. supra no. 59, chapter 5; Allison, op.
cit. supra no. 73, pages 207-216.
91 See M. Schindler "Judicial Review of Administrative
Acts in Germany" (1955-56) 2 British Journal of
Administrative Law 113; W. Feld "The German
Administrative Courts" (1962) 36 Tulane L.R. 495; Singh,
op. cit. supra no. 86, chapter 7; E. Blankenburg
"Changes in Political Regimes and Continuity of the Rule
of Law in Germany" in D.M. Provine et al. (eds.),
Courts, Law, and Politics in Comparative Perspective
(Yale: University Press, 1996) pages 249, 259-266, 306-
308.
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ordinary courts.92 The Continental distinction
between public and private law is closely related
to the existence of separate jurisdictions. This
degree of separation and specialisation enabled the
administrative courts to develop certain principles
specifically designed to regulate the exercise of
public power. Duguit summarised this approach in
the following manner: "[t]he administration of the
state is conducted under the control of
administrative courts ...Cognisant of the conditions
under which it is necessary to operate the state,
they afford the necessary guarantees of
independence and impartiality. They reconcile the
interests of the state with those of private
citizens. In this way all administration is a
93
matter of law and controlled by the courts."
Though the above similarities can be drawn out
when compared with English law, significant
differences of approach exist between French and
German administrative law. 94 The French tradition is
92 Duguit, op. cit. supra no. 77, page 159; J.F. Garner
"Administrative Law: Civil and Common Law Systems
Compared" (1980) 25 I.C.J .R . 39, 49.
93 Ibid., pages 158-159.
94 See R.W. Evans "French and German Administrative Law
with some English comparisons" (1965) 14 I.C.L.Q. 1104;
H.G. Crossland "Rights of the Individual to Challenge
Administrative Action Before Administrative Courts in
France and Germany" (1974) 24 I.C.L.Q. 707; J.-M.
Woehrling "Le Controle Jurisdictionnel De
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based on the objective control of the legality of
administrative action and has been viewed as
oriented in favour of the administration. 95 As the
administration serves the public interest, the
French have considered that it should not be
constrained by a rigid set of rules but by such
limitations as are necessary to protect the
individual in light of the needs of public
administration. According to Brown and Bell "the
law applied by the administrative courts in France
has come into being as the result of a delicate
balance between those guarantees for the rights of
the individuals that are demanded at anyone time
by public opinion, and the ever-changing
necessities of public administration."96 The German
tradition is marked by a high degree of legalism in
poli tics97 and dominated by the idea of the
protection of subjective individual rights98 and the
L'Administration En Europe De L'Ouest. Particularismes
et Convergences." (1994) 6 E.R.P.L. 353.
95See A. Mestre Le Conseil d'Stat, Proteturs des
Privileges de l'Administration (Librairie generale du
droit francaise, 1974).
96Brown and Bell, op. cit. supra no. 59, page 167, see
also page 277.
97See P. Blair "Law and Politics in Germany" (1978) 26
Political Studies 348.
~ See A. Blankenagel "The Concept of Subjective Rights
as the Focal Point of German Administrative Law" (1992)
11 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 79.
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close control of discretion.99 In Germany
administrative law is viewed as "a notion of order
which has a lasting impact on the administrative
culturel/10oand aims at "achieving an optimum
balance between an effective administration and
realization of social interests on the one hand and
the safeguard of ...individual interests on the
other.1/101Under the "Rechtsstaatl/ concepe02 the
German courts have developed inter alia the
principles of legitimate expectations
("Vertrauensschutzl/) and proportionality
99 See E.K. Pakuscher "The Use of Discretion in German
Law" (1976-77) 44 University of Chicago L.R. 94; Singh,
op. cit. supra no. 86, chapter 6; Nolte, op. cit. supra
no. 59, 196-197.
100E. Schmidt-ABmann quoted in Singh, op. cit. supra no.
86, page 2. It might be noted that the concept of
juridification has largely been developed German
scholars in order to ensure that legal order underpins
developing State activity, see M. Weber Economy and
Society (New York, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), 1968)
volume 2, chapter 8; G. Teubner "Juridification.
Concepts, Aspects, Limits and Solutions" in G. Teubner
(ed.) Juridification of Social Spheres (Berlin, 1987)
page 3; J. Habermas Between Facts and Norms.
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy. (Polity Press, 1996).
101 Singh, op. cit. supra no. 86, page 65. See also
Schmidt-ABmann, op. cit. supra no. 76, 66.
102 See R.C. van Caenegem "The \Rechtstaat' in Historical
Perspective" in Legal History: A European Perspective
(London: The Hambledon Press, 1991) page 165; V. G6tz
"Legislative and Executive Power under the
Constitutional Requirements entailed in the Principle of
the Rule of Law" in C. Starck (ed.), New Challenges to
the German Basic Law (Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991) page 141. See also E.K.
Pakuscher "Control of the Administration in the Federal
Republic of Germany" (1972) 21 I.C.L.Q. 452, 464-465; P.
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("VerhaltnismaBigkeit") to regulate the citizen-
state relationship. 103 While different styles of
approach are evident, the general aim of
Continental administrative law is clearly
purposive. It seeks to ensure that public
authorities exercise their powers in the public
interest and that in the process individual
interests are protected; a balance must be struck
by the administrative court between administrative
purpose and individual interests.
According to Redlich and Hirst, it is because
Continental public law "forms so complete an
antithesis to the development of the law and
constitution of England ... [that] ...through this
antithesis the true meaning and effect of the
English constitution are best shown. ,,104 Profound
differences also exist between British and
Continental administrative cultures. The highly
legalistic attitude of the Continental legal-
rational model of bureaucracy compared with the
more pragmatic, typically discretion-based approach
of British administration is at the centre of the
difference. This difference in administrative
Radler "Judicial Protection against the Executive by
German Administrative Courts" [1992] Admin Review 78.
103 Nolte, op. cit. supra no. 59, 192-195, 201-203.
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cultures infuses the methods of redress against the
administration. The legalistic Continental approach
places great importance on legal remedies whereas
the British culture traditionally emphasises the
redress through political channels with the courts
playing a subsidiary role. 105 The distinctive
feature of Continental administrative law is then
the rational and principled approach to the
protection of the individual and the evaluation of
the administration. This contrasts sharply with the
more pragmatic British common law method.
Continental Europe developed a tradition of
theorising over the role of the State which was
reflected in administrative law. The State was seen
as having a distinct set of purposes from the
individual and therefore was to be subject to a
distinct body of law. In England there is no
tradition of the State as a legal entity and Dicey
denied the possibility of a separate administrative
law as incompatible with the Rule of Law. According
to Kahn-Freund the difference between Civilian and
common law approaches to public law arises in part
because of the fact that in Continental countries
104 Redlich and Hirst, op. cit. supra no. 15, page 325.
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government has an inherent power to govern. Whereas
in the common law the courts have an inherent power
to control but government has no inherent power at
all: "[t]hat which is true of administrative action
under the common law - that it must be based on a
statutory grant of power - is true of judicial
action under the \civil law' systems. ,,106 The
inherent power of the common law courts allowed
them to develop a system of precedents in an anti-
rationalist manner whereas Continental courts
operate within a more formal, rational and
conceptualised framework. 107
While elsewhere special jurisdictions, such as
the French Conseil d'Etat, were established to
decide public law disputes, in England the ordinary
courts were to decide such issues by applying the
artificial reason of the common law. As a closer
relationship exists between the administration and
the courts on the Continent, there is a better
fusion of fairness with good and efficient
lOS F.F. Ridley "The Citizen Against Authority: British
Approaches to the Redress of Grievances" (1984) 37
Parliamentary Affairs 1, 7.
106 O. Kahn-Freund "Common Law and Civil Law - Imaginary
and Real Obstacles to Assimilation" in M. Cappelletti
(ed.), New Perspectives For a Common Law of Europe
(Florence, 1978) page 137, 160. See also Singh, op. cit.
supra no. 86, pages 64-65.
107 P. Legrand "European Legal Systems Are Not
Converging" (1996) 45 I.C.L.Q. 52, 75.
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administration than in the common law where, in the
absence of such a relationship, the courts
concentrate only upon imposing standards of
fairness in administrative dealings. In Continental
countries administrative law developed as an
autonomous and systematic discipline with separate
legal principles to regulate the relationship
between citizen and the State, whereas in common
law countries that relationship is governed by the
same principles that apply between citizens
themselves. Significantly different styles of legal
reasoning and approach exist between the pragmatic
common law tradition and the more formal and
rational civilian tradition. The insight of J.S.
Mill that the English "distrust everything which
emanates from general principles ... [while] ...the
French ...distrust whatever does not so emanate"loa
is indicative of the different styles of legal
thought and also of the different approaches to
administrative law between common law and
Continental systems. Contineptal administrative
courts have endeavoured to keep step with evolving
governmental activities and above all to make "an
loaJ.S. Mill "Bentham" (1838) in J.S. Mill and J.
Bentham Utilitarianism and Other Essays (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, A Ryan (ed.), 1987) page 132, 164.
54
effort ...to maintain a rational and elegant
synthesis of public law by relating judgments to
principles derived from a coherent and evolving
philosophy. ,,109 Whereas in England the common-law
system was caught up in a web of medieval
governmental immunitiesllO and concepts which
prevented the evolution of a coherent body of law.
The relationship between English and
Continental administrative law has changed and
developed over time. English law has been able to
define itself by reference to Continental law. At
first, this relationship was one of the perceived
superiority of the common law. Lord Hewart
considered the "Continental system of
'Administrative Law' ... [to be] ...profoundly
repugnant ...to English ideas". 111 However, as the
growth in administrative power has continued,
comparative studies have undermined the view that
English law provides better protection for the
individual against the arbitrary exercise of power
than Continental administrative law.1l2 The response
109 Dyson, op. cit. supra no. 12, page 233.
110 See, e.g, Rederiaktiebolaget 'Amphitrite' v. The King
[1921] 3 K.B. 500i Malone v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner [1979] Ch. 344.
III Hewart, op. cit. supra no. 38, pages 12-13.
112 F.J. Port Administrative Law (London, 1929) chapter
VIIi Denning, op. cit. supra no. 40, pages 77-81, 115-
118, 123-126i B. Schwartz French Administrative Law and
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of Continental administrative law to the growth of
State activity has been a positive one: notions of
legality have been adapted to the changing purposes
of administrative power.ll) In comparison English
administrative law has failed to provide an
adequate response to such changes instead
preferring to retain the traditional common law
model of judicial review. The purposive approach of
Continental administrative law seems have to been
more effective than the common law in ensuring that
the individual is provided sufficient protection.
To the extent that English judges have
responded to Continental belief that no
administrative law exists in England, it has been
by recourse to the upsurge in judicial review and
the establishment of a separate procedure beneath
which the common law conception of legality
the Common-Law World (New York: University Press, 1954)
chapter 10; Hamson, op. cit. supra no. 89; Brown and
Bell, op. cit. supra no. 59, pages 249-250, 277, 286;
Allison, op. cit. supra no. 73, chapter 8.
113 J.n.B. Mitchell "Administrative Law and Policy
Effectiveness" in J.A.G. Griffith (ed.), From Policy to
Administration. Essays in Honour of William A. Robson.
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1976) page 174, 190; G. Arena
"Rights vis-a.-vis the Administration: Commentary" in A.
Cassese, A. Clapham and J. Weiler (eds.), Human Rights
and the European Community: Methods of Application.
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991) page 495,
498-502; Schmidt-ABmann, op. cit. supra no. 76, 66; N.
Emiliou The Principle of Proportionality in European
Law. A Comparative Study. (Kluwer, 1996) chapter 1.
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continues to prevail.1l4 This is in sharp contrast
with the French who "find a justification for the
distinct character of their droit administratif in
its capacity to adapt the principles of
administrative legality and administrative
liability to the differing needs of the various
public services, a capacity which they claim could
only be found in judges who are also trained
administrators."lls It is also in contrast with
German administrative law which places great
importance on substantive controls of discretionary
power by specialist courts1l6 and acknowledges that
"[a]n administrative law which does not
recognise ... [the] ...legitimate functions of the
administration ...can ... [only
marginally] ...influence ...administrative
reality".1l7 Comparing the development of English
and Continental administrative law, Chiti has
commented that the development of a separate
administrative law in European states never implied
that the administration was "exempt from control,
114 See G. Slynn "But in England there is no ..." in W.
Fuerst (ed.), Festschrift fur Wolfgang Zeidler Volume 1
(Berlin/New York, 1987) page 397; Lord Woolf "Droit
Public - English Style" [1995] P.L. 57.
115 Brown and Bell, op. cit. supra no. 59, page 274.
116 Nolte, op. cit supra no. 59. See also Schwarze, op.
cit. supra no. 88, pages 270-279.
117 Schmidt-AiSmann, op. cit. supra no. 76, 66.
57
but rather that it was subject to an administrative
legality which was distinct in content and
conditions from the law to which private
individuals were subject. This was perhaps a more
efficient means of limiting administrative power,
for it was modelled on the specific characteristics
of that power, in a continuous dialectic between
authority and liberty. ,,118 The development of
Continental administrative law has been
characterised as a change of focus "from
administrative power to administrative function,,1l9
with the law based not just on the idea of control
but also on ideas of efficiency and impartiality
and having to be constantly adapted to the goal or
function of the administration.
Overall, it may be concluded that different
traditions and methods of approach to the subject
of public law exist between England and the
Continent which influence the whole conception of
the subject.12o In 1969 Mitchell could justifiably
comment that "the real gap between the United
118 M.P. Chiti "Administrative Comparative Law" (1992) 4
E.R.P.L. 11, 19.
119 Arena, op. cit. supra no. 113, page 498.
l20 See J. Bell "Convergences and Divergences in European
Administrative Law" [1992] Rivista Italiana di Diritto
Pubblico Comuntario 3, 5-7, 19-20.
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Kingdom and mainland Europe lies in the area of
public law". 121
European Community administrative law is a
unique hybrid of different legal traditions
specifically adapted for the purposes of the
European Community. 122 The Treaties have entrenched
the values of economic liberalism at a
constitutional level. The European Court acts as a
guardian of the Treaties and serving the
integrationist ideology of the Community. 123 By
identifying the purposes of the Community, the
Treaties set out the limits within which the
Community institutions and the Member States must
perform their tasks. The European Court is
concerned to ensure that such powers are fulfilled
and that in the process due weight is afforded to
the affected private interests. The European Court
has drawn from French and German administrative law
in order to define the general principles which
should govern the exercise of power and
specifically adapted them to the Community where
power is in the form of economic intervention for
121 J.D.B. Mitchell "Why European Institutions?" in L.J.
Brinkhorst and J.D.B. Mitchell European Law and
Institutions (Edinburgh: University Press, 1969) page
30, 44.
122 S K .ee oopmans, op. c~t. supra no. 59.
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the purpose of market liberalisation. 124 While the
methodology and style of the European Court is the
result of different legal traditions, it has
developed a broad armoury of review which adopts a
purposive orientation toward the exercise of public
power. According to Advocate General Lagrange "the
rule which governs the whole of administrative
law ... [is]...the principle of the purpose pursued.
In contrast to the rights of private
individuals ...the rights of public authorities
which are in fact powers, may be exercised only for
the purposes for which they have been vested with
those powers. ,,125
The complexity of administration within the
Community has required the European Court to
articulate general principles in order to guide the
administration in its dealings with individuals and
traders in view of the purposes for which it is
exercising its powers. 126 The aim and effect of the
general legal principles "are both to guarantee the
123 G.F. Mancini and D.T. Keeling "Democracy and the
European Court of Justice" (1994) 57 M.L.R. 175, 186.
124 Mertens de Wilmars, Ope cit. supra no. 87.
125 Case 3/54 Associazone Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane
(ASSIDER) v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community [1954-56] E.C.R. 63, 76 (col. 1) of the
Advocate General's opinion.
126 See W. Lorenz "General Principles of Law: Their
Elaboration in the Court of Justice" (1964) 13 A.J.C.L.
1; Schwarze, OPe cit. supra no. 88.
60
freedom of action given to the authority and to
place such restrictions on it as are necessary to
avoid arbitrariness." 127 The general principles have
a specific normative character which is defined by
reference to the purpose for which the
administration acts. For example, the principle of
proportionality, which requires the administration
not to impose a disproportionate burden on the
individual, is adapted to the economic purposes of
the Community in order to ensure that economic
intervention is subsidiary and that there is a
connection between an intervention threshold and
the safeguard of individual liberties. 128 Aware that
the principles will need to be applied across a
diverse range of administrative powers which change
with the development of the European Community, the
European Court has sought to leave room for
interpretation, precision and further elaboration
in the application of the general principles of
law. However, within the different contexts of
application, there is sufficient certainty in the
articulation of the general principles to enable
the administration to be guided and directed as to
127 Mertens de Wilmars, op. cit. supra no. 87, 8. See
also schwarze, ibid., page 73.
128 Ibid., 13. See chapter 6.
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how it ought to conduct itself in order to avoid
arbi trary action. 129 The importance of the
principles is such that their codification is being
debated.130
European Community administrative law is an
amalgam of different influences and therefore of
different visions of administrative law. Community
law only has its own distinctive legal tradition
because it is the result of different alternating
influences of French and German administrative law
which are adapted to the distinct purposes of the
Community. For instance, the European Court adopts
a less intensive form of substantive review of
legality than the German administrative courts so
as not to interfere with the decision-making
competence of the institutions. 131 Beneath these
influences can be seen the common factor of a
purposive orientation towards administrative law.
129 See chapter 6, section 4.
130 See M.P. Chiti "Are there Universal Principles of
Good Governance?" (1995) 1 E.P.L. 241; J. Schwarze "The
Europeanization of National Administrative Law" in J.
Schwarze (ed.), Administrative Law Under European
Influence. On the Convergence of the Administrative Laws
of the EU Member States. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996)
pages 789, 830-836; C. Harlow "Codification of EC
Administrative Procedures? Fitting the Foot to the Shoe
or the Shoe to the Foot" (1996) 2 E.L.J. 3; M. Shapiro
"Codification of Administrative Law: The US and the
Union" (1996) 2 E.L.J. 26.
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This purposive nature is reflected in the fact that
administrative law is viewed as an area of law
having to be constantly developed with changes in
public administration in order to ensure
administrative legality. The general principles of
law and the balancing of public and private
interests are the tools which the administrative
court uses for this end. Furthermore, a specialist
administrative court with the institutional ability
to effectively review administrative action is seen
as an essential component of administrative law.
13l NI'o te, op. c~t. supra no. 59, 205-206, 211; M.
Brenner "Administrative Judicial Protection in Europe:
General Principles" (1997) 9 E.R.P.L. 595, 615.
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Chapter 3: Pressures for the Development of the
Principles in English Law
1. The Role of Lord Diplock
In 1963 Lord Reid stated:
"We do not have a developed system of
administrative law - perhaps because until fairly
recently we did not need it. So it is not
surprising that in dealing with new types of cases
the courts have had to grope for solutions, and
have found that old powers, rules and procedures
are largely inapplicable to cases which they were
never designed or intended to deal with."l
The Diceyan legacy of the denial of the existence
of an English administrative law and the perceived
need for developing such a system put the English
judiciary in a difficult position. As Lord Reid's
statement shows there was a dawning realisation
that public law cases differed from private law
cases and consequently different concepts and
remedies needed to be applied. The difficulty was
1 Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, 72-73. Cf. Breen v.
Associated Engineering Union [1971] 2 Q.B. 175, 189H per
Lord Denning M.R.
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that if the judiciary were to embark on this
project they needed to develop separate rules
suited for public law adjudication and it was
exactly the denial of a public law tradition in
which they had to work. Following the lead taken by
the House of Lords in a number of important cases2
other judges were encouraged to develop
administrative law.3 Most judges preferred to move
cautiously4 while others, typically Lord Denning,S
occasionally adopted a more activist stance. One
judge, Lord Diplock, consciously attempted to
develop new solutions to enable the courts to
decide public law cases. Lord Diplock was a senior
Law Lord for many years6 and gave many important
2 Ridge v. Baldwin, ibid.; Padfield v. Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997;
Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2
A.C. 147.
3 Encouragement also came from academics. See H.W.R.
Wade "Crossroads in Administrative Law" (1968) 21 C.L.P.
75.
4 See A. Lester "English Judges as Law Makers" [1993]
P.L. 269, 270.
5 See E. Young "Developing a System of Administrative
Law?" in P. Robson and P. Watchman (eds.), Justice, Lord
Denning and the Constitution (Gower, 1981) page 157; J.
Jowell "Administrative Law" in J. Jowell and P. McAuslan
(eds.), Lord Denning: the Judge and the Law (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) chapter 6; The Denning Interviews
- Administrative Law (V.H.S. Videocassette, Interviewer:
H.W.R. Wade, Butterworths, 1984).
6 From 1968 to 1985. On Lord Diplock's judicial career
see R. Stevens Law and Politics. The House of Lords as a
Judicial Body, 1800-1976. (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979) pages 565-569; A. Paterson The Law Lords
(London: Macmillan, 1982). For biographical details see
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speeches concerning judicial review. According to
Sir Stephen Sedley, Lord Diplock "never uttered a
word without some carefully thought-out purpose.,,7
To understand the role of Lord Diplock it is
helpful to examine his views on judicial law-making
which he gave in his Presidential Address to the
Holdsworth Club in 1965.8 Lord Diplock began from
the statement that law is about man's duty towards
his neighbour and that courts are by the very
nature of their functions sometimes compelled to
act as legislators. Lord Diplock was concerned to
show that the law should be relevant to the needs
of contemporary society. To determine the kinds of
law the Parliamentary and judicial process are best
fitted to make it was necessary to realise the
basic differences between them. When Parliament
B. Dickson "The Contribution of Lord Diplock to the
General Law of Contract" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 441, 442-444.
7 S. Sedley "The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law
Without a Constitution" (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 270, 282. Lord
Diplock was a powerful judge whose judgments were
characterised by their penetrating analyses and precise
use of language. However, his intellectual confidence
could on occasion lead to ironic put downs. For example,
in Hughes v. Hughes (unreported, 1966) sitting in the
Court of Appeal with Lord Denning M.R. and Harman L.J.,
who both favoured the appeal, Lord (then Lord Justice)
Diplock dissented by simply stating: "For the reasons
given by my brother Harman, I would dismiss the appeal."
L. Blom-Cooper and G. Drewry Final Appeal. A Study of
the House of Lords in its Judicial Capacity. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1972) page 87.
8 Sir Kenneth Diplock "The Courts as Legislators" (The
Holdsworth Club, University of Birmingham, 1965). See
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makes a law it is inevitably indulging in "crystal-
gazing"9 to foresee how human beings will react to a
new law of conduct in circumstances which will be
different to those in which the Act was passed.
While technical advances caused social and economic
changes more quickly than ever before, an Act of
Parliament could soon be operating in a different
social environment from the one in which it was
passed. However, Lord Diplock stated that judge-
made law which is based on the actual experience of
the litigants involved is "flexible not rigid,
adaptable to changing circumstances, not fixed for
ever in the fetters of the past."lO The static,
agricultural and aristocratic society of the
nineteenth century had given way to a dynamic,
industrial and economic society of the twentieth
century. While the judges of the nineteenth century
had boldly developed the common law to adapt to the
needs of society, Lord Diplock considered that at
the turn of the century the courts had lost their
courage and resorted to the literal interpretation
of statutes. In the modern society the common law
by itself was no longer adequate. Statute and
also Lord Reid "The Judge as Law Maker" (1972-3) 12
J.S.P.T.L. 22.
9 Ibid., page 13.
68
common law had to work together in order that the
law was adequate for developing social needs.
Statute law had laid down rules in areas which
"bear no relation to existing judge-made law"ll and
the flexible use of precedent was needed to remedy
this. Lord Diplock suggested that the contemporary
role of the courts in modern society must recognise
the following:
"Today in a highly complex swiftly changing
society most changes are organisational and
involve the creation of new or of the adaptation
of existing administrative organs to carry them
out. This Parliament alone can dOi the Courts
cannot ...[such]...organisational changes do not
destroy human relationships, they only alter the
framework in which the individual, whether within
the organisation or outside, performs his duty to
his neighbour. It is the regulation of those human
relationships within the new framework that I
suggest is the proper field of judge-made law. ,,12
The role of the courts was limited. Only Parliament
could decide how society would be organised.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. I page 12.
12 Ibid. I page 15.
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However, the courts could appropriately supplement
the legislative function.13 Lord Diplock hoped that
recent decisions showed a "growing tendency to
tackle the new problems and to evolve new
principles to solve them" and a reversion to the
"bolder attitude of the nineteenth century
judges".14 Such views share an affinity with Dicey's
opinion that "the appeal to precedent is in the law
courts merely a useful fiction by which judicial
decision conceals its transformation into judicial
legislation".ls It is against such background ideas
that Lord Diplock directly considered
administrative law which coincided with the
reawakening of the courts' interest in this area.16
Having identified the growth in administrative
activity as the challenge for the common law, Lord
13Ibid., page 11. Lord Diplock stated that "judge-made
law, if judges will make proper use of its
potentialities, is the only practicable way of laying
down rules of conduct appropriate in the unforseeable
variety of circumstances which will in fact arise."
ibid., page 15 (italics added).
14Ibid., page 22.
15 A.V. Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution [1885](London: Macmillan, 10th edn., 1959)
page 19. See also A.V. Dicey Lectures on the Relation
Between Law & Public Opinion in England During the
Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 2nd edn., 1963)
lecture XI.
16 In "Judicial Control of the Administrative Process"
(1971) 24 C.L.P. 24 Lord Diplock stated: "[w]hen I was
called to the Bar in 1932 the expression 'administrative
law' was unknown. Although I was myself instrumental in
1967 in obtaining its inclusion among the subjects for
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Diplock was concerned to show that the courts were
capable of meeting it by reviving old remedies and
removing obstacles. 17 Lord Diplock' sown
contribution began by widening the scope of review
by opening up prerogative powers to reviewlB and an
analysis of jurisdiction19 which "set the fuse to
explode the old distinction between" errors of law
within and without j ur i sdi ct.Lon v'" As part of this
process Diplock used the opportunity in a case
concerning locus standi to reformulate the Rule of
Law:
"The rules as to standing ...were made by judges,
by judges they can be changed; and so they have
been over the years to meet the need to preserve
the integrity of the rule of law despite changes
in the social structure, methods of government and
the extent to which the activities of private
the Bar Examinations, I still do not find it easy to
define."
17 Lord Diplock, ibid.; Lord Diplock "Administrative Law:
Judicial Review Reviewed" (1974) 33 C.L.J. 233.
18 R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte
Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864. See also Council of Civil
Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985]
A.C. 374, 409E-410D per Lord Diplock.
19 Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission
[1968] 2 Q.B. 862 (C.A.).
20 J. Laws "Illegality: The Problem of Jurisdiction" in
J. Goudie and M. Supperstone (eds.), Judicial Review
(London: Butterworths, 1992) page 51, 54. See now R. v.
Lord President of the Pri~ Council ex parte Page [1993]
A.C. 682.
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citizens are controlled by governmental
authorities, that have been taking place
continuously, sometimes slowly, sometimes
swiftly ...Those changes have been particularly
rapid since World War II. Any judicial statements
on matters of public law if made before 1950 are
likely to be a misleading guide to what the law is
today. ,,21
Lord Diplock viewed the Rule of Law as a constant
principle within a changing social and economic
structure. It was for the courts to decide exactly
what legal requirements the principle demanded
against such changes to human relationships in the
new organisational frameworks.22 The requirements of
the Rule of Law were therefore to be described in
dynamic and not in static terms.23 Should the tide
of social and economic changes require
modifications to the Rule of Law then the courts
21 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of
Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617,
639H-640A.
22 S. Sedley "Governments, Constitutions, and Judges" in
G. Richardson and H. Genn (eds.), Administrative Law &
Government Action. The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms
of Review. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) page 35, 40;
S. Sedley "The Common Law and the Constitution" in Lord
Nolan and S. Sedley The Making and Remaking of the
British Constitution (London: Blackstone, 1997) page 15,
2l.
23 J. Laws "The Ghost in the Machine: Principle in Public
Law" [1989] P.L. 27, 29.
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would step in. The consequence of this is that the
Rule of Law could no longer be given the
restrictive Diceyan interpretation but must be
responsive to social and political change. If Lord
Diplock introduced any new principles of
administrative law it was because he considered
them necessary to safeguard the Rule of Law in view
of the changing modes of social organisation and
government.
In 1977 Lord Diplock ended his address to the
5th Commonwealth Law conference with a review of
the judicial developments in relation to
administrative law. 24 This was "the great
achievement of the twentieth century in the
judicial development of law". 25 Recalling his
admiration of previous generations of judges, Lord
Diplock stated that what had been achieved in the
twentieth century in administrative law was
comparable to the great achievements of those
nineteenth century judges who succeeded in adapting
private law to the needs of an increasingly
24 Lord Diplock "Judicial Development of Law in the
Commonwealth" in Proceedings and Papers of the Fifth
Commonwealth Law Conference (Edinburgh: Blackwood &
Sons, 1978) page 493.
25 Ibid., page 500.
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industrial and utilitarian society. Lord Diplock
continued:
"Public law, the mutual rights and duties of
government and governed, now rivals private
law ...in the influence it has on mutual
happiness and well-being ...And, if I have my
way, we have not finished yet.,,26
Earlier the same year Lord Diplock had indicated
what course of direction he had in mind for English
administrative law. In a contribution to a House of
Lords debate27 on the introduction of a Bill of
Rights Lord Diplock referred to the European
context of the forms of protection for fundamental
rights. Recalling a meeting of the heads of the
supreme administrative courts of the Member States
of the European community28 Lord Diplock stated that
it had been the unanimous opinion that the method
26 Ibid. (emphasis added) .
27 Hansard 379 H.L. Deb. col. 991-995 (3rd February
1977) .
28 Fifth Colloquium of the Councils of State and the
Supreme Courts of Justice of the Member States of the
European Communities Discretionary Power and the
Advisability of Administrative Decisions; The Extent and
Limitations of Judicial Control (The Hague: Government
Publishing Office, 1976). Lord Diplock "Judicial
Development of Law in the Commonwealth", op. cit. supra
no. 24, page 500 commented of his own attendance: "[m]ay
be I want under a false trade description bearing in
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of reviewing abuse of governmental power on the
grounds of a breach of fundamental rights would
have substantially the same result in all the
European countries. 29 Referring to Community law,
Lord Diplock commented that although the European
Treaty did not contain any explicit guarantee
concerning fundamental rights, the European Court
had not taken the lowest common measure but looked
to the more progressive doctrines in the national
legal systems. As a result of this method the
European Court had developed two doctrines "which
have not yet been accepted fully in this country". 30
The two doctrines were, namely, the principles of
the protection of legitimate expectations and
proportionality. In a revealing aside prompted by a
query by Lord Hailsham, Lord Diplock intimated that
"[t]hose are the two that I had in mind
particularly as doctrines which are only just
beginning to be assimilated in this country." 31 In
mind Dicey's proud disclaimer that droit administratif
formed any part of English or Imperial law."
29 Ibid: "[t]he reasoning by which the result was reached
would be different in the civil law countries, the
juristic concepts which underlay what constituted the
major and minor premises in the reasoning process would
not necessarily be the same, but all lead to the same
conclusion."
30 Hansard 379 H.L. Deb. col. 993 (3rd February 1977).
31 Ibid., Hansard col. 994. ef. M. Beloff "Judicial
Review - 2001: A Prophetic Odyssey" (1995) 58 M.L.R.
143, 151-152 suggesting that proportionality and
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short, Lord Diplock considered the time ripe for
judicial development of the principles of
legitimate expectation and proportionality in
English law.
It is important to understand the motivation
behind this project. However, in attempting to do
so an immediate difficulty emerges as Lord Diplock
did not provide a clear expression of why he
considered the assimilation of these principles to
be appropriate. Therefore, in order to attempt to
understand the motivation of Lord Diplock recourse
must inevitably be made to interpretation in order
"to bring to light an underlying coherence or
sense. ,,32 Piecing together what little information
actually exists, Lord Diplock's intention to
develop these principles within English law can be
subjected to a range of different interpretations
in order to find a coherence between his actions
and the meaning of the situation for him. This
involves understanding to what extent Lord
Diplock's short-term intentions (the adoption of
substantive legitimate expectations are "principles ripe
for transplant".
32 C. Taylor "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" in
Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers
Volume 2 (Cambridge: University Press, 1985) page 15.
Cf. generally M. Loughlin Public Law and Political
Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) chapter 3.
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the principles) were dependent upon his longer-term
Lnt.ent.Lons c "
The contemplated adoption of new principles
can be interpreted in light of the process of
developing the common law to establish an
administrative law. The "breakthrough" 34 of the
House of Lords decision in Anisminic35 had freed the
courts from drawing the distinction between errors
within and without jurisdiction. Ridge v. Baldwin
revived and expanded the applicability of the right
to be heard. Following the procedural reforms of
Order 53,36 Lord Diplock, in O'Reilly v. Mackman,37
introduced a principle of procedural exclusivity
and used the terms "public law" and "private law"
to signify the difference between the proceedings.3a
Referring to the statement of Lord Reid referring
to the lack of an administrative law in England,
33See A. MacIntyre "The Indispensability of Political
Theory" in D. Miller and L. Sidentop (eds.), The Nature
of Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) page
17, 27.
34 In re Racal Communications Ltd. [1981] A.C. 374, 383B
per Lord Diplock.
35 Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission
[1969] 2 A.C. 147.
36Order 53 R.S.C., S.l. 1977 No. 1955; section 31
Supreme Court Act 1981. See L. Blom-Cooper "The New Face
of Judicial Review: Administrative Changes in Order 53"
[1982] P.L. 250.
37 [1983] 2 A.C. 237.
38 Ibid., 283H-285G. See also Hoffman-La Roche & Co. A.G.
v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] A.C.
295, 366A; Town Investments Ltd. v. Department of the
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Lord Diplock: commented that "[b]y 1977 the
need ... [for an administrative law] ...had continued
to grow apace and this reproach to English law had
been removed. We did have by then a developed
system of administrative law ...". 39 The possible
adoption of new principles could have been a
fulfilment of Lord Reid's challenge for the courts
to find new solutions for the new types of cases
that were corning before them. Central to the
developing system of administrative law was the
elaboration of the grounds of review. The adoption
of the principles of legitimate expectations and
proportionality could therefore be viewed as part
of the rationalisation and simplification of
judicial review, which Lord Diplock: desired,40 and
therefore contributing towards a more developed
system of administrative law.
The adoption of the principles could also have
been motivated by a general desire for English law
to keep up with Continental developments. Lord
Environment [1978] A.C. 359, 380A-381Ei GCHQ, supra no.
18, 408E-411B.
39 Ibid., 279H.
40 See Lord Diplock "Administrative Law: Judicial Review
Reviewed", op. cit. supra no. 17, 244; Racal
Communications, supra no. 34, 382G. The categorisation
of the three heads in the GCHQ case was a product of
this rationalisation and simplification.
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Diplock was interested in comparative law41 and well
aware of the case-law of the Conseil d'Etat, the
Bundesverwaltungsgericht42 and the European Court. 43
Even before the UK joined the European Community,
Lord Diplock remarked that "[i]n the course
of ... [his] ...lifetime in the law ... [he had] ...been
fortunate to work enough with European lawyers to
believe that the common law has much to gain from
closer contact with and understanding of the
concepts of the civil law. ,,44 According to Lord
Wilberforce there were two features in the approach
41 See Lord Diplock "Preface" in J.F. Garner and A.R.
Galbraith (eds.), Judicial Control of the Administrative
Process (Report of a Conference at Ditchley Park 4-7
July 1969, Ditchley Paper No. 22) i Lord Diplock
"Foreword" in B. Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade Legal Control
of Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) page Xii
Lord Diplock "The Common Market and the Common Law"
(1972) 6 The Law Teacher 3, 15; Dickson, op. cit. supra
no. 6, 443. In the Seventh Colloquium of the Councils of
State and the Supreme Courts of Justice of Member States
of the European Community The Power of the Courts - both
Superior and Inferior Courts and Bodies Exercising
Quasi-Judicial Functions - to Award Damages in
Administrative Actions (London, 1980) Lord Diplock acted
as chairman. In his opening address he stated, at page
193: "[t]he topic that we have chosen ...(and I must
confess I have a certain share of the responsibility for
choosing it) is a branch of administrative law where I
think that we in the United Kingdom perhaps have the
greatest amount to learn from you ...".
42 See Lord Diplock "Judicial Control of the
Administrative Process", op. cit. supra no. 16, 3-5;
ibid. "Administrative Law: Judicial Review Reviewed",
op. cit. supra no. 17, 241 and 244.
43 Hansard 379 H.L. Deb. col. 993-4 (3rd February 1977) .
Lord Diplock was also chairman of the House of Lords
Committee to examine the EEC directives and regulations:
"Lord Diplock 1907-1985" (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 1, 2.
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of Lord Diplock: one of cautious moves within
established principle and secondly a desire to keep
English law in a moving relationship with European
developments.45 Wade has stated that Lord Diplock's
"object was to show that British judicial review
was fully equal to that of other countries in range
and effectiveness."46 Significantly, Lord Diplock
attended a meeting of the heads of the supreme
administrative courts of the EEC countries in the
Hague in October 197647 allowing for comparative
discussion on the judicial control of
administrative power. In his welcoming address of
the conference, W.F. De Gaay Fortman stated that
"[t]he growing integration of the European
Communities means that the ... [national
courts] ...must pay ever closer attention to the
administrative law of the other Member States and
44 Lord Diplock "The Common Market and the Common Law",
op. cit. supra no. 41, 16.
45 R. Wilberforce "Lord Diplock and Administrative Law"
[1986] P.L. 6. Jowell, op. cit. supra no. 5, page 209
states that Lord Dip10ck espoused the "restraint model"
of judicial control of administrative action compared
with Lord Denning's more activist approach. According to
Wilberforce, ibid., such restraint was more "a matter of
technique than objective."
46 Letter from Sir William Wade to the author dated 26th
March 1997. See also Lord Diplock "Administrative Law:
Judicial Review Reviewed", op. cit. supra no. 17, 244.
47 Fifth Colloquium of the Councils of State and the
Supreme Courts of Justice of the Member States of the
European Communities Discretionary Power and the
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also to the jurisprudence evolved by the Court of
Justice ...Mutual influences are at work here ...".48
The introduction of legitimate expectations and
proportionality was not preceded by any direct
exposure of English law to the Community
principles. However, Lord Diplock's interest in
European and comparative law must have provided an
impetus for developing similar principles in
English law.
Furthermore, it seems probable that Lord
Diplock foresaw the importance of the European
Community and its potential influence on English
law. By his own admission Lord Diplock had "as a
lawyer ... [been for a] ...long ... [time] ...interested
in the legal questions involved in membership of
the Common Market" and was concerned to resolve any
problems that might have been faced by the
accession of the United Kingdom.49 It is possible
that he contemplated the introduction of the two
principles so that English law would be better
prepared for the challenges ahead. If so, then Lord
Diplock could have sought to pre-empt the influence
Advisability of Administrative Decisions; The Extent and
Limitations of JUdicial Control, op. cit. supra no. 28.
48 Ibid., page 197.
49 Lord Diplock "The Common Market and the Common Law" I
op. cit. supra no. 41.
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of European principles by their active adoption
into English law prior to the increasing influence
of Community law. 50 Al ternati vely, Lord Diplock·
could have merely wished to change the language of
review to a more European fashion. According to
Wade, who has long held the view that problems in
administrative law stem from a confusion of
terminology or verbal misunderstandings,Sl Lord
Diplock's "opinion ...was that proportionality and
legitimate expectation were different more in name
than in substance from the English rules, though he
realised that it might be necessary for British
judges to adopt them as the influence of European
law became ever more insistent. ,,52 However, that
Lord Diplock considered the adoption of the
50 See the quotation of Lord Roskill at no. 70 below
which supports this.
51 See H.W.R. Wade ,,\Quasi-judicial' and its Background"
(1949) 10 C.L.J. 216, 218; H.W.R. Wade "The Twilight of
Natural Justice?" (1951) 67 L.Q.R. 103, 109; H.W.R. Wade
and C.F. Forsyth Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 7th edn., 1994) page 27. Cf. the importance of
linguistic philosophy in post-war jurisprudence, in
particular H.L.A. Hart "Definition and Theory in
Jurisprudence" (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 37; ibid., The Concept
of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). On the
contribution of H.W.R. Wade to the "conservative
normativist" style of public law scholarship see
Loughlin, op. cit. supra no. 32, pages 184-190.
52 Letter from Sir William Wade to the author dated 26th
March 1997. In "Administrative Law: Judicial Review
Reviewed", op. cit. supra no. 17, 242 Lord Diplock
stated: "[n]o doubt we shall continue to confuse our
fellow lawyers in the European Communities by continuing
to talk of ultra vires in relation to administrative
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principles suggests that he did not view the change
merely to be one of language but one of principle
also.
Finally, it is possible to view Lord Diplock's
interest in adopting these principles, which
perhaps proceeded without a complete understanding
of their significance within a Continental
philosophy of law and the State, as another means
by which the judiciary, with the value of their
political experience gained through the common law
tradition, could supervise the decisions of
administrative bodies. Interpreted in this way,
Lord Diplock's interest in transplantation would
have been motivated less by the incorporation of
another's systems principles and values but rather
by a sense that the principles enabled another way
through which traditional English judicial values
could be articulated against executive incursions
on liberty, albeit in a more conceptually precise
method than the ordinary common law rules. If so,
then the principles would have been viewed as
fitting into the common law tradition of continuity
and innovation; rather than fearing that the
European principles would "imperil the heritage of
action, when all we mean by it to-day is failure to
83
the Common Law", 53 Lord Diplock could have
considered using them as a means of protecting that
heritage.
A number of interpretations are then possible
which may be more or less compatible. Diplock's
decision to transplant the principles could have
been motivated by a number of intentions. However,
difficulties arise concerning the causal
effectiveness of those intentions in bringing about
f· It' S 54 Forone course 0 act10n over a terna 1ve course .
instance, had the United Kingdom not acceded to the
European Community, and therefore the issue of the
possible application of the principles by the
English courts never arisen, would Lord Diplock
have still considered their possible adoption by
reason of his interest in comparative law or as a
means of establishing a more developed system of
English administrative law? Alternatively, had a
more systematic English administrative law already
existed, would Lord Diplock have been motivated by
a felt need to keep up with European developments?
It is difficult to give any clear answer to such
questions. As the range of interpretations are not
comply with the requirement of 'legality'''.
53 Lord Diplock "The Common Market and the Common Law",
Ope cit. supra no. 41, 4.
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incompatible with each other, they can be viewed
as, to some extent, interdependent. Lord Diplock's
interest in comparative law could only have been
further fuelled by the accession of the United
Kingdom to the European Community. Equally, the
identification of the need to develop English
administrative law is related to a desire to ensure
that it is comparable with European law. By seeking
to introduce new principles as a means of upholding
judicial values, Diplock could have viewed himself
as exemplifying the attitude of those bold
nineteenth century judges which he so admired.
Pulling together the possible strands - the
maintenance of the Rule of Law within an
increasingly sophisticated society, the development
of a English system of administrative law, a desire
to keep up with European developments, the
inevitable impact of Community law, the
introduction of a new language through which to
articulate the "fundamental assumpt.Lona" " of the
common law - Lord Diplock's decision to introduce
these principles can be seen as a conscious attempt
to transplant European principles of administrative
law into English law. This is not to say that other
54 See Maclntrye, OPe cit. supra no. 33, pages 26-27.
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judges necessarily agreed with Lord Diplock's
project. To traditional common lawyers the role of
judges is merely to declare the law as it has
developed since "time immemorial". 56 Lord Diplock' s
advocacy of new principles to control
administrative power may have been seen by some as
crossing the divide between what the law is and
what it ought to be and therefore a questionable
piece of judicial law-making. Others viewed the
possible development of new grounds of review as
unnecessary or the influence of European principles
as unwarranted. For example, Wade questioned
whether English law needed to import new principles
as the doctrine of reasonableness would allow
British judges to react against any element of
unfairness, whether procedural or substantives7 and
in the opinion of Lord Wilberforce the European
Court "is not a court which develops doctrines or
jurisprudential theories which have any impact on
English law.,,5aHowever, to a Law Lord who openly
55Dicey, op. cit. supra no. 15, page 329,
56 See G.J. Postema Bentham and the Common Law Tradition
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) pages 4-13.
57H.W.R. Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (London: The
Hamlyn Lectures, Revised edn., 1989) page 95.
58Lord Wilberforce interviewed in G. Sturgess and P.
Chubb (eds.), Judging the World: Law and Politics in the
World's Leading Courts (London: Butterworths, 1988) page
271, 276. Cf. the view of Lord Hailsham The Dilemma of
Democracy. Diagnosis and Prescription. (London: Collins,
86
admitted that courts on occasion needed to
legislate59 and who had achieved an "almost
olympian,,60 predominance in the House of Lords such
concerns could be put aside. Alternatively, Lord
Diplock's "quality of persuading his colleagues to
the extreme ... [which] ...almost got to the stage of
a mesmeric quality" and his "intellectual
superiority, coupled with enormous hard work" may
have enabled him to persuade his colleagues to
follow his point of view. 61
It was not until 1984 in the GCHQ case that
Lord Diplock gave a comprehensive statement on
judicial review. According to Lord Scarman, this
speech was "in a very real sense a last
testament. ,,62It is worth concentrating upon this
statement for the following reasons. First, Lord
Diplock suggested a novel categorisation of
judicial review under the three heads of
illegality, irrationality and procedural
1978) page 175: "[o]ne cannot rule out ...the long-term
effects on judicial reasoning of familiarity with
another tradition of jurisprudence."
59 Lord Diplock "The Courts as Legislators", op , cit.
supra no. 8.
60 "Influential Law Lord", The Times, 16th October 1985,
page 18.
61 Lord Wilberforce, op. cit. supra no. 58, page 275.
62 Lord Scarman "The Development of Administrative Law:
Obstacles and Opportunities" [1990] P.L. 490. The
speeches in the GCHQ case were delivered on 22nd
November 1984. Lord Diplock died on 14th October 1985.
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impropriety.63 This tripartite classification was a
product of the rationalisation of judicial review.64
Questions of vires and jurisdiction were to be
replaced with simple questions of legality.
Unreasonableness was re-defined from the
tautological definition provided by Lord Greene
M.R.65 to irrationality.66 The Latin tags audi
alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua were to
be assimilated under a general ground of procedural
Lmprop rd et.y i '"
Secondly, Lord Diplock also used his speech to
mark the possible future direction of the law. It
therefore contained an exposition of the principle
of legitimate expectations as it had developed
until then. Lord Diplock also stated that in
articulating the heads of review he had in mind
63 In Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of
State for the Environment [1986] A.C. 240, 249D Lord
Scarman described this as a "'classical' but certainly
not exhaustive analysis".
64 For the argument that increases in the judicial review
case-load in the 1980s provided a powerful pressure on
the courts to rationalise the grounds of review in order
to maintain consistency see M. Loughlin "Courts and
Governance" in P. Birks (ed.), The Frontiers of
Liability (Oxford: University Press, 1994) pages 91,
lOO, 107. The categorisation was also a product of Lord
Diplock's strictly logical approach.
65 See chapter 7, section 3B.
66 It seems that Lord Diplock had the development of a
ground of irrationality in mind since at least 1974. See
"Administrative Law: JUdicial Review Reviewed", op. cit.
supra no. 17, 243.
67 Nowadays commonly referred to as "procedural
fairness".
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"particularly the possible adoption in the future
of the principle of 'proportionality' which is
recognised in the administrative law of several of
our fellow members of the European Economic
Community. ,,68 The influence of the general
principles of Community law is evident and has been
recognised as such by Lord Diplock's
contemporaries. According to Lord Mackenzie Stuart
"[t]he concept of recognising that a failure to
respect legitimate expectations may give rise, in
public law, to a remedy is a novelty in English law
and lacks discernible English parentage. To find
the true ancestry one does not have to look far
across the Channel. ,,69 Lord Roskill has revealed
that in referring to the possible adoption of
proportionality Lord Diplock "clearly had in mind
the likely increasing influence of Community law
upon our domestic law which might in time lead to
the further adoption of this principle as a
separate category and not merely as a possible
68 GCHQ case, supra no. 18, 410E.
69 Lord Mackenzie Stuart "Recent Developments in English
Administrative Law - The Impact of Europe?" in F.
Capotorti (ed.), Du droit international au droit de
l'integration. Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore. (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987) page 411, 417.
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reinforcement of one or more of these stated
categories such as irrationality.n70
In this, his last exposition on judicial
review, Lord Diplock celebrated the advances made
over the previous thirty years, classified the
heads of challenge as principles of public law,
endorsed the principle of legitimate expectations
and advanced the possible adoption of
proportionality. By giving this magisterial speech
Lord Diplock ensured that judicial review, or
rather his own articulation of it,7l became firmly
entrenched in English law and could be developed by
future judges. Diplock's approach was that the
judges should develop the law in a way that is
responsive to social needs and therefore he led the
judicial movement for the development of
administrative law within the fold of the common
law. This was achieved simply by declaring such a
system to exist as a result of a few landmark
cases72 and procedural innovations.?3 However, this
70 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696, 750D.
71 See R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte
Datafin plc [1987] Q.B. 815, 836H per Lord Donaldson
M.R.; H.W.R. Wade Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 6th edn., 1988) page viii. See also Lord
Wilberforce, op. cit. supra no. 58.
72 Ridge v. Baldwin, supra no. 1; Padfield v. Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, supra no. 2; Anisminic
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, supra no. 35.
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grossly underestimated the complexity of the
problems of both developing a system of
administrative law and transplanting Continental
principles within it. In conclusion Lord Diplock
should be viewed as having exerted a powerful
influence in identifying the agenda for English
judicial review. His eminent standing ensured that
the language of "public lawN, "proportionalityN and
"legitimate expectations" gained a firm foothold in
the vocabulary of English law. However, while Lord
Diplock succeeded in introducing this new language
into English law, ironically he could exercise
little influence over the subsequent conceptual
development of the principles. That task inevitably
passed to other judges who may not have either
shared Diplock's views or even recognised the
principles to be legal transplants.
2. The Challenge of Community Law
One century after Dicey rejected droit
administratif as incompatible with the English Rule
of Law, 74 the English courts are facing the
challenge presented by the Community Rule of Law
73 See no. 38 supra.
91
and the general principles of Community law which
are derived from Continental systems of
administrative law.75 Since the entry of the United
Kingdom into the European Community, the "new legal
order,,76has presented a major challenge for the
English common law which has become apparent in
different ways.77 For instance, the question of the
compatibility of the supremacy of Community law
with the sovereignty of Parliament,78 the obligation
74Dicey, op. cit. supra no. 15, chapter XII.
75For statements that Community law is based on the Rule
of Law see Case 294/83 Parti ecologiste 'Les Verts' v.
European Parliament [1986] E.C.R. 1339, paragraph 23;
Case C-2/88 Imm. J.J. Zwartfeld [1990] E.C.R. 1-3365,
paragraph 17; Opinion 1/91 Draft Agreement relating to
the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] E.C.R.
1-60079, paragraph 21. See also G. Bebr "Court of
Justice: Judicial Protection and the Rule of Law" in D.
Curtin and T. Heukels (eds.), Institutional Dynamics of
European Integration. Essays in Honour of Henry G.
Schermers. Volume II. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1994) page 303. Cf. also the impact of the European
Convention of Human Rights see N. Grief "The Domestic
Impact of the European Convention of Human Rights as
Mediated through Community Law" [1991] P.L. 555; S.
Farran The UK Before the European Court of Human Rights.
Case Law and Commentary. (London: Blackstone, 1996); M.
Hunt Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford:
Hart, 1997).
76Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] E.C.R. I, 12.
77Cf. Lord Denning's metaphor in H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J.
Bollinger S.A. [1974] 1 Ch. 401, 418F of the tide of
European law flowing "into the estuaries and up the
rivers".
78 R. v. Secretary of Sta te for Transport ex parte
Factortame Ltd. (No.2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603; R. v.
Secretary of State for Employment ex parte Equal
Opportunities Commission [1995] 1 A.C. 1. See also
H.W.R. Wade "What Has Happened to the Sovereignty of
Parliament?" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 1; P.P. Craig
"Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after
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to interpret national laws in conformity with
European directives,79 the need to identify which
bodies provide "a public service under the control
of the State" and have special powers for that
purposeSO in order to allow individuals to rely on
the vertical direct effect of directives, the right
to an effective remedy,Sl the liability of the State
for breach of Community laws2 and the different
standards of legality for reviewing administrative
act ron'" have formed the issues through which the
challenge of Community law has emerged. Community
law forms an external pressure on English
Factortame" (1991) Y.E.L. 221; N. MacCormick "Beyond the
Sovereign State" (1993) 56 M.L.R. l.
79 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen [1984] E.C.R. 1891; Case C-106/89 Marleasing
SA v. La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA
[1990] E.C.R. 1-4135; Duke v. Reliance systems Ltd.
[1988] A.C. 618. See A. Arnull "Interpretation and
Precedent in English and Community Law: Evidence of
Cross-fertilisation?" in The Common Law of Europe and
the Public Law of the United Kingdom (S.P.T.L. Seminar,
King's College London, 14th June 1997).
80 Case C-188/89 Foster v. British Gas [1990] E.C.R. 1-
3133, paragraph 22. See also Doughty v. Rolls Royce pIc
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 1045. On the notion of "public
service" see L. Duguit Law in the Modern State (trans.
F. and H.J. Laski) (London, 1921) chapter 2.
81 Factortame, op. cit. supra no. 78; In re M. [1994] 1
A.C. 377. See also Woolwich Building Society v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners [1993] A.C. 70, 177E per Lord
Goff.
82 Cases C-6&9/90 Francovich v. Italy [1991] E.C.R. 1-
5357; Cases C-46 & C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v.
Germany, R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte
Factortame Ltd. (No.3) [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889; Bourgoin
S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
[1986] Q.B. 716.
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administrative law which will become more acute
with the development of the Community and legal
challenges brought before the English courts. It is
not simply the extent of the encroachment of actual
Community laws but rather the philosophy and style
underpinning Community law that is having an impact
on English law.84 The European jurisprudence is
based on a very different philosophy of law,
government and the individual to that underpinning
English law and the rational and more principled
approach typical of Continental legal styles
clashes with the traditional pragmatic common law
method. In other words, the difference between the
more purposive orientation of Continental
administrative law and the common law is no longer
of mere comparative interest but forms a central
issue in the effectiveness of European Community
law within the United Kingdom. The challenge
presented by Community law must therefore be viewed
as essentially a cultural challenge for the
distinctive nature of the common law method.
83 See J. Steiner Enforcing EC Law (London: Blackstone,
1995) pages 82-92.
84 Loughlin, op. cit. supra no. 32, page 195. See also
House of Lords European Communities Committee Special
Report (Session 1974-75) H.L. 38; J. Temple Lang "The
Constitutional Principles Governing Community
Legislation" (1989) 40 N.r.L.Q. 227, 242-245.
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The challenge of Community law was perhaps
first identified by J.D.B. Mitchell, a writer who
worked within the functionalist style in public
law.ss Mitchell recognised that as public power was
no longer being contained at the national level but
was being extended to the European Community, the
issue of law in relation to the exercise of that
power would arise. As English law has a very
distinct approach to law and government, the
exercise of power at the Community presented
problems for English law as it would have to
accommodate the influence of Community law which,
being drawn from the Continental tradition,
substantially differed from the English approach.
Mitchell argued that English law would have to be
modernised in order to meet the challenge presented
by Community law. For example, Mitchell argued that
the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty had to
be developed in light of changing circumstances
such as accession to the European Community.86 In
1969 Mitchell observed that "there is emerging a
85 See generally M. Loughlin "Sitting on a Fence at
Carter Bar: In Praise of J.D.B. Mitchell" (1991) 36
Juridical Review 135.
86 J.D.B. Mitchell "The Sovereignty of Parliament and
Community Law: The Stumbling-Block That Isn't There"
(1979) 55 International Affairs 33; J.D.B. Mitchell
"What Happened to the Constitution on 1st January 1973?"
(1980) 11 Cambrian L.R. 69.
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new order of European public law between
traditional international law and domestic
law ... [which] ...means that terms such as
'Administrative/constitutional' must in this larger
context be re-interpreted. "S7 Mitchell was concerned
that English law should be able to meet the
challenge faced by the external influence of
Community law. His answer was for English lawyers
to think in terms of a system of public law that
was both purposive and susceptible.ss Public law
should be purposive in that it focuses on the
objectives sought to be achieved by the
administration and would therefore be less
technical and more creative. The counterpart to
which was a "susceptibility of lawyers in
understanding the realities and problems of the
governmental process". S9
Mitchell argued that "[t]here is no reason why
rational constructive thought should not be brought
to bear on government" and as experiment was
87 J.D.B. Mitchell "Why European Institutions?" in J.D.B.
Mitchell and L.J. Brinkhorst European Law and
Institutions (Edinburgh: University Press, 1969) page
30, 41.
88 J.D.B. Mitchell "Administrative Law and Policy
Effectiveness" in J.A.G. Griffith (ed.), From Policy to
Administration. Essays in Honour of William A. Robson.
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1976) page 174, 193.
89 "Why European Institutions?", op. ci t. supra no. 87,
page 44.
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impossible "[t]he only substitute ...can be the
comparative method pursued in depth. ,,90 However,
Mitchell did caution that "[s]uperficiality remains
a real danger which is enhanced by facile but
misleading translation of terms". 91 Underpinning
this functionalist approach is a view of law as
part of the apparatus of government as opposed to
Dicey's view of law as an autonomous analytical
discipline. Mitchell would then have argued that
lawyers ought to seek means of constructively
dealing with both the efficient achievement of
governmental objectives and the fair treatment of
individuals. The interpretation of English law in
the light of the new emerging European public law
could therefore help to achieve this purposive
orientation.
If the central issue facing English law since
the use of legislation on a large scale for social
purposes has been to develop a conception of
legality appropriate to the developing system of
governance, then the challenge of Community law
places this issue into a sharper focus by
highlighting the differential approaches to the
role of law in government. Other European States
90 Ibid., pages 49-50.
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have experienced a similar socialisation of the law
and their legal systems have sought to
constructively deal with the issues arising from
this,92 which in turn has influenced Community law.
The impact which Community law will have on English
law can only increase with the normative importance
of the Community. While Mitchell could not have
anticipated how the challenge presented by
Community law would develop, it will be important
to bear in mind his views when comparing the
development of legitimate expectations and
proportionality by the English Courts with the
case-law of the European Court.
The challenge Community law presents in
relation to the general principles of law arises
because of the different legal standards placed on
the administration between English and Community
law. According to Laws J. "...Wednesbury and
European review are different models - one looser,
one tighter - of the same juridical concept, which
is the imposition of compulsory standards on
decision-makers so as to secure the repudiation of
91 Ibid., page 50.
92 See generally G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the
Welfare State (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter,
1986) .
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arbitrary power.,,93The Government itself has
recognised that "European Community law has
provided new rights and expectations, some of which
may only be vindicated within the context of
judicial review ...".94 The English courts have to
apply differential standards of legality which are
determined by whether an applicant's case comes
under the scope of either Community law or English
law. If an individual seeks to rely on a Treaty
right, such as the free movement of workers, which
has direct effect then the national court will have
to determine whether that right has been infringed
by reference to European principles.95 The general
principles will also fall to be applied to action
by the Member State which is required by Community
93 R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex
parte First City Trading Ltd. [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 250,
279. Cf. J. Laws "English & Community law: Uniformity of
Principle" The European Advocate (Autumn 1994) page 2.
94Government evidence to the Treasury and Civil Service
Select Committee 26th April 1994 quoted in A. Marr
Ruling Britannia. The Failure and Future of British
Democracy. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996) page 288.
Judge D. Edward "Proportionality and Legitimate
Expectations" (A talk given at the Judicial Studies
Board Seminar on UK and EC Law, 8th January 1993) page 5
has stated that "the Community Court will go further
towards what a U.K. judge would regard as a review of
the merits than at least a strict traditionalist would
regard as proper in the U.K. context."
95On direct effect see P.P. Craig and G. de Burca EC
Law. Text, Cases, and Materials. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995) chapter 4.
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law.96 Most Community administration is indirect;
the Community institutions exercise policy-making
powers but the implementation and enforcement of
schemes, such as the Common Agricultural Policy, is
devolved to national bodies. Not only are European
schemes of regulation more juridified and
legalistic than the more discretionary British
style of regulation,97 but the exercise of such
powers will require the national courts to apply
the general principles of Community law as the
source of the power stems from Community law. As
Daintith observes "[n]ational courts, as well as
national administrators ...find themselves cast as
actors in the process of ensuring the faithful
implementation of Community law." 98 National courts
are not under any obligation to apply the general
principles of Community law when a challenge is
made to an administrative decision under domestic
96 R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex
parte First City Trading Ltd., supra no. 93, 268-269.
See also J. Temple Lang "The Sphere in Which Member
States are Obliged to Comply with the General Principles
of Law and Community Fundamental Rights Principles"
[1991/2] L.I.E.I. 23; Lord Slynn "European Law and the
National Judge" in Butterworth Lectures 1991-92 (London:
Butterworths, 1993) page 18, 27.
97 See A. Hunt "Regulation of Telecommunications: the
Developing EU Regulatory Framework and its Impact on the
United Kingdom" (1997) 3 E.P.L. 93, 114; T. Daintith
(ed.), Implementing EC Law in the United Kingdom:
Structures For Indirect Rule (Chichester: Wiley, 1995).
98 Daintith, ibid., page 14.
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law. Their obligation as Community courts is to
apply different legal principles depending on the
source of law under which the impugned decision was
made. The impetus behind this is the European
Court's purpose to ensure the effectiveness of
Communi ty law. 99 As Community law draws the
boundaries of legality more tightly than English
law there may be considerable pressure to provide
the same standard of legal protection under
domestic law as is required by Community law for
the following reasons.
First, the method of interpretation which the
European Court draws from comparative law acts as a
powerful lever for the interpenetration and
reconciliation of the national laws of the Member
States.100 The European Court adopts the most
progressive principles from the national law of the
Member States in order to develop the general
principles of Community law. If the European Court
has adopted a principle from a national legal order
this may lead to an evaluation of how such
99 See generally F. Snyder "The Effectiveness of European
Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and
Techniques" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 19.
100 Y. Galmot "R~flexions sur le recourse au droit
compar~ par la Cour de Justice des Communaut~s
europ6enes" (1990) 6 R.F.D.A. 255, 261. See also Y.
Galmot "L'apport des principes g~n~raux du droit
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principles compete with the law of other Member
States. As Community law imposes more constraints
on the exercise of public power it raises the
question of whether it is more successful in the
avoidance of arbitrariness than English law.
According to Sir Gordon Slynn, if the general
principles of law "are applied in a Community law
context, it seems not improbable that they will
have their effect on decisions in an analogous
context under domestic law. ,,101Secondly, the
Community can act as a forum for seeking common
solutions to common problems. 102As "Community
law ...derives from not only the economic but also
the legal interpenetration of the Member States,,103
it can act as a means of resolving common national
problems through shared Community solutions. For
example, Lord Diplock as part of his quest to
determine how the courts should control
administrative power came to acknowledge the
principles through attending conferences on
communautaire a la garantie des droits dans l'ordre
juridique Franc;:ais"[1997] C.D.E. 67.
101 G. Slynn "But in England there is no ..." in W. Fuerst
(ed.), Festschrift fur Wolfgang Zeidler Volume 1
(Berlin, 1987) page 397, 400. See also Laws, Ope cit.
supra no. 93, 5-6.
102 T. Koopmans \\EuropeanPublic Law: Reality and
Prospects" [1991] P.L. 53, 54.
103 Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Limi ted v. Commission
[1982] E.C.R. 1575, paragraph 18.
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European administrative law. From a functionalist
perspective, Mitchell, who had consistently argued
that England lacked a distinct system of public
law,104 was optimistic about the possible
reformative effects of the "richness" of Community
law on English law: "[t]here is an excitement about
ideas even if couched in arid terms like
'proportionality', or 'legitimate
expectation' ...which invigorates debate, and the
debate then corresponds to current reality."los
Thirdly, the national courts are under a duty
to apply Community law. This obligation is
"profoundly altering the constitutional role of
British judges as law makers by widening the scope
of judicial review of substance and merits as well
as form and procedure." 106An effect of this new
judicial approach under Community law is that it
highlights areas of national law where a different
approach is adopted which may result in
inconsistent legal protection for the individual.
1" See J.D.B. Mitchell "The Causes and Effects of the
Absence of a System of Public Law in the United Kingdom"
[1965] P.L. 95; ibid. "The State of Public Law in the
United Kingdom" (1966) 15 I.C.L.O. 133.
lOS Mitchell "The Sovereignty of Parliament and Community
Law: The Stumbling-Block That Isn't There", op. cit.
supra no. 86, 45-46.
106 Lt'es er, op. c~t. supra no. 4, 288.
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For example, in re M.107 the House of Lords
reconsidered the rule that interim injunctions were
not available against the Crown following the
FactortamelOB case where the European Court had held
that Community law required the possibility that
such injunctions could be granted. Lord Woolf
stated that "it would be most regrettable if an
approach which is inconsistent with that which
exists in Community law should be allowed to
. I ,,109persist if ... [it] ...was not str~ct y necessary.
Community law required a remedy which English law
did not by itself provide. The result was that
English law provided less legal protection than
Community law and therefore created an unjust
dichotomy by not treating like cases alike.llo The
House of Lords resolved this problem by
reconsidering the rule. The case shows that the
107 Supra no. 81.
loa F 8actortame, supra no. 7 .
109 re M., supra no. 81., 422G. Cf. H. Woolf "Judicial
Review: A Possible Programme For Reform" [1992] P.L.
221, 233. See also M. v. Home Office [1992] 2 W.L.R. 73,
100A-B, 101C per Lord Donaldson M.R.; Woolwich Building
Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] A.C. 70,
177E per Lord Goff; The Law Commission Consultation
Paper No. 126 Administrative Law: Judicial Review and
Statutory Appeals (London: HMSO, 1993) paragraph 2.10;
J. Goudie "Judicial Review" in D. Bean (ed.), Law Reform
For All (London: Blackstone, 1996) page 134, 137.
110 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1961) page 156. See also I. Ward "Fairness,
Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights: The Case For a
104
English courts will have to be aware of the level
of legal protection that is provided under
Community law and attempt to reconcile English and
Community law in the case of inconsistency or risk
the development of a two-speed system of guarantees
for litigants. Sedley J. has recognised that as the
standards of the European Convention of Human
Rights inform the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice it would be "unreal and
potentially unjust to continue to develop English
public law without reference to them."lll The
potential inequality arising from such differences
would appear to be just as great in relation to the
principles of proportionality and legitimate
expectations. Such judicial concerns are a
reflection of the profound changes in public power
which have been occurring. As administrative power
is no longer a self-contained national phenomenon,
the administrative law concerning the exercise of
such powers can similarly be no longer self-
contained. This Europeanisation of administrative
power and law must inevitably have an impact on the
national legal systems. For example, Walker has
Unified Administrative Law Within the European
Community" (1994) 5 Touro International L.R. 279.
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suggested that "[als English administrators come to
take more and more decisions in the exercise of
Community law powers, the case for recognition in
domestic law of the principle of proportionality as
developed in the European Court of Justice will
become increasingly compelling."ll2
When English courts are required to apply the
general principles of Community law which find no
equivalent in English law then the disparity will
be more evident and the potential injustice for the
individual will be great. The inconsistency in
legal protection may be more apparent in English
law than in other Member States where a higher
level of legal protection is guaranteed or where a
constitutional provision of equality would prevent
such inconsistent legal protection. English
administrative law does not recognise any
substantive restraint on discretionary power other
than that of Wednesbury unreasonableness and it is
unrealistic to hope this ground will provide
protection equal to that afforded by the general
1ll R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte McQuillan [1995] 4 All E.R. 400, 422h.
ll2P. Walker "Irrationality and Proportionality" in J.
Goudie and M. Supperstone (eds.), Judicial Review
(London: Butterworths, 1992) page 119, 137. See also
Lord Slynn "European Law and the National Judge", op.
cit. supra no. 96, pages 18, 27-28.
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principles of Community law.ll3 According to
Mitchell "raJ reconciliation of concepts becomes
essential if the individual is not to suffer./ll4
More recently, van Gerven has argued that in order
to prevent an undesirable drifting apart of
Community and national rules which govern similar
situations, a principle of homogeneity must be
recognised in order to keep the two sets of rules
together.l1S There seems to be a growing awareness
amongst the English judiciary of the influence of
Community law and the need to maintain a consistent
approach. Neill L.J. has intimated that "there is
much to be said for the view that all the courts in
the European Community should apply common
standards in the field of administrative law."llG
Such pressures may create an osmotic or spill-
over effect of European law whereby principles
which need only be applied by the national court
when it is concerned with Community law may
113 See, e.g ., R. v. Secretary of Sta te for the Home
Department ex parte Adams [1995] All E.R. (EC) 177.
114 Mitchell "Administrative Law and Policy
Effectiveness", op. cit. supra no. 88, page 192.
115 W. van Gerven "Bridging the Gap Between Community and
National Laws: Towards a Principle of Homogeneity in the
Field of Legal Remedies?" (1995) 32 C.M.L.Rev. 679, 699-
702.
116 R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte
National and Local Government Officers' Association
[1993] 5 Admin. L.R. 785, 800G. See also Lord Slynn
107
nevertheless filter through into the court's
elaboration of domestic law.1l7 As a result of such
"osmotic reciprocal influence,,1l8between Community
and national law and the development towards a
model of European public administration1l9 it has
been argued that a common European administrative
law is now developing. l20
However, while the impact of Community law is
potentially profound, its actual influence will
inevitably be uneven. The infection of legal
concepts tends to depend upon immediate exposure to
"European Law and the National Judge", op. cit. supra
no. 96, pages 27-29; Laws, op. cit. supra no. 93.
117 L. Neville Brown and J.S. Bell French Administrative
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 4th edn., 1993) page 286;
Y. Cripps "Some Effects of European Law on English Law"
(1994) 2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
(http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol2/cripps.html); G.
Ress quoted in G.F. Schuppert "On the Evolution of a
European State: Reflections on the Conditions of and
Prospects for a European Constitution" in J.J. Hesse and
N. Johnson (eds.), constitutional Policy and Change in
Europe (Oxford: University Press, 1995) pages 329, 349-
350.
118Ress, ibid.
119 S. Cassese "Towards a European Model of Public
Administration" in D.S. Clark (ed.), Comparative and
Private International Law: Essays in Honour of John
Henry Merryman on his Seventieth Birthday (Berlin, 1990)
page 353.
120 See J. Rivero "Vers un Droit Commun suropeen.
Nouvelles Perspectives en Droit Administratif" in M.
Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives For a Common Law of
Europe (Florence, 1978) page 389; J. Schwarze European
Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992); J. Schwarze
(ed.), Administrative Law under European Influence. On
the Convergence of the Administrative Laws of the EU
Member States. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996). See also
J. Bell "Convergences and Divergences in European
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a source. 121 This sort of infection does not include
general issues such as the doctrinal or theoretical
underpinning of Continental administrative law. In
the absence of the consideration of such wider
issues, English judges exposed to Community law may
attempt to "patch-up" English law to attain
equality of protection for the individual. However,
precisely because such wider issues are not
considered the English courts will be unable to
effectively integrate the European jurisprudence.
The danger is that the courts will view English law
as providing equality of protection because it has
changed its conceptual language into European
terminology. In order that the common law is able
to respond effectively to the challenge of
Community law the English courts will need to avoid
this specious remedy but instead need to seek an
understanding of law that is appropriate to meeting
the challenge. National approaches to law and
administration reflect different styles, methods
and cultural attitudes which may constitute strong
forces against the convergence of administrative
Administrative Law" [1992] Rivista Italiana di Diritto
Pubblico Comunitario 3.
121 J.D.B. Mitchell "Law, Democracy and Political
Institutions" in M. Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives
For a Common Law of Europe (Florence, 1978) page 361,
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law. Classifications such as private law and public
law are fundamental to ways of thinking and the
approach to the subject. This difference of
approach is particularly pronounced between the
English and Continental traditions of
administrative law.
The emergence of a European administrative law
has created pressures for convergence between
English and Continental administrative law.
However, equally strong pressures for divergence
exist. As Community law is predicated upon a
different philosophy of law and government than
English law, this will simultaneously create
tensions both for and against the convergence of
administrative law. The common law may experience
the influx of new principles which provide greater
protection for the individual and therefore
pressure for the common law to "level up". However,
precisely because this difference in legal
protection is predicated upon a different
underlying philosophy to law and government, the
common law may be unable to effectively meet the
challenge presented by Community law. There can be
no escape from the external pressure of Community
388. Cf. the Factortame and re M cases supra no. 78 and
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law on English administrative law apart from the
unlikely prospect of the United Kingdom withdrawing
altogether from the European Union. Either the
common law faces the challenge presented by seeking
to modernise its approach to law and government or
risks becoming irrelevant and out of date.
81.
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Chapter 4: The Principle of the Protection of
Legitimate Expectations in European Community Law
1. The Principle of Legitimate Expectations
The principle of legitimate expectations is
one of the general principles of Community law
developed through the jurisprudence of the European
Court and "forms part of the Community legal
order" .1 The purpose of this chapter is to give an
account of the principle as it has evolved in the
case-law of the European Court.2 The principle means
that "certain expectations which a natural or legal
person, as a result of his consistent conduct,
arouses on the part of a person with whom he has
legal relations or on the part of any persons with
a legal interest in the matter, produce legal
effects.,,3 It requires the administration to respect
1 Case 112/77 August Topfer & Co. GmbH v. Commission
[1978] E.C.R. 1019, paragraph 19. See also Case 112/80
Firma Anton Durbeck v. Haupzollamt Frankfurt am Main-
Flughafen [1981] E.C.R. 1095, paragraph 48.
2 For an economic analysis of the case-law see E.
Sharpston "Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality"
(1990) 15 E.L.Rev. 103.
3 J.P. Muller Vertrauensschutz im Volkrecht (Cologne-
Berlin, 1971) page 1 quoted in Case 338/85 Fratelli
Pardini SpA v. Ministero del commercio con I 'estero and
Banca toscana (Lucca branch) [1988] E.C.R. 2041,
paragraph 34 of the opinion of Advocate General Darmon
and by P. Tavernier "Le juge communautaire et
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those expectations it raised in the mind of the
individual or provide compelling reasons as to why
the public interest now requires those expectations
to be disappointed. The principle of legitimate
expectations is omnipresent in all dealings between
the individual and the administration and is a
guide to good administrative conduct.
According to Borchardt, the protection of
legitimate expectations requires a situation of
trust between the individual and the administration
and a reconciliation of the inherent conflict
between the interests of the individual and the
Community.4 A situation of trust will exist when the
conduct of the administration has raised an
expectation giving the individual reason to believe
that it will act towards him or her in a particular
way. At this stage the expectation is no more than
a mere hope or aspiration. In order for the
European Court to consider protection of the
expectation, it must be an objectively reasonable
expectation. The expectation must be capable of
being reasonably entertained in light of the
l'application dans Ie temps des reglements C.E.E."
[1976] A.F.D.I. 169, 195.
4 K.-D. Borchardt "Vertrauenscchutz im Europaischen
Gemeinschaftsrecht. Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH von
Algera uber CNTA bis Mulder und von Deetzen." (1988) 15
Eu.GR.Z. 309, 311-312.
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conduct of the administration or any changes in the
overall situation. However, the reasonableness of
an expectation is a necessary but not sufficient
requirement. To be worthy of protection the
expectation must also be capable of being sustained
against the public interest. The legitimacy of an
expectation is to be determined by weighing up the
individual's interest in protection of his or her
expectation against the public interest. An
expectation is legitimate therefore if the European
Court finds it worthy of protection.
The principle of legitimate expectations needs
to be distinguished from the related principles of
legal certainty and vested rights. Legal certainty
requires that "there be no doubt about the law
applicable at a given time in a given area and,
consequently, as to the lawful or unlawful nature
of certain acts or conduct.us This principle has
prevented penal statutes having retroactive
application6 and requires that non-penal statutes
are generally precluded from taking effect from a
5 Case C-331/88 R. v. Minister for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food ex parte Fedesa [1990] E.C.R. 1-4023,
paragraph 8 of the opinion of Advocate General Mischo.
See generally J. Schwarze European Administrative Law
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992) chapter 6; J.A. Usher
General Principles of EC Law (London: Longman, 1998)
pages 65-71.
6 Case 63/83 R. v. Kent Kirk [1984] E.C.R. 2689.
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point of time before their publication except where
the purpose of the measure requires otherwise and
the legitimate expectations of those concerned are
respected.' Although legal certainty and legitimate
expectations are related values which find a common
justification in the need for security and
predictability in the law, they form distinct
principles. Legal certainty is an objective value
which places substantive limits on Community acts
whereas legitimate expectations will arise as a
result of the conduct of the administration and
only operate in the context of a specific
relationship between an individual and the
administration.B As the case-law on retroactivity9
suggests, the principle of legitimate expectations
can protect the legal certainty an individual may
have in respect of a specific relationship with the
administration. A vested or acquired right derives
from "objective factors inherent in the provisions
7 Case 98/78 Firma A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979]
E.C.R. 69, paragraph 20. See F. Lamoureux "The
Retroactivity of Community Acts in the Case Law of the
Court of Justice" (1983) 20 C.M.L.Rev. 269.
B Case 161/88 Binder v. Haupzollamt Bad Reichenhall
[1989] E.C.R. 2415, paragraph 28 of the opinion of
Advocate General Darmon.
9 Supra no. 6.
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which in law govern the sector concerned. ,,10 Such a
right is vested or acquired because it is based
upon a provision which cannot be withdrawn. It is
only because the right cannot be withdrawn or
revoked that it enjoys this status.l1 A vested right
has a much more absolute character than a
legitimate expectation which can be overridden if
the public interest so requires. 12
The principle of legitimate expectations has
been most carefully considered in German public
law13 and it seems that the German principle of
10 Case 74/74 Comptoir National Technique Agricole (CNTA)
S.A. Commission [1975] E.C.R. 533, 556 (col. 2) of the
opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi.
11 Joined Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 Algera v. Common
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community [1957-
8] E.C.R. 39, 55.
12 J. Mertens de Wilmars "The Case-Law of the Court of
Justice in Relation to the Review of the Legality of
Economic Policy in Mixed-Economy Systems" [1983/1]
L.!.E.!. 1, 15-16. See also Lord Mackenzie Stuart
"Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel In Community Law
and English Administrative Law" [1983/1] L.r.E.r. 53,
54-55.
13 See F. Osseribuhl "Vertrauensschutz im sozialen
Rechtsstaat" (1972) 25 D.C.V. 25; K. Schmidt "Die
Vertrauensschutzrechtsprechung des
Bundesverwaltungsgerichts und das
Bundesverfassungsgericht" (1972) 25 D.C.V. 36; Schwarze,
op. cit. supra no. 5, pages 886-901; G. Nolte "General
Principles of German and European Administrative Law - A
Comparison in Historical Perspective" (1994) 57 M.L.R.
191, 195, 203. On the principle in Dutch administrative
law see R. Widdershoven and R. de Lange "Dutch Report"
in J. Schwarze (ed.), Administrative Law under European
Influence. On the convergence of the administrative laws
of the EU Member States. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996)
page 529, 568-572. The principle has also been applied
by the Strasbourg Administrative Tribunal in Entreprise
Freymuth c. Ministre de l'Environnement, 8th December
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"Vertrauensschutz" provided the inspiration for the
European Court to develop the principle of
legitimate expectations.14 The influence of the
German principle has found a route to the European
Court through the use of Article 177 references and
the opinions of Advocates General. Though the
principle first emerged as a corollary of the
principles of legal certainty and vested rights/Is
since the 1970s the European Court has explicitly
referred to legitimate expectations as an
independent principle of law. This development can
be seen in Westzucker GmbH v. Eintuhr- und
1994. See R. Errera "Recent Decisions of the French
Conseil d'Etat" [1995] P.L. 657; M. Heers "La s~curit~
juridique en droit administratif franyais: vers une
cons~cration du principe de confiance l~gitime?" (1995)
11 R.F.D.A. 963.
14 See Case 169/73 Compagnie Continentale France v.
Council [1975] E.C.R. 117, 140 (col. 1) of the opinion
of Advocate General Trabucchi; Case 338/85 Fratelli
Pardini SpA v. Ministero del commercio con l'estro and
Banca toscana (Lucca branch), supra no. 3, paragraph 34
of the opinion of Advocate General Darmon; Case 161/88
Friedrich Binder GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Bad
Reichenhall, supra no. 8, paragraph 26 of the opinion of
Advocate General Darmon. See also J.A. Usher "The
Influence of National Concepts on Decisions of the
European Court" (1976) 1 E.L.Rev. 359, 363; Schwarze,
op. cit. supra no. 5, page 1170, T.C. Hartley The
Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994) page 152.
15 See Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v. High Authority
of the European Coal and Steel Community [1965] E.C.R.
677, 691. See also Schwarze, op. cit. supra no. 5, page
872; F. Hubeau "Le Principe de la Protection de la
Confiance Legitime dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour de
Justice des Communautes Europeennes" [1983] C.D.E. 143,
149-150; Borchardt, op. cit. supra no. 4, 309-311.
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Vorratsstelle fur Zucker6 where the Finance Court
of Hesse sent a reference to the European Court
asking whether a Regulation infringed "a principle
of legal certainty by which the confidence of
persons concerned deserves to be protected
(Vertrauensschutz) .,,17 In his opinion Advocate
General Roemer stated that the issuing of a licence
may create an expectation on the behalf of the
individual and if the administration decides to
change the situation, then the individual may
consequently suffer loss. Advocate General Roemer
stated that what is required is a "weighing up of
respective interests" as interference with an
individual's confidence could "only be sanctioned
if public interests predominate". 18
It may be surmised that the European Court
developed the principle of legitimate expectations
16 Case 1/73 [1973] E.C.R 723.
17 Ibid., paragraph 6. See also 81/72 Commission v.
Council [1973] E.C.R. 575, paragraph 13 where the
European Court referred to "the rule relating to the
protection of legitimate confidence." When the principle
was first used the phrase "protection of confidence" was
used as the translation of "Vertrauensschutz". However,
according to Usher, op. cit. supra no. 5, page 54 the
translation was changed to the "protection of legitimate
expectations" in order to avoid misunderstandings over
the special meaning given to the word confidence in the
English legal system.
18 Ibid., 741 (col. 1) of the Advocate General's opinion.
Advocate General Roemer relied upon a decision of the
German Federal Constitutional Court of 23rd March 1971
reported in (1971) 24 D.O.V. 605.
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for two reasons. First, the European Court
presumably considered the principle to be
"progressive" 19 in that it enhanced the legal
protection of the individual against the arbitrary
use of administrative power. The principle provides
a mechanism for determining when individuals can
justifiably rely in confidence on the conduct of
the administration and so must have been seen as
the "most carefully considered,,20 solution to this
problem. Secondly, the adoption of the principle
might have been considered by the European Court as
another step towards a Community administrative law
which provided protection equal to the best
performing national legal orders. Had the European
Court refused to recognise the principle then it
could have been seen as falling behind those
national legal systems which protected legitimate
expectations and only offering "second-class" legal
prot ect Lon."
19 Case 14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en
Staalfabrieken N.V. v. High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community [1962] E.C.R 253, 283-4 of the
opinion of Advocate General Lagrange.
20 Joined Cases 63 to 69/72 Wilhelm Wehahn Heneemiuxl:«v.
Council [1973] E.C.R. 1229, 1260 (col. 1) of Advocate
General Roemer's opinion.
21 The importance of the need for Community law to
provide protection equal to the most successful national
legal systems can be seen in Case 14/61 Koninklijke
Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfalbrieken N.V. v. High
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community,
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2. The Justification of the Principle
The European Court has not explicitly drawn
out any theoretical justification for the principle
of legitimate expectations though some Advocate
Generals have suggested various justifications. The
question to be asked is why should legitimate
expectations be worthy of protection? The answer to
this can be found in the concepts of fairness in
public administration, the Rule of Law and an
administrative morality of trust. It has been
stated that the principle of legitimate
expectations has a "specific equitable function,,22
supra no. 19, 279 of the op~n~on of Advocate General
Lagrange; Case C-49/88 AI-Jubail Fertilizer Company and
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company v. Commission [1991]
E.C.R. I-3187, paragraph 16; Case C-371/92 Elliniko
Dimosio (Greek State) v. Ellinika Dimitriaka AE [1994]
E.C.R. I-2391, paragraphs 38 and 39 of the opinion of
Advocate General Van Gerven. However, the need to
protect expectations by the national legal systems may
sometimes conflict with the efficiency of Community law.
See Case C-5/89 Commission v. Federal Republic of
Germany [1990] E.C.R. I-3437. See also D. Triantafyllou
"Zur 'Europaisierung" des Vertrauensschutzes
(insbesondere § 48 VwVfg) - am Beispel der Ruckforderung
staatlicher Beihilfen" [1992] N.Vw.Z. 436; F. Schulze
"Vertrauensschutz im EG-Recht bei der Ruckforderung von
Beihilfen" [1993] Eu.Z.W. 279.
22 Case 5/75 Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH B.J. Stolp
v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und
Futtermittel [1975] E.C.R. 759, 777 (col. 2) of the
opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi.
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which ensures "fair dealing and good faith,,23by the
Community administration and that "assurances
relied upon in good faith should be honoured. ,,24 By
enabling the European Court to decide whether the
individual can legitimately have confidence in his
expectations, the principle of legitimate
expectations allows "a balance between equity and
the rigour of law.,,25It would be unfair and
contrary to good faith for the administration to
raise certain expectations as to its future conduct
which are then subsequently disappointed. Other
justifications advanced have focused on the
importance of the principle in upholding the Rule
of Law. According to Schwarze, the principle is
merely a general maxim derived from the notion that
the Community is based on the Rule of Law.26 In
order for individuals to arrange their lives, the
23 Case 74/74 eNTA, op. cit. no. 10, 560 (col. 1) of the
opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi. See also Lord
Mackenzie Stuart, op. cit. supra no. 12, 73.
24 Case 169/73 Compagnie Continentale v. Council, supra
no. 14, paragraph 4 of the opinion of Advocate General
Trabucchi.
25 Case 210/87 Remo Padovani and the successors of Otello
Mantovani v. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato
[1988] E.C.R. 6177, paragraph 32 of the opinion of
Advocate General Darmon.
26 Schwarze, op. cit. supra no. 5, page 867. Cf. The
German idea of Rechtstaat enforces a substantive
conception of the Rule of Law. See M.P. Singh German
Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective (Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1985) pages 5-6; Nolte, op. cit. supra
no. 13, 200-201, 203.
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law should be certain, regular and predictable.27
Legal certainty is a basic value of the Rule of Law
and the protection of legitimate expectations
promotes the certainty and predictability of the
law in specific relationships between the
individual and the administration by allowing the
individual to rely on administrative conduct as to
its future intentions.
Another justification for protecting
legitimate expectations views the principle as
imposing an administrative morality of trust. For
Advocate General Trabucchi, the importance of the
principle lies in the recognition that "trust in
d' 28the Community's legal order must be respecte ' .
According to Luhmann, trust is a basic fact of
social life.29 If the individual is to carry out his
life then placing some trust in the administration
is inevitable. For example, a trader could not
27 See J. Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972) pages 235-245; J. Raz "The Rule of Law and
Its Virtue" in The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and
Morality. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) page 210, 222.
28 Case 5/75 Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH B.J. Stolp
v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und
Futtermittel, supra no. 22, 776 (col. 1) of the opinion
of Advocate General Trabucchi. See also Case 2/75
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel
v. Firma C. Mackprang [1975] E.C.R. 607, 623 (col. 2) of
the opinion of Advocate General Warner.
29 N. Luhmann "Trust: a mechanism for the reduction of
social complexity" in Trust and Power. Two works by
Niklas Luhmann. (Chichester: Wiley, 1979) page 4.
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operate at all without placing at least a minimum
of trust in the Community administration. The
principle of legitimate expectations forces the
administration to be trustworthy because the trader
may have no choice but to trust the administration
as to its future conduct. For instance, in the
Mulder case30 the applicant undertook not to produce
milk for a certain period of time and was therefore
compelled to place trust in the administration that
he would not be placed in a worse position
precisely because he made this undertaking. The
principle of legitimate expectations was held to
preclude the application of restrictive measures
which specifically affected the applicant because
he had made the undertaking. Protecting legitimate
expectations can be seen as enforcing the
individual's trust in the administration in order
to prevent the breakdown of that trust which would
otherwise result and with it the end of a workable
relationship between the individual and the
administration.
The function of the principle is to ensure
protection of those expectations created by the
administration but not at the expense of the wider
30 Case 120/86 Mulder v. Minister van Laudbouw en
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public interest. Good administration can be served
by the realisation of such expectations but not if
the public interest requires their disappointment.
The principle forms part of the judicial tool-kit
for administrative law, a central principle of
which is that the public and private interests
should be balanced against each other. This need to
balance the competing interests is required in the
application of the principle of legitimate
expectations. Administrative bodies have powers to
act in the public interest. The exercise of such
powers may interfere with private rights and
interests of individuals. Expectations do not form
strict legal rights but can be created through the
relationship between the administration and
individual and as such form a private interest. The
creation of an expectation by the administration
will require protection but when the gain to the
public interest in frustrating that expectation is
clearly greater than its protection, then the
public interest will have to take precedence. The
principle of legitimate expectations is then a
specific articulation of the principle of European
Visserij (1988] E.C.R. 2321.
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administrative law that the competing interests
need to be properly weighed and fairly balanced.
It might be argued that the principle of
legitimate expectations has an unintended ulterior
function of promoting a defensive administration
unwilling to conduct itself in such a way as to
raise any expectations as to its future conduct.
Alternatively, it could be that the principle of
legitimate expectations has had an educative effect
on administrative decision-making and encouraged
administrators to make special provision for those
individuals who have reasonably entertained such
expectations. In the absence of empirical evidence
it is impossible to determine what the consequences
of upholding legitimate expectations have been.
While the principle has a potentially wide scope of
being invoked, the European Court has gradually
narrowed down its application.31 The Court has
imposed a high standard on claimants to ensure that
any change made to their expectations was not
reasonably foreseeable. Even if the claimant holds
31 Judge D. Edward "Proportionality and Legitimate
Expectations" (A talk given at the Judicial Studies
Board Seminar on UK and EC Law, 8th January 1993) page
10. See also M. Waelbrock "Examen de Jurisprudence (1971
a 1977)" [1978] Revue Critique de Jurisprudence BeIge
73, 76-77; Lord Mackenzie Stuart, op. cit. supra no. 12,
pages 57-59, 73; E. Sharpston, op. cit. supra no. 2,
160.
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a reasonable expectation, the administration may
argue that the public interest overrides the need
for the protection of that expectation. Relatively
few arguments based on legitimate expectations have
succeeded before the European Court and cases of
legitimate expectations being protected are
exceptional whatever their wider impact on the
administration may be.
3. The Inducement of an Expectation
For an individual to invoke the principle, an
expectation must have been induced into the
individual's mind by conduct of the administration.
The European Court has stated that the principle
"extends to any individual who is in a situation in
which it appears that the administration's conduct
has led him to entertain reasonable expectations."n
Whether an expectation has been induced therefore
concerns the issues of whether administrative
conduct has raised an expectation and what exact
type of conduct is capable of inducing an
expectation.
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A. Conduct by the Administration
The requirement that an expectation must have
been raised by conduct of the administration
ensures that the principle protects only those
expectations which exist as a result of
administrative conduct and not by virtue of the
subjective hopes and aspirations of the individual
as to how the administration should act. Were it
otherwise then the principle could be used to cover
those expectations which the individual undertook
to follow at his own risk and not at the
encouragement of the administration.)) The European
Court has been keen to ensure that the principle is
not expanded beyond its justifiable limits and
therefore has consistently required that the
expectation be based on administrative conduct. The
litigation concerning milk production provides a
good example.
)2 Case 289/81 Mavrides v. European Parliament [1983]
E.C.R. 1731, paragraph 21.
))Cf. Luhmann, Ope cit. supra no. 29, pages 32-33 who
states that placing trust relies on incomplete and
unreliable information given to the individual which is
not enough to guarantee success. Therefore, the
individual overdraws on the available information in
order to anticipate the future conduct of the trustee.
128
The milk market had been over-supplied for
many years.34 In 1977 the Council adopted two
Regulations which sought to regulate the sector and
solve this problem. Regulation 1078/7735 aimed at
encouraging milk producers to stop production. If a
producer made an undertaking not to produce milk
for a five-year period he would in return be
awarded a non-marketing premium. Regulation
1079/7736 introduced a 'co-responsibility levy' for
all milk processing. Several milk producers made an
undertaking to cease milk production for five
years. However, as this did not solve the problem
of surplus production the Council adopted more
stringent measures in 1984.37 Regulation 856/8438
introduced a 'super-levy' to be imposed on top of
the 'co-responsibility levy'. This levy was to be
payable when milk deliveries exceeded a given
'reference quantity'. Regulation 857/8439 set out
the method of calculation for a reference quantity.
Under Article 2(1) the reference quantity for a
34 See M. Cardwell Milk Quotas. European Community and
United Kingdom Law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
pages 5-8.
35 OJ 1977 L 131, p. l.
36 OJ 1977 L 131, p. 6.
37 See G. Avery "The Common Agricultural Policy: a
Turning Point?" (1984) 21 C.M.L.Rev. 481; Cardwell, op.
cit. supra no. 34, pages 11-23.
38 OJ 1984 L 90, p. 10.
39 OJ 1984 L 90, p. 13.
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producer was to be equal to the quantity of milk or
milk equivalent delivered by the producer in 1981
plus 1%. Under Article 2(2) the Member State could
decide to calculate the reference quantity as equal
to the amount of milk production or milk equivalent
delivered or purchased in 1982 or 1983 (the
relevant 'reference year') which was then to be
weighted by a percentage in order that it did not
exceed the guaranteed quantity laid down for the
Member State.
In Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en
Visserij40 the applicant was a Dutch farmer who had
made an undertaking in 1979 to cease milk
production for a five-year period ending in
September 1984. Near the end of this period the
applicant, intending to resume milk production,
applied for a reference quantity which was refused
by the Dutch Minister for Agriculture and
Fisheries. As the applicant could not provide proof
of milk production in 1983 no reference quantity
could be awarded to him and without one the
applicant would be charged the super-levy for his
milk production. The applicant claimed that the
40 Case 120/86, supra no. 30. See also Case 170/86 von
Deetzen v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1988] E.C.R.
2355.
130
Regulation introducing the reference quantity
violated his legitimate expectations because when
the non-marketing undertaking was made there was no
indication that the Council would subsequently
introduce other restrictive measures. The European
Court reasoned that a producer had given up and
later resumed milk production could not expect to
do so under exactly the same market conditions as
existed when they had ceased production. It was not
legitimate to expect that such producers would not
be subject to any market or structural policy which
had been introduced in the meantime.41 However, the
European Court held that the applicant could expect
to be able to resume production without being
restricted from doing so precisely because he was
encouraged to cease his milk production:
"The fact remains that where a producers, as
in the present case, has been encouraged by a
Community measure to suspend marketing for a
limited period in the general interest and against
payment of a premium he may legitimately expect
not to be subject, upon the expiry of his
undertaking, to restrictions which specifically
affect him precisely because he availed himself of
41 Ibid., paragraph 23.
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the possibilities offered by the Community
provisions. ,,42
The applicant's legitimate expectation was that he
would be able to resume his milk production and not
be prevented from doing so precisely because of the
encouragement by the Community to cease milk
production for a five-year period. That is what had
happened here. The applicant had been effectively
precluded from being awarded a reference quantity
for the relevant year and from resuming milk
production because he had made the non-marketing
undertaking. When the applicant made the
undertaking it was unforeseeable that he would not
be awarded a reference quantity in order to be
exempt from the super-levy because the reference
quantity system was not introduced until 1984. The
conduct of the Community which induced the
expectation were the two 1977 Regulations as they
encouraged the applicant to cease milk production.
The expectation was that the ability of the
producers who had made a non-marketing undertaking
to resume production would not be any the less
because they had made this undertaking.
42 Ibid., paragraph 24.
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This case is to be contrasted with Kuhn v.
Landwirtschaftskammer Weser-Ems.43 The applicant was
a milk producer who had leased his farm to two
tenants successively for the period of 1981 to 1983
inclusive. He applied for a reference quantity to
be calculated on the basis of the farm's 1981 or
1982 production as an exceptional case because the
lessee had mismanaged the farm and deliberately
reduced milk production. As a result the applicant
could not show a representative level of deliveries
for that year. As the Regulation did not allow
account to be taken of a change of hands during the
reference year the applicant claimed a legitimate
expectation. The European Court rejected this
argument reasoning that the applicant could not
legitimately expect the change of hands during the
reference year to be taken account of as he had
leased the farm by his own decision and not as the
result of any encouragement by the Community. The
European Court stated:
"...the principle of the protection of
legitimate expectations may be invoked as against
Community rules, only to the extent that the
Community itself has previously created a
43 Case C-177/90 [1992] E.C.R. I-35.
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situation which can give rise to a legitimate
expectation."44
The principle of legitimate expectations will
therefore not extend to an individual who did not
act due to the conduct of the Community but at his
own risk which he freely took without any
encouragement by the Community. In Kuhn the
applicant had freely decided to lease his farm
whereas in Mulder the applicant had been encouraged
to do so by the Community. An expectation can only
be considered worthy of protection if it was
induced by the conduct of the Community
administration.
That the expectation must have been induced by
conduct of the Community presupposes that the
individual actually held the expectation. The
individual who acts to his detriment in ignorance
of any expectations induced by the Community and
then later seeks to establish a legitimate
expectation to make good any loss suffered would be
unlikely to succeed as he acted at his own risk in
ignorance of the expectation. In such a situation
there was no expectation at all induced by the
44 Ibid., paragraph 14.
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Community into the individual's mind. However, the
position is not so clear-cut as the case of
Siegfried Rauh v. Hauptzollamt Nurnberg-Furth45
demonstrates. In 1985 the applicant had inherited
his farm from his parents who had made a non-
marketing undertaking which expired in December
1984 just before the applicant took over the farm.
The applicant was refused a reference quantity for
the farm. Before the European Court it was argued
that it would be contrary to the applicant's
legitimate expectations to be refused a reference
quantity because he had only taken over the holding
after the non-marketing period had expired. The
Commission argued that the expectation protected by
Article 3a (inserted into the Regulation after the
Mulder case) only belonged to those farmers who had
actually made the non-marketing undertaking. As the
applicant had inherited the farm after the expiry
of the undertaking he had no expectation as there
was no conduct of the Community towards the
applicant which could have induced an expectation.
Nevertheless, the European Court found that the
applicant did have a legitimate expectation. It
reasoned that the restrictions imposed upon those
45 Case C-314/89 [1991] E.C.R. 1-1647.
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farmers, as in Mulder, had affected them precisely
because of their non-marketing undertakings. Such
restrictions would be maintained because the rules
were not to be interpreted as providing for an heir
or successor to apply for a reference quantity in
the same way as the producer himself. The judgment
of the European Court may seem to question the
basic requirement that there be conduct of the
Community which induced the expectation in the
applicant's mind. However, it is consistent with
principle if the heir or successor is seen as
stepping into the shoes of their predecessor. If
so, then there is no objective reason for treating
the heir or successor any differently than the
predecessor.46 The European Court treated the
applicant as an objective entity, the "farmer",
regardless of the change of personnel that occurred
following the expiry of the undertaking. The
relationship between heir or successor and
predecessor is not a means of evading the
requirement that conduct by the Community induce an
expectation but rather a fulfilment of that
requirement in that the heir or successor takes
over the business exactly as the predecessor left
46 Ibid., paragraphs 30-34 of the opinion of Advocate
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it and any expectations the predecessor may have
had are also transferred.
B. The Type of Conduct
Exactly what forms of conduct are capable of
raising an expectation? The inducement of an
expectation by an express representation or
assurance is a clear case of conduct by the
administration. For example, in Commission v.
Counai.T" (hereinafter the "staff salaries" case) a
decision was adopted by the Council to end the
difficulties concerning the remuneration of
Community officials. The decision introduced for a
three year period a method of calculating increases
in salaries which resulted in an increase of 3.75%
in staff salaries. Some months later the Council
adopted a Regulation48 which changed the increase in
the salaries to only 2.5%. The Commission
challenged the validity of the Regulation. The
European Court appraised the decision within the
framework of the Staff Regulations and held that by
adopting the decision the Council had gone beyond
General Mischo.
47 Case 81/72, supra no. 16. See L. Dubouis (1973) 9
R.T.D.E. 761.
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mere preparatory considerations and had begun a
decision-making process. The European Court found
that the decision amounted to an undertaking by the
Council towards the staff that the new method of
calculation would be used for the stipulated length
of time otherwise "the rule of protection of the
confidenceu49 would be violated. The Council had
failed to provide sufficient justification in order
to justify departing from its undertaking. The
Regulation was therefore declared void. The
Council's decision amounted to an undertaking which
gave rise to a legitimate expectation that the
system of salary calculation would be used.50
The Mulder case is another example of an
express representation inducing an expectation. The
difference is that in Mulder the expectation was
raised as a result of the non-marketing undertaking
which was an express representation. The
undertaking did not explicitly state that the
applicant would not be subject to restrictions
which specifically affected him precisely because
he ceased milk production. However, it was
48 Regulation No 2647/72, OJ 1972 L 283, p. 1.
49 Ibid., paragraph 10.
50 In his opinion, ibid., 593 (col. 1) Advocate General
Warner stated that in English law there was no exception
to the general principle that an administration cannot
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reasonable for the applicant to expect not to be
treated any differently because he had made the
non-marketing undertaking. The inducement of
expectations through express representations
therefore includes those expectations which arise
from the content of the representation and those
which are reasonable to expect as a result of the
representation. The content of a Regulation can
also form an express representation capable of
inducing a legitimate expectation.s1
The existence of a settled practice may also
amount to similarly clear conduct by the
administration capable of inducing an expectation.
For example, in Ferriere San Carlo v. CommissionS2
the European Court declared void the Commission's
decision to impose a fine on the applicants for
exceeding its production quota for steel
reinforcing bars because of the existence of a
continuing practice by the Commission to tolerate
the disposal of stock in addition to the delivery
quota. The Commission's practice had applied to
excess production of reinforcing bars existing on
bind itself as to the exercise of its discretion which
could possibly apply in the present case.
Sl Case C-152/88 Sofrimport SARL v. Commission [1990]
E.C.R. 1-2477.
52 Case 344/85 [1987] E.C.R. 4435.
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the two preceding years. The applicant, acting in
reliance on this practice of toleration, had over-
produced and proceeded to dispose of the excess
when the Commission imposed a fine. The legitimate
expectation arose from the past practice of
toleration which amounted to conduct capable of
inducing an expectation. Similarly in Decker v.
Caisse de pension des employes privess3 the
existence of a practice of passing transfer
requests made by staff through the European
Parliament to the national administrative body
created a legitimate expectation which defeated the
application of a national time-limit of one year
for such requests.
Schwarze states that legitimate expectations
may be created by an action on the behalf of the EC
administration by a consistent administrative
practice and by an undertaking or an assurance.54
While this is correct in many cases of legitimate
expectation, it is not a comprehensive statement as
the European Court has allowed conduct other than
practice or assurance to create a legitimate
53 Case 129/87 [1988] E.C.R. 6121.
54 Schwarze, OPe cit. supra no. 5, pages 950-951.
140
expectation. For example, in Grogan v. Commission55
the issue was raised as to whether delay by the
administration could amount to conduct capable of
inducing an expectation. The applicant, who had
worked as a Staff Official, retired in 1975 and had
resumed his residence in Ireland. He had chosen to
have his pensions paid in Belgian Francs which he
would then change into Irish pounds at the exchange
rate at the time. Due to the devaluation of the
Irish pound in the 1970s the Council had increased
the weightings for those who had their pension paid
directly into Irish pounds. Those in the position
of the applicant did not suffer a similar possible
reduction in purchasing power yet the weighting was
increased as it was of general application. The
pension benefits of people in the applicant's
position gradually increased in real value compared
with those who had their pension paid directly into
Irish pounds. In 1978 the Council put an end to
this by adopting two Regulations, one of which
updated exchange rates and the other restored the
weightings to the level necessary to serve the
function they had previously served which was
55 Case 127/80 [1982] E.C.R. 869. See also Case 164/80 De
Pascale v. Commission [1982] E.C.R. 909; Case 167/80
Curtis v. European Parliament [1982] E.C.R. 931.
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compensating for the difference in living
conditions. The applicant's pension was to be
decreased from BFR 30 145 to BFR 13 080 by a
reduction of one tenth per month for a ten months.
The applicant claimed that the new system infringed
his legitimate expectations because he was entitled
to expect the continued payment of the pension at
the same level because this has "guided him in
choosing his mode of living during his years of
retirement".56 The European Court rejected this as
none of the Community institutions had committed
themselves to the maintenance of the system.57
However, the European Court accepted the plea of
legitimate expectations with regard to the
arrangements for the introduction of the new system
of calculating pensions. The deterioration of the
system had worsened with time. Nothing the
pensioners had done was responsible for the change
in exchange rates, rather it was the inaction and
delay of the Council to ensure that the exchange
rates bore a proper relationship to economic
reality. The European Court stated:
56 Ibid., paragraph 27.
57 Ibid., paragraph 30.
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"Whilst there may be some explanation for the
Council's inaction it must none the less not
be overlooked that pensioners benefiting from
that inaction were entitled to expect the Council
to take account of the situation in which they had
been placed by the prolonged application of the
system temporarily used."s8
The transitional period of ten months for the
reduction of the applicant's pension did not
adequately protect this legitimate expectation
because the Council was making those in the
applicant's position bear the loss of the increase
in their pensions after seven years of inaction by
the Council. The applicant therefore had a
legitimate expectation that the Council would
progressively reduce the pension payments but over
a length of time which allowed suitable transition
to be made by the applicant.
Conduct through delay has also given rise to a
legitimate expectation in a different context to
that in Grogan. In Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV)
Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV v. Commission59
a challenge was made to a decision concerning state
58 Ibid., paragraph 33.
59 Case 223/85 [1987] E.C.R. 4617.
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aid. In 1982 the applicant had been given a subsidy
by the Dutch government which the Commission had
shown an interest in as possibly incompatible with
the common market. In December 1984 the Commission
decided that the subsidy was incompatible with the
Community rules. The applicant claimed that the
Commission's delay of 26 months had given rise to a
legitimate expectation that it did not find the aid
objectionable. The European Court held that the
Commission's delay was due to its own inactivity
and had given rise to reasonable grounds for
believing that the state aid was lawful. Therefore
a legitimate expectation existed that the state aid
was lawful. This case should be contrasted with
Italian Republic v. Commission60 where the
Commission allowed 55 months to pass before holding
that the grant of aid was unlawful. The claim of a
legitimate expectation was, however, rejected by
the European Court as the applicant had shown
reluctance in complying with the Commission's
procedure by delaying the provision of necessary
information thereby protracting the whole
procedure. The Commission's delay could not raise
60 Case C-303/88 [1991] E.C.R. I-1433.
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an expectation as the applicant was partly to blame
for causing and prolonging the delay.
The conclusion to be drawn from Grogan, RSV
and Italian State v. Commission is that delay or
inaction by the administration can induce an
expectation provided that the delay has not in part
been caused by the applicant. This is entirely
consistent with the reasoning which underlies the
requirement for conduct by the administration to
induce a legitimate expectation: the principle does
not exist in order to allow any loss which the
claimant suffers through his own fault to be passed
onto the Community but only that loss which can be
attributed to conduct of the Community.
4. Objectively Reasonable Expectations
After conduct of the administration has
induced an expectation it becomes necessary to
determine whether the expectation is objectively
reasonable. The question is whether it was
reasonable for the applicant in all the
circumstances to have relied on the expectation.61
In determining this the European Court will require
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that the expectation is reasonably clear and
precise and that any change in the situation was
not reasonably foreseeable. The European Court
adopts an objective test to determine the
reasonableness of the expectation in order that the
Community is only liable for those losses which it
was responsible for. Under the principle of
legitimate expectations the European Court has
sought to ensure that the Community should only be
held liable for "unreasonable treatment" of an
individual or undertaking and not for the "hard
business luck"62 which a business can expect to risk
in the market.
A. Quality of Inducement
It will be necessary to determine whether the
conduct relied upon could reasonably have given
rise to the expectation held. There must therefore
be a reasonable relationship between the actual
conduct of the administration and the applicant's
expectation. An example of this is provided by
Koninklijke Scholten-Honig N.V. and de Verenigde
61 Case 74/74, supra no. 10, 557 (col. 2) of the opinion
of Advocate General Trabucchi.
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Zetmeelbedrijen \\DeBijenkorf" B.V. v.
Hoofdprodukschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten. 63 The
applicant had invested in the manufacture of
isoglucose, a product technically similar to sugar
and new to the market. Such manufacturers had for a
time benefited from production refunds. However,
the Commission had adopted Regulations which
abolished the making of production refunds for
isoglucose. The applicant claimed that its
legitimate expectations had been frustrated because
it had not been notified of the possibility that
such measures might be adopted. The European Court
held that the provisions under which the
manufacturers had been given production refunds
were introduced before isoglucose existed and so it
did not fall within the category of products which
the system was designed to help. That the
manufacturers of isoglucose had benefited from
refunds awarded under a system intended to regulate
the common organisation of the market in cereals
could not raise a reasonable expectation that the
refunds would continue. Furthermore, as the product
was similar to sugar the manufacturers should have
62 Case 120/86 Mulder, supra no. 30, 2341 (col. 2) of the
opinion of Advocate General Slynn.
63 Case 125/77 [1978] E.C.R. 1991.
147
known that the growing sugar surplus would require
intervention. According to Advocate General
Reischl:
"...there can only be said to be a breach of
the principle of legitimate expectation that a
given legal position will continue if, having
regard to all the relevant circumstances and
especially to the conduct of the Community
institutions, there were grounds for being
absolutely certain that a specific legal
situation would not be altered."64
In this case there had not been any conduct from
which it was reasonable to infer that the awarding
of production refunds for isoglucose would
continue. If the producers had got into unexpected
difficulties because they had decided to invest in
the product on the basis of specific forecasts of
the market which later turned out to be wrong then
that was at their own risk as the Community had not
given them any indication that production refunds
for isoglucose would continue. In Finsider v.
Commission65 the applicant sought to claim a
legitimate expectation from a favourable opinion of
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the Commission concerning an adjustment of
reference production in steel. The Commission
claimed that a mere opinion could not give rise to
any legal obligations as to the future. The
European Court accepted this but acknowledged that
a favourable opinion could make an undertaking
entertain certain expectations in view of the fact
that the Commission took account of the current
situation and forecasts and was well placed to be
aware of possible future directions. However, the
European Court recognised that it was not necessary
in this case to decide whether a favourable opinion
could raise an expectation in view of the serious
crisis in the steel market. It therefore left open
the question of whether it would be reasonable to
have an expectation as a result of a favourable
opinion by the Commission.
B. The Administrative Body Against Which the
Expectation is Claimed
Another issue which may determine the
reasonableness of an expectation is whether the
expectation is induced by one administrative body
64 Ibid., 2032 of the opinion of the Advocate General.
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that a second administrative body will act in a
certain way. Must there be conduct by the
administrative body against which the expectation
is sought to be enforced or is it possible that
conduct of another administrative body can raise an
expectation? In Salerno v. Commission and Counci166
the applicant was a staff official who claimed a
legitimate expectation against the Commission and
the Council on the basis of a resolution of the
European Parliament which was adopted from a
Commission proposal. The resolution concerned the
formation of a European Agency for Co-operation.
The Parliament had stated that the staff for this
agency were to retain their established rights and
that the new provisions were to apply retroactively
to the day when they were to be engaged by the
agency. The European Court found that a resolution
of the European Parliament could not give rise to a
legitimate expectation that the other Community
institutions would comply with it.67 The judgment
could be interpreted as meaning that it was not
reasonable for the applicant to claim a legitimate
expectation from one body on the basis of the
65 Joined Cases 63 and 147/84 [1985] E.C.R. 2857.
66 Joined Cases 87 and 130/77, 22/83, 9 and 10/84 [1985]
E.C.R. 2523.
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conduct of another. The European Parliament had the
power to make a resolution but this did not mean
that it also spoke for the Commission and the
Council. It would not therefore have been
reasonable to allow the applicant to raise an
expectation against one body on the basis of
another's conduct. Similarly, in Friedrich Binder
GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhal168 the
European Court refused to allow the applicant to
claim a legitimate expectation against the
Community on the basis of the report of a proposed
Council Regulation reported in a German customs
tariff handbook. The handbook could not reasonably
have induced an expectation on the behalf of the
Community. The only tariffs that the applicant
could reasonably expect to be imposed were to be
found in the Official Journal of the Community.
It will not be reasonable to expect one
administrative body to act in a certain way on the
basis of conduct of another administrative body if
the claimant could reasonably have known that the
body inducing the expectation had no power to do so
or the inducement of the expectation could be
checked against official Community information.
67 Ibid., paragraph 59.
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Were the general rule otherwise then the principle
of legitimate expectations would have a free-
standing basis under which any expectation held by
the applicant would be capable of being considered
worthy of protection. This limitation of the
principle serves to protect legal certainty for
there is no infringement of legal certainty if an
administrative body violates a subjective
expectation which was raised by another
administrative body. Conduct of an administrative
body cannot raise an expectation against another
body unless it was reasonable for the claimant to
hold such an expectation. Cases falling within this
exception are, for example, where the Commission
has announced a policy to be implemented by
national administrative bodies. Should a national
body fail to implement the policy as the Commission
announced then the applicant would have a
reasonable expectation induced by the Commission's
conduct as regards how the national administrative
body ought to act.
C. Reasonably Foreseeable Changes to Expectations
68 Case 161/88, supra no. 8.
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A reasonable expectation cannot exist if the
possibility of change was reasonably foreseeable.69
This distinguishes an expectation from a mere hope
or aspiration. If the individual fails to foresee
the possibility of change then any confidence he
had in the fulfilment of the expectation is held,
if the change was reasonably foreseeable, at his
own risk and not due to the Community. The
individual will only have himself to blame for
undertaking such a risk in the light of reasonably
foreseeable changes being made. This limitation on
the operation of the principle is in order to
ensure that expectations do not become immutable.
The principle therefore does not operate in a
vacuum as an objective restraint on administrative
power but is responsive to the reasonably
foreseeable changes that can occur in the
administration of the Community.
Many cases of legitimate expectation have
arisen in the context of the monetary compensatory
amounts system which was introduced in agricultural
sectors from the early 1970s. The purpose of the
compensatory amounts was to compensate for
69 Case C-337/88 Societa agricole fattoria alimentare SpA
v. Amministratzione delle finanze dello Stato [1990]
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different price levels of agricultural produce due
to the difference in exchange rates for national
currencies.70 The value of an agricultural product
was to remain the same but if it was expressed in a
currency which was devalued or revalued then a
distortion of trade could occur which was to be
remedied by the compensatory amounts. Allowing
Member States to charge compensatory amounts on
imports, and grant them on exports, prevented the
fluctuation of exchange rates having an immediate
effect on agricultural prices in national currency
and thereby keeping the values of the product the
same in whatever currency it was expressed in. It
is within the conflict between the requirement of
constant re-adjustments of the compensatory amount
levels to prevent a distortion of trade and the
requirements of traders to be certain and secure in
their commercial transactions that the principle of
legitimate expectations has been applied. The
trader who applied for the advance fixing of
compensatory amounts subject to a deposit holds an
E.C.R. 1-1, paragraph 9 of the opinion of Advocate
General Tesauro.
70 See generally J .A. Usher "Agricultural Markets: Their
Price-Systems and Financial Mechanisms" (1979) 4
E.L.Rev. 147; F. Snyder Law of the Common Agricultural
Policy (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985) pages 111-121;
J.A. Usher Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European
Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) pages 108-121.
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expectation that those compensatory levels will be
applied to its transactions. However, if it is
reasonably foreseeable that changes will be made to
the compensatory levels then it will not be
reasonable to expect that the amounts will remain
the same. In assessing whether the possibility of
change the European Court asks whether a reasonable
and prudent trader could have foreseen the
possibility of change and acted upon it.
In Groupement d'Interet Economique 'Union
Malt' v. Commission71 the applicant traded in malt
and barley. To export such goods from the EC a
licence was required which was to be valid for 11
months. This particular sector had been
incorporated within the system of monetary
compensatory amounts. Community rules provided that
in the case of some products, including malt and
barley, the refund could be paid to the exporter
before the products were exported. A Regulation
made provision for the exporter to place the
products under customs control before the licence
expired. Two procedures were set up to enable this.
The first is not of direct concern, however, the
second was the bonded warehouse procedure under
71 Joined Cases 44 to 51/77 [1978] E.C.R. 57.
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which the products could remain for six months. A
Regulation, which entered into force after the
applicant had fixed the refund in advance, reduced
the period that products would remain under the
bonded warehouse procedure to either the remaining
length of time of the export licence or one month
if the export licence was valid for under one
month. Contracts for malt and barley were usually
entered into for 15 to 18 months allowing for
delivery of the goods to be made after 12 months.
The bonded warehouse procedure allowed the period
which passed before the placing of orders and the
making of deliveries to be recovered when the
export licence expired. The applicant claimed that
by changing the period such products would remain
within the procedure the Commission had infringed
its legitimate expectations.
The European Court held that the applicant's
expectation was not reasonable as it could not have
been unaware that some action by the Commission was
to be undertaken in order to resolve the difficult
situation in the malt market. During 1972-3 the
number of export licences had increased each year
and so had the advance fixing of the refund
resulting in difficulties in the market. During
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July 1975 the Soviet Union had purchased vast
quantities of the product precipitating a crisis.
The Court found that traders who had been
negotiating contracts for the year 1975-6 could not
have been unaware that the maintenance of the
system and the time-limits caused grave
difficulties and an increasing financial burden for
the Community.72 In light of this and the
presentation by the Commission to the Management
Committee of the strategy of reducing either the
length of time products were to remain in
warehouses or the periods of validity for licences,
it was reasonably foreseeable that change was
imminent. Therefore the applicant could not claim a
legitimate expectation. According to Advocate
General Mayras to claim a breach of legitimate
expectations the interference with the expectation
"must have occurred without warning and with
immediate effect and without any transitional
measure of such a nature as to enable a prudent
trader to avoid losses or to be compensated for
them.tl73 It must sound like a "clap of thunder in a
72 Ibid., paragraph 34.
73 Ibid., 91 (col. 1) of the opinion of the Advocate
General.
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clear sky". 74 As the introduction of the new measure
was reasonably foreseeable the export licence had
not induced a reasonable expectation in the mind of
the applicant.
The European Court has on many occasions found
that a legitimate expectation did not exist as it
was reasonably foreseeable that changes could
happen.75 For example, if a proposal made by the
Commission to change the compensatory amounts then
this should alert the experienced trader to the
possibility of change.76 In British Beef Company
Limited v. Intervention Board for Agricultural
Produce" Advocate General Caportorti explained the
"general criterion" which emerged from the case-
law:
"...no legitimate expectations may be placed
in the maintenance of rules, nor therefore is
it possible to claim the protection of such an
74 Ibid., 92 (col. 1) of the opinion of the Advocate
General.
75 See Case 97/76 Merkur Auf3enhandel GmbH & Co. KG v.
Commission [1977] E.C.R. 1063, paragraph 9; Case 78/77
Firma Johann Luhrs v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1978]
E.C.R. 169, paragraph 6; Case 127/78 Hans Spitta & Co.
v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt Am Main-Ost [1979] E.C.R. 171,
paragraph 9; Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale AG v. Federal
Republic of Germany [1982] E.C.R. 2745, paragraph 27.
76 See, e.g., Joined Cases 95 to 98/74, 15 and 100/75
Union Nationale des Cooperatives Agricoles de Cereales
v. Commission and Council [1975] E.C.R. 1615, paragraph
45.
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expectation, if the possibility of legislative
amendment is reasonably foreseeable at the time a
contractual obligation is entered into, where it
is in relation to the performance of that
undertaking that exemption from the intervening
detrimental changes in the rules is sought."78
As Advocate General Capotorti continued, it then
becomes important to determine exactly which
factors could make a change in expectations
reasonably foreseeable. In relation to monetary
compensation amounts, the effectiveness of the
system required that variations be made very
quickly. Furthermore, the purpose of the system was
not to protect individual traders but to prevent
monetary instability and its consequent
difficulties for the functioning of the common
market.79 As those affected by the system must have
known of this the European Court has demanded a
high standard of what is objectively reasonable in
the circumstances.eo For example, the British Beef
case concerned the application of a Regulation
levying compensatory amounts in export contracts
77 Case 146/77 [1978] E.C.R. 1347.
78 Ibid., 1360-1 of the opinion of the Advocate General.
79 See Case 74/74 eNTA, supra no. 10, paragraphs 39-40.
80 Schwarze, op. cit. supra no. 5, page 1142.
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which were concluded before the adoption of the
Regulation. The European Court found that the
applicant could not have been unaware of the
uncertainties typical of the situation or that a
proposal by the Commission to the Council to alter
the representative rate of the pound might fail and
that following this new compensatory amounts would
have to be fixed. Legitimate expectations will only
arise if a reasonable and prudent trader would have
omitted to cover itself against the exposure to the
risk of the exchange rate.S1 According to Lord
Mackenzie Stuart "...the Court is less
susceptible ...to the blandishments of the large and
experienced undertaking well able to see in which
direction the economic wind is blowing and able to
make for a safe anchorage before the storm cloud
breaks. "S2
D. Speculative Activity
The reasonableness of an expectation can also
be determined by whether it was compatible with the
purposes of the system in which it was created. If
81 Case 74/74 CNTA supra no. 10, paragraph 41.
82 Lord Mackenzie Stuart The European Communities and The
Rule of Law (London: The Hamlyn Lectures, 1977) page 96.
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the expectation runs counter to the policy and
purposes behind the system then it may not be
reasonable for the applicant to hold such an
expectation. This issue arose in Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futterrnittel v.
Firma c. Mackprang.83 The applicant, who traded in
cereals, offered the German intervention agency a
quantity of wheat. The agency accepted the offer
and took delivery of some of the wheat. However,
the Commission gave the intervention agency the
power to temporarily confine its purchases of wheat
to that grown on its own territory. This power had
been given in order to remedy the making of
speculative profits by buying wheat in France and
selling to the German intervention agency following
the fall in the French franc. Following this the
agency repudiated the contract with the applicant
who then claimed a legitimate expectation that it
could expect to be excluded from the application of
the decision as it had made arrangements under the
previous system with the agency. It would seem that
the applicant had a strong case of legitimate
expectations: it had made concrete arrangements,
relied on the expectation and the introduction of
83 Case 2/75, supra no. 28.
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the decision was not reasonably foreseeable.
Nonetheless both Advocate General Warner and the
European Court rejected the applicant's case.
Advocate General Warner held that the expectation
was not legitimate because the activity of the
applicant had been subversive of the intervention
system:
"No trader who was exploiting that system in
order to make out of the system profits that
the system was never designed to bestow on him
could legitimately rely on the persistence of
the situation. On the contrary, the only
reasonable expectation that such a trader could
have was that the competent authorities would act
as swiftly as possible to bring the situation to
an end. fl84
The European Court concluded that the challenged
decision was not an infringement of legitimate
expectations but "a justified precaution against
purely speculative activities. fiBS The applicant's
expectation was of making a speculative profit
which threatened to contribute to the undermining
84 Ibid., 623 (col. 2) of the opinion of the Advocate
General.
BS Ibid. I paragraph 4.
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of the intervention system. As the changes had been
introduced to prevent speculation the applicant
could not claim a legitimate expectation to that
effect.
E. Mistake of Fact
If the conduct of the administration raising
an expectation is predicated on a mistaken basis of
fact which is known to the applicant then this may
prevent the expectation from being reasonable.
Pauvert v. Court of Audi tiore" demonstrates how a
mistake of fact by the administration which is
known by the applicant can lead to the expectation
being no more than a mere hope. The applicant had
been employed by the Court of Auditors as a
chauffeur from 1973 to 1978 and as an official from
1978. In 1983 he accepted the position as head
chauffeur. The Court of Auditors had required that
candidates must have had fifteen years' experience
as a chauffeur. The applicant was never appointed
to the post as it was re-advertised. Now applicants
must have a minimum of fifteen years' relevant
experience of which eight must have been as a
86 Case 228/84 [1985] E. C. R. 1969.
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chauffeur. The applicant claimed a legitimate
expectation of being appointed to the position as
the Court of Auditors had agreed to appoint him.
The Court of Auditors claimed that the appointment
had been made under a mistaken view of the facts:
the applicant had only five years' experience as a
chauffeur and so did not fulfil the conditions. The
European Court held that the applicant was
precluded from relying on the principle of
legitimate expectations as he was the best placed
person to know that as he had only been employed
for five years as a chauffeur he did not fulfil the
necessary conditions. It was not reasonable for the
applicant to expect the Court of Auditors to employ
him when he knew that the conditions which had been
laid down were not fulfilled by him. All he could
reasonably expect was that the conditions set out
would be followed and that the mistake of fact by
the Court of Auditors would not be ignored once it
had been discovered.
5. Policy, Discretion and Legitimate Expectations
In applying the principle of legitimate
expectations the European Court has sought to
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ensure that while an individual's legitimate
expectations are not infringed, the powers of the
administration are not impeded either. It has
therefore been necessary to achieve a balance in
order that the protection of the individual is not
a threat to the functioning of the Community whilst
not being altogether ignored either. This is
illustrated by the cases where a legitimate
expectation is claimed that a policy will not be
changed. Policy-making within the Community87 is
decided by the Community institutions. Such bodies
are concerned with the implementation of such
policies and are frequently given wide
discretionary powers to achieve policy objectives.
The need for the Community institutions to change
policy is as important as it is for national
administrative bodies. A variation of policy may be
necessary for several reasons. For example,
technological developments may compel change. A
policy which was tried and then failed will need to
be replaced by a new policy. Change in the
political complexion of the Council of Ministers
may call for changes in policy. Perhaps most
87 See generally P.P. Craig and G. de Burca EC Law. Text,
Cases and Materials. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)
chapter 3.
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important in practical terms is the need for the
Community administration to respond quickly to
changes in economic and market forces.ss A crisis in
a certain policy area will command action by the
Community to ensure the proper functioning of the
common market. Policy must be allowed the freedom
to change. An administrative body which had been
given a discretionary power must be able to use
that power should it need to do so. According to
Advocate General Trabucchi "it must be borne in
mind ...that when exercising a discretion, an
administrative authority is always at liberty to
adopt a different view from those previously taken
on particular issues. The adoption at a particular
time of one of the possible alternatives does not
deprive the authority of the power to take a
different view in future.ns9 If the principle of
legitimate expectations could prevent the
administration from enjoying a margin of discretion
88 The European Court has frequently emphasised this
need. See, e.g., Case 84/78 Angelo Tomadini S.n.c. v.
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1979] E.C.R.
1801, paragraph 22; Case 112/80 Firma Anton Durbeck v.
Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen, supra no. 1,
paragraph 48.
89 Case 47/75 Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission
[1976] E.C.R. 569, 589 of the opinion of the Advocate
General. See also Joined Cases 17 and 20/61 Klockner v.
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
[1962] E.C.R. 325, 342; Lord Mackenzie Stuart The
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in the exercise of its power then this could hamper
a change in policy and effectively prevent the
administration from effectively responding to the
changing needs of the Community administration.
Not surprisingly therefore the European Court
has consistently stated that the principle of
legitimate expectations cannot operate so as to
prevent a change in policy. One of the earliest
cases concerning this was Edeka Zentrale AG v.
Federal Republic of Germany.90 The applicant was an
importer of mushrooms from Taiwan and South Korea.
Having applied for and been refused two import
licences the applicant challenged a Regulation
which had ceased the issuing of such licences. The
Regulation had been adopted following a commercial
agreement between the Community and China which
formed part of the Community commercial policy.
Under the Regulation all import licences for
preserved mushrooms had been suspended apart from
those granted to imports of Chinese mushrooms. The
European Court rejected the claim that this
frustrated the applicant's legitimate expectations:
European Communities and the Rule of Law, op. cit. supra
no. 82, page 54.
90 Case 245/81 [1982] E.C.R. 2745.
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"Since Community institutions enjoy a margin
of discretion in the choice of means needed to
achieve their policies, traders are unable to
claim that they have a legitimate expectation
that an existing situation which is capable of
being altered by decisions taken by those
institutions within the limits of their
discretionary power will be maintained." 91
The Regulation had been adopted to give effect to
the commercial agreement agreed under the
commercial policy under the wide powers of the
Community to choose the means necessary to achieve
such policies. If the principle of legitimate
expectations could cover an expectation to the
effect that the existing situation would be
maintained then this would result in both the
powers of the administration being fettered and an
inability to change the choice of the means to
achieve the policy. All that the applicant could
91 Ibid., paragraph 27. See also Case 52/81 Offene
Handelsgesellschaft in Firma Werner Faust v. Commission
[1982] E.C.R. 3745, paragraph 27; Case 278/84 Federal
Republic of Germany v. Commission [1987] E.C.R. 1,
paragraph 36; Case 256/84 KOYo Seiko Company Limited v.
Council [1987] E.C.R. 1899, paragraph 20; Case 258/84
Nippon Seiko KK v. Council [1987] E.C.R. 1923, paragraph
34; Case 203/86 Spain v. Council [1988] E.C.R. 4563,
paragraph 19; Joined Cases 424 and 425/85 Cooperatieve
Melkproducentenbedrijven Noord-Nederland BA ('Frico') v.
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therefore legitimately expect was that it would be
treated in accordance with the terms of whatever
means were to be chosen in order to achieve the
policy decided upon.
Similarly in Societe fran9aise des Biscuits
Delacre v. Commission92 the European Court again
stressed the need of the Community not to be
prevented by the expectations of individual traders
in developing its policies. By a Regulation the
Commission introduced a system of aid thereby
allowing traders to make tenders to obtain aid for
the use of butter. The applicant had lodged a
tender for aid with the French intervention agency.
However, a week later the Commission changed the
maximum amount of aid that could be tendered for.
As the applicant's tender exceeded this new limit,
its tender was rejected. The applicant claimed that
this change suddenly and unforeseeably frustrated
its expectations and its plan of future production.
The European Court recognised that "the Commission
had a margin of discretion in choosing the means
necessary for carrying out its policy in its
Voedselvoorzienings In- en Verkoopbureau [1987] E.C.R.
2755, paragraph 33.
92 Case C-350/88 [1990] E.C.R. 1-935. See also Joined
Cases C-258/90 and C-259/90 Pesquerias de Bermeo SA and
Naviera Laida SA v. Commission [1992] E.C.R. 1-2901.
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capacity as authority responsible for the
management of butter stocks, in which it has to
adjust its policy of aid and butter consumption to
meet the fluctuating market conditions. ,,93 The
Regulation had been a special measure designed to
dispose of butter on particularly favourable terms
in order to deal with the situation where the
market is encumbered with heavy stocks which cannot
be disposed of in the normal way. Due to the
increase in butter sales and prices, the maximum
amount of aid had steadily decreased since the
invitation to tender had been open. The applicant
could not legitimately claim an expectation to be
treated favourably under a system which was
introduced to deal with market conditions which no
longer existed and the principle of legitimate
expectations could not be used to defeat the
Commission's powers to reformulate policy in the
light of fluctuating market conditions.
In such cases the public interest in changing
policy prevails over the private interest in the
protection of expectations. The rule that
legitimate expectations cannot be applied so as to
interfere with changes of policy forms an absolute
93 Ibid., paragraph 32.
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and strictly enforced limitation on the operation
of the principle. The justification is in the need
for the administration to change and develop
policy. Alternatively, it could be reasoned that if
the protection of expectations is concerned with an
administrative morality of trust, then the general
public can trust the administration to effectively
exercise its powers in the public interest. Should
the protection of an individual's expectation
threaten to prevent the administration's duty to
act in the public interest, then it must give way.
The principle of legitimate expectations operates
inside the area of changes from one policy to
another and not in order to prevent changes of
policy. For example, in Mulder the European Court
recognised that the applicants could not
legitimately expect not to be subject to any rules
of market or structural policy adopted whilst the
producers had made their non-marketing undertaking.
However, the applicants could legitimately expect
not to be subject to restrictions which
specifically affected them because they agreed not
to market milk when they resumed their production.
The confidence an individual can have in the
administration is not that new policies or measures
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will not be adopted but that the individual will be
treated fairly when such changes are made.
6. Legality and Legitimate Expectations
The relationship between the principles of
legitimate expectations and legality raises
fundamental issues of how to reconcile potentially
conflicting interests. On the one side, there is
the public interest in the administration acting
within the limits of its legal powers and, on the
other, the individual's private interests in being
treated fairly by the administration which raised
the expectation. The European Court has stated that
an individual cannot claim a legitimate expectation
which the administration did not have the legal
power to raise and has restricted the application
of the principle to the confines of lawful
expectations.
For example, in SpA Acciaierie e Ferriere
Lucchini v. Commission94 the applicant claimed a
legitimate expectation on the ground that the
Commission had treated infringements of the same
rules by other undertakings permissively. However,
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this acquiescent attitude had ceased when the
Commission adopted a decision against the applicant
from breaching the rules. Advocate General
Capotorti stated that "conduct of the authorities
which is outside the normal application of the law
to which it is itself subject cannot however give
rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of a
person subject to those authorities."95 The European
Court refused to allow a concession by the
Commission to make the infringement of the rules
legitimate.96 The issue also arose in Hauptzollamt
Krefeld v. Maizena Gmbd7 where the applicant
challenged a decision by the German Customs Office
demanding repayment of a production refund. The
practice for calculating the production refund was
contrary to the Community rules98 and the applicant
claimed a legitimate expectation that this
established practice would not be departed from by
the German authorities. The European Court rejected
this argument:
94 Case 1252/79 [1980] E.C.R. 3753. See also Case 188/92
Thyssen AG v. Commission [1983] E.C.R. 3721.
95Ibid., 3771 (col. 2) of the opinion of the Advocate
General.
96 Ibid., paragraph 9.
97 Case 5/82 [1982] E.C.R. 4601. See also Case 316/86
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v. Krucken [1988] E.C.R.
2213.
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"A practice of a Member State which does not
conform to Community rules may never give rise
to legal situations protected by Community law
and this is even so where the Commission has
failed to take the necessary action to ensure
that the State in question correctly applies
the Community rules. ,,99
The unlawful practice by the German authorities
could not have given rise to a legitimate
expectation as it was contrary to the relevant
Community rules.
While the case-law of the European Court
clearly supports the view that any conduct of
either a Community or a national administrative
body which is outside or contrary to Community law
cannot give rise to a legitimate expectation, this
may not be wholly satisfactory. Some of the
national legal orders allow the protection of
legitimate expectations which are contrary to the
law. For instance, German administrative law allows
the protection of legitimate expectations contrary
to the law to be resolved by a balancing of the
interests of legality with those of legal
98 Ibid., paragraphs 3-10.
99 Ibid., paragraph 22.
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certainty. i oo Also section 48 (2) of the German
Administrative Procedure Act 1976 provides that "an
unlawful administrative decision granting a
pecuniary benefit may not be revoked insofar as the
beneficiary has relied upon the decision and his
expectation, weighed against the public interest in
revoking the decision, merits protection. ,,101 Under
Dutch administrative law, legitimate expectations
contrary to the strict application of the law may
be protected if the individual concerned acted in
reliance on the expectation and that the interests
of any third parties are not affected.l02 In order
to understand why the European Court has so
restricted the application of the principle of
legitimate expectations it is essential to know its
reasoning. However, the European Court has omitted
to explain why it is impossible for an individual
100 Decision of the Berlin Administrative Court (1957) 72
D.V.Bl 503 affirmed by the Federal Administrative Court
(1959) 9 BwerGE 251. See Nolte, op. cit. supra no. 13,
203. It may not be a coincidence that the references in
the above cases, Maizena and Krucken, came from German
courts. See also Joined Cases 205 to 215/82 Deutsche
Milchkontor GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany [1983]
E.C.R. 2633; Case C-5/89 Commission v. Federal Republic
of Germany [1990] E.C.R. 1-3437.
101 Translation taken from Joined Cases 205 to 215/82
Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Federal Republic of
Germany, ibid., paragraph 28. See also Singh, op. cit.
supra no. 26, page 46.
102 Widdershoven and de Lange, op. ci t. supra no. 13,
pages 569-570. See also C.J. Bax "Judicial Control on
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to entertain a legitimate expectation as a result
of conduct of the administration which is outside
Community law. Lord Mackenzie Stuart simply states
that it follows logically from an examination of
the principle that a practice contrary to Community
law cannot give rise to a legitimate expect.at.Lon."?'
The reasons can only be speculated at. Arguments
which could support the rule will therefore be put
forward in order that the basis of the rule can be
examined.
It could be argued that if unlawful conduct
could induce a legitimate expectation then this
would allow an administrative body to expand its
powers at will.l04 The public is protected from the
arbitrary and capricious exercise of public power
by ensuring that such bodies only act within the
limits of their powers. Just as a body cannot be
prevented from exercising its powers, it cannot
exercise power which it does not have. The purpose
of this restriction on the scope of legitimate
expectations could therefore be said to prevent the
the Administration in the Netherlands" (1992) 4 E.R.P.L.
71, 76-77.
103 Lord Mackenzie Stuart "Legitimate Expectations and
Estoppel in Community Law and English Administrative
Law", op. cit supra no. 12, 64.
104 Cf. Lord Greene M.R . in Mini ster of Agr icul ture and
Fisheries v. Hulkin, unreported but cited in Minister of
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arbitrary use of public power. However, it is
questionable whether the rule achieves this
purpose. Arbitrary administrative conduct may be
caused not only by acting outside its powers but
also by allowing an innocent individual to rely to
their detriment on its unlawful conduct which is
later ignored. The harm caused to the individual
may be classified as arbitrary. The limitation on
legitimate expectations fails to prevent such
administrative action because the harm suffered by
the individual is not capable of being passed onto
the administrative body which created it. Instead
the individual has to shoulder the sole burden for
the loss it has suffered as a result of relying on
the unlawful administrative conduct. It is
difficult to see how placing the loss on the
individual can deter arbitrary action by the
administrative body.
It might be argued that the individual should
be expected to know the law applicable in the
relevant area and therefore know whether the
administrative conduct was lawful or not. However,
this is to impose a high burden on the individual.
For example, in Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v.
Agriculture and Fisheries v. Matthews [1950] 1 K.B. 148,
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KriickenlOS the customs official thought that the
applicant's export certificate was valid under
Community law. It was only after the European Court
itself had ruled on the issue that the law became
certain. A ruling by the European Court on the
interpretation of a provision can of course differ
from that of an administrative body but until the
European Court makes a ruling the individual will
have to submit to the administration's view of the
law. The facts of the Pardini 106 case provide a good
example. A Regulation on the common organisation of
cereals provided that the levies to be charged in
respect of imports were to be those applicable on
the day of importation. The Italian authorities
applied this provision so that in the event of a
change in the levy rate after acceptance of the
import declaration in the customs office, the
authority could apply the more favourable rate so
long as the goods had not been released. In 1976
the European Court held that this interpretation
was invalid.lO? The Italian authority proceeded to
recover the difference between the actual levy rate
153-4.
105 Case 316/86 [1988] E.C.R. 2213.
106 Case 338/85 Fratelli Pardini SpA v. Ministero del
commercio con l'estro and Banca toscana (Lucca branch),
supra no. 3.
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and the more favourable rate. In such a situation
the individual innocently relied on the
interpretation given to the rules by the
administration. Is it reasonable to suppose that
the individual should be able to know that any
conduct based on the previous interpretation of the
rules was unlawful? What if the individual did take
a different view of the legality of an
administrative practice which was subsequently
vindicated by the European Court. Failure to
conform with the different (illegal) view of the
administration could risk other hardships. While
the principle of legitimate expectations is based
on the concept of trust in the administration, the
limitation of the principle to only lawful
expectations does not protect the trust that the
individual may be forced to place in the
administration. If the individual is expected to
know the law applicable in the face of the
administration inadvertently telling him otherwise
then the principle would not be protecting trust
that could reasonably be expected in the
administration. Instead it would impose on the
individual impossibly high standards such as
107 Case 113/75 Frecassetti v. Amministrazione delle
179
foreseeing a future decision of the European Court
reversing a previously accepted interpretation of
Community rules.
Finally, it has been stated by the Court of
First Instance in Societe Anonyme a Participation
Ouvriere Compagnie Nationale Air France v.
Commi.ee i orr'" that it follows from the hierarchy of
legal rules as laid down in the Treaty and upheld
in the case-law that "a Community institution
cannot be forced, by virtue of the principle of
legitimate expectations, to apply Community rules
contra legem. ,,109 The hierarchy of legal rules sets
out a validity ranking of Community norms.110 An act
of general application such as a Regulation cannot
be altered by an individual decision. As regards
legitimate expectations, the reasoning is that if
an unlawful decision induces a legitimate
expectation, the Regulation, against which the
decision is held to be unlawful, would have to be
altered. As the hierarchy of legal rules cannot
allow an individual decision to amend a general
normative measure therefore an unlawful decision
cannot induce a legitimate expectation. However, is
finanze dello Stato [1976] E.C.R. 983.
108 Case T-2/93 [1994] E.C.R. 1I-323.
109 Ibid., paragraph 102.
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it correct to state that the individual decision
would in such a situation be altering the general
measure or that the principle of legitimate
expectations, as one of the general principles of
law, would be enforcing the expectation induced by
the decision? The hierarchy of rules demands in a
moral situation that an individual decision cannot
alter a Regulation. However, if a decision has
induced an expectation which was to be enforced,
then it would not be the decision itself which
would be altering the Regulation but the principle
of legitimate expectations. The European Court
would be altering the operation of the Regulation
as regards the individual by use of the principle
of legitimate expectations and not the unlawful
decision. If so, then this would be entirely
compatible with the hierarchy of rules as the
principle of legitimate expectations "forms part of
the Community legal order"llL and is a "fundamental
principle,,1l2 against which Regulations can be
declared void.1l3 The general principles of law have
a validity over all other norms except the Treaty
provisions. If the principle of legitimate
1LOSchwarze, op. cit. supra no. 5, pages 248-252.
L11Case 112/77 Topfer, supra no. 1, paragraph 19.
m Case 112/80 Durbeck, supra no. 1, paragraph 48.
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expectations was extended to protecting
expectations arising due to unlawful conduct then
there would be no contravention of the hierarchy of
rules.
An alternative to the limitation of the
principle to only lawful expectations has been
proposed by Advocate General Darmon who has argued
that the European Court should not restrict itself
to its previous dicta in cases such as Maizena in
order to reject the possibility of legitimate
expectations arising out of unlawful administrative
conduct.1l4 Rather the European Court ought to
determine the scope of such dicta with regard to
its previous decisions which show that the
principle exists in order to achieve a balance
between equity and the rigour of law. If the
principle were to be restricted as in Maizena then
a large part of its purpose to temper the rigidity
of the law would be removed. It is just as
possible, if not more so, for administrative bodies
to unfairly frustrate the expectations of
individuals where that expectation was induced by
113 See, e.g., Case 120/86 Mulder supra no. 30.
114 Case 210/87 Padovani, supra no. 25, paragraph 32 of
the opinion of the Advocate General. See also Case
161/88 Binder, supra no. 8, paragraph 9 of the opinion
of the same Advocate General.
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unlawful administrative conduct. Therefore, the
inducement of an unlawful legitimate expectation
should in principle be possible of being considered
as to whether it is legitimate or not. This
approach does not accept that every unlawful
expectation should be enforced as legitimate but
that there seems no good reason why such
expectations should not be capable of being
considered as to whether they are worthy of
protection. Were the European Court to allow
unlawful conduct to raise an expectation then this
would necessarily involve a weighing up of the
competing interests to determine whether the
balance lay with the public interest in legality or
the private interest in legal certainty as in
German and Dutch administrative law. support for
such an approach can be found in the SNUPAT casellS
which concerned the withdrawal of unlawful
measures. The European Court stated that in
determining whether unlawful measures could be
withdrawn depended on a balance of interests:
115 Joined Cases 42 & 49/59 Societe Nouvelle des Usines
de Pontlieue - Acieries du Temple (SNUPAT) v. High
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
[1962] E.C.R. 53.
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"...the principle of respect for legal
certainty, important as it may be, cannot be
applied in an absolute manner, but that its
application must be combined with that of
legality; the question which of these principles
should prevail in each particular case depends
upon a comparison of the public interest with the
private interests in question ...,,116
If conduct outside the scope of Community law were
to be allowed to induce an expectation then a
similar balancing act would be required in order to
determine the comparative weight between the
competing interests. That such an approach already
exists in a related area of law and in two of the
national legal systems provides strong reasons for
the adoption of a similar balancing act in relation
to the protection of unlawful legitimate
expectations in Community law.
7. The Legitimacy of an Expectation
Should an expectation pass the tests of
objective reasonableness, it then becomes necessary
to determine whether it has a legitimacy which
116 Ibi d ., 87.
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makes it worthy of protection. The European Court
will assess the legitimacy of an expectation by a
careful weighing up of the competing interests
involved.
A. The Balancing of Interests
For an individual to place trust in his
expectations is to anticipate his future
relationship with the administration.117 The
protection of such expectations concerns the
temporal dimension of how far they can be sustained
in light of the changing circumstances and needs of
public administration. The principle of legitimate
expectations enables the European Court to
determine whether the individual's trust can be
maintained in view of such changes by undertaking a
balancing exercise of the individual's expectation
against the competing public interest
considerations put forward by the administration.
Determining whether an expectation is legitimate
and therefore worthy of protection presupposes a
weighing up of the competing private and public
117 See generally Luhmann, op. cit. supra no. 29, chapter
2.
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interests.118 The legitimacy of an expectation is
not absolute but is relative to the competing
strengths of the public and private interests and
it may change with the requirements of the public
interest.
It is for the administration to determine what
the public interest requires, for example, whether
protective measures ought to be adopted. In doing
so the individual's expectations are relevant.
Should the public interest require such a change
then the administration will have to decide whether
it overrides the individual's expectation. Deciding
what the requirements of the public interest are
and the primary weighing up of it with the affected
private interests are tasks for the administration.
However, should the individual claim an
unjustifiable disappointment of his expectation it
is clear that the European Court will review it on
the basis of whether there is a fair and
proportionate nexus between the public interest
objective sought after and the measure adopted. As
will be shown below, the European Court asks
118 See Case 1/73, supra no. 16, 741 (col. 1) of the
opinion of Advocate General Roemer; Borchardt, op. cit.
supra no. 4, 311-312, 314; Schwarze, op. cit. supra no.
5, pages 952-953; Widdershoven and de Lange, op. cit.
supra no. 13, page 569.
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whether the public interest relied upon is
predicated on a logical and consistent basis and,
if so, whether there were alternative means of
protecting the public interest which do not
necessitate the infringement of the individual's
expectation or, alternatively, could the
expectations if enforced possibly subvert the
public interest claimed. If the public interest
might well be undermined by the protection of the
expectation, then it is clear that it must be
disappointed. Advocate General Trabucchi has stated
that "there can be no doubt that the interests of
individuals, even if they form a group of some
size, must take second place" when the demands of
the public interest require it.1l9 The function of
the European Court is not to substitute its view of
the desired public interest objective for that of
the administrator but to determine whether the
disappointment of the individual's expectation is
indispensable for the attainment of that objective.
Should another option be open to the administrator
which does not require the infringement of the
expectation but is still capable of securing the
public interest then this will be preferred.
119 Case 74/74 supra no. 10, 559 (col. 1) of the opinion
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Conversely, should the protection of the
expectation lead to the subversion of the public
interest then it cannot be enforced. This process
of the European Court reviewing the balance struck
by the administration between the competing public
and private interests determines the legitimacy of
an expectation and whether it is worthy of
protection.
In the CNTA case the European Court found that
the public interest did not override the
applicant's expectation. The case arose in the
context of monetary compensatory amounts. The
applicant had sought the advance fixing of refunds
for the export of colza seeds subject to a deposit
and had agreed to export the products. Before the
goods were exported the Commission abolished the
compensatory amounts applicable in that Community
sector. The applicant claimed a legitimate
expectation that the compensatory amounts would
continue for deliveries in progress and that any
losses suffered would be compensated. The European
Court found that the Commission had ignored the
legitimate expectations of the traders in the
applicant's position. It is in the opinion of
of Advocate General Trabucchi.
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Advocate General Trabucchi that the reconciliation
of the competing interests was considered. The
Advocate General approached the matter by
acknowledging that if the public interest so
required then private interests must be
subordinated. However, it would be dangerous to a
general answer to the question of when the
Community should adopt appropriate measures in
order to protect such interests. The Advocate
General preferred to deal with such issues as and
when they arise. In view of the particularity of
each case, it does seem dangerous to lay down any
generalised principles to be applied in all cases.
The balancing of interests will always be coloured
by their nature and context. Advocate General
Trabucchi proceeded to examine the competing
interests involved in the present case by asking
what was the reason for the abolition of the
applicable compensatory amounts. The Regulation had
declared that the application of compensatory
amounts was no longer necessary in relation to the
colza seed sector as 84% of Community production
had either been sold or was in the process of being
sold. The purpose of compensatory amounts had been
to protect the Community market by preventing
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agricultural prices from being compromised. The
Commission had reasoned that as only 16% of the
internal market in colza seeds remained, this did
not present a threat to the Community and therefore
abolished the relevant compensatory amounts.
However, of that 84% of production, 30% was
regarded as having been committed for sale because
it had either been the subject of advance fixing in
respect of export refunds or supplementary aids but
had not yet been delivered to the purchaser. So
while 84% of the Community production was
considered to have been sold or in the process of
being sold, 30% of this had been subject to advance
fixing but had not yet been delivered. Were the
compensatory amounts to be abolished then this
would affect that 30% yet to be delivered as
compensatory amounts are paid or levied only on the
delivery of the goods. The Commission had done
nothing to meet the expectations in respect of the
advance-fixing certificates obtained by the
producers within this 30% band of production. In
Advocate General Trabucchi's view, to place support
on the fact that this proportion of Community
production had for all intents and purposes now
gone out of the Community in order to conclude that
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this same percentage ought not to have the benefit
of compensatory amounts appeared to have "little in
common with the principles of fair dealing and good
faith which should govern the attitude of a public
authori ty towards those subj ect to control." 120 An
inconsistency existed between the reason for the
abolition of the compensatory amounts and the fact
that no account had been taken of the 30%
production which had not yet been delivered. The
purpose of compensatory amounts was to maintain
traditional trade patterns. The Commission was
claiming that this purpose had been fulfilled on
the basis that some traders, like the applicant,
had undertaken commercial transactions due to the
advance-fixing of exports refunds whilst
simultaneously wanting to abolish the compensatory
amounts applicable to such traders due to the
advance-fixing of export refunds. According to
Advocate General Trabucchi:
"There is, therefore, a discernible
inconsistency between the underlying reason
for the provision ...[abolishing the compensatory
amounts] ...and the fact that no account was taken
120 Ibid., 560 (col. 1) of the opinion of the Advocate
General.
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also in another respect of that part of Community
output which, being for all intents and purposes
committed for export, was an important element in
building up the economic situation which led to
the decision to abolish compensatory amounts ."121
As an inconsistency existed in the justification
for the abolition of compensatory amounts for the
30% of production committed for sale but not yet
delivered, the expectations of traders in that
group, such as the applicant, were legitimate.
The reasoning of the Advocate General is
instructive. By inquiring into the basis of the
provision which infringed the applicant's
expectation, it could be examined whether it had a
well-reasoned basis. As an illogicality existed,
the expectations could not be infringed. The public
interest which the Commission argued compelled the
disappointment of the expectation was predicated on
a misconception: that the infringement of the
expectations was justified by a measure which in
fact ignored such expectations. The public interest
could not therefore override the applicant's
interests in the maintenance of its expectations.
121 Ibid., 560 (col. 2) of the opinion of the Advocate
General.
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Should the administration claim that the public
interest requires the disappointment of an
expectation then a logical and coherent
justification must support the existence of the
public interest. How the European Court resolves a
direct conflict between the public interest and the
protection of an expectation is shown in the next
case.
In Firma Anton Durbeck v. Haupzollamt
Frankfurt am Main-Flughafed22 a challenge was made
to a Regulation which provided for the temporary
suspension of imports of Chilean apples into the
Community. The applicant, who had concluded
contracts for the importation of apples before the
adoption of the Regulation, claimed a legitimate
expectation that transitional measures should have
been introduced with regard to traders in its
position. The public interest underpinning the
temporary suspension of imports was that the sector
was threatened with serious disturbances which
could have endangered the objectives of the Common
Agricul tural Pol icy. 123 The European Court held that
if this public interest was to be achieved then the
expectations of traders must give way:
122 Case 112/80 [1981] E.C.R. 1095.
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\\ in view of the needs which the temporary
suspension of imports met, transitional
measures which exempted contracts already entered
into from the suspensions of imports would have
robbed the protective measure of all practical
effect by opening the Community market in dessert
apples to a volume of imports likely to jeopardise
that market .,,124
If transitional measures had been made to protect
the expectations of traders such as the applicant
then this could have had the effect of making the
temporary suspension ineffective and thereby
undermining the public interest in protecting the
market from serious disturbances. The need for
transitional measures and protective measures were
in direct conflict: one could not be achieved
without the other. In the absence of any other
means available to achieve the public interest
123 See Article 39 EC Treaty.
124 Ibid. I paragraph 50. See also Case 78/77 Firma Johann
Luhrs v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1977] E.C.R. 169,
paragraph 6; Case 127/78 Hans Spitta & Co. v.
Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1979] E.C.R. 171,
paragraph 9.
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objective, the applicant's expectation had to give
way.125
In Spagl v. Hauptzollamt Rosenheim126 the
European Court found that although the public
interest required the adoption of new measures,
this could be achieved without the infringement of
the applicant's expectations. The case followed the
Mulder litigation on milk quotas. Following that
ruling new provisions had been introduced127 which
were also challenged as contrary to the principle
of legitimate expectations. The applicant had a
made non-marketing undertaking which ended on 31st
March 1983 and his application for a reference
quantity was refused. The first question concerned
whether Article 3(a), inserted into Regulation
857/84128 following Mulder, could exclude the grant
of a special reference quantity to producers whose
period of non-marketing ended before 31st December
1983 or before 30th September 1983. The
introduction of this cut-off period for the grant
125See also Case C-152/88 Sofrimport SARL v. Commission,
supra no. 51 where the Commission did not demonstrate
the existence of an overriding public interest to
justify the application of suspensory measures to
Chilean apples in transit.
126Case C-189/89 [1990] E.C.R. I-4539. See also Case C-
217/89 Pastatter v. Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall [1990]
E.C.R. I-4585.
127See Cardwell, op. cit. supra no. 34, pages 48-51.
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of a special reference quantity excluded those
producers, such as the applicant, whose non-
marketing undertaking had expired at any time
between 1981 and 1983. For those producers who had
made a non-marketing undertaking their legitimate
expectations had been affected because the cut-off
date affected them precisely because they had made
the undertaking. The Council and Commission had
argued that the public interest required the
insertion of a cut-off date as the effectiveness of
the system could be impaired by encouraging other
producers to resume production who would not
otherwise have done so but wished to profit from
the precious asset of a milk quota. The European
Court stated that the specific restriction of a
cut-off date could not be justified by reasons
relating to the public interest as that interest
could be safeguarded by measures of a general
nature.129 If the general public interest required a
restriction to the scheme, then such an objective
could have been better served by a measure of
general application rather than specific
restrictions which affected such producers
128 Article 3(a) was inserted by Regulation 764/89 OJ
1989 L 84, p. 2.
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precisely because they had made a non-marketing
undertaking. Any restriction to be made in the
general interest could have been achieved by a
general measure which affected everyone in the
sector and did not specifically affect those
producers such as the applicant. An alternative
course was therefore open to the Community which it
should have pursued rather than infringe the
applicant's expectations.
The second question concerned whether Article
3(a) could restrict the special reference quantity
provided for the producers who had made a
undertaking to only 60% of the quantity of milk
delivered by the producer during the twelve months
preceding the non-marketing undertaking. As those
producers who had made an undertaking had not
produced any milk during the reference year chosen
by the Member State, some other form of calculation
had to be devised in order to determine the special
reference quantity they were to be given. The
chosen method was to use a representative period
before the undertaking was made. From this figure a
reduction was to be made to ensure that such
producers were not accorded an undue advantage when
129 Ibid., paragraph 15. See also paragraph 32 of the
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compared with those producers who had delivered
milk during the chosen reference year. The special
reference quantity of a producer who had made an
undertaking was to be limited to only 60% of the
milk delivered or produced in the year preceding
the non-marketing undertaking. The restriction was
also challenged as contrary to the principle of
legitimate expectations. The European Court stated
that the principle precluded the reduction rate
being fixed at such a high level (40%) which
affects those producers precisely because they made
a non-marketing undertaking. Having obtained
information from the Commission the European Court
found that the rates of reduction applicable to
producers who had not made an undertaking did not
exceed 17.5%.130 Therefore, the 40% reduction was
over twice the highest reduction for the other
producers. This difference in treatment
specifically affected such producers precisely
because of their non-marketing undertaking. In
response the Council and Commission claimed that it
was not possible to give such producers special
opinion of Advocate General Jacobs.
130The 17.5% reduction being the highest reduction
applicable for any producer awarded a reference quantity
following a chosen reference year was made by the United
Kingdom, ibid., paragraph 43 of the opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs.
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reference quantities of more than 60% of their milk
deliveries without undermining the objective of the
scheme to deal with structural surpluses in the
milk market. The Commission had estimated that one
million tonnes of milk would be covered by the
requests for the grant of a special reference
quantity by those producers who had made an
undertaking whereas the Council considered that
600,000 tonnes of milk was the largest volume
compatible with the objective of the scheme. The
Community reserve had been increased by 600,000
tonnes and the reference quantities of the other
producers had remained unchanged. In other words,
the producers who had made the undertakings were
getting as much as was thought possible without
undermining the operation of the whole scheme. The
European Court rejected this argument. It stated
that even if a larger increase than the Community
reserve could not be contemplated without the risk
of disturbing the balance of the milk market, an
alternative existed to the 60% rule. The Community
could have reduced the reference quantities of the
other producers proportionally by a corresponding
amount so as to enable the allocation of larger
reference quantities to the producers who had made
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an undertaking. 131 It was possible for the reference
quantities of the other producers to be lowered in
order that producers who had made an undertaking
could have a reference quantity that was the same.
This was an alternative way of protecting the
legitimate expectations of such producers whilst
upholding the effectiveness of the scheme.
The nature of the expectations recognised in
Mulder was that those producers who had made a non-
marketing undertaking would not be treated any
differently as a result. In the Spagl case the
European Court rejected the other restrictions
placed on such producers as the public interest
objective of those restrictions could have been
achieved by other means which did not require the
infringement of the producers' expectations. The
tenor of the ruling is that other producers should
similarly be affected by any restriction made in
the public interest and not only those producers
who made an undertaking. What was decisive was the
matching up of the content of the expectation with
the Regulation which infringed it and the public
interest purpose. The case shows that the European
Court is prepared to examine alternative options
131 Ibi d., paragraph 28.
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which may require the reprocessing of all reference
quantities in order to protect the legitimate
expectations of a certain class of producer.
The following comments can be made with regard
to the balancing of interests and the legitimacy of
expectations. When a reasonable expectation is
infringed in the absence of an overriding public
interest it is a legitimate expectation worthy of
protection. When a public interest is claimed to
justify the infringement of an expectation, it must
be balanced against the interests of the
individual. This balance is first of all for the
administration to strike but it can be reviewed by
the European Court. If the public interest so
requires then the individual's expectation must be
infringed. If the public interest is predicated on
an illogical or inconsistent basis, as in eNTA,
then it cannot override the expectation. Should the
content of the expectation and of the public
interest conflict so that the public interest
cannot be safeguarded without infringement of the
expectation, as in Durbeck, then the public
interest must prevail. Alternatively, if fulfilment
of the expectation might well subvert the public
interest the expectation must be disappointed.
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However, if there are other means of safeguarding
the public interest open to the administration
which do not necessitate the infringement of
expectation, as in Spagl, then the expectation is
worthy of protection. In deciding this question the
European Court will take account of the following:
the nature of the expectation, the public interest
objective and the justification underpinning this,
the availability of alternative measures and any
detrimental reliance by the applicant. The case-law
shows that the European Court will determine
whether the infringement of the individual's
expectations was indispensable for the achievement
of the public interest objective by looking at all
the relevant circumstances.
B. Detrimental Reliance
Whether the applicant has acted to his
detriment in reliance on an expectation will be a
relevant factor in assessing whether that
expectation deserves protection. For example, in
CNTA a deposit was paid by the applicant in order
to be awarded the advance fixing of aid and refunds
on exports, which would have been lost had the
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expectation been frustrated. Also the applicant had
concluded contracts on the basis of the advance
fixing. Both of these actions formed detrimental
reliance by the applicant which went into the
determination of whether the expectation was
legitimate .132 In the Mulder case the detrimental
reliance by the applicant was crucial for the
protection of their expectations. The European
Court reasoned that it was because producers who
voluntarily made the non-marketing undertaking that
they had a legitimate expectation not to be treated
any differently precisely because they made the
undertaking. The producers' detrimental reliance
was their suspension of milk production. However,
while the existence of detrimental reliance may be
an indication that an expectation is worthy of
protection, it is not always a necessary
cond It.Lonv+" For example, in the "staff salaries"
case the European Court found that the staff
officials had a legitimate expectation without the
expectation being detrimentally relied upon by the
officials. The existence of detrimental reliance
will therefore be a factor to be taken into account
132 Case 74/74 supra no. 10, paragraphs 42 and 42 of the
Court's judgment and 560 (col. 1) of the opinion of
Advocate General Trabucchi.
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when the European Court balances the competing
interests.
8. Liability for the Frustration of Legitimate
Expectations
If an individual has successfully claimed the
breach of a legitimate expectation, then it is also
possible to claim damages for the loss arising from
that breach. Article 215(2) provides that the
Community shall, in accordance with the general
principles of law, make good any damage caused by
it. As regards the liability of the Community for
legislative acts which involve choices of economic
policy the European Court has held that the
Community will not incur non-contractual liability
unless there has been a sufficiently flagrant
violation of a superior rule of law for the
protection of the individual.134 An applicant can
then secure damages for the losses resulting from
the breach of a legitimate expectation if there was
133 Schwarze, op. cit. supra no. 5, page 952.
134 Case 5/71 Aktien-Zuckerfabirk Schoppenstadt v.
Council [1971] E.C.R. 975, paragraph 11. See generally
H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels and P. Mead (eds.), Non-
Contractual Liability of the European Communities
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) i S. Weatherill and
P. Beaumont EC Law. The Essential Guide to the Legal
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a sufficiently serious violation of a legitimate
expectation. In CNTA the European Court held that
the Community could be held liable to compensate
for damage suffered as a result for the breach of
legi timate expectations. 135 However, in subsequent
proceedings it was found that the applicant had not
in fact suffered any loss due to the disappointment
of the legitimate expectation and was therefore not
entitled to compensation.136 In Sofrimport SARL v.
Commi s s iotr?' the Commission was found to have
breached the expectations of those traders with
goods in transit by adopting protective measures
prohibiting such goods from the Community market.
The European Court held that the Commission had
completely failed to take account of traders with
goods in transit, that the applicant had suffered
damage beyond the limits of risks inherent in the
business and that no overriding public interest
existed. Therefore the Commission had to make good
that damage resulting from its failure to adopt
transitional measures.
Workings of the European Community. (London, 2nd edn.,
1995) pages 313-319.
135 Case 74/74, supra no. 10, paragraph 43.
136 Case 74/74 [1976] E.C.R. 797.
137 Case C-152/88, supra no. 51.
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Following the Mulder and Spagl cases the milk
producers sought damages for loss arising from both
the total and permanent exclusion from the
Community milk market and the more limited
exclusion due to the 60% rule.138 The European Court
followed its earlier case-law that liability for
the choice of economic policy will only arise where
there has been a manifest and grave disregard by
the Community for the limits of its powers.
Concerning liability for the total and permanent
exclusion of the producers from the milk market,
the European Court found that the Community had
committed a manifest and sufficiently serious
breach of legitimate expectations. The Community
had completely failed to take account of the
situation of those producers who had made a non-
marketing undertaking without invoking any higher
public interest. The European Court considered that
the breach of a superior rule for the protection of
the individual was all the more obvious because the
total and permanent exclusion from the market was
unforseeable and went beyond the bounds of normal
economic risks inherent in the milk market. The
138 Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder v. Council
and Commission [1992] E.C.R. 1-3061. See T. Heukels
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Community had therefore exceeded the margin of
error allowed in such decisions and made an
inexcusably unlawful decision139 and was liable for
loss arising from this breach. The European Court
then considered liability for the more limited
exclusion from the milk market arising from the
rule that such producers could be awarded special
reference quantities equal to 60% of their milk
deliveries in the year before they entered into the
undertaking. While this rule had been found to be
contrary to the legitimate expectations of the
producers in the Spagl case, it was not a
sufficiently serious breach of that principle for
the Community to incur liability for the loss
arising from it. The European Court gave two
reasons why the 60% rule did not give rise to
damages. First, the rule did allow the producers to
resume their activities as milk producers and
therefore the Council had not failed to take
account of their situation. Secondly, the rule was
a choice of economic policy made in pursuance of a
higher public interest. The European Court did not
consider that the margin of error allowed to the
(1993) 30 C.M.L.Rev. 368; Cardwell, op. cit. supra no.
34, pages 60-65.
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Community had been exceeded as the rule had been
adopted in the interests of a higher public
interest: the need to tackle the problem of milk
surpluses and the need to strike a balance between
those producers who had made an undertaking and the
other producers subject to the scheme. As the
Community had taken account of the producers'
expectation and acted for a higher public interest,
it had not manifestly or gravely disregarded its
powers or made an inexcusable breach of legitimate
expectations in adopting a legislative measure
which involved choices of economic policy. The
European Court did not take account of the higher
public interest as a means of repeating the
balancing test undertaken in Spagl to determine the
legitimacy of the producers' expectation but in
order to determine whether the Community was liable
for the losses consequent upon the breach of their
expectations. While a measure may be found to be
contrary to the principle of legitimate
expectations the European Court will require that
the error be both manifest and inexcusable in order
that the Community be liable to compensate for the
loss accruing from it.
139 See paragraph 15 of the opinion of Advocate General
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9. Conclusion
No attempt will be made to summarise the
preceding analysis. 140 While the principle of the
protection of legitimate expectations is a central
part of the unwritten general principles of
Community law, its enforcement has been limited
because of the importance attributed to the
functioning of the market and the need for the
Community to have a broad scope of discretion.
While in most cases the European Court has found
some reason why an expectation does not require
protection, in a few cases it has protected
expectations even though this demanded
administrative changes, as in the Mulder and Spagl
cases. A claim of legitimate expectation will only
be successful if there is a clear case of
unreasonable treatment and the administration
grossly misjudged the protection of the
individual's expectations. The principle is
therefore a means of protecting the individual's
Van Gerven.
140 The European principle of legitimate expectations
will be compared with the English principle in chapter
5, section 9.
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expectations without defeating the public interest
requirements in public administration.
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Chapter 5: The Principle of Legitimate Expectations
in English Law
1. Introduction
The introduction of the principle of
legitimate expectations into English law is an
example of the means and difficulties of
transplanting a new principle within an established
legal framework. At first obiter comments refer to
the phrase without elucidating its meaning. Second,
dissenting judgments show it to be gaining more
ground. This is followed by cases where the
principle is argued before the court but found not
to apply on the facts of the instant case. Finally,
a court makes a decision relying on the principle.
However, the ambit and extent of that principle
seems uncertain. Judges may state that the
principle has an important place in the growing
case-law of judicial review but decline to examine
it thoroughlyl or if there is discussion it seems
incomplete.2 The development of the principle of
1 In re Findlay [1985] A.C. 318, 338C-D per Lord
Scarman.
2 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the
Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374 (hereinafter the GCHQ
case) .
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legitimate expectations reflects each of these
evolutionary stages. The purpose here is to examine
the case-law of the English courts concerning the
principle in order to enable a comparative
evaluation with Community law.
2. The Origins of "Legitimate Expectations" in
English Law
While the use of legitimate expectations by
the courts is comparatively modern, it is possible
to trace the principle further back into history. A
precursor to the principle of legitimate
expectations can be found in the work of Bentham
who advanced a "disappointment-prevention
principle" as part of his principle of utility. An
expectation was to be fixed if it was rational and
consistent with the greatest-happiness principle.3
Judicial use of the phrase legitimate expectations
can be traced back to 1881 when James L.J. stated
that it was a presumption of statutory
interpretation that an Act of Parliament is not to
be interpreted as interfering with any legal rights
3 J. Bentham "Official Aptitude Maximised; Expense
Minimised" (1830) in The Works of Jeremy Bentham Volume
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or any legitimate expectations of any person
whatsoever if the statute would allow that
interpretation.4 The application of the principle to
the exercise of public power has featured in the
work of Hayek. In a discussion of governmental
interference with the private sphere, Hayek
recognised that "it is necessary that the
individuals affected be not harmed by the
disappointment of their legitimate expectations but
be fully indemnified for any damage they suffer as
a result of such action."s The modern origins of the
phrase by the English courts stem from its use by
Lord Denning M.R.
In Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home
Affairs6 Lord Denning M.R. used the phrase
"legitimate expectations" in an obiter comment. The
case concerned two U.S. citizens who had come to
the U.K. in order to study at a college of
scientology. The time limits on their permits to
stay in the UK had expired and they had applied to
the Home Secretary for an extension which was
refused without giving them a hearing. Lord Denning
Five (J. Bowring (ed.), New York, 1962) pages 263, 266,
277.
4 In re Barker (1881) 17 Ch. D. 241, 243.
5 F.A. Hayek The Constitution of Liberty (London, 1960)
page 217.
6 [1969] 2 Ch. 149.
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found it was not necessary in this case to give the
applicants an opportunity to make representations.
A hearing would only have to be given where a
person had a right or an interest or, Lord Denning
added, "some legitimate expectation, of which it
would not be fair to deprive him without hearing
what he has to say.,,7Such a legitimate expectation
would arise, continued Lord Denning, if the
applicants' permits had been revoked before their
time limits had expired. In such a case the
applicant "ought, I think, to be given an
opportunity of making representations; for he would
have a legitimate expectation of being allowed to
stay for the permitted time."a
This passing mention of the phrase "legitimate
expectation" shines out from the judgment. The
arguments of counsel did not refer to it and no
case was cited to support it as a legal concept.
Where did it come from? According to Lord Denning,
some twenty years later, his use of the phrase
"came out of my own head and not from any
continental or other source."g The next use of the
7 Ibid., 170F.
8 Ibid., 171A per Lord Denning M.R. See also Widgery
L.J. (as he then was) at 173F.
9 From a letter by Lord Denning quoted in C.F. Forsyth
"The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate
Expectations" (1988) 47 C.L.J. 238, 241. See also The
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phrase was also by Lord Denning in Breen v.
Associated Engineering Union .10 Breen had been
elected as a shop steward at his place of
employment. The district committee of Breen's trade
union refused approval of the appointment to the
post without giving him either a hearing or the
reasons for the decision. When Breen challenged
this a majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed
his appeal. Lord Denning, dissenting, stated that
the law regarding the right to be heard was the
same as when he had set it out in Schmidt: if
someone sought an appointment or some other post
that was a privilege the applicant could be
rejected without first being given a hearing or
reasons. If, on the other hand, the applicant had
some right, interest or legitimate expectation then
a hearing and reasons should be given if it would
be unfair to do otherwise. Lord Denning went on to
find in favour of the applicant on the basis that
he had a legitimate expectation of being approved
unless there were good reasons given by the
district committee because he had been elected to
Denning Interviews - Administrative Law (V.H.S.
Videocassette, Interviewer: Professor H.W.R. Wade,
Butterworths, 1984).
10 [1971] 2 Q.B. 175.
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the post.ll Some commentators view these dicta as
the foundation of the inception of the phrase and
the concept of legitimate expectations in English
law.12 Whether this is correct compels close
attention.
Arguably the example instanced by Lord Denning
in Schmidt and the basis of his dissent in Breen
are not applications of the concept of legitimate
expectations. In both cases the phrase was used by
Lord Denning as a general belief that the claimant
was entitled to justice and for "fair-play" to be
done by giving the applicants procedural protection
because of the threat to their interests. This view
would appear to sit comfortably with Denning's
distinctive views on the ability of the judge to
fashion justice to the requirements of the
particular case. Furthermore, the existence of a
representation or a settled practice is an
essential requirement for the application of the
11 Ibid., 191F.
12 G. Ganz "Legitimate Expectation: A Confusion of
Concepts" in C. Harlow (ed.), Public Law and Politics
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986) page 146; R. Baldwin and
D. Horne "Expectations in a Joyless Landscape" (1986) 49
M.L.R. 685, 694; P. Elias "Legitimate Expectations and
Judicial Review" in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.), New
Directions in Judicial Review (London: Stevens & Sons,
1988) page 37; B. Hadfield "Judicial Review and
Legitimate Expectations" (1988) 39 N.r.L.Q. 103, 104.
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concept.13 However, in the example given in Schmidt
there was no administrative conduct which could
have induced the belief in the individual's mind
that he would be given a hearing if the permit was
revoked before its time limit had expired. It would
be more accurate to say that the right to be heard
was based on a deprivation of a right or interest
and not a legitimate expectation.14 In Breen the
district committee of the trade union had neither
made an undertaking or built up a past practice
which could raise a reasonable expectation that a
hearing and reasons would be given to the
applicant. Neither was there a policy adopted by
the district committee to the same effect. Exactly
what was the basis of the legitimate expectation in
that case is difficult to discern. Lord Denning
thought the expectation arose because the applicant
had been democratically elected by his fellow
employees. The concept requires the public
authority to induce a reasonable expectation, yet
this expectation was not induced by the district
committee. The usage of the phrase by Lord Denning
in both cases is contrary to the modern cases on
13 Supra no. 2, per Lord Fraser, 401B.
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the principle of legitimate expectations. For
example, Lord Denning classified the Padfield caselS
which concerned the rule that an exercise of
discretion must not frustrate the policy and
objects of a statute, as a legitimate expectation
case.16
Judging such early cases against more recent
cases may, for some, be looking back with hindsight
but it is necessary to do so in order to discern
the origins of the principle in English law. It is
contended here that Lord Denning was using the
phrase in the Schmidt and Breen cases as a way of
achieving procedural protection for the applicants
when the rules of natural justice, or the duty to
act fairly, did not by themselves extend to such
situations. This, of course, involved a sleight of
hand: what compels the giving of a hearing and, in
Breen, the giving of reasons, when the existing law
on administrative procedures would not provide such
procedural protection? Lord Denning's failure to
answer this may explain why so little was said
about the content and operation of this principle
14 S.A. deSmith, H. Woolf and J. Jowell Judicial Review
of Administrative Action (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th
edn., 1995), page 429, footnote 50.
15 Padfield v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food [1968] A.C. 997.
16 Supra no. 10, 191C.
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except the merest reference to the catch-phrase of
"legitimate expectation" .17 The truth is that it was
only ever a way of achieving what was thought to be
required by justice when more established concepts
could not do so. Cinnamond v. British Airports
Authority8 provides further support for this view.
There six taxi-cab drivers, each of which had
convictions for illegally touting for passengers
outside Heathrow airport, challenged a by-law which
prohibited any person from entering the airport
except if they were a genuine airline passenger.
The applicants claimed that as this prohibition
affected their livelihood they had a legitimate
expectation of a hearing. Lord Denning rejected
this submission. The applicants had no legitimate
expectation of being heard because of their
conduct. Lord Denning reasoned that the taxi-cab
drivers' long record of convictions and unpaid
fines allowed the British Airport Authority to make
the by-law without affording them a hearing.
However, if the conduct of the applicants had
precluded them from having a legitimate expectation
17 In Lloyd v. McMahon [1987] A.C. 625, 714G Lord
Templeman refused to be persuaded by extravagant
language (that an oral hearing was an objective
fundamental right) to elevate the "catch-phrase [of
legitimate expectation] into a principle."
18 [1980] 2 All E.R. 368.
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of being heard, there was, as in Schmidt and Breen,
no undertaking or existence of a past practice upon
which to base such an expectation. This case is not
an example of the application of the principle or
of the cancellation of a legitimate expectation
because the possibility of such an expectation
never existed. The public authority's conduct is
directly related to the existence of a legitimate
expectation. For the court to maintain that a
legitimate expectation did not exist or that it was
cancelled due to the conduct of the claimants, as
it did in Cinnamond, is contrary to this and only
serves to explain the real nature of the usage of
the phrase by the court. In that case the court
used the phrase "legitimate expectations" as a mask
to cover the non-intervention by the court upon the
basis of the court's own subjective assessments as
to the requirements of justice needed to satisfy
the applicant's generalised expectation of justice.
Due to their unmeritorious conduct the claimants
could not expect to be justly treated by being
afforded a hearing.
If the real basis of such decisions is that
the individual has some form of protectable
interest which required procedural protection, then
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they cannot be justified as examples of the
principle of legitimate expectations. Although this
class of case has been recognised as an instance of
legitimate expectation,19 as Cane states, the use of
the phrase in this sense is redundant as the basis
of procedural protection is the applicant's
interest and calling it a legitimate expectation
does not make the interest any stronger.20 Simon
Brown L.J. has acknowledged that this class of case
is "no more than a recognition and embodiment of
the unsurprising principle that the demands of
fairness are likely to be somewhat higher when an
authority contemplates depriving someone of an
existing benefit or advantage than when the
claimant is a bare applicant for a future
benefit."21 In such cases there were not any
reasonable expectations induced by the conduct of
the public authority in question. Such expectations
19 See R. v. Devon County Council ex parte Baker [1995] 1
All E.R. 73, 88j-89a per Simon Brown L.J.
20 P. Cane An Introduction to Administrative Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 3rd edn., 1996) page 180. For examples
of legitimate expectations being used to require
procedural fairness for protectable interests see
McInnes v. Onslow Fane [1978] 3 All E.R. 211, 218b-g;
O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237, 275E-F; R. v.
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Greater London
Council [1986] 1 Q.B. 556, 587H; R. v. Rochdale
Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Schemet (1993) 91
L.G.R. 425, 445-446.
21 R. v. Devon County Council ex parte Baker, op . cit.
supra no. 19, 91a.
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as existed were just hopes which arose due to the
interests of the claimants which, Lord Denning
thought, in justice deserved some form of
procedural protection. Therefore, the phrase
"legitimate expectations" was used to enable
procedural protection to fasten on the individual's
protectable interests. The conceptual distinction
between the concept of legitimate expectations
proper and the "protectable interest" cases is
this: legitimate expectations impose a duty to act
fairly, to honour reasonable expectations raised
due to the conduct of the public authority whereas
protect able interests may compel a right to a
hearing for the claimant because the decision
threatens to affect his interest which arises
regardless of the conduct of the public authority.22
The protection of a legitimate expectation due to
the conduct of the public authority promotes
certainty and consistent administration which is
distinct from the imposition of procedural fairness
in a decision which may affect an individual's
rights or interests.23 The "protectable interest"
type of case involves nothing more than the courts
22 deSmith, Woolf and Jowell, op. cit. supra no. 14,
pages 423-424.
23 Ibid.
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requiring a greater content of procedural fairness
as "[t]he requirements of natural justice must
depend on the circumstances of the case. ,,24This
type of case has been seen as resurrecting the
distinction between rights and privileges in a
different form.25
The difference between a protectable interest
and a legitimate expectation is well illustrated by
the case of R v. Assistant Commissioner of Police
of the Metropolis ex parte Howell.26 The applicant
had been a taxi-cab driver for 12 years and, at the
age of 50, was required to provide medical evidence
of his fitness to continue to hold his licence. The
Assistant Commissioner refused to renew his licence
and did not let Howell know the objections to
renewal or give him a fair hearing. Ackner L.J. (as
he then was) in the Court of Appeal, found that
Howell had a reasonable expectation of the renewal
of his licence because the Assistant Commissioner
had told him that before the licence could be
renewed a doctor's certificate would have to be
24Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109, 118E
per Tucker L.J. See also Lloyd v. McMahon, supra no. 17,
702H-703A per Lord Bridge.
25Baldwin and Horne, op. cit. supra no. 12, 694-698;
P.P. Craig Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
3rd edn., 1994) pages 288-289, 293-4.
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produced, which Howell had performed. Ackner L.J.
found that the Assistant Commissioner's decision
therefore ought to be quashed because this
legitimate expectation had been unfairly
frustrated.27 Slade L.J. agreed that the decision
could not stand but because natural justice had
required a hearing to have been given first.28 The
reasoning employed by Ackner L.J. is that of
legitimate expectation whereas Slade L.J. relied on
the protectable interest of the applicant which
deserved procedural protection. Though the two
principles may overlap there should nonetheless be
kept conceptually distinct: legitimate expectation
fastens upon the public authority's conduct and the
requirements of procedural fairness to protectable
interests arise from the context in which a dispute
arises and is not dependent on the public
authori ty' s conduct. 29
The view of Sir Thomas Bingham that the
Schmidt and Breen cases "may not amount to
26 [1986] R.T.R. 52. See also R v. Secretary of State for
the Environment ex parte Greater London Council [1985]
J.P.L. 543.
27 Ibid., 60b.
28 Ibid., 61k .
29See also R v. Great Yarmouth Borough Council ex parte
Botton Brothers Arcades Ltd. (1988) 56 P. & C.R. 99; R
v. Secretary of State for Education ex parte Islam
[1993] 5 Admin.L.R. 177; R v. Birmingham City Council ex
parte Dredger (1993) 91 L.G.R. 532.
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parentage,,30 of the principle of legitimate
expectations is correct, despite those cases
containing the first usage of the phrase. If so,
then where does the concept originate from? There
is, however, no simple answer. Rather it is a
question of pulling together the various strands
which led to the principle of legitimate
expectations. The Schmidt and Breen cases did not
contribute to the development of legitimate
expectations, but they merely introduced the
phrase.
Another strand in the development of
legitimate expectation comes from the Court of
Appeal decision in R v. Liverpool Corporation ex
parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association.31
The case arose from a proposal by the authority to
increase the number of taxis and an undertaking was
made to the effect that the present taxicab owners
would be consulted before any decision was made.
Later another undertaking was made that the number
of taxis would not exceed 300 until legislation had
been passed. However, the authority later confirmed
a resolution that the number of taxis would be
30T.H. Bingham '''ThereIs a World Elsewhere': The
Changing Perspectives of English Law" (1992) 41 I.C.L.Q.
513, 523 footnote 34.
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increased without giving the existing taxi cab
owners an opportunity to make representations. Lord
Denning M.R. found that the authority had acted
wrongly because it denied the owners an opportunity
to be heard and had broken its undertaking without
sufficient cause. Lord Denning considered that the
authority was not at liberty to disregard its
undertaking and should not have departed from this
except after the most serious consideration,
hearing what the other party had to say and then
only if the overriding public interest required it.
It is important to note the terms of the relief
granted. A prohibition order was made to the effect
that the authority was not to act on its
resolutions and not to grant any further taxi
licences (above the total number of 300) without
first giving the applicants a hearing concerning
the relevant matters raised, which included the
undertaking given by the Corporation. Roskill L.J.
agreed with the terms of this order, but was not in
total agreement with Lord Denning. For Roskill L.J.
it was unnecessary to decide whether the
Corporation was under a duty to hear the taxicab
owners' representations. As regards the
31 [1972] 2 Q.B. 299.
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undertaking, this could be departed from by the
Corporation but only after the consideration of
representations made by all those concerned.32 Sir
Gordon Willmer also agreed with the order made and
thought the case to be one in which the court could
intervene "in order to ensure that a decision is
arrived at only after fair discussion and after
hearing all proper representations of the parties
interested. ,,33 What seems clear is that Lord Denning
envisaged the possibility that the Corporation
might be bound by its undertaking despite the
applicants having been heard, whilst Roskill L.J.
and Sir Gordon Willmer did not. If one looks at the
basis upon which Lord Denning found that the
Corporation would be bound to its undertaking it
seems unclear. The duty to act fairly was not
employed with regard to the undertaking and the
phrase legitimate expectation was not mentioned.
Ganz sums up the enigma of the undertaking:
"It sprang autochthoncally from the case itself.
It was in later cases that the link was forged
32 Ibid., 311E.
33 Ibid., 313F.
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between legitimate expectations and the Liverpool
Corporation Case. ,,34
Lord Denning did refer to two cases which concerned
the estoppel of a public authority35 which better
explain the nature of the undertaking. Only in
retrospect, however, can the judgment of Lord
Denning be placed within the principle of
legitimate expectations which was neither referred
to nor applied in this case. 36
There is also some uncertainty over the
provenance of the principle. When Lord Diplock
first referred to the principle he emphasised that
the principle belonged to public law: "[i]n public
law, as distinguished from private law ...such
legitimate expectation gave to each appellant a
sufficient interest to challenge the legality of
the adverse disciplinary award. ,,37 However, in the
Preston case Lord Templeman recognised that
unfairness by a public authority could amount to an
34 Ganz, op. cit. supra no. 12, page 150.
35 Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B. 227;
Lever Finance Ltd. v. Westminster London Borough Council
[1971] 1 Q.B. 222. See also H.T.V. Ltd. v. Price
Commission [1976] I.C.R. 170, 185G-186B per Lord Denning
M.R.
36 See the GCHQ case, supra no. 2, 401B per Lord Fraser.
37 O'Reilly v. Mackrnan, supra no. 20, 27sE per Lord
Diplock. See also the GCHQ case, supra no. 2, 408H per
Lord Diplock.
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abuse of power if it was equivalent to a breach of
contract of a breach of representation.3a The
conceptual uncertainty as to whether the principle
of legitimate expectations forms an independent
public law principle or whether it is simply a
consequence of the private law principle of
estoppel betrays the lack of a clearly formulated
basis of public law. Further uncertainty is
demonstrated by some judicial comments to the
effect that the principle had a limited role in
giving the individual a sufficient interest to
challenge the decision.39 However, if a legitimate
expectation only enabled an applicant standing to
challenge, then it would surely provide the
applicant with little more than he or she already
possessed. As Parker L.J. has recognised "to have a
sufficient interest to afford a locus standi to
challenge is a long way from being entitled to
succeed in such challenge."40
The answer to question concerning the origins
of the concept is unclear. It is submitted here
that the development of the principle of legitimate
38 In re Preston [1985] A.C. 835, 866H-867A.
39 O'Reilly v. Mackman, supra no. 20, 275E per Lord
Diplocki Findlay, supra no. 1, 338D per Lord Scarman.
40R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Khan [1985] 1 All E.R. 40, 46h.
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expectations from the early 1980s onwards was
influenced by the existence of the principle in
Community law. In 1977 Lord Diplock considered the
time ripe for the assimilation of the Community law
principle of legitimate expectations into English
law.4l While Lord Denning M. R. 's use of the phrase
would not appear to have been influenced by the
European principle, it seems that other judges, in
particular Lord Diplock, used that phrase in order
to develop a similar concept of legitimate
expectations in English law as that which existed
in European Community law. 42 The idea Lord Diplock
had in mind was a remedy against action with
retrospective effect43 which he considered to be a
progressive principle and regretted that it had not
evolved in English law. According to Usher, when
the European Court decided to apply the German
principle of "Vertrauensschutz", it was translated
into French, being the working language of the
European Court, as "protection de la confiance
legitime". This was originally translated into
4lHansard 379 H.L. Deb. col. 994 (3rd February 1977).
42Forsyth, op. cit. supra no. 9, 241-245; Lord Mackenzie
Stuart "Recent Developments in English Administrative
Law - The Impact of Europe?" in F. Capotorti (ed.), Du
droit international au droit d l'integration. Liber
Amicorum Pierre Pescatore. (Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987) page 411, 417. See chapter 3,
section 1.
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English as "legitimate conf Ldenoev " which was
considered misleading in view of the technical
meaning of confidence in English law and so was
changed to the more appropriate phrase "legitimate
expectation" .45 Forsyth suggests that it is likely
that the label "legitimate expectation", as used by
Lord Denning, was subsequently borrowed from
English law by commentators to describe the concept
used by the European Court.46 If so, then this makes
Lord Denning's reference made in 1969 all the more
remarkable. Although this did not introduce the
principle of legitimate expectations it could have
been subsequently used to describe that principle
as developed by the European Court. Also the
principle could have mistakenly been seen as doing
little more than vindicating the more well-known
common law principle of estoppel.
Regardless of the labels used it is clear that
the principle of legitimate expectations known in
43 Hansard 379 H.L. Deb. col. 994 (3rd February 1977).
44 This wording was used in early decisions of the
European Court. See Case 81/72 Commission v. Council
(1973] E.C.R. 575, paragraphs 10 and 13. In Case 1/73
Westzucker GmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Zucker
(1973] E.C.R. 723, paragraph 6 the European Court
described it as "...a principle of legal certainty by
which the confidence of persons concerned deserves to be
protected (Vertrauensschutz). The literal translation of
"Vertrauensschutz" is "confidence protection".
45 J.A. Usher General Principles of EC Law (London:
Longman, 1998) page 54.
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English law was developed as a response to the same
principle in Community law. Equally important is
the fact that some judges have allowed the European
principle to influence the development of the
principle in English law. For example, Sedley J.
has recognised that although "Britain ... [is] ...a
relative latecomer to the doctrine ... [t]his ...may
be an advantage, at least to the extent that our
case law on the topic has not had a chance to
ossify and because it enables us to learn from our
neighbours. ,,47However, to the extent that Lord
Denning's use of the phrase in the Schmidt and
Breen cases is still classified as a category of
legitimate expectation,48 and legitimate
expectations is seen as deriving from or equal to
the principle of estoppe149 there remains a lack of
46Forsyth, op. cit. supra no. 9, 242 footnote 22.
47R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex
parte Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd. [1995] 2 All E.R.
714, 725g.
48 See, e.g., Lord Diplock's analysis of the principle in
the GCHQ case which proceeds on the basis that it
provides procedural fairness for protectable interests.
For criticism see Elias, op. cit. supra no. 12, pages
40-42. See also Craig, op. cit. supra no. 25, pages 293-
294; C.F. Forsyth "Wednesbury Protection of Substantive
Legitimate Expectations" [1997] P.L. 375, 377.
49See In re Preston, supra no. 38, 886H-867A per Lord
Templeman;'Oloniluyi v. Home Secretary [1990] Imm.A.R.
135, 146 per Dillon L.J.; R. v. Independent Television
Commission ex parte TSW Broadcasting Ltd., House of
Lords, 26th March 1992, LEXIS transcript per Lord
Templeman; M. Beloff "Natural Justice - (The Audi
Alteram Partem Rule) and Fairness" in M. Supperstone and
J. Goudie (eds.), Judicial Review (London: Butterworths,
232
conceptual clarity surrounding the precise use of
the principle. Through the two separate roots of
procedural fairness and estoppel, the European
principle of legitimate expectations came to be
woven into the common law. However, the courts have
not always been clear in which sense the term is
being employed. As Simon Brown L.J. has
acknowledged, "many semantic confusions ...have
bedevilled this area of our law."so
3. The Inducement of Expectations
To be worthy of protection an expectation must
be both reasonable and legitimate. It must be
capable of being reasonably held in the
circumstances and capable of being protected
against any policy or public interest
considerations which might override it. Early in
the process of introducing the principle into
English law, senior judges did not clearly
distinguish the senses in which the term was being
used. Lord Fraser considered that legitimate meant
1992) page 152, 178; C. Graham "Towards a European
Administrative Law? The English Case" [1993] Rivista
Trimstrala di Diritto Publico 3, 10.
50 R. v. Devon County Council ex parte Baker, supra no.
19, 89h.
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little more than reasonable51 but later accepted
Lord Diplock's view that although an expectation
was reasonable this did not qualify for protection;
it had to be legitimate also.52 Sedley J. has
attempted to clarify the confusion in stating that
"legitimate expectation" is now "a term of art,
reserved for expectations which are not only
reasonable but which will be sustained by the court
in the face of changes of policy".53 In this section
consideration will be given to what makes an
expectation reasonable.
In the GCHQ case Lord Fraser stated:
"Legitimate, or reasonable, expectation may
arise from an express promise given on behalf
of a public authority or from the existence of a
regular practice which the claimant can
reasonably expect to continue. ,,54
This statement has shaped the ways in which an
individual can claim a legitimate expectation. The
public authority must actually raise an expectation
51 Ng Yuen Shiu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1983] 2
A.C. 629, 636E.
52 GCHQ, supra no. 2, 408H-409A per Lord Diplock, 401C
per Lord Fraser.
53 Hamble, supra no. 47, 732b.
54 GCHQ, supra no. 2, 401B.
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in the individual's mind and this can be achieved
either by way of an express promise or by a
consistent practice. An example of an expectation
arising by means of an express promise or statement
is Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu.55
Illegal immigrants from China into Hong Kong were
told by the authorities that they would be
interviewed concerning their position and that
although no guarantee could be given that they
could remain, each case would be treated on its own
merits. However, the applicant was detained and
removed without being allowed an opportunity to
make representations. Lord Fraser, giving the
advice of the Privy Council, assumed that in
general the applicant's status as an illegal
immigrant did not of itself give rise to a right to
be heard. Despite this the applicant should have
been given a fair hearing in this case because he
had a legitimate expectation of being heard which
arose from the express statement made by the
authorities to that effect. Lord Fraser stated that
it was in the interests of good administration and
the duty to act fairly for a public authority to
fulfil its promise. It was the fact of the promise
55 Supra no. 51.
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and not the status of the applicant which gave rise
to a legitimate expectation of a fair hearing.
An example of the inducement of an expectation
by means of a settled practice is provided by the
GCHQ case.56 A consistent practice had existed
between the Minister for the Civil Service and the
Civil Service Unions of consulting over changes
concerning the conditions of employment for the
civil service staff working at the Government
Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ). The House of
Lords held that the Unions did have a reasonable
expectation to be consulted in the future
concerning possible changes to the staff's working
conditions and that removing the ability of the
staff to belong to trade unions without
consultation would have been in breach of that
expectation but for the claim of national security
which superseded the protection of that
expectation. Lord Roskill stated that the principle
was a particular manifestation of the duty to act
fairly imposed upon public authorities.57 The
existence of an administrative practice of
consultation raised a reasonable expectation that
such consultations would continue in the future.
56 Supra no. :2.
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Legitimate expectations have also arisen
through the setting out of criteria for the
application of a policy. For example, in R. v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Khan58 the Home Secretary had set out the criteria
by which a child from overseas could be adopted.
Parker L.J. held that as the applicant had
fulfilled the criteria, the Home Secretary could
not change the criteria as regards the applicant
unless he was afforded a hearing and then only if
the overriding public interest demanded it. The
setting out of the criteria for adoption was found
to have induced a legitimate expectation that those
criteria would be applied in the applicant's case.
Although there was no express promise or settled
practice that the criteria would be applied, a
legitimate expectation had been raised. This case
shows the underlying requirement at work here:
legitimate expectations must exist as a result of
the conduct of the public authority. The need for
some form of administrative conduct to raise an
expectation can be seen from the following case.
57 Ibid., 415C.
58 Supra no. 40.
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In R. v. Secretary of State for Education ex
parte London Borough of Southwar~9 Laws J. refused
to accept that a legitimate expectation could arise
from a promise to be implied between the
relationship of the Education Secretary and the
local authority. The Education Secretary had
decided to approve proposals for a school to have
grant maintained status by 1st January 1994. The
local authority had objected to this but was only
told of the Secretary of State's decision 8 days
before the change of status was to be implemented.
It was argued that the local authority had a
legitimate expectation of being consulted regarding
the implementation date. However, this argument was
rejected. Laws J. held that no legitimate
expectation of consultation existed:
"It is important to have in mind that while this
area of the law is pre-eminently concerned with
fairness ...we are obliged, sitting here, to pay
due respect to another principle: the principle of
legal certainty. It would be intolerable if our
jurisprudence did not make it reasonably clear to
public administrators, whose task extends not to a
59 [1995] E.L.R. 308. See also R. v. Secretary of State
for Education and Science ex parte Islam [1993] 5
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single case but to the management of a continuing
regime, when the law obliges them to consult
persons or bodies affected by their decisions, and
when it does not. ,,60
Similarly in Lloyd v. McMahon61 the argument that a
legitimate expectation of an oral hearing was an
objective fundamental right although the applicants
did not expect to be invited to a hearing was
rejected. Legitimate expectations is a principle
which concentrates on the conduct of public
authorities. The existence of an expectation will
impose a duty to act fairly on the public authority
in all the circumstances. Past conduct, either by
way of an express statement, settled practice or
the setting out of policy, may determine what the
future conduct of the public authority should be
but only to the extent that fairness is preserved
for both the individual and the public authority.
The inducement of an expectation by some conduct of
the public authority is therefore a necessary
requirement because the imposition of other
subjectively held expectations would impose unfair
Admin.L.R. 177.
60 Ibid., 320D-E.
61 Supra no. 17.
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burdens on the public authority and reduce legal
certainty.
The requirements of fairness and legal
certainty will also condition the form of
administrative conduct which can induce reasonable
expectations. A refinement of the conditions a
representation must fulfil was made in R. v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners ex parte M.F.K. Underwriting
Agents Ltd.62 which concerned whether taxpayers
could justifiably rely on statements made by the
Commissioners concerning their tax liabilities.
Bingham L.J. (as he then was) stated that in
assessing the meaning and effect reasonably capable
of being placed on statements by the Commissioners,
the factual context was all-important. In seeking a
clarification of tax liability it was necessary for
the individual to "put all his cards face upwards
on the table" and give full disclosure of the
details of his transactions.63 Secondly, the
representation made by the Commissioners must be
"clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant
qualification."64 Bingham L.J. stated that the duty
to act fairly raised by a reasonable expectation
62 [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1545.
63 Ibid., 1569E.
64 Ibid., 1569G.
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did not work solely in the favour of the applicant
but was a two-way street: "[i]t imports the notion
of equitableness, of fair and open dealing, to
which the authority is as much entitled as the
citizen."65 The guiding principle is what would it
be fair and reasonable to expect in all the
circumstances. For example, in R. v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department ex parte Sakala66 the
applicant claimed a legitimate expectation that the
Secretary of State would follow the recommendation
of a special immigration adjudicator. A
Parliamentary statement had been made to the effect
that such recommendations would "almost invariably"
be followed unless it was perverse or unlawful.
However, the Court of Appeal refused to accept that
this statement could induce the expectation
claimed. Fairly read the statement could not give
rise to the expectation that the Secretary of State
would always follow the recommendation made.
The existence of an expectation due to a
settled practice will be a question of fact and
degree. The courts will examine all the
circumstances to determine whether it was possible
for the applicant to hold a reasonable expectation.
65 Ibid., 1570A.
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For example, in R. v. British Coal Corporation ex
parte Vardy 7 the applicant claimed a legitimate
expectation that the modified colliery review
procedure, which had been in constant use since
1985, would be used prior to the closure of any
coal pits. Glidewell L.J. stated that this was a
"classic example of legitimate expectation". 68 It is
possible for both a settled practice and an express
representation to simultaneously induce an
expectation as happened in R. v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department ex parte Ruddock.69
Successive Home Secretaries had a practice of
publishing the criteria for the interception of
telephone communications and the relevant Home
Secretary had adopted them. The expectation was
induced by both a consistent practice and an
express statement. Taylor J. remarked that "[i]t
would be harder to imagine a stronger case of an
expectation arising". 70
While the courts have developed these two
categories of administrative conduct which can
raise an expectation, they have not always been
66 [1994] Imm. A.R. 227.
67 [1993] I.C.R. 720. See also R. v. Birmingham City
Council ex parte Dredger, supra no. 29.
68 Ibid., 758H.
69 [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1482.
70 Ibid., 1497F.
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conceptually clear in defining legitimate
expectations. In R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners
ex parte Unilever plc71 the applicant claimed that
the Revenue should have allowed it to claim tax
relief on trading losses incurred within a certain
year. As the applicant's claim was outside the two
year limit the Revenue had refused to consider it.
However, on 30 occasions over a twenty year period
the Revenue had not enforced the time limit.
Despite the lack of a positive assurance, as
required in the MFK case, the applicant claimed
that it had been led to believe that the time limit
would not be enforced. The Court of Appeal found
that even though there had not been an unambiguous
representation, there was unfairness amounting to
an abuse of power and the decision to apply the
time limit was irrational. While the decision can
be interpreted as a case of legitimate expectation
arising from an administrative practice72 the Court
of Appeal did not clearly articulate this reasoning
preferring to identify unfairness amounting to an
abuse of power and irrationality. The decision
71 [1996] S.T.C. 681.
72 P.P. Craig "Substantive Legitimate Expectations and
the Principles of Judicial Review" in The Common Law of
Europe and the Public Law of the United Kingdom
(S.P.T.L. Seminar, King's College London, 14th June
1997) page 11.
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could have the effect of weakening the conceptual
basis of legitimate expectations. For example,
Simon Brown L.J. stated that the MFK category of
legitimate expectation was "essentially but a head
of Wednesbury unreasonableness,,73 thereby allowing
another developing principle of judicial review to
disappear into the "billowing fog of Wednesbury
unreasonableness. ,,74
73 Ibid., 69Sb.
74R. Gordon and T. Ward "The Billowing Fog" (1996) 146
N.L.J. 1663, 1664.
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4. The Justification of the Principle
It has frequently been stated that the
principle is rooted in fairness75 or imposes a duty
to act fairly. 76 The duty to act fairly is usually
thought to be closely associated with the rules of
natural justice.77 The use of "the duty to act
fairly" has been seen as a more flexible
requirement allowing the courts to break down the
rigid formalism of separating decision-making into
"judicial", "quasi-judicial" and "administrative"
that existed before the decision in Ridge v.
Bel dwi ri :" What is to be discussed here is the duty
to act fairly and the principle of legitimate
expectations. The creation of a reasonable
expectation will impose a duty to act fairly on the
public authority. However, this should not be
confused with the duty to act fairly in the
procedural sense of the rules of natural justice.
The manifestation of the duty to act fairly in
procedural fairness and the rules of natural
75 M.P.K., supra no. 62, 1569H-1570A per Bingham L.J.; R.
v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Richmond
upon Thames London Borough Council [1994] 1 All E.R.
577, 595g per Laws J.
76 Ruddock, supra no. 69, 1497A per Taylor J.
77 See Re H.K. (An Infant) [1967] 2 Q.B 617; O'Reilly v.
Mackman, supra no. 20, 275E per Lord Diplock.
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justice do not compel the fulfilment of reasonable
expectations but relate to the decision-making
process independent of any expectations raised. For
example, in Attorney-General of Hong Kong the duty
to act fairly to afford the applicant a hearing
existed because of the assurance made by the
Government; the applicant's status as an illegal
immigrant did not by itself create any right to a
hearing. The different justifications underlying
the two uses of the duty to act fairly have been
used in the above discussion of the "protectable
interest" cases. 79 The duty to act fairly imposed by
a legitimate expectation is a duty to act
consistently in the interests of good
administration and to fulfil the expectations
raised unless good reasons prevent the public
authority from doing so. Conceptual uncertainty
exists to the extent that the judiciary have not
clearly distinguished between the two senses in
which "the duty to act fairly" is being used.
However, as it can be seen that the duty to
act fairly is being used in a different sense in
relation to legitimate expectations, it is
78 [1964] A.C. 40. See Craig Administrative Law, op. cit.
supra no. 25, pages 289-292.
79 Supra section 2.
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necessary to ask why should it be unfair to
frustrate such expectations? A competing number of
explanations can be found. First, legal certainty
is a value protected by the rule of law. The
application of the law must be predictable, regular
and certain in order that people can arrange their
lives around it.sO The value of legal certainty
requires reasonable expectations to be either
fulfilled or for good reasons to be given in
support of their disappointment. If an individual
has relied in good faith on the reasonable
expectations induced by administrative conduct, the
disappointment of such expectations may entrap the
individual in a worse position than he was in to
start with. The protection of legitimate
expectations can prevent such entrapment.81
Secondly, human dignity is a value worthy of
protection which would be offended if an individual
had been led to expect something which was then
unfairly den.ied." A third justification can be
found in public trust and confidence in public
authorities. The trust and confidence the public
80 J. Raz "The Rule of Law and its Virtue" in The
Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979) page 210, 222.
81 Ibid.
82 P.P. Craig "Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual
Analysis" (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 79, 86.
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has in public authorities is dependent on the
extent to which they can legitimately expect such
bodies to fulfil their promises or continue with
their settled practices. If such expectations are
unfairly frustrated then the public would lose
their trust and confidence in such bodies. The
principle does have more substantial justifications
than merely requiring a public authority to act
fairly which, in the words of Laws J., is
"notoriously a concept giving rise to different
views as to its application in practice".83
Writers have taken different views on the role
the principle is fulfilling. Some commentators have
viewed the principle as affording protection in the
distribution of governmental property, such as
licences or grants rather than more traditional
property rights.84 Richardson views the protection
of legitimate expectations of consultation as the
common law imposing greater procedural requirements
on the processes of policy formulation85 while
83 R. v. Secretary of State for Education ex parte London
Borough of Southwark, supra no. 59, 320E.
84 See Baldwin and Horne, Ope cit. supra no. 12. See also
Craig, Ope cit. supra no. 82, 97-98. Cf. C.A. Reich "The
New Property" (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733.
85 G. Richardson "The Legal Regulation of Process" in G.
Richardson and H. Genn (eds.), Administrative Law &
Government Action. The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms
of Review. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) page lOS,
116-117, 122.
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others see it as promoting consistency in
administrative decision-making.86 Allan states that
the principle can be seen as enforcing established
practices and statements made by public authorities
which form the background of disputes between the
administration and the individual: "[b]y deferring
to existing or customary arrangements the court
permits those subject to its jurisdiction to
determine their own rules. In its appeal to the
standards and values shared by litigants - citizen
and public authority - the law can reflect the
practice of government, and share responsibility
for shaping the constraints which justice or
fairness recommends. ,,87 From a liberal framework of
law Allan views the principle of legitimate
expectations as a vehicle for the recognition and
application of rights in public law. 88
86 J. Jowell and A. Lester "Beyond Wednesbury:
Substantive Principles of Administrative Law" [1987]
P.L. 368, 377; deSmith, Woolf and Jowell, op. cit. supra
no. 14, page 424.
87 T.R.S. Allan Law, Liberty, and Justice. The Legal
Foundations of British Constitutionalism. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993) pages 198-199. See also F.A.
Hayek Law, Legislation and Liberty. Volume I Rules and
Order. (London, 1973) pages 85-88.
88 T.R.S. Allan "Pragmatism and Theory in Public Law"
(1988) 104 L.Q.R. 422, 435. Cf. the "liberal
normativist" style of public law discourse identified by
M. Loughlin Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992).
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Whatever role the principle may be seen to be
taking, it also has significant practical
implications. While no conclusions can be drawn
without detailed empirical evidence,89 it is
possible to make some points. First, judicial
uncertainty over the scope of the principle can be
particularly unhelpful for administrators.9o For
example, the uncertainty as to whether the
principle is merely procedural or also substantive
in operation creates administrative uncertainty as
to what requirements public authorities will have
imposed on them. The courts have stated that a
clear and unambiguous representation is required in
order to induce an expectation but the courts' own
elaboration of the principle has itself been far
from clear and unambiguous, thereby diminishing
legal certainty for both the administration and the
individual.
Secondly, the consequences of protecting
legitimate expectations can be seen in a couple of
cases. Following the Khan case the Home Office
responded by "reducing the specificity and
89 Cf. G. Richardson and M. Sunkin "Judicial Review:
Questions of Impact" [1996] P.L. 79.
90 S. James "The Political and Administrative
Consequences of Judicial Review" (1996) 74 Public
Administration 613, 624.
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precision" of the administrative guideline. 91 The
consequence then of enforcing standards of fair
dealing on the administrator was to stimulate the
adoption of a defensive attitude by the Home
Office. A former Treasury Solicitor, Sir Michael
Kerry, has recognised that the obvious danger of
decisions enforcing legitimate expectations is that
administrators will attempt to ensure that further
expectations are not created.92 Therefore, by
seeking to ensure fairness by protecting legitimate
expectations, the courts may, rather paradoxically,
actually encourage the administration not to make
any statement as to its possible future action and
thereby increase the risk of arbitrary discretion.
In this sense, the inability of the courts to
require basic standards of certainty and precision
in administrative guidance might undermine any
positive benefit derived from the principle of
legitimate expectations. A more recent case
concerning a change in sentencing policy where the
Home Office adopted some transitional measures,
although the applicant's case did not in fact fall
91 A. Mowbray "Administrative Guidance and Judicial
Review" [1985] P.L. 558, 563.
92 M. Kerry "Administrative Law and Judicial Review - The
Practical Effects of Developments over the Last 25 Years
in Administration in Central Government" (1986) 64
Public Administration 163, 170.
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within them, suggests that the principle could be
having an educative effect on the administration by
the implicit acknowledgement of the need to take
special account of the special position of
individuals caught between changes of policy.93
However, the unwillingness of the courts to require
administrators to provide clearly defined
transitional provisions concerning a policy change
may weaken any such educative value of the
principle as the adoption of transitional
provisions is at the discretion of the
administration.
It has been suggested that the principle of
legitimate expectations should be able to
contribute to the structuring of administrative
discretion by informing the administration of the
values of honesty, open-mindedness and
consistency.94 Perhaps the greatest impediment to
this judicial structuring of administrative
discretion is the lack of specialist judicial
knowledge of how governmental processes actually
work and the inability to examine findings of fact
93 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 All E.R. 397, 400g per Hirst
L.J. Transitional provisions were also provided for in
the Hamble case, supra no. 47, 720j per Sedley J.
94 D. Feldman "Judicial Review: A Way of Controlling
Government?" (1988) 66 Public Administration 21, 27.
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made by the administration in judicial review
proceedings.95 As the courts labour under such
limitations and are themselves precluded from
appraising the consequences of protecting
legitimate expectations it is difficult to see how
the courts can effectively enforce such standards
on the administration. The danger is that if
judicial conceptions of "fairness" are not fully
informed by a real knowledge of the administration,
then they may in fact, despite judicial
protestations to the contrary, turn out to be
little more than ritual incantations of the
"justice of the common law" 96 which obfuscate clear
understanding of how to ensure that the management
of complex public policy programmes are carried out
effectively and equitably.
5. Is Detrimental Reliance a Necessary Condition?
An area of doubt over the operation of
legitimate expectations is whether it is necessary
for the individual to have relied to his detriment
on the conduct of the public authority in order to
95 This issue is dealt with more thoroughly in chapter 7,
section SB.
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claim a legitimate expectation. According to
deSmith, Woolf and Jowell detrimental reliance is
not a necessary qualification for the existence of
a legitimate expect.at.Lon ,"? However, in some cases
the courts have laid down a requirement of
detrimental reliance. For example, in R. v. Jockey
Club ex parte RAMRacecourses Ltd.98 Stuart-Smith
L.J. stated that the principle had many
similarities with the private law principle of
estoppel, one of which was that the individual must
have relied on the expectation raised by the public
aut.hori tyv'" Also in R. v. Lloyd's of London ex
parte Briggs100 the High Court rej ected an argument
that once a reasonable expectation had arisen it
was unnecessary for the individual to show
detrimental reliance which would have been
necessary in order to sustain a private law action
in estoppel. Some judges have therefore sought to
assimilate legitimate expectations with the private
law principle of estoppel by requiring the
individual to have relied to his detriment on the
96 Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth
District (1863) 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180, 194 per Byles J.
97 deSmith, Woelf and Jewell, op. cit. supra no. 14, page
573. See also Cane, op. cit. supra no. 20, pages 144-
145.
~ [1993] 2 All E.R. 225.
99 Ibid., 236h-j. See also Beloff, op. cit. supra no. 49,
page 178.
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conduct which induced the expectation.
Alternatively other judges have stressed that
"[t]he test in public law is fairness, not an
adaptation of the law of contract or estoppel. ,,101
Sedley J. has identified a difference between the
two principles: the decision-maker's knowledge or
ignorance of the extent of reliance placed by the
individual does not have any bearing on the
existence or legitimacy of an expectation.102 While
some judges have therefore stated that detrimental
reliance is a necessary condition as the principle
is similar to the private law principle of
estoppel, other judges have stressed that
legitimate expectations is a public law principle
and detrimental reliance is not a necessary
condition although it can add to the weight of the
legitimate expectation. For example, in the MFK
case Bingham L.J. stated that "[i]f a public
authority so conducts itself as to create a
legitimate expectation that a certain course will
be followed it would often be unfair if the
100 [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 176, 183.
101 R. v. Independent Television Commission ex parte TSW
Broadcasting Ltd., Court of Appeal, 5th February 1992,
per Lord Donaldson M.R., quoted in R. v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners ex parte Unilever plc [1994] S.T.C. 841,
852f. See also deSmith, Woolf and Jowell, op. cit. supra
no. 14, page 574.
102 Ramble, supra no. 47, 72Sh-j.
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authority were permitted to follow a different
course to the detriment of one who entertained the
expectations, particularly if he acted on it." 103
The extent to which the individual has relied on
the expectation may give its legitimacy a greater
weight but is not a necessary requirement in all
cases. For example, in the Ruddock case there was
not any detrimental reliance by the applicant on
the expectation that the criteria for tapping
telephones would be applied in her case.
6. A Procedural or Substantive Principle?
Whether the principle of legitimate
expectations can protect expectations as to
procedure or can be extended to matters of
substance has proved to be a highly contentious
issue. For example, in the Ruddock case Taylor J.
stated that "[w]hile most of the cases are
concerned ...with a right to be heard, I do not
think that the doctrine is so confined. ,,104 In R. v.
103 MFK case, supra no. 62, 1569H (emphasis added). See
also Silva v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
[1994] Imm.A.R. 352, 357 per Simon Brown L.J.
104 Ruddock, supra no. 69, 1497A. See also Chundawadra v.
Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1988] Imm.A.R. 161, 172,
175.
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Council of the Borough of Poole ex parte cooper'?"
Sir Louis Blom-Cooper Q.C. stated that
"[l]egitimate expectation is ...exclusively a
procedural right. It cannot be extended to
encompass any substantive right ..." It would be
helpful to focus on what exactly is being disputed
here. A procedural expectation may arise when the
applicant expects to be consulted or given a
h . l' 106earlng or some form of procedura protectlon
before a decision is made by the public authority.
A substantive expectation will arise when the
applicant expects that a benefit of a substantive
nature will be received or will continue. A
substantive expectation goes beyond the procedural
requirements to be imposed and may concern the end
benefit itself or some other value of substance.
For example, in the Khan case the legitimate
expectation was that the criteria set out to give
expression to the policy would not be changed in
the applicant's case. The content of this
expectation went beyond mere procedure and into
substantive matters. The focus of judicial review
lOS (1995) 27 H.L.R. 605, 614.
106 In R. v. Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment
ex parte Duggan [1994] 3 All E.R. 277 the High Court
found a legitimate expectation of being informed of the
reasons for the decision.
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on procedural prot.ect.Lon"?and the decision-making
processlOB rather than substantive review and the
sheer difficulty of raising a substantive
expe ctat.Lorr':"has led to an early concentration on
applying the principle to procedural
expectations.llo Such concerns have also influenced
the debate over whether the principle can be
extended to protection of substantive expectations
as well as procedural expectations.
Recent judicial disagreement over the scope of
the principle will be analysed beginning with R. v.
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Richmond
upon Thames Borough counc i lF" This case concerned
the regulation of aircraft noise at night. The
Secretary of State had a power to prohibit aircraft
of certain descriptions from taking off and landing
and to specify the maximum number of times which
those aircraft could take off or land. In 1988 the
Secretary of State introduced measures which
limited aircraft movements at night in the London
airports. These measures were due to expire in
107 See, e.g., Ridge v. Baldwin, supra no. 78.
108 Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982]
3 All E.R. 141, 155c per Lord Brightman.
109 Hamble, supra no. 47, 724d per Sedley J.
110 See R.E. Riggs "Legitimate Expectations and
Procedural Fairness in English Law" (1988) 36 A.J.C.L.
395; Hadfield, op. cit. supra no. 12.
III Supra no. 75.
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October 1993 and be replaced by a quota system. A
press notice had stated that the new quota policy
was designed to keep the overall noise levels below
those of summer 1988. On this statement the local
authorities claimed a legitimate expectation that
the policy of noise levels would not be taken
beyond the 1988 levels under any circumstances. In
order to claim such an expectation it was argued
that the principle of legitimate expectations could
be used to protect substantive expectations.
However, this submission was rejected by Laws J.
for the following reasons.
First, no previous authority existed to
justify the proposition that the principle could
protect substantive expectations. Laws J. stated
that the case-law such as Ruddock and Khan showed
nothing more than that the applicant may have an
expectation that it would be unfair if a policy was
changed without first giving those affected an
opportunity to make representations.1l2 However,
this view of the case-law is arguably wrong. In
Ruddock Taylor J. held that the principle was not
restricted to procedural expectations. The House of
112 Ibid., 595f -596a.
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Lords in re Findlay13 had recognised that a
substantive legitimate expectation of a certain
policy being applied was possible whether the
applicants had been consulted. Although the claim
of legitimate expectations failed in Ruddock due to
a lack of evidence, an expectation existed that
warrants for the interception of communications
would only be made within the terms of the stated
criteria unless there was good reason to depart
from them. The view that the case only concerned
the right to be heard is incorrect. Such a right
would have been self-defeating in the context of
intercepting communications. 114 The applicants there
had a substantive expectation. The Khan case was
also an example of .the protection of a substantive
expectation.
Secondly, Laws J. stated that if the principle
did extend to substantive expectations it would
impose an unacceptable fetter on the power of a
public authority to change its policy when it
considered that was necessary for the fulfilment of
its public responsibilities.l1S The need for public
authorities to develop policy and effectively
ll3 Supra no. 1.
114 This was recognised in Ruddock, supra no. 69, 1497A
per Taylor J.
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exercise their discretionary powers is
fundamental.116 Public authorities exercise their
powers in the public interest to determine what
policies are best. If the principle of legitimate
expectations did operate to emasculate policy or
fetter discretionary power, then it would represent
an illegitimate brake on the exercise of public
power. However, the principle of legitimate
expectations does not prevent changes of policy in
general but concerns the position of the applicant
within such changes of policy. Two policies may be
perfectly lawful when put side by side but can
create unfairness for the individual if the public
authority changes its policy for no good reason
after raising an expectation that it would act in a
particular way.117 If a public authority has raised
an expectation then it must act fairly toward the
individual which may include exempting the
individual from the operation of the new policy as
in Khan. Even then the public authority can argue
that the overriding public interest requires the
individual to be treated on the terms of the new
policy. According to Sedley J. the principle "does
115Ibid., 596a.
116See section 7 below.
117Cane, op. cit. supra no. 20, page 143.
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not risk fettering a public body in the discharge
of public duties because no individual can
legitimately expect the discharge of public duties
to stand still or be distorted because of that
individual's peculiar position."l1S
Thirdly, Laws J. stated that if the principle
was to be extended to substantive expectations and
required the court to decide whether the overriding
public interest required the individual's
expectation to be overridden then this would mean
that the court would judge the merits of the public
interest and the proposed policy change.1l9 That
would be an illegitimate interference by the court
with the merits of public decisions. Alternatively,
Laws J. reasoned that if that was incorrect then
all the court can do is decide whether the proposed
policy change was unreasonable in the Wednesbury
sense. The sleight of hand made here is to
assimilate the decision regarding which objectives
are in the public interest with the task of which
means should be used to achieve those objectives.
In other words it confuses ends with means. The
court cannot substitute its view of the policy
objectives for those of the public authority but
118 Hamble, supra no. 47, 724c.
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must this also mean that the court cannot examine
whether the frustration of the individual's
expectation is indispensable for the achievement of
those policy objectives by testing other
alternative means equally capable of achieving the
same objectives? If the court is to test the
legitimacy of an expectation by the existence of an
overriding public interest, this means that the
court must examine whether other measures could
have been adopted in order to attain the policy
objective but which do not necessarily disappoint
the applicant's expectation.
Despite an evident disapproval for substantive
legitimate expectations Laws J. did recognise that
"the doctrine is rooted in the ideal of
fairness ...the question is always whether the
discipline of fairness, imposed by the common law,
ought to prevent the public authority from acting
as it proposes. ,,120 What is perhaps unclear is
whether Laws J. is employing the duty to act fairly
in the sense of providing procedural fairness for
protectable interests or as requiring the public
authority to act consistently in view of the
expectation it raised. In R. v. Ministry of
119 Ibid., 596j.
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Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Hamble
(Offshore) Fisheries Ltd.121 Sedley J. referred to
this statement by Laws J. in order to justify
substantive legitimate expectations:
"...the real question is one of fairness in
public administration. It is difficult to see
why it is any less unfair to frustrate a
legitimate expectation that something will or
will not be done by the decision-maker than it
is to frustrate a legitimate expectation that the
applicant will be listened to before the
decision-maker decides to take a particular
step. ,,122
The need for protecting substantive legitimate
expectations was, for Sedley J., as much in the
interests of fairness as the protection of
procedural expectations. This reasoning is sound in
principle: if the principle imposes a duty to act
fairly in the sense of acting consistently with
regard to the expectations it induced, why should
120 Ibid., 59Sg-j.
121 Supra no. 47.
122 Ibid., 724b. Sedley J. stated at 724g: "[s]ince some
of the leading cases in the Court of Justice concern
legitimate expectations of substantive benefits or
protections in the face of policy shifts, they furnish
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it be limited to a duty to act fairly in regard to
procedural and not substantive expectations? The
reasoning in the Hamble decision expanding the
principle to substantive expectations has been
accepted in subsequent cases. In R. v. Secretary of
State for the HomeDepartment ex parte Hargreaves123
the Court of Appeal did not explicitly address the
issue of whether the principle of legitimate
expectation extends to substantive expectations as
it was concerned with the appropriate test for
determining the legitimacy of an expectation. While
the Court of Appeal seemed to implicitly accept the
possibility of protecting a substantive legitimate
expectation, the matter is not altogether free from
doubt i ':" Lord Steyn has recognised that the precise
further support for the view I have expressed ...on this
topic."
123 Supra no. 93.
124 S. Foster "Legitimate Expectations and Prisoners'
Rights: The Right to Get What You are Given" (1997) 60
M.L.R. 72; T.R.S. Allan "Procedure and Substance in
Judicial Review" (1997) 56 C.L.J. 246 and Craig
"Substantive Legitimate Expectations and the Principles
of Judicial Review", op. cit. supra no. 72, page 10
state that the case could be interpreted as authority
against the protection of substantive legitimate
expectations. See also R. v. Gaming Board for Great
Britain ex parte Kingsley, Queen's Bench Division,
(CO/2506/94) 16th October 1995, LEXIS Transcript where
Jowitt J. was prepared to accept that the principle
could apply to substantive benefits. See also Forsyth,
op. cit. supra no. 9, 246-250; deSmith, Woolf and
Jowell, op. cit. supra no. 14, page 571; Lord Irvine of
Lairg Q.C. "Judges and Decision-Makers: The Theory and
Practice of Wednesbury Review" [1996] P.L. 59, 71-72; R.
Singh and K. Steyn "Legitimate Expectation in 1996:
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scope of the principle is a controversial
question.125 The issue can only be resolved with
certainty by the House of Lords.
Craig has advanced a different
conceptualisation of the problem of protecting of
substantive legitimate expectations based upon the
competing interests of legality and legal
certainty.126 The interest in legality is ensuring
that changes of policy do not become unduly
fettered while legal certainty protects the
individual's reasonable expectations. Craig argues
that denying any doctrine of substantive legitimate
expectations is no longer plausible when it is
accepted that two competing values are at stake as
the need for policy not to be unduly fettered may
not always operate so as to defeat the interests of
legal certainty. The benefits of this analysis is
that any uncertainty over the duty to act fairly is
removed and legitimate expectation is viewed as a
separate principle of review arising from the need
to balance the competing interests of legality and
legal certainty. However, as the very need to
Where Now?" [1996] J.R. 17 in favour of substantive
expectations.
125 Pierson v. Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment
[1997] 3 All E.R. 577, 606f.
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protect these values still await formal recognition
by the courts, this conceptualisation of the
problem, while more rationally constructed, is
unlikely to be preferred by the courts over their
usual assessments of unfairness and
unreasonableness.
7. Legitimate Expectations and Policy
The principle of legitimate expectations can
apply to the policies adopted by a public authority
in the exercise of its public duties. An
expectation that a certain policy will be applied
to the applicant may arise either by an express
representation or a settled practice. Where a
representation is made the conditions discussed
above will apply but whether a settled practice has
raised an expectation is not necessarily so clear.
When the practice which raised an expectation was
adopted because of the policy, which itself can
change, then the practice cannot be expected to
survive a change in policy.127 The extent to which a
126 P.P. Craig "Substantive Legitimate Expectations in
Domestic and Community Law" (1996) 55 C.L.J. 289, 298-
304.
127Hamble, supra no. 47, 729b. On the difference between
a change of policy and departure from policy see Y.
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public authority must apply the old policy even
though a new policy has been adopted is resolved by
the principle of legitimate expectations. The Khan
case concerned the question of legitimate
expectations within a change of policy. A Home
Office circular letter stated that the Home
Secretary could exercise his discretion to allow
adoption of a foreign child if certain conditions
were fulfilled. However, when the applicant came to
adopt the child, the Home Office refused; a change
of policy and criteria had been made which the
applicant did not fulfil. In the Court of Appeal
Parker L.J. held that the applicant possessed a
legitimate expectation that the procedure and
criteria stated in the circular letter would be
followed. The Home Office would have to apply the
old policy in the applicant's case because of his
legitimate expectations. Parker L.J. did recognise
that the duty to act fairly imposed by the
expectation was not absolute. The Home Secretary
could change his policy vis-a-vis the applicant
after a hearing had been afforded to him and then
only if the overriding public interests required
it. The application of the principle of legitimate
Dotan "Why Administrators should be Bound by their
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expectations was to safeguard the special position
of the applicant within the change of policy.
The ability to make changes of policy is at
the centre of the system of government and provided
by statutory discretionary powers. According to
Lord Diplock: "[a]dministrative policies may change
with changing circumstances, including changes in
the political complexion of governments. The
liberty to make such changes is something that is
inherent in our constitutional form of
government. ,,128 Similarly, Taylor J. has recognised
that "[b]y declaring a policy ... [the decision-
maker] ...does not preclude any possible need to
change it." 129 The courts have been careful not to
allow the principle of legitimate expectations to
prevent or interfere with a change in policy that
is fairly carried out. This issue arose in Re
Findlay30 where the applicants, who were prisoners,
claimed that before a change in sentencing policy
was made, each of them could legitimately expect to
be released on licence. It was argued that the
change of policy frustrated their expectations. In
Policies" (1997) 17 O.J.L.S. 23.
128 Hughes v. Department of Heal th and Social Securi ty
[1985] A.C. 776, 788A.
129 Ruddock, supra no. 69, 1497B.
130 Supra no. 1.
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rejecting this claim Lord Scarman emphasised the
imperative of changing policy:
"But what was their legitimate expectation?
Given the substance and purpose of the
legislative provisions governing parole, the
most that a convicted prisoner can legitimately
expect is that his case will be examined
individually in the light of whatever policy the
Secretary of State sees fit to adopt provided
always that the adopted policy is a lawful
exercise of the discretion conferred upon him by
the statute. Any other view would entail the
conclusion that the unfettered discretion
conferred by the statute upon the minister can in
some cases be restricted so as to hamper, or even
prevent changes of policy." 131
On the facts of the case it was a contentious point
whether the fulfilment of the prisoner's
expectations would operate so as to defeat the
change in policy and even if there were reasons of
overriding public importance for frustrating the
expectations these were not articulated by the
House of Lords. However, the point of principle to
131 Ibid., 338E-F.
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emerge from Findlay is valid: it will not be
legitimate to expect that a public authority will
not change its policy in general as it would reduce
the powers of the public authority. The need to
change policy in general is required by the
discretionary power which is given to a public
authority to act in the public interest. Policy
changes may be required by the change in the
political complexion of the decision-maker, or for
technological advances or as response to emergency
action. The imperative of policy changes cannot be
defeated by legitimate expectations. However,
expectations can be protected to this extent that
they do not subvert the change of policy and are
legitimate. Unfortunately the courts have not
always distinguished between these two inquiries as
the next cases illustrates.
R. v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte
Uni ted Sta tes Tobacco In terna tional Inc. 132
concerned a claim of legitimate expectation which
was frustrated by a change of policy. The applicant
manufactured oral snuff and had been encouraged by
Government departments and grants of money to set
up a factory. However, in 1988 the Government, on
132 [1992] 1 Q.B. 353.
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the basis of medical advice, changed its policy;
oral snuff was to be banned. The applicant claimed
a legitimate expectation implied by the course of
conduct with the Government that it would be able
to continue its operations. In the High Court, the
claim of legitimate expectations was rejected.
Taylor L.J., relying on the statement in re
Findlay, held that if the Secretary of State had
concluded that a change of policy was required "his
discretion could not be fettered by moral
obligations to the applicants deriving from his
earlier favourable treatment of them. It would be
absurd to suggest that some moral commitment to a
single company should prevail over the public
interest. ,,133 The decision has been criticised
because the court confused the two issues of
whether an expectation existed and whether the
public interest overrode the expectation.l34 In
assimilating these two separate inquiries the court
accepted that because a change of policy had been
made, this necessarily frustrated any expectations
the applicant had and did not examine whether the
133 Ibid., 369G. See also 372F-G per Morland J.
134 B. Schwehr and P. Brown "Legitimate Expectation -
Snuffed Out?" [1991] P.L. 163, 166-167. See also Craig
"Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis", op.
cit. supra no. 82, 97.
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Secretary of State had shown good reason for
changing his mind as regards the applicant. While
as in re Findlay there may have been good public
interest justifications for overriding the
applicant's expectations, confusion of whether an
expectation existed in the first with whether a
higher public interest existed, the approach of the
court "dilutes an otherwise healthy and beneficial
doctrine. ,,135
There is also some uncertainty as to whether
the protection of legitimate expectations can be
asserted against secondary legislation. Neill L.J.
has doubted whether, save in exceptional cases,
legitimate expectations could be invoked to
invalidate primary or secondary legislation put
before Parliament. 136While the judicial inhibition
against reviewing primary legislation is well-
recognised,137 the restriction of the principle in
regard to secondary legislation seems
unjustifiable. Considering that policies can be
implemented by secondary legislation, such a
135Ibid., 167.
136 R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte
National and Local Government Officers' Association
[1993] 5 Admin.L.R. 785, 804E.
137A.V. Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of
the Constitution (London: Macmillan, lOth edn., 1959)
chapter 1. See also Lord Irvine, op. cit. supra no. 124,
75-78.
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restriction would seriously limit the applicability
of the principle.l3S If a legitimate expectation was
raised against secondary legislation it would only
require a change made in the individual's case
unless the public authority could raise arguments
of an overriding public interest.
8. The Revocation of Expectations
Expectations can be revoked at two stages.
First, when a reasonable expectation exists, this
can be revoked by changes which will no longer make
it reasonable for the individual to hold that
expectation. Secondly, when a reasonable
expectation is claimed and recognised by the court,
the public authority may argue that it must be
defeated by a change of policy or public interest
reasons. If so, then the issue will be whether the
expectation is either legitimate and worthy of
protection or must be overridden. These two issues
will be examined here as will the question of
unlawful expectations.
138 The courts have declared secondary legislation
approved by Parliament as contrary to other common law
principles. See R. v. H.M. Treasury ex parte Smedley
[1985] Q.B. 657 (improper purpose); R. v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department ex parte Leech [1994] Q.B.
198 (presumption of liberty).
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A. Revocation of Reasonable Expectations
The revocation of a reasonable expectation
depends like the inducement of an expectation on
the conduct of the public authority. Such conduct
may change the expectations previously induced. For
example, in Hughes v. Department of Health and
Social Securi ty39 the applicants were civil
servants who had been compulsorily retired at ages
between 60 and 65. The Department of Health and
Social Security had for a number of years adopted a
code concerning pay and conditions which had stated
that while the normal age for retirement was 60,
civil servants could continue to work until the age
of 65 subject to their efficiency. However, a
circular in 1981 announced a change in policy:
civil servants in the relevant grades were to be
retired at the age of 61 and, later, at 60. The
question whether the code had given rise to a
legitimate expectation was rejected by the House of
Lords. Lord Diplock reasoned that "any reasonable
expectations that may have been aroused by the
previous circular [were] destroyed and ...replaced
139 Supra no. 128.
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by such other reasonable expectations as to the
earliest date at which they can be compelled to
retire if the administrative policy announced in
the new circular is applied to them."140
Another example of expectations being revoked
is R. v. Department of Trade and Industry ex parte
Blenheim Queensdale Ltd.141 which concerned a
challenge by two companies to a decision to
withdraw financial assistance to organisers of
overseas trade fairs and exhibitions. Such
financial help had formed part of the overseas
advertising scheme, the purpose of which was to
help companies extensively promote their events.
The Notes for Guidance of the scheme set the
maximum amount of aid at £25,000. In March 1990 the
Department decided that the maximum aid would be
available for the end of that month but after then
the scheme would be at an end. Both applicants
claimed a legitimate expectation that the scheme
would not be withdrawn without sufficient notice
being given in order to enable them to adjust their
overseas advertising and that the withdrawal would
not operate retrospectively to expenditure already
140 Ibid., 788B-C.
141 Queen's Bench Division, (CO/939/90, CO/1002/90) 13th
May 1992, LEXIS transcript.
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made in reliance on the Notes for Guidance. The
first applicant, Blenheim, was rejected. A company
employee had a telephone conversation with a
Department official in which it had been explained
that decisions to be made concerning exhibitions
after March 1990 had been deferred pending a report
on the scheme and a decision as to its future.
Potts J. found that this amounted to a
representation that the scheme was in jeopardy and
that to have acted in light of this was at the
company's own risk and not due to any legitimate
expectations it held. The second company, Brintex,
was successful in claiming a legitimate
expectation. The company had made applications for
aid and had incurred expenditure in doing so.
Taking this into account Potts J. found that its
reasonable expectation had been defeated in an
unfair way. This case demonstrates the utility of
the foreseeability of changes made to expectations.
The first company had been told of the possibility
of change to the scheme whereas the second had not.
To suspend the assistance scheme did not frustrate
the expectations of the company that could
reasonably have foreseen change and continued to
act in reliance on the scheme. However, it did
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frustrate the legitimate expectations of the
company which was not told of the possibility of
change.
B. The Test For Determining the Legitimacy of an
Expectation
Once an individual can claim a reasonable
expectation, the public authority can claim that
this expectation must be defeated for reasons of a
higher public interest. This relative nature of an
expectation distinguishes it from the more absolute
principle of estoppel which once raised cannot be
defeated. The issue here concerns how the courts
should decide whether the public interest claimed
by the public authority should frustrate the
individual's expectations. Disagreement over the
appropriate test for determining the legitimacy of
an expectation and the acceptable limits of
judicial review have arisen between Sedley J. and
the Court of Appeal.
R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food ex parte Ramble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd.142
concerned the legitimacy of an expectation against
142 Supra no. 47.
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a change of policy. The applicant had bought a
vessel, the Nellie, because of the respondent's
policy which allowed the transfer of pressure stock
licences from one boat to another. Pressure stocks
are fish protected by European Community fishing
quotas which are laid down under the European
Treaty. Member States had to determine the detailed
rules and application of the quotas allocated to
them. In the UK this had been achieved under the
Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967 which made it an
offence for any British registered vessel to fish
without a licence. Each vessel had a given vessel
capacity unit (VCU) determined by its size and
engine power. The transfer of licences from one
boat to another was permissible provided that the
total VCU of the operator's fleet was not
increased. The applicant had purchased another two
vessels with beam trawl licences in order to
transfer these licences to the Nellie. However, the
Ministry announced a moratorium on the transfer of
licences. The applicant claimed that the change of
policy had unfairly frustrated its legitimate
expectations. Sedley J. accepted that although the
case arose under a domestic statute, it would be
unreal to treat the point of law as an entirely
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domestic one. The purpose of the legislation was to
allow the Ministry to implement and give effect to
the common agricultural policy. Sedley J.
recognised that a major part of this joint exercise
would be frustrated if in the implementation of the
policy the Member State was governed only by its
national law. Furthermore, the possibility of
eventual recourse to the European Court through an
Article 177 reference required the national courts
to have full regard to the jurisprudence of the
European Court. 143 Sedley J. continued to define the
principle of legitimate expectations by reference
to the case-law of the European Court. 144
After reviewing European and English
authorities Sedley J. defined what makes an
expectation legitimate. Legitimacy was not an
absolute concept but "a relative concept, to be
gauged proportionately to the legal and policy
implications of the expectation.,,145 Legitimacy was
"a function of expectations induced by government
143 That Ramble was a case which fell to be decided under
European review is supported by the subsequent
classification in R. v. Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food ex parte First City Trading Ltd.
[1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 250, 269 per Laws J.
144 Sedley J. also quoted from J. Schwarze European
Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992) pages
867-868 and some of the cases of the European Court
discussed in the European legitimate expectations
chapter.
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and of policy considerations which militate against
their fulfilment." 146The legitimacy of an
expectation was to be determined by balancing the
need of protecting the expectation with the public
interest in overriding it. Such a balance was in
the first place for the policy-maker to strike but
this balance could be reviewed by the court on an
application for judicial review. Sedley J. stated
that while policy was for the policy-maker alone,
the fairness of the decision not to accommodate
such reasonable expectations which the policy will
defeat remains the court's concern. To undertake
such a review was not to allow the court to
substitute its view of the policy for that of the
public authority but to protect "the interests of
those individuals whose expectation of different
treatment has a legitimacy which in fairness
out tops the policy choice which threatens to
frustrate it.,,147Sedley J.'s opinion was clear: the
court must review the balance struck by the policy-
maker between the need to protect individual
expectations and the need to change policy in the
145Ibid., 724c.
146Ibid., 731c.
147Ibid., 731e.
281
public interest as applied to the individual.l48
Sedley J. was not advancing the proposition that
the court could examine whether the change of
policy in general was right or wrong but whether
the change of policy as regards the individual's
expectation was justifiable.
On the facts of the case, Sedley J. refused
the applicant's application. The course of licence
aggregation that the applicant had embarked upon
was far from completion and the change of policy
would not completely destroy the investment made.
The fulfilment of the applicant's expectation would
mean that the licence policy could not be changed.
Sedley J. held that once it was accepted that it
cannot be legitimate to expect that a policy will
not be changed, the expectation was little more
than a hope. Furthermore, the exclusion of the
applicant from the transitional provisions was not
unfair for fairness did not require the policy
change to take account of the applicant's
expectations which might well have eventually
subverted the policy.
One point deserves attention here. Although
Sedley J. drew upon the case-law of the European
148 See also deSmith, Woolf and Jowell, op. cit. supra
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Court, the implication from the judgment is that as
a matter of principle the court should undertake a
balancing act to determine the legitimacy of an
expectation whether under Community or English law.
While the courts will have to apply differential
standards of judicial review depending on whether
the case arose under Community or English law,149
the approach of Sedley J. as regards legitimate
expectation was that the European case-law should
be referred to as a means of further defining the
application of the principle. 150In this process of
assimilating the English and Community principles
of legitimate expectations, the Hamble decision
represents one of the most explicit cases to date
to recognise that principles of judicial review are
no longer self-contained and that English courts
can develop national principles of law by reference
to the development of similar principles in
Community law.
However, the Hamble decision was soon
criticised as wrong in principle. In a speech
no. 14, pages 575-576.
149R. v. Ministry of Agricul ture, Fisheries and Food ex
parte First City Trading Ltd., supra no. 138, 279.
150In Hamble, ibid., at 724f, neither counsel submitted
that there was any difference between the English law
and Community law as regards the principle of legitimate
expectations. See also R. v. Secretary of State for the
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reaffirming the need for the courts to maintain
their traditional restraint and only apply the
Wednesbury standard of review, Lord Irvine
criticised the Hamble approach as "no more than
judicial irredentism: it is to advance from a hard-
edged decision on the existence and extent of a
legitimate expectation (which is proper) to a hard-
edged review of the merits of the Secretary of
State's overall decision as to whether that
legitimate expectation may be overridden (which is
improper) .,,151 The notion that a balancing test was
to be undertaken by the court appeared to exceed
the traditional limits of judicial review: that the
court should only examine whether the decision-
maker acted within the limits of its powers subject
to Wednesbury limits. 152 If judicial review of
substance exceeded these limits then it could be
argued that the judge was not taking enough account
of the acceptable limits of the judicial role in
Home Department ex parte McQuillan [1995] 4 All E.R.
400, 422h per Sedley J.
151 Lord Irvine, op. cit. supra no. 124, 72. On "hard-
edged" questions see R. v. Monopolies and Mergers
Commission ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd.
[1993] 1 W.L.R. 23, 32D-F per Lord Mustill. The Hamble
decision did receive some academic support see Craig
"Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Domestic and
Community Law", op. cit. supra no. 122, and Craig
"Substantive Legitimate Expectations and the Principles
of Judicial Review", op. cit. supra no. 72.
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examining whether the public interest required the
frustration of an expectation.
Following much the same approach as Lord
Irvine, the Court of Appeal in R. v. Secretary of
State for the HomeDepartment ex parte Hargreaves153
rejected an invitation to apply the balancing
exercise formulated in Hamble. The case concerned
three prisoners who had been issued with a notice
on their admission to prison that they could apply
for home leave after serving one third of their
sentence. The prisoners had also signed a compact
under which the prison promised to consider them
for home leave when they became eligible. However,
for reasons of improving public safety and
confidence in the administration of justice, the
Home Secretary decided to change the policy so that
the earliest date for home leave was substantially
deferred. Though the Home Secretary had the
applicants' expectations in mind, it was concluded
that the public interest which prompted the change
of policy outweighed the extension of the
transitional arrangements to them. The applicants
claimed that their expectations had been unfairly
152 See, e.g., R. v. Birmingham City Council ex parte 0
[1983] 1 A.C. 578, 594H-595A per Lord Brightman.
153 Supra no. 93.
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frustrated and could not be overridden by the
public interest. It was argued that concerns
regarding public safety could be better met by more
rigorous testing of prisoners before allowing home
leave at all and that public disquiet at the
release of prisoners after only serving a short
amount of their sentence was caused not by home
leave and, finally, that a longer period before
home leave would not promote the public interest as
it would increase the risk of break-up of
families .154 The Court of Appeal was then met with
an invitation to balance up the competing interests
in order to determine the legitimacy of an
expectation in the face of a given public interest
in the change of policy.
The Court of Appeal addressed the question of
the proper approach for the court in assessing
substantive legitimate expectations. Hirst L.J.
reasoned that while on matters of procedure only
the court could decide what requirements ought to
be imposed, on matters of substance the role of the
court was different. 155 Accordingly, the test for
determining legitimate expectations would differ
154 Ibid., 406g-408d.
155 Relying on R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex
parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 Q.B. 146, 183 per Lloyd L.J.
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according to whether the expectation claimed had a
procedural or substantive content. Hirst L.J.
stated that Sedley J.'s approach of requiring the
court to undertake a balancing exercise was
correctly characterised as "heresy": "[o]n matters
of substance (as contrasted with procedure)
Wednesbury provides the correct test. "156 The Hamble
judgment was overruled to the extent that a
balancing exercise was propounded. Pill L.J. stated
that the court must consider whether an expectation
was created and, if so, whether or not it can be
defeated by a change of policy. This would depend
on all the circumstances, including the nature of
the expectation, the change of policy involved and
any justification given for that change in the
light of the expectation claimed to exist. However,
Pill L.J. disavowed any broader power of the court
to judge the fairness of the substance of the
decision to frustrate the individual's expectations
and to the extent that the Hamble judgment required
a review of the overall fairness of substance it
was "wrong in principle." 157 Applying this test to
the change of policy it was found that the decision
156 Ibid., 412h.
157 Ibid., 416c.
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to frustrate the applicant's expectations was not
unreasonable.
Rather than just distinguishing Ramble as a
case concerning Community law, the Court of Appeal
emphatically denounced and overruled the approach
taken there. The proper test to determine the
legitimacy of an expectation was whether the
decision to frustrate any reasonable expectations
was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority
could ever have arrived at it. The notion that it
was for the court to weigh up and balance the
competing public and private interests was viewed
as going beyond the limits set by Wednesbury
unreasonableness and allowing the court to examine
the intrinsic merits of the policy decision itself.
The Court of Appeal did not consider that it was
permissible for a court to examine whether the
disappointment of an expectation was indispensable
to the achievement of the desired public interest
objective by examining whether other means could
have been adopted in order to achieve the
objective. The Court of Appeal clearly felt that it
was beyond the acceptable limits of the judicial
role to examine whether the frustration of an
individual's expectation was indispensable for the
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achievement of the new policy. The only judicial
inquiry that was thought to be correct was whether
the decision to frustrate the expectations by a
change of policy was unreasonable or irrational.
However, there are strong reasons in support
of the view that the Court of Appeal's rejection of
the need for a balancing of interests, though
understandable, was misconceived. 158 Determining the
legitimacy of an expectation necessarily involves
some balance to be struck between the competing
interests. The individual has an interest is the
protection of his expectation whereas the public
authority has an interest in developing policy. The
question is whether the change in policy
necessitates the individual's expectation to be
overridden. As Allan states "there can be no escape
from the need to review the balance between public
and private interests" 159 whether this is undertaken
either through an explicit balancing test or as an
aspect of Wednesbury unreasonableness. Arguably,
the Court of Appeal engaged in a self-deception in
the sense that because it rejected the need for a
158 See Craig "Substantive Legitimate Expectations and
the Principles of Judicial Review", op. cit. supra no.
72, pages 19-28.
159 Allan, op. cit. supra no. 87, page 204. See also
Cane, op. cit. supra no. 20, page 144.
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balancing test in favour of unreasonableness, it
was not itself undertaking the "heretical"
balancing exercise under a different guise.
However, despite protestations to the contrary, the
use of Wednesbury unreasonableness itself
necessarily involves the balancing of competing
interests but not on any explicit or rational
basis. The invocation of Wednesbury does not
automatically resolve such issues but in reality
obfuscates them. The two interests remain in need
of reconciliation whatever the court's rhetoric.
However, Wednesbury unreasonableness allows the
courts to think that they are not undertaking a
balancing exercise and therefore hide, or rather
not require them to articulate, a rational
justification for their decisions. The Court of
Appeal's condemnation of a rational and explicit
balancing of interests may therefore be more
expressive of the court's own conception of
administrative legality than of the extent to which
expectations are worthy of protection. Rather than
openly engage in an examination of the public
interest reasons advanced by the public authority
to justify the revocation of the individual's
expectation, the courts should only ask "was that
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unreasonable?" In doing so the Court of Appeal was
seeking to secure the legitimacy of substantive
review not by a explicit and rational balancing of
interests but by the tautologous and casuistic
Wednesbury formulation indicative of the anti-
rationalist methods and "artificial reason" of the
common law. Rather than requiring the courts to
engage in a more rigorous review as to why the
public interest claimed should defeat the
individual's expectations, the courts now only
identify those decisions which are Wednesbury
unreasonable.
C. Unlawful Expectations
Finally, it may be mentioned that the English
courts have refused to confer legitimacy on
unlawful expectations. Primacy must always be given
to the ultra vires rule, for otherwise public
authorities would be able to extend their power at
will.160 Lord Denning M.R.'s attempts to prevent a
public authority from going back on an ultra vires
160 Ministry of Agricul ture and Fisheries v. Hunkin, 1948
unreported but cited in Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries v. Matthews [1950] 1 K.B. 148, 153-154. See
also H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth Administrative Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 7th edn., 1994) pages 270,
376.
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representation through the principle of eat.oppeL""
were effectively stopped by the Court of Appeal.162
While the principle of estoppel is not suited for
application to the exercise of statutory powers,
the courts have not attempted to resolve the
problem of whether it is fair not to allow
individuals to rely on the unlawful representations
of public authorities. Despite academic
encouraqement+" the courts have refused to allow an
ultra vires representation to bind the action of an
authority and to use the principle of legitimate
expectations to resolve the problem through
balancing the interests of legality with those of
legal certainty.164 This limitation of the principle
of legitimate expectations is explained by the fact
the court's review is predicated upon the ultra
vires rule itself and that the courts justify
legitimate expectations on the basis of the duty to
161 Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, supra no. 35;
Falmouth Boat Construction Co. v. Howell [1950] 1 K.B.
16; Wells v. Minister of Housing and Local Government
[1967] 1 W.L.R. 1000; Lever Finance Ltd. v. Westminster
Borough Council, supra no. 35.
162 Western Fish Products v. Penwi th District Council
[1981] 2 All E.R. 204. See also Maritime Electric Co. v.
General Dairies Ltd. [1937] A.C. 610.
163 P.P. Craig "Representations by Public Bodies" (1977)
93 L.Q.R. 398; ibid., "Substantive Legitimate
Expectations in Domestic and Community Law", Ope cit.
supra no. 126, 310-312.
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act fairly and not through achieving a balance
between the competing values of legal certainty and
legality. In this respect the principle in English
law is similar to that in European Community law.165
9. Comparison of English and Community law
concerning the Principle of Legitimate Expectations
Insights can be gained from a comparison of
legitimate expectations in English and Community
law as the principle developed over the same period
in both legal systems. Since the early 1970s the
European Court has recognised legitimate
expectations as an independent principle of review,
whereas the English courts have used the phrase
since 1969. Despite the development of a similar
principle at the same time the public law heritage
of European law, as compared with the lack of a
public tradition in English law, will be profoundly
important in any comparison. Whereas the European
Court has effectively employed the principle to
protect substantive expectations by weighing up the
competing public and private interests since the
164 In Ramble, 731g-h Sedley J. appeared to accept this.
See also R. Singh "Making legitimate use of legitimate
expectation" (1994) 144 N.L.J. 1215.
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1970s,166 the case-law of the English courts shows
uncertainty and confusion over the role, scope and
very meaning of the principle. While the European
Court seems to have grafted the principle into its
review with ease, the English courts have
experienced persistent difficulties in
transplanting the principle.
The development of a principle of legitimate
expectations in English law has enabled the courts
to articulate such a principle through the
"artificial reason" of the common law. When the
phrase was first used by Lord Denning, its meaning
had nothing in common with the European principle
of legitimate expectations but was just used as a
catch-phrase which allowed the court to impose the
requirements of procedural fairness on a decision-
maker which threatened to withdraw a protectable
interest from the individual. The meaning of the
principle of legitimate expectations became
confused with providing merely procedural
protection or imposing an estoppel against the
exercise of public power. The principle was, in the
words of Lord Fraser, "somewhat lacking in
165See chapter 4, section 6.
166See Case 74/74 Comptoir National Technique Agricole
(CNTA) B.A. v. Commission [1975] E.C.R. 533.
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precision" .167 Here the English courts can be seen
attempting to solve the problem of the extent to
which individuals can rely in confidence on
administrative conduct not by theoretical reason
but by artificial reason and common law precedents.
There is also an adherence by some judges to the
universal conception of legality by assimilating
legitimate expectation with the private law
principles of estoppel or misrepresentation. In so
far as the courts have recognised that legitimate
expectations is a separate public law principle,
distinct from the private law principles, it has
been through the duty to act fairly rather than
through a theoretical analysis of the problem of
protecting an individual's trust in public
administration. Even the sense in which the duty to
act fairly is being used has become confused. In
this way the courts have kept the basis of the
principle rather ambiguous and obscure. 168
Legitimate expectation proper was first
integrated into English law in relation to
procedural expectations. This was perhaps the
167 Ng Yuen Shiu, supra no. 51, 636D per Lord Fraser. See
also Salemi v. Mackellar (No.2) (1977) 137 C.L.R. 396,
404 per Barwick C.J.
168 Ganz, op. cit . supra no. 12, page 159; Baldwin and
Horne, op. cit. supra no. 12, 692.
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easiest means of integration as English law had
revived the principle of the right to be heard in
relation to administrative decisions .169 Legitimate
expectations came to be closely connected with the
right to be heard.170 This was achieved through the
duty to act fairly: a promise or a past practice
may create a reasonable expectation that the
administrator will act fairly toward the individual
in view of the expectation it created. The
protection of procedural expectations is well
established in English law, even more so than in
Community law. The reason for this is that as the
Community generally provides for extensive
consultation procedures the protection of
procedural expectations is not an issue. 171
After procedural expectations were recognised
in English law, the issue as to whether substantive
expectations could be protected then came to the
fore. In comparison, Community law does not even
distinguish between procedural and substantive
legitimate expectations, and it has never been an
issue whether the protection of substantive
169 See generally Craig Administrative Law, op. ci t.
supra no. 25, chapter 8.
170 GCHQ,supra no. 2, 41SF per Lord Roskill.
171 Judge D. Edward "Proportionality and Legitimate
Expectations" (A talk given at the Judicial Studies
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expectations was within the proper sphere of
judicial review. No doubt influenced by German
public law, Community law has used the principle as
a substantive control on the exercise of power. 172
After two early cases it seemed that English law
would protect substantive expectations. 173 However,
controversy over the acceptable limits of the
principle has led to judicial disagreement and
uncertainty. The difficulty for the English courts
was that intruding into the substance of a decision
was regarded as permissible only on the basis of
Wednesbury unreasonableness. Disagreements over the
acceptable scope of the principle have still not
been finally resolved. The main objection against
protecting substantive expectations is that it
would involve the court in deciding whether the
public interest overrode the expectation and
therefore questioning the merits of the
d ' , , d I ' h 174a m1n1strator S propose po 1CY c ange.
Board seminar on UK and EC law, 8th January 1993) page
9.
172 See G. Nolte "General Principles of German and
European Administrative Law - A Comparison in Historical
Perspective" (1994) 57 M.L.R. 191, 195, 203.
173 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Khan, supra no. 40; R. v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department ex parte Ruddock, supra no. 69. See
Forsyth "The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate
Expectations", op. cit. supra no. 9, 246-250.
174 Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council, supra
no. 75, 596j per Laws J.
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Underlying this view can be seen the courts'
unwillingness to use law as a means of advancing
the administrator's policy objective and of
advising on the best means of reconciling the
protection of individual's expectations with the
attainment of policy objectives. While it is sound
in principle that substantive expectations deserve
protection, there is a lingering uncertainty over
this issue. 175
The English courts have also disagreed on the
appropriate test to determine whether an
expectation has a legitimacy worthy of protection.
As the Ramble case was decided under the scope of
Community law, it brings into sharp contrast the
difference between English and European conceptions
of judicial review. Sedley J. stated that it was
for the court to determine whether the public
interest justified the disappointment of an
expectation by engaging in a balancing of the
competing interests. 176 However, the Court of Appeal
severely criticised this approach denouncing it as
"heresy": only Wednesbury unreasonableness provided
175 See Pierson v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, supra no. 125, 608f per Lord Steyn.
176 Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd., supra no. 47, 731c-
e.
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the correct test. 177 The different opinions on the
acceptability of the balancing test reflect
different conceptions of administrative law. 178 The
Hamble decision clearly reflects European notions
of the need to balance the competing interests
whereas the Court of Appeal reasserted the
traditional model of judicial review. Interpreted
from the viewpoint of the Court of Appeal, the
emphatic rejection of assimilating English and
Community law reflects the superiority of common
law values as manifested in the Wednesbury test
over a more rational and European balancing of
interests test. By turning the question of the
appropriate test to determine the legitimacy of an
expectation into a question over the acceptable
limits of judicial review, the Court of Appeal
effectively ensured the superiority of the
"artificial reason" of the common law as opposed to
a rational balancing test. However, this can be
seen to depend upon two fallacious lines of
177 Hargreaves, supra no. 93, 412h per Hirst L.J. See
also Pill L.J. at 416b-d.
178 Cf . T. Hobbes Leviathan [1651](Oxford Universi ty
Press, 1996) chapter XI, section 19: "...men give
different names, to one and the same thing, from the
difference of their own passions: as they that approve a
private opinion, call it opinion; but they that mislike
it, heresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than
private opinion; but has only a greater tincture of
choler [anger].ff
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reasoning: first, that the Wednesbury test is not
merely another form of balancing test but under a
different guise and, second, that it provides the
only acceptable division between the merits and
administrative legality.
As the case-law of the European
Courtdemonstrates, engaging in balancing tests does
not entail substitution of opinion nor does it
require every expectation to be protected. By
undertaking this operation the court is realizing
the extent of the individual's expectation in view
of the changing demands of public administration;
it seeks to optimize the individual's expectation
to the extent that achievement of the
administrator's objective remains factually
possible. Whatever the Court of Appeal's rhetoric
may have been, the individual's expectation and the
public interest remain in need of reconciliation.
However, rather than being an explicit and rational
balancing test, the Wednesbury test does not
require the court to justify why the balance struck
between the competing interests was either right or
wrong and acts as a cloak for the courts' social
and economic preferences. 179
179 Jowell and Lester, op. cit. supra no. 86, 381.
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While the off the cuff comparative comment of
Laws J. that "legitimate expectation ... [is] ...no
more an absolute doctrine in Europe than in
England,,180is correct, this does little to
recognise let alone address the critical issue of
the different styles and conceptions of
administrative law that underpin the different
methods of determining whether an expectation is
legitimate. Community law requires substantive
justification for the disappointment of an
expectation and the European Court is prepared to
examine alternative means of achieving the public
interest goal without necessarily frustrating the
individual's expectation. English law allows the
court to cover up the basis of its review under the
Wednesbury test. In another case Simon Brown L.J.
stated that the category of legitimate expectation
developed in cases against the Inland Revenue
Commissioners was "but a head of Wednesbury
unreasonableness,,181 thereby allowing a developing
principle of administrative law to disappear into
the "billowing fog" of an all-encompassing
180R. v. Secretary of Sta te for Heal th ex parte Macrae
Seafoods Ltd. [1995] C.O.D. 369, 371 per Laws J.
181 Supra no. 73.
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principle of unreasonableness .182If legitimate
expectations are only capable of protection if it
would be unreasonable for the public authority to
do otherwise, then it would appear that the
principle adds little to the legal protection of
trust in government as it becomes merely a
discretionary feature dependent upon the court's
own individual sense of right and wrong rather than
a rational and explicit balancing of interests
test. Interpreted in this way I think that the
response of the Court of Appeal in the Hargreaves
case demonstrates a failure to understand and apply
a developed principle of administrative justice
combined with a self-deception as to the balance
between private and public interest which the court
implicitly struck.
Although the observation of Laws J. that
public administration "extends not to a single case
but to the management of a continuing regime,,183is
to be welcomed, it is perhaps rather ironic when
seen in light of the courts' own highly particular
and case specific review of the legitimacy of
expectations in public administration. Instead of
developing the principle as a means of guiding and
182 Gordon and Ward, op. ci t. supra no. 74.
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structuring the exercise of administrative power by
elaborating and rationalising how the
administration should treat certain types of
expectations and how it might balance the competing
interests, the courts have preferred the highly
particular Wednesbury test. In other words, the
courts have failed to adequately think through
whether their task extends to the single case or to
the management of a continuing regime and, if so,
how this could be conceived. The consequence of the
courts' approach is, on the one hand, to seek to
provide legal certainty by recognising the
importance of legitimate expectations but, on the
other hand, to diminish that legal certainty by
failing to provide any general or specific guidance
to the administration concerning the legitimacy of
expectations across the broad range of
administrative programmes.
The difficulties of transplantation have been
exacerbated when some judges may have been unaware
that the principle was in fact developed elsewhere
and therefore have not paid sufficient regard to
comparative materials, while other judges have
sought to develop the principle as a means of
183 Supra no. 60.
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assimilating English and Community law. The result
is further inconsistency of approach and
uncertainty. For instance, the judgment of Sedley
J. in the Hamble case has been praised for its
remarkable grasp of European literature and the
case-law of the European Court. However, it is
unfortunate, though hardly surprising, that higher
judges subsequently overruled this judgment in such
emphatic language without either addressing such
concerns or even seeking a proper understanding of
what was being disputed.
Perhaps the biggest problem faced by the
English judiciary over the application of
legitimate expectations is that it requires a
different role from them in realising expectations
in the view of the changing demands of public
administration. This requires the judiciary to have
the necessary institutional confidence and
knowledge of governmental processes. For example,
in the Spagl case184 the European Court required a
reorganisation of all the reference quantities for
milk quotas in order to protect the applicants'
legitimate expectations. The most that the English
courts have done is to require the Home Secretary
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to exempt an individual from the operation of new
criteria concerning the adoption of a foreign
child.18S The courts have also allowed the Home
secretary an unfettered discretion to change
sentencing policy without regard to prisoners'
expectations.186 It would be surprising if an
English judge examined the underlying reasons for a
measure as undertaken by Advocate General Trabucchi
in the CNTA case. 187 The second Mulder case, 188 where
the European Court held the Community liable to
compensate milk producers for the permanent
exclusion from the market, would be unthinkable in
English law where damages can only arise from the
existence of a tort. Compared with the European
Court, the English courts lack the necessary
knowledge of public administration and the
institutional confidence to adequately protect
legitimate expectations.
Writing in 1978 Mitchell, comparing the
decision of the European Court in Commission v.
Council (Staff sel er iee)?" with the opinion given
184 Case C-189/90 Spagl v. Hauptzollamt Rosenheim [1990]
E.C.R. 1-4539.
185 Khan, supra no. 40.
186 In re Findlay, supra no. 1i Hargreaves, supra no. 93.
187 Supra no. 159. See chapter 4, section 7A.
188 Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder v. Council
and Commission [1992] E.C.R. I-3061.
189 Supra no. 44.
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by Advocate General Warner citing English
authori ties, 190 noted the difference of approach:
"There lies within the decision of the
[European] Court a sense of administrative
morality, whereas, certainly within the English
authorities, that was lacking. They could in fact
be used as illustrations of the way in which the
underlying thought of British administrative law
had failed to adjust to the problem of modern
government. ,,191
Is it possible to state that since 1978 the English
courts have developed, through the principle of
legitimate expectations, an administrative morality
in touch with the realities of modern government?
To the extent that the courts have recognised that
expectations induced by administrators may deserve
some form of protection, the courts are beginning
190 Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Oswald (1883) App. Cas. 623;
R. v. Port of London Authority [1919] 1 K.B. 176;
Birkdale District Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Southport
Corporation [1926] A.C. 355; Ellen Street Estates Ltd.
v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590; Robertson v.
Minister of Pensions, supra no. 35; William Cory & Son
Ltd. v. London Corporation [1951] 2 K.B. 476; Schmidt v.
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, supra no. 6; Re L.
(AC)(an infant) [1971] 3 All E.R. 743.
191 J.D.B. Mitchell "Law, Democracy and Political
Institutions" in M. Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives
For a Common Law of Europe (Florence, 1978) page 361,
373.
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to work toward an administrative morality. However,
this gradual development has suffered from relapses
into the traditional account of judicial review.
The result of the case-law is that the
administration can defeat any reasonable
expectations it may have induced provided that this
is not so unreasonable that no reasonable
administrator could ever have arrived at it. 192 To
state that any judicial control beyond this limit
would be an illegitimate interference with the
merits and that any further accountability lies
within the province of Parliament compares quite
unfavourably with the jurisprudence of the European
Court. Although the English courts have integrated
the principle of legitimate expectations to some
extent, they have been prevented from fully
assimilating the principle, because of the
reluctance to review substantive legality against
their preference for the Wednesbury test and the
dominant conception of law which effectively
prevents the courts from engaging in an explicit
and rational balancing of interests. The judges
have confused the evaluation of whether the public
interest could be achieved by other means which do
192 Hargreaves, supra no. 93.
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not necessitate the disappointment of the
individual's expectation with the substitution of
their opinion of what the public interest demands.
Overall, the painstaking development of the
principle of legitimate expectations has been
successful in that the English courts now recognise
the need to protect individuals' expectations.
According to Laws, in recent years European and
English law have "in very broad terms marched hand
in hand as regards legitimate expectation.II193 To
that extent Lord Mackenzie Stuart's assessment that
one can "trace a common tendency ... [in Community
and English law] ...to check unfairness on the part
of the administration while refraining from
interfering with the proper exercise of a
discretionary power,,194is correct. However, this
statement needs to be substantially qualified for
the following reasons. First, doubts still exist
over whether substantive expectations are capable
of being protected in English law. Second, the
courts have shown themselves to be unwilling, as a
matter of English law, to determine whether an
193J. Laws "English & Community Law: Uniformity of
Principle" The European Advocate (Autumn 1994) page 2
(italics added) .
194Lord Mackenzie Stuart "Legitimate Expectations and
Estoppel in Community Law and English Administrative
Law" [1983/1] L.I.E.I. 53, 73.
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expectation is legitimate by weighing up the
competing public and private interests and
examining whether the attainment of a policy
objective requires an expectation to be defeated.
Finally, as English law lacks a general remedy of
compensation for damage arising from administrative
action,195 individuals suffering loss as a result of
the infringement of their legitimate expectations
cannot be compensated unless they can have an
appropriate remedy in tort. The principle of the
protection of legitimate expectations is more
favourable for individuals in their capacity as
Community citizens than it is for them as subjects
of the Crown and more suited to the needs of public
administration in the Community than in England.
Despite the partial successes of the introduction
of the principle of legitimate expectations, the
judges have been hampered in this regard by the
failure to modernise the underlying thought of
English administrative law in order to solve the
problem of how to ensure effective legal protection
of an individual's trust in modern government
195See generally Craig Administrative Law, Ope cit.
supra no. 25, chapter 17; C. Harlow and R. Rawlings Law
and Administration (London: Butterworths, 2nd edn.,
1997) pages 619-628.
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without defeating the objectives of the public
interest.
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Chapter 6: The Principle of Proportionality in
European Community Law
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to give an
explanation of the principle of proportionality as
applied by the European Court. This examination
will focus upon two central issues: the nature and
purposes of the principle of proportionality and
its place in the European Court's framework of
review. It is hoped that the principle of
proportionality can be explained by the purposes it
serves within the different contexts in the
Community legal order. This may in turn promote an
understanding of the application of the principle
by the European Court. Another issue to be
addressed will be whether application of
proportionality involves the European Court
substituting its view of policy decisions for that
of the administration.
Some commentators have viewed the principle of
proportionality as the most important general
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principle of Community law.1 Whether or not this is
a correct assessment is debatable. Others may think
that the principle of non-discrimination is, or
potentially is, more important.2 While
proportionality is clearly significant in both
conceptual and practical terms, there exists a
considerable amount of uncertainty over its scope.
For example, Schwarze has stated that the principle
is "an extremely variable instrument of review. Its
administration is problematic since it has been
applied in virtually every legal field and hardly
appears to be measurable in strict terms,,3 and that
no satisfactory explanation has been given of the
1 J. Gundisch "Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsatze in der
Rechtsprechung des Europaischen Gerichtshof" in Das
Wirtschaftrecht des Gemeinsamen Marktes in der aktuellen
Rechtsentwicklung (Baden-Baden, 1983) page 97, 108 cited
in J. Schwarze European Administrative Law (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1992) page 677 who shares this view.
See also K.-V. Schiller "Der
VerhaltnismaSigkeitsgrundsatz im Europaischen
Gemeinschaftsrecht nach der Rechtsprechung des EuGH"
[1983] R.1.W. 928; M. Lugato "Principio di
Proporziona1ita e invalidita di atti Comunitari nella
Giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia delle Comunita
Europee" [1991] Rivista di Diritto Comunitario e Scambi
Internazionali 67.
2 D. Edward "Foreword" in T. Hervey and D. O'Keeffe
(eds.), Sex Equality in the European Union (Chichester:
Wiley, 1996) page xii, states that Ole Due, former
President of the European Court, views the concept of
discrimination as the most important legal concept in
the Community legal order. See also R. Lauwaars
Lawfulness and Legal Force of Community Decisions
(Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) page 230.
3 Schwarze, op. cit. supra no. 1, page 864.
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precise scope of the principle.4 It is suggested
here that such uncertainty has arisen in part due
to a failure to view the principle in terms of its
differing purposes and the framework of review in
which it is operated by the European Court.
2. The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is widely
recognised to have originally developed in German
public laws where it developed not on the basis of
any implied legislative prohibition against the
unreasonable exercise of powers but on a more
fundamental and scientific basis of ends and means
or cause and effect relationship.6 The fundamental
4 Ibid., page 677.
5 J. Mertens de Wilmars "The Case-Law of the Court of
Justice in Relation to the Review of the Legality of
Economic Policy in Mixed-Economy Systems" [1982/1]
L.I.E.I. 1, 13; M.P. Singh German Administrative Law in
Common Law Perspective (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985)
page 88; G. Nolte "General Principles of German and
European Administrative Law - A Comparison in Historical
Perspective" (1994) 57 M.L.R. 191, 192-193, 201-202.
6 Singh, ibid., page 88 citing L. Hirschberg Der
Grundsatz der VerhaltnismaBigkeit (G~ttingen, 1981)
pages 43-44. On proportionality in German law see Singh,
ibid., pages 88-92; Schwarze, op. cit. supra no. 1,
pages 685-692; N. Emiliou The Principle of
Proportionality in European Law. A Comparative Study.
(Kluwer, 1996) chapter 2. See also Re Export of Oat
Flakes [1969] C.M.L.R. 85, 91 decided by the German
verwaltungsgericht. On proportionality in French law see
Emiliou, ibid., chapter 3; L. Neville Brown and J.S.
Bell French Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
4th edn., 1993) pages 218-220, 245-250. See also W. van
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meaning of proportionality is that the decision-
maker must, in the attainment of its objective,
adopt measures which accord to that end and avoid
excessive or unnecessary measures. The substance of
a measure must bear some relation to its objective
or, alternatively, the overall burdens of a measure
should not exceed the overall benefits to be gained
from it. Should the overall costs of the measure
exceed its gains then it is disproportionate. Put
simply, a measure may be disproportionate if it
results in doing more harm than good. Whatever the
virtues of acting for the defined objective, the
administration must not go about its task in such a
way that the measure is either incapable of
achieving that end or it causes harm to others in
the process such that the measure ceases to be
justifiable.
According to Advocate General Jacobs
"[a]pplication of the principle of proportionality
implies a balancing exercise: the burden imposed on
the undertakings concerned must be weighed against
the benefit accruing to the Community ...".7
Gerven "The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of
Member States of the EC: National Viewpoints From
Continental Europe" (Institute of European Law,
University of Birmingham, 20th March 1998) .
7 Case C-256/90 Mignini SpA v. Azienda di Stato gli
Interventi nel Mercato Agricolo (AIMA) [1992] E.C.R. I-
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Administrative decision-making involves the
weighing up of competing interests and the ordering
of priorities. The principle of proportionality
involves the determination of whether the balance
struck by the administrator was excessive or
disproportionate. The way in which
disproportionality is identified is to compare the
burden caused by a measure with its benefit. The
promotion of one interest may adversely affect the
other. If a restriction placed upon the applicant
is severe then one would expect a correspondingly
significant benefit to the Community. Conversely,
if the measure's impact on the applicant was only
slight then it would suffice to show that the
measure was not arbitrary and promoted the
Community objective even if only to a limited
extent. In this way, a decision must bear a
proportionate symmetry between its burdens and
benefits. The principle of proportionality can be
summed up as a requirement that the administrator
should not do more harm than good by employing
2651, paragraph 30 of Advocate General Jacobs's opinion.
See also C. Tomuschat "Europe - A Common Constitutional
Space" in C. Forder and B. de Witte (eds.), The Common
Law of Europe and Legal Education (Kluwer, 1992) page
133, 141; Judge David Edward "Proportionality and
Legitimate Expectations" (A talk given at the Judicial
Studies Board seminar on UK and EC law, 8th January
1993) page lOi van Gerven, ibid., page 30.
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means which are out of proportion to the ends
pursued.
The generic principle of proportionality
covers three tests, or sub-principles, which
determine the suitability, necessity and
proportionality in the narrow sense of a challenged
measure. These tests are cumulative in the sense
that a measure must pass all the tests in order
that it is not invalidated on the ground of
disproportionality. The suitability principle is
concerned with the effectiveness or appropriateness
of the measure for achieving the purpose pursued.
It essentially asks whether the measure is capable
of attaining the objective for which it was made.
If not, then the measure is unsuitable. The
necessity test is concerned with the impugned
measure's interference with the applicant's
interest or right. This principle requires that the
means adopted to attain the objective be the least
restrictive possible. If an alternative is open to
the decision-maker which does not so affect the
applicant's right or interest then the measure is
unnecessary. Whereas, if no alternative is
available then the restriction will be necessary to
achieve the pursued aim. The principle of
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proportionality in the narrow sense is concerned
with the balance of the competing interests. So
while a measure may be both suitable and necessary
for attaining its objective it may nonetheless
impose an excessively severe and disproportionate
burden when compared to the relative benefits of
the measure.
3. The Principle of Proportionality in Community
Law
As a general principle of Community law, the
principle of proportionality must "govern action by
public authorities, Community or national, within
the Community legal order."a The European Court has
developed the principle despite the lack of an
express statement in the Treaties requiring
proportionality in decision-making. Rather the
principle is derived from the Community Rule of Law
which the European Court serves to protect.9
8 Case 118/75 Criminal Proceedings against Watson and
Belmann [1975] E.C.R. 1185, 1208 (col. 2) of Advocate
General Trabucchi's opinion.
9 For statements that Community law is based upon the
Rule of Law see Case 294/83 Parti ecologiste \Les Verts'
v. European Parliament [1986] E.C.R. 1339, paragraph 23;
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Proportionality was first mentioned in Federation
Charbonniere de Belique v. High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel communityO where the
European Court stated that "in accordance with a
generally accepted rule of law such an indirect
reaction by the High Authority to illegal action on
the part of the undertakings must be in proportion
to the scale of the action."ll The European Court
clearly assumed that the principle was self-
evidently part of the Community legal order.
However, it was not until the early 1970s that the
principle became frequently invoked before the
European Court. The principle is now pre-eminent in
the European Court's review of both Community and
national administrative legality and is applied to
d .. d d h 12 t 13 deC1S1ons rna e un er t e E.C.S.C., Eura om an
E.C. Treaties. Under the latter it applies to
nearly every area of law and to national decisions
made within the scope of Community law.
Case C-2/88 Imm. J. J. Zwartveld [1990] E.C.R. I-3365,
paragraph 17; Opinion 1/91 Draft Agreement relating to
the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] E.C.R.
I-6079, paragraph 21.
10 Case 8/55 [1954-56] E.C.R. 292.
11 Ibid., 299.
12 Case 8/55 Federation ctiexbonnier« de Belique, ibid.,
concerned a decision under the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
13 Case C-308/90 Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH v.
Commission [1993] E.C.R. I-309.
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Proportionality is also a principle of
institutional law as well as administrative law.
Article 3b(3), inserted by the Treaty of European
Union, states that any action by the Community
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the objectives of the Treaty. The principle of
subsidiarity requires that "[i]n areas which do not
fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action ...only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the
Communi ty. /I 14 The principle of subsidiarity
determines whether the Community should act at all
and, within this area, the principle of
proportionality determines what form the action
should take.1s The principle of proportionality must
therefore be borne in mind by the Community when it
decides how it should act in a particular field of
competence.
14 Article 3b (2) .
15 See Case C-84/94 Uni ted Kingdom v. Council [1996] 3
C.M.L.R. 671, paragraphs 125-6 of Advocate General
Leger's opinion. See also Emiliou, op. cit. supra no. 6,
pages 139-142.
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The Advocates General and the European Court
have given different definitions of the
requirements of the principle of proportionality.
In a couple of early cases the European Court
assimilated proportionality as part of the
"principle of justice".16 In subsequent cases the
requirements of proportionality have been more
fully elaborated. In 1970 Advocate General
Dutheillet de Lamothe stated that under the
principle of proportionality "citizens may only
have imposed on them, for the purposes of the
public interest, obligations which are strictly
necessary for those purposes to be attained."17
Advocate General Capotorti has stated that
proportionality means that "...any burden placed on
those affected by Community rules must lie within
the limits necessary for obtaining the objective
sought and require the least possible sacrifice on
the part of those concerned."18 The European Court
has adopted the following definition:
16See, e.g., Joined Cases 17 and 20/61 Kl6ckner-Werke AG
and Hoesch AG v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community [1962] E.C.R. 325, 340; Case 19/61
Mannesman AG v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community [1962] E.C.R. 357, 371.
17Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1146
(col. 1) of the Advocate General's opinion.
18Case 122/78 S.A. Buitoni v. Fonds d'Orientation et de
Regularisation des Marches Agricoles (FORMA) [1979]
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"In order to establish whether a provision of
Community law is consonant with the principle
of proportionality it is necessary to establish,
in the first place, whether the means it employs
to achieve its aim correspond to the importance of
the aim and, in the second place, whether they are
necessary for its achievement." 19
In its recent jurisprudence the European Court has
accepted that the principle of proportionality is
best explained in terms of the three constituent
principles of suitability, necessity and
proportionality in the narrow sense:
"By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness
of the prohibition of an economic activity is
subject to the condition that the prohibitory
measures are appropriate and necessary in order to
achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the
legislation in question; when there is a choice
between several appropriate measures recourse must
be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages
E.C.R. 677, 691 (col. 1) of the Advocate General's
opinion.
19 Case 66/82 Fromanqais SA v. Fonds d'Orientation et de
Regularisation des Marches Agricoles (FORMA) [1983]
E.C.R. 395, paragraph 8.
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caused must not be disproportionate to the aims
pursued. ,,20
While different definitions or interpretations have
been preferred by various Advocate Generals and
differently constituted chambers of the European
Court it is clear that such differences are not
intended to signify a qualitative change in the
conceptual basis of proportionality.
4. The Application of the Framework of
Proportionality
Uncertainty over the scope of the principle of
proportionality has arisen because of the different
applications of the principle. In applying the
principle in one case the European Court may state
that the impugned measure will only be
disproportionate if it is manifestly inappropriate
for its purposes whereas in other cases the
European Court will closely scrutinise the measure.
It is apparent that the principle operates on a
sliding scale of review. The nature of the test for
20 Case C-331/88 R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food ex parte Fedesa [1990] E.C.R. 1-4023, paragraph
13. This three pronged definition of proportionality
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legality imposed on the decision-maker by the
European Court will vary. More than one commentator
has described the principle as "a question of
degree" .21 This is in part due to the evaluative
findings necessary in its application.22 The answers
to whether a measure is excessive or beyond what is
necessary are to be found by looking at the
circumstances in which it was made and at the
competing interests involved. The principle is
therefore not self-executing; the nature of the
proportionality test used by the European Court is
heavily dependant upon the context of the
particular case before it. According to Advocate
General Capotorti "...an infringement of the
principle of proportionality may ... [not] ...be held
to have occurred, without careful reflection on the
scope of that principle and on the importance which
the facts given assume in its light.,,23
corresponds to its elaboration in German law. See
Emiliou, op. cit. supra no. 6, pages 26-37.
21 Lord Mackenzie Stuart "Control of Power Within the
European Communities" (1986) 11 Holdsworth Law Review 1,
14; C. Vajda "Judicial Review Within the Common
Agricultural Policy-Part II" (1979) 4 E.L.Rev. 341, 347.
22 G. Slynn Introducing a European Legal Order (London,
The Hamlyn Lectures, 1992) page 36 recognises that the
principle requires value judgments to be made.
23Joined Cases 154, 205, 205, 226 to 228, 263 and
264/78, 39, 31, 83 and 85/79 S.p.A. Ferriera Valsabbia
v. Commission [1980] E.C.R. 907, 1055 (col. 2) of the
Advocate General's opinion.
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The argument advanced here is that the
principle of proportionality forms an evaluative
framework in which the European Court can assess
administrative legality. What this means is that
the European Court constructs a suitable frame of
reference to express the requirements of
proportionality through which it can determine
whether the ends justify the means. The evaluative
framework of proportionality can be set at varying
levels of intensity or degrees of control. The
European Court examines the legality of a measure
with differing degrees of rigour placing various
constraints on the exercise of power. The degree of
control exercised by the European Court ranges from
an exacting control to a more relaxed control
deferential to the exercise of discretionary
powers. The nature and form of the proportionality
framework does not depend upon the mere whim of the
European Court, though it often does not explicitly
draw out why it chose one particular framework over
another. The construction of the proportionality
framework is influenced by various factors such as:
the relative importance of the competing interests;
the specific function served by the principle
demanded by the context of its application; the
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subject-matter under review; the nature of the
challenged measure; the political accountability of
the body subject to review and the overall
competency of the European Court. From these, and
other factors, the European Court decides how the
principle of proportionality is to be expressed in
regard to the specific case before it. The
application of the principle of proportionality
forms a variable framework for assessing the
legality of means against ends. Deciding which
framework best expresses the requirement of
proportionality is an essential feature of the
application of that principle.
In order to apply the principle of
proportionality it is incumbent on the European
Court to ascertain certain matters.24 As the
principle concerns the legality of the means chosen
to attain an end it is first necessary to discern
the end purpose pursued by the measure. This end
forms the decision-maker's objective which it is
seeking to achieve in the public interest. Second,
the applicant's interest will need to be
identified. Which interest of the applicant does
24 See P.P. Craig Administrative Law (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 3rd edn., 1994) pages 414-415 where the author
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the measure bear upon? How does the impugned
measure affect the applicant? Having ascertained
this the European Court knows which interests the
decision-maker has balanced and how. Next, the
framework of review needs to be articulated. Again,
this is conducted by assessing various factors
present in the specific case. What weight is to be
accorded to the relevant interests? Is the public
interest an important one while the applicant's
interest is comparatively slight, e.g., the
protection of public health or state security as
against a small financial disadvantage? Or is the
applicant's interest important, e.g., a fundamental
right or a significant financial disadvantage? What
is the context of the application of
proportionality? Did the decision-making process
concern fundamental rights, the imposition of a
penalty or an economic policy measure? Is the
measure of an individual and self-contained nature
or is it a general, normative measure? Was a
hastily made decision required by pressing
circumstances? Is the decision-maker open to other
forms of accountability? Having arrived at a
suitable framework of review the European Court
lists five steps involved in any application of
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will apply the principle of proportionality to the
facts before it. Was the measure a suitable,
appropriate and effective way of achieving its
objective? Was the measure the least restrictive
alternative open to the decision-maker? Did the
measure place a disproportionate and excessive
burden upon the applicant when compared with the
benefit advanced to the public interest?
Across the different substantive areas of
Community law three broad types of case have been
discerned where the principle of proportionality is
applied.2s These concern measures affecting Treaty
and fundamental rights, those imposing a penalty
and those entailing economic and policy choices.
The principle of proportionality has a different
purpose depending upon which of these three types
of decision-making it is applied to. This in turn
affects the articulation of a framework of review
by the European Court. These different purposes of
the principle give specific expressions to the
principle's generic meaning that the decision-maker
must not end up doing more harm than good in the
attainment of its objective.
proportionality.
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A. Measures Affecting Treaty and Fundamental Human
Rights
The common market is based upon four
fundamental freedoms (goods, 26 workers, 27
estab lLahment;" and services29) which give positive
economic rights to Community citizens. These Treaty
rights have been accorded great importance by the
European Court in terms of how the Community can
affect the ordinary lives of its citizens. These
economic rights are central to the whole Community
enterprise of economic integration. They are not,
however, absolute. The Treaty allows the Member
States to derogate from these rights in a limited
range of circumstances. 30 The principle of
proportionality is applied to ensure that any
measures derogating from these rights are
objectively justified. When examining the legality
of such a derogation the European Court will
already have part of its evaluative framework in
place as the importance accorded to the
individual's interest, the Treaty right, is
25 Craig, ibid., pages 418-421.
26 Articles 9-11, 30-37.
27 Articles 48-51.
28 Articles 52-58.
29 Articles 59-66.
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acknowledged. The application of the principle of
proportionality to review infringements of these
rights will therefore be comparatively
straightforward as the reasons for derogation are
limited and the classification of such rights as
fundamental requires any restriction to be to the
minimum extent possible. The purpose of
proportionality is then to ensure the primacy of
the Treaty right; it can only be restricted with
good reason and not beyond the precise limits
required by the derogation. Proportionality is a
necessary corollary of the existence of these
rights. As such rights are seen as intrinsic to the
Community Member States are only allowed to
restrict them within a limited range of cases and
then the exception must be necessary and justified.
Treaty rights are complemented by the protection of
fundamental human rights. Due to pressures to
provide protection for human rights the European
Court developed fundamental rights as general
principles of law.31 Infringement of fundamental
30 See, respectively, Articles 36, 48(3) and (4), 55,
56(1),66.
31 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschatt v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle, supra no. 17. See generally
P.P. Craig and G. de Burca EC Law. Text, Cases, and
Materials. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) chapter 7.
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human rights is also reviewed against the principle
of proportionality.
B. Measures Imposing a Penalty
The second area in which the principle of
proportionality is applied is against the
imposition of an administrative penalty.
Administrative decisions may impose penalties upon
individuals or traders in various contexts to
ensure compliance with Community law. For example,
in the agricultural sphere penalties are imposed by
the forfeiture of deposits and Member States may
impose penalties on individuals if they breach
Community law. The principle of proportionality has
been applied to ensure that the penalty imposed is
not excessive. The interests to be balanced in such
cases are usually specific. The individual's
interest is in the degree of the penalty while the
Community interest is in ensuring that Community
law is followed. The purpose of proportionality in
reviewing the imposition of a penalty is two-fold.
First, the principle can promote the effectiveness
of the penalty for achieving its purpose. Second,
it provides protection for the individual concerned
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by making sure that she/he does not suffer an
excessive or disproportionate burden.
C. Measures Entailing Economic and Policy Choices
Policy decisions are made by the Community
institutions in order to promote European
integration. The European Community is based upon
the idea of the mixed-economy which stimulates
competition through which economic integration is
to be achieved.32 To ensure that the market
functions correctly the Community institutions may
decide to intervene. Such intervention is bound to
affect individual freedom in some way. It has been
stated that in the field of economic law the
greatest risk of administrative arbitrariness
occurs.33 In order that the process of economic
integration does not undermine the individual
freedom necessary for its success, the principle of
proportionality is applied to ensure that such
intervention is suitable for achieving its aims, no
more than is necessary and not disproportionate.
32 See Mertens de Wilmars, 0p. cit. supra no. 5. See also
D.J. Gerber "Co~stitutionalizing the Economy: German
Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the 'New' Europe"
(1994) 42 A.J.C.L. 25.
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According to Mertens de Wilmars, a former judge at
the European Court:
"From the economic point of view the principle
of proportionality embodies two concepts
fundamental to mixed-economy systems which are
democratic in their inspiration: the principle
that the intervention of the authorities must
be subsidiary in nature and that there must be a
connection between an intervention threshold
and the safeguard of individual liberties."34
The level and extent of any intervention must be
checked in order that the Community economy does
not become a planned economy, in which case the
Community would fail to achieve its purpose of
economic integration through the establishment of a
single market and individual freedom would be
unnecessarily overridden. The principle ensures
that state intervention serves the purpose of
social development, which is in the interests of
33 Lord Mackenzie Stuart The European Communities and the
Rule of Law (London, The Hamlyn Lectures, 1977) page
110.
34 Mertens de Wilmars, op. cit. supra no. 5, 13. Article
5 E.C.S.C., which provides that the Community is to
carry out its task "with a limited measure of
intervention", and Article 57 E.C.S.C., which provides
that in the sphere of production preference is to be
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the Community, effectively and appropriately and
does not go beyond what is necessary in order to
attain this purpose.
The making of economic policy decisions
involves the weighing up of competing interests and
prioritising of some interests over others.
Difficult decisions have to be made as to how the
conflicting interests should be resolved in
determining policy. For example, the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has several objectives
which may at times conflict with each other.35 The
European Court has recognised that these objectives
"may not all be simultaneously and fully
attained."36 It is inevitable that if the decision-
maker is to make a decision some interest will be
adversely affected in some way. Policy decisions
require a trade-off between competing goals and
interests; to secure an advantage often a
corresponding disadvantage has to be endured.
Consequently, it is correct to state that in this
field of decision-making "there is nearly always
something to be said against any administrative
given to indirect means of action, reflect these
concepts.
35See Article 39. See generally F. Snyder Law of the
Common Agricultural Policy (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1985) .
333
decision" .37 The Community institutions may have to
make decisions which adversely affect either a
particular individual, a group or everyone in
general. Application of the principle of
proportionality must take account of this in order
that the European Court avoids becoming a covert
form of administration. Early in its jurisprudence
the European Court recognised that the Community
institutions were not under an obligation to avoid
decisions which adversely affected any interests.3e
However, this did not mean that the Community could
ignore the special interests of those concerned and
act so harshly that those interests are compromised
more than could reasonably be expected. The
European Court stated that when making a decision
the Community "is bound to act with all the
circumspection and care required to balance and
assess the various, often conflicting, interests
involved and to avoid harmful consequences in so
far as, within reason, the nature of the decision
to be taken permits." 39 As the interests involved in
36 Case 5/67 W. Beus GmbH& Co. v. Hauptzollamt Munchen
[1968] E.C.R. 83, 98.
3? R. v. Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment ex
parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696, 767B per Lord Lowry.
38 Case 15/57 Compagnie des Hauts Forneaux de Chasse v.
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
[1957-58] E.C.R. 211, 228.
39 Ibid.
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the making of such decisions are likely to be more
generalised, multifarious and interrelated, the
European Court is faced with a different task than
with decisions affecting fundamental rights and
penalties. This is reflected in the construction of
the proportionality framework to review economic
policy measures.
5. The Case-Law of the European Court
In this section the case-law of the European
Court will be examined. This analysis will
inevitably be selective in order to discern some of
the more important cases. As a general principle of
Community law proportionality is used in various
ways. It is employed to determine the validity of a
measure adopted either by the Community
institutions or by a Member State, to provide
guidance in the interpretation of a measure, to
guide the exercise of powers conferred by the
Treaty and secondary legislation and to fill in any
gaps in Community law. A division will be made
between the application of proportionality to
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measures adopted by the Community institutions and
those adopted by the Member State.
A. The Principle of Proportionality Applied to
Community Measures
Challenges to Community measures based upon
the principle of proportionality have occurred most
often in the field of the CAP.40 This forms an ideal
zone for the application of the principle for in
the implementation of the CAP the Community
necessarily has to regulate economic activity in
depth and therefore invade the sphere of action of
individuals.41 Many of the cases examined arise from
the context of the CAP. 42 The type of decision-
making conducted in this sphere includes both
economic policy decisions and measures imposing
penalties. Therefore, the sphere of the CAP
40 See generally Snyder, op. cit. supra no. 35; J.A.
Usher Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European
Communities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). For
analyses of the principle of proportionality in the
sphere of the CAP see S. Neri "Le principe de
proportionnalite dans la jurisprudence de la Cour
relative au droit communautaire agricole" (1981) 17
R.T.D.E. 652; Schwarze, op. cit supra no. 1, pages 727-
773; Emiliou, op. cit. supra no. 6, chapter 6.
41 Neri, ibid, 678.
42 For an analysis of the principle of proportionality in
another area of Community activity see A. Egger "The
principle of proportionality in Community anti-dumping
law" (1993) 17 E.L.Rev. 367.
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provides cases in which the European Court has
constructed different frameworks in order to apply
the principle of proportionality.
Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Berlin-Packhor3 concerned one of the earliest
applications of the principle of proportionality to
an economic measure made by the Community
institutions. A challenge was made to the level of
Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) charged on
goods. Due to currency fluctuations, the Council
had decided to devise a system of MCAs44 in order to
compensate for different prices levels of
agricultural produce due to the difference in
exchange rates for national currencies. Pursuant to
Council Regulation No 974/7145 the level of the MCAs
were to be based solely on the relationship between
the official parity of the Deutsche Mark (DM)
compared with the dollar and its true parity rather
than on any profit made by the importer on the
exchange rate. In the preamble of the Regulation it
was stated that the MCAs adopted should not exceed
43 Case 5/73 [1973] E.C.R. 1091. See also Case 9/73 Carl
SchlQlter v. Hauptzollamt L6rrach [1973] E.C.R. 1135.
44 See generally J .A. Usher "Agricultural Markets: Their
Price-Systems and Financial Mechanisms" (1979) 4
E.L.Rev. 147; P. Gilsdorf "The System of Monetary
Compensation from a Legal Standpoint Part I-The system
and its Effects, Part II-Legal Basis of and Limits to
the System" (1980) 5 E.L.Rev. 341, 433.
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what was strictly necessary to compensate the
difference between the exchange rates. This
requirement encapsulated the principle of
proportionality. As the currencies of other
countries fluctuated in relation to the DM to an
extent different from that of the dollar
compensatory amounts charged would not always
correspond to the effects in the monetary field of
the revaluation of the DM so that a trader could be
charged a greater amount than it had actually
benefited from. The applicant had imported cheese
milk from Bulgaria into Germany and had been
charged compensatory amounts of 45.50 DM per 100
kg. The applicant claimed that the method of
calculation of MCAs was disproportionate.
The European Court reasoned that the Council
had been required to quickly draw up measures
having immediate effect that were to be applicable
to all imports and exports concerned in order to
deal with the constantly developing and more or
less unpredictable situation of currency
fluctuations. The Council had sought to make an
overall assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages of introducing the system of MCAs.
45 OJ 1971 L 106, p. 1.
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The applicant had argued that the Council should
have adopted a system based upon any profit made by
the importer due to the exchange rate. However, the
European Court found, in agreement with the
Commission, that an alternative method of
calculation based upon the exchange rate of the
exporting state would have resulted in
overburdening the administration and would have
rendered trade more difficult. Furthermore, such a
system could have been rendered nugatory if the
parties contractually agreed to trade in a certain
currency.46 The European Court stated that the
requirement that the MCAs charged were to be no
more than were strictly necessary could not be
judged in relation to the individual situation of
anyone particular group of operators:
"Given the multiplicity and complexity of
economic circumstances, such an evaluation would
not only be impossible to achieve, but would also
create perpetual uncertainty in the law.
An overall assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages of the measures contemplated was
46 Ibid., 1126 (col. 2) to 1127 (col. 1) of Advocate
General Roemer's opinion.
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justified, in this case, by the exceptionally
pressing need for practicability in economic
measures which are designed to exert an
immediate corrective influence; and this had
to be taken into account in balancing the
opposing interests. ,,47
The European Court concluded that the applicant had
not shown that the way the Council had weighed up
the advantages and disadvantages of calculating the
level of MCAs was "manifestly out of proportion to
the obj ect in view" .48
In this case the European Court began to
develop the framework of manifest
disproportionality or 'marginal review'. 49 The
applicant must show that the challenged measure was
not merely disproportionate but manifestly
disproportionate. This framework therefore allows
the decision-maker a wide degree of discretion or a
margin of appreciation in the exercise of its
discretionary powers. This framework of review is
47 Ibid., paragraph 22.
48 Ibid., paragraph 23.
49 H.G. Schermers and M. Waelbrock Judicial Protection in
the European Communities (Kluwer, 1992) paragraphs 310
and 313. Article 33 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty provides:
"The Court of Justice may not, however, examine the
evaluation of the situation ...save where the Commission
is alleged to have ...manifestly failed to observe the
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constrained to the identification of only arbitrary
or patent disproportionality. The European Court
adopted this framework of review for the following
way. First, it noted that the Council was faced
with an unpredictable and quickly changing
situation which demanded a response. The measures
taken were adopted quickly against an unpredictable
background. The European Court appreciates that the
Community institutions must have some lee-way in
moments of economic stress when contingency
measures have to be made.50 Secondly, an overall
assessment had been made of the situation and of
the system to be introduced. This system would have
its advantages which would be offset by
corresponding disadvantages. The alternatives
proposed by the applicants certainly had
disadvantages also. By making an overall assessment
the Council had to trade certain interests off
against each other. The applicant's interest was
that of being charged MCAs which did not correspond
to the profit made due to the fluctuating exchange
rate, while the Community interest was to ensure a
fair standard of living for the agricultural
provisions of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to
its application."
50 Lord Mackenzie Stuart, op. ci t. supra no. 33 I page 96.
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commund t.y'" and to stabilise agricultural markets. 52
To achieve these aims the Council must be given a
wide discretionary power. The requirement in the
preamble of the regulation that the amounts of MCAs
be limited to those which were strictly necessary
was therefore relevant in the overall assessment of
the system, not in terms of individual amounts
charged to a certain group of operators.53 The
situation caused by the currency fluctuations was
the very opposite of a market lead by supply and
demand. Speculative traders could make profits just
by converting the currency they obtained for their
products. The public interest justification for the
introduction of MCAs was therefore the
stabilisation of markets. The Council had made an
economic decision which had traded certain
interests off against one another. This was
inevitable for otherwise there would not have been
any progress towards achieving the objectives at
all. As the measure aimed to secure an important
interest it was in the traders' interest that it
51 Article 39 (1)(b).
52 Art i c1e 39 (1) (c) .
53 In Case 15/83 Denkavi t Nederland BV v.
Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1984] E.C.R.
2171, paragraph 5 Advocate General Mancini stated that
the principle of proportionality "does not exclude - in
fact it presupposes - consideration and co-ordination of
all the requirements of the System."
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worked, otherwise it could potentially destroy
their businesses. The burden placed on the
applicant was not so severe when compared to the
importance of the measure's objective. Furthermore,
the European Court did not have the requisite
expertise to examine alternative remedies. Advocate
General Roemer stated that he, and presumably the
European Court also, was bound to agree with the
Commission that an alternative system would have
been impracticable and caused considerable
difficulties.54 For these reasons the European Court
set the framework of review for proportionality at
the manifest level.
Bela-Muhle Josef Bergmann KG v. Grows-Farm
GmbH & Co. KG,55 commonly referred to the 'skimmed-
milk' case, concerned the application of a
different framework of review in which to test the
proportionality of an economic policy measure, a
Council Regulation. The Community had been faced
with an increasing surplus of skimmed-milk powder.
To deal with the problem the Council adopted a
54 Ibid., 1126 (col. 2) of the Advocate General's
opinion.
55 Case 114/76 [1977] E.C.R. 1211. See also Case 116/76
Granari BV v. Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten
[1977] E.C.R. 1247 and Joined Cases 119 and 120/76
Olmuhle Hamburg AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg Waltershof
[1977] E.C.R. 1269. See C.M. Schmittoff "The Doctrines
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regulation in order to reduce stocks of milk powder
by increasing its use in animal-feed.56 Grants of
aid for certain vegetable products and the free
circulation of certain imported animal feed
products for cattle-traders were made subject to an
obligation to purchase quantities of skimmed-milk
powder at a price that was equal to three times its
value as animal feed. In order to counter the milk
powder surplus a burden had to fall somewhere. The
Council had decided that not only milk producers
but also producers in other agricultural sectors
should shoulder the burden through the compulsory
purchase of milk-powder for use in animal feed at a
price three times higher than the products it
replaced. It was argued that this contravened the
requirements of proportionality.
In the opinion of Advocate General Capotorti
the amount that producers were obliged to pay for
the animal feed was a "kind of tax levied ...to meet
the need to dispose of surplus milk-powder
stocks" .57 The Advocate General then considered
whether the measure was necessary; were the burdens
of Proportionality and Non-Discrimination" (1977) 2
E.L.Rev. 329.
56 Regulation 563/76, OJ 1976 L 67, p. 18.
57 Ibid., 1234 (col. 1) of the Advocate General's
opinion.
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placed upon the producers excessive as other less
onerous alternative means were available to the
Council? Advocate General Capotorti stated that two
possible alternatives had been open to the Council.
First, the burden could have been more evenly
distributed if it was indirectly spread throughout
the Community via the Community budget. Second, the
costs of processing liquid skimmed-milk into milk
powder and of denaturing were higher than the
market price of the milk used in animal feed. Had
the processing of liquid milk into powder been
discouraged and instead devoted to other purposes,
it would have served to have reduced the surplus of
milk powder. The Advocate General stated that
"compared with the advantage sought for the
Community, that system made demands which were too
heavy on certain categories of producers and
consumers" .58 The European Court followed the
opinion of the Advocate General as regards the
principle of proportionality in all but one way.
The European Court conflated the principle of
proportionality with that of non-discrimination. It
stated that the "obligation to purchase at such a
disproportionate price constituted a discriminatory
58 Ibid., 1234 (col. 2) of the Advocate General's
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distribution of the burden of costs between the
various agricultural sectors."59 The need to keep
these two concepts distinct has been convincingly
made.60 It is clear that the European Court did not
consider the Regulation to be lawful and perhaps
wished to emphasise its disapproval by stating that
it was not only disproportionate but discriminatory
also.
At first glance it might appear that the
European Court would have applied the manifest
proportionality test as in the Balkan-Import-Export
case. However, the European Court did not expressly
state that the applicant had to show the measure to
be manifestly disproportionate but seemed to be
less deferential in its review. The European Court
seemed to have attached weight to the fact that
such a considerable financial burden fell "not only
on producers of milk and milk products but also,
and more especially, on producers in other
agricultural sectors".61 Such producers were not
responsible for the milk surplus and therefore
formed an 'innocent' class. It is possible that the
opinion.
59 Ibid., paragraph 7.
60See M. Herdegen "The Relation Between the Principles
of Equality and Proportionality" (1985) 22 C.M.L.Rev.
683; Emiliou, op. cit. supra no. 6, pages 148-161.
61 Ibid., paragraph 7.
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European Court, like Advocate General Capotorti,
saw the obligation as a kind of tax or economic
penalty which affected producers unconcerned with
the milk sector.62 The European Court is keen to
ensure that in the regulation of the market
economic penalties are not imposed on traders63 and
the suspicion that a measure amounts to a de facto
economic penalty may justify a closer scrutiny. The
purpose of applying proportionality shifted from
being whether an economic policy choice was
subsidiary to whether the imposition of a severe
economic burden was necessary. The weight of the
conflicting interests and the nature of the charge
therefore led the European Court to a framework of
review with a more intensive degree of control than
the marginal review of the manifest
disproportionality requirement. Applying the
principle of proportionality it was clear that
while the Community interest of seeking to decrease
the milk surplus was a legitimate and important
aim, less burdensome alternatives means were
available to the Council. The producers had
62 Craig, op. cit. supra no. 24, pages 419-420 views the
measure not as a penalty stricto sensu but as a
disproportionate economic charge.
63 See, e.g., Case 77/86 R. v. H.M. Commissioners of
Customs and Excise ex parte The National Dried Fruit
Trade Association [1988] E.C.R. 757, paragraph 32.
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suffered an excessive burden and the intervention
went beyond what could be viewed as necessary.
In reaching the decision as to whether the
measure was excessive the European Court engages in
an evaluative process.64 This is a function of the
framework of proportionality. The European Court
has to decide how to articulate the principle of
proportionality in the case before it. In the
'skimmed-milk' case the European Court decided to
be less deferential in its review for the reasons
given. From this decision it can be seen that the
principle of proportionality is concerned with
specific burdens and sacrifices imposed upon
individuals rather than a general review of all the
competing interests. Should the challenged measure
impose a particularly harsh burden on a certain
sector then the European Court may invalidate on
grounds of proportionality. Alternatively, if it is
merely complained that the measure does not attain
the correct balance of the competing interests,
without imposing a heavy burden upon a particular
sector, then the European Court is likely to apply
the manifest test for proportionality as the case
demonstrates.
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In Germany v. Council (Bananas) 65 the European
Court explained why its review must be limited to
manifestly incorrect assessments. A challenge had
been made against Council Regulation No 404/9366
which introduced a new common organisation of the
market in Bananas. The German Government challenged
the Regulation. According to Advocate General
Gulmann, bananas are amongst the most important
agricultural products in international trade.67
Prior to the Regulation there had been no common
organisation of the Community banana market. The
Community had been supplied by bananas produced in
the Community, those in countries which signed the
Lome Convention with the Community (ACP States) and
bananas from third countries. The consumption of
bananas in various Member States differed. The
Council decided to act in order to bring about free
movement within the Community and a common system
of trade with third countries. As the prices of the
different bananas varied the Council was faced with
a difficult task of balancing the relevant
~ G. de BQrca "The Principle of Proportionality and its
Application in EC Law" (1993) 13 Y.E.L. lOS, 122.
65 Case C-280/93 [1994] E.C.R. 1-4973. On the subsequent
banana litigation see N. Reich "Judge-made 'Europe a la
carte': Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts between
European and German Constitutional Law Provoked by the
Banana Litigation" (1996) 7 E.J.I.L. 103.
66 OJ 1993 L 47, p , 1.
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interests and of ensuring the marketing of products
at reasonable prices.68 The banana market was
unusual compared to other sectors and therefore the
Council's experience was limited. Furthermore, the
Council had a difficult task in determining the
system's future effects which depended upon a
series of factors which were hard to foresee, such
as consumer reaction.
The Regulation consisted of common quality and
marketing controls for all bananas and the creation
of producers' organisations. Community producers
were to be compensated up to a maximum quantity of
bananas and traditional imports of bananas from ACP
States could continue. Third-country imports were
to be subject to a tariff-quota and, within that,
to a levy of ECU 100 per ton of bananas. Imports
outside the quota were set at ECU 750 per ton for
non-traditional ACP State bananas and ECU 850 per
ton for third-country bananas. The German
Government argued that the tariff quota was
contrary to the principle of proportionality as it
placed excessive burdens on certain traders and was
not necessary. It was argued that the Council had
manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretionary
67 Ibid., paragraph 10 of the Advocate General's opinion.
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power. Both Advocate General Gulmann and the
European Court rejected this argument. The European
Court stated that it must constrain its review of
the measure to only manifestly incorrect
assessments for "in establishing a common
organisation of the market, the Council has to
reconcile divergent interests and thus select
options within the context of the policy choices
which are its own responsibility. ,,69 It was
acknowledged by the Advocate General that there
were circumstances which could provide a basis for
the European Court to declare the system introduced
invalid. To succeed an applicant would have to show
that the Council had manifestly and seriously
overstepped those limits by making manifestly
incorrect assessments of the assumptions and
effects involved in those policy choices. In the
present case the Council had not exceeded its
powers regarding the establishment of the factual
basis of the action or the precise demarcation of
its objectives and its choice of the appropriate
means.70 Advocate General Gulmann commented that the
Council had made "no such manifest error in the
68 Article 39(1) (e).
69 Ibid., paragraph 91.
70 Ibid., paragraph 99 of the Advocate General's opinion.
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fundamental choice of means for achieving its
purposes for the Court to overrule that choice
within the framework of its review of legality."n
Again the framework of review was limited but
not altogether excluded. Conflicting interests had
to be resolved in a new common organisation of the
market and burdens had to be shouldered somewhere.
Indeed Advocate General Gulmann stated that it was
doubtful whether the Council could not have chosen
other less burdensome means for consumers and
traders for attaining its objectives.72 However, the
applicants had not shown that the threshold of
manifest disproportionality had been reached. This
restraint shows the difference in the role of the
administrator or legislator and that of the
European Court. The wide discretion given to the
Council corresponds with its political
responsibilities. The European Court certainly does
not see itself as the appropriate forum for
continuing political disagreements when Member
States, outvoted in the Council of Ministers, seek
to have a measure invalidated by the European Court
when it is not manifestly disproportionate.
71 Ibid., paragraph 87 of the Advocate General's opinion.
72 Ibid.
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The European Court will also adopt a
deferential framework of review when it reviews the
retrospective legality of a measure. Crispoltoni v.
Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and Donatab Srl?)
involved a challenge to two regulations which
concerned the common organisation of the tobacco
market. The common organisation of this sector had
been established by a system based upon norm and
intervention prices.?4 The Council would fix a norm
price and an intervention price for the following
year which was to be 90% of the norm price. The
products could be sold either on the market or to
the intervention agencies and a premium was granted
to encourage purchasers to buy at the norm price.
Due to an increase in production the Council
decided to introduce a system of maximum guarantee
quantities which limited production.?5 For every 1%
that the maximum guarantee quantity was exceeded
then the intervention prices and premiums were to
be reduced by 1%. Despite this measure production
continued to increase. In 1992 the Council sought
to deal with the problem by means of a completely
?3Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 [1994]
E.C.R. I-4863.
?4Council Regulation No 727/70, OJ 1970 (I), p. 206.
75 Council Regulation No 1114/88, OJ 1988 L 110, p. 35.
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new common organisation of the market.76 The
applicant had received a premium for its 1991
tobacco production. However, the Commission found
that the applicant had exceeded the maximum
guaranteed quantity by 15% and the Italian
intervention agency sought the reimbursement of
this 15%. Before the European Court it was argued
that the maximum guarantee system was
disproportionate and the introduction of a system
in 1992 was evidence of the inappropriateness of
the maximum guarantee quantity system.
The European Court stated that the applicant
had to show that the measure was manifestly
inappropriate having regard to the objective the
Council sought to achieve. Furthermore, the
European Court stated:
"The legality of a Community act cannot depend
on retrospective considerations of its
efficacy. Where the Community legislature is
obliged to assess the future effects of rules
to be adopted and those effects cannot be
accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to
criticism only if it appears manifestly
incorrect in the light of the information
76 Council Regulation No 2075/92, OJ 1992 L 215, p. 70.
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available to it at the time of the adoption of
the rules in question."77
The framework of review was then to be adjusted in
view of the fact that the European Court was
reviewing the legality of the system
retrospectively. When the system was introduced it
could not have been reasonably foreseen that it
would prove to be inadequate for combating the
over-production. The European Court was stating
that the fact that the measures adopted were not
necessarily the best is insufficient to annul
them.78 Had the European Court been willing to
examine the measure ex post facto then it would
have imposed on the Council an impossibly high
standard to foresee the inadequacies of the system
which could not reasonably have been foreseen. Even
if the Council had been given enough time to
consider the likely consequences of introducing the
system it could not reasonably have foreseen the
exact levels of effectiveness and suitability of
the scheme. The European Court therefore modified
77 Ibid., paragraph 43. The European Court referred to
the previous cases of Case 40/72 I. Schroeder KG v. the
Federal Republic of Germany [1973] E.C.R. 125, paragraph
14 and Cases C-267 to 285/88 Wuidart v. Laitrie
Cooperative Eupenoise, a coopertaive society [1990]
E.C.R. I-435, paragraph 14.
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its framework of review to test whether the measure
was disproportionate in view of the information
available when it was made. The European Court
found that while the system may not have been the
most effective and appropriate means available
neither had it proved to be manifestly
inappropriate. Advocate General Jacobs remarked
that had the maximum guaranteed system not been
introduced then production could have increased
even more.79 The argument that the system penalised
those producers regardless of their conduct was
rejected by the European Court. The alternative to
the maximum guarantee system was to adopt a system
of individual quotas was would have been more
restrictive than the maximum guarantee system.so
That the maximum guarantee quantity system was
insufficiently effective was not enough to justify
the conclusion that it was disproportionate.
In Mignini SpA v. Azienda di Stato per gli
Interventi nel Mercato Agricolo (AIMA)s i the
European Court found a measure adopted in the
exercise of a broad discretionary power to be
78 Lord Mackenzie Stuart, op. cit. supra no. 33, page 96.
79 Ibid., paragraph 48 of the Advocate General's opinion.
80 Ibid., paragraph 58 of the Advocate General's opinion
and paragraph 46 of the European Court's judgment.
81 Case C-256/90 [1992] E.C.R. I-2651.
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disproportionate. The applicant produced animal
foods from soya beans. To promote the development
of soya bean production aid had been payable to
those undertakings concluding contracts at a
minimum price set by the Community. However, the
applicant was refused the aid because it had not
satisfied the condition that the produce be
identified on the premises of the production
establishment. This condition aimed at ensuring
that the system of aid was not abused by fraudulent
multiple claims. The applicant argued that the
requirement that the produce be identified on the
premises of production82 and therefore requiring
manufacturers to have storage facilities on their
premises where production takes place, was contrary
to the requirements of proportionality; it was
unnecessary for the purposes of control and
disproportionate in that it was very expensive.
Also as the same condition was not imposed upon
producers which used soya beans to produce oil it
was argued that it was unequal.
The European Court stated that for the purpose
of examining the provision the principles of
82 Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation No 2537/89, OJ
1989 L 245, p. 8, as amended by Commission Regulation No
150/90, OJ 1990 L 18, p. 10.
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proportionality and non-discrimination could not be
separated. Significantly it continued by stating
that if a measure was patently unsuitable for
achieving its objective then this would affect its
legality but the Community institutions still
retained a broad discretionary power in regard to
the CAP reflecting the Treaty responsibilities
imposed on them. In assessing the necessity of the
obligation that storage facilities be on the
premises for animal food producers the European
Court found that various means of control had been
open to the responsible agencies. Information could
be cross-checked in order to verify that it
corresponded. The Commission argued that physical
controls were needed to ensure the reliability of
checks carried out elsewhere. Such controls were
possible where the manufacture of oil was concerned
but not for the manufacture of animal feeding-
stuffs. However, the European Court found that any
system would be open to some fraud whatever the
controls and, furthermore, the composition of
animal food allowed the quantity of beans processed
to be determined from microscopic analyses of the
final product. The Commission also argued that as
incorporaters of soya beans were more numerous than
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manufacturers of oil, which were not subject to the
obligation, control of the movements of goods could
be more difficult for incorporaters. Again the
European Court preferred the applicant's argument;
movement of products could be controlled by other
less restrictive means, such as the approval of
storage facilities. The European Court further
pointed out that the burden on animal food
manufacturers to build new storage facilities on
their premises could prove to be a sufficient
deterrent to make some producers not apply for the
aid and therefore frustrate the whole purpose of
the aid system. The obligation was invalidated as
contrary to the principles of proportionality and
non-discrimination.
When the European Court uses the framework of
patent or manifest unsuitability it requires
overwhelming grounds for a measure to be
invalidated. In the present case the obligation for
storage facilities on the premises had to be
weighed against the need to control fraud which is
rife in some areas of Community policy. It might be
thought that the prevention of fraud, like the
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protection of public health,S3 is an important
public interest and that a severe and excessive
burden on the applicant's behalf would be required
to justify a finding of manifest
disproportionality. The reason for the generous
nature of the European Court's review is that the
condition could actually prevent some businesses
from taking advantage of the aid policy altogether.
To apply for aid the producer had to store the
produce on its premises. The European Court
recognised that the construction of new storage
premises and additional storage charges would come
at a high cost.84 The condition, which was self-
contained and amenable to review without
questioning the whole policy underlying it, could
deter producers from applying for the aid and
therefore defeat the whole purpose of the policy.
Rather than questioning the aid policy, the
European Court's review had the effect of
strengthening its effectiveness by invalidating a
83 See, e.g., Case C-331/88 R. v. Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Fedesa [1990]
E.C.R. I-4023.
84 Ibid., paragraph 30. Compare with the view of Advocate
General Jacobs, ibid., paragraph 30 of the opinion of
the Advocate General, that the obligation was "in
reality simply a reduction in the extent to
which ...[processors of soya beans] ...may benefit from a
generous arrangement ...".
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condition which had a dissuasive effect on
undertakings taking advantage of it.
The next two cases involved the forfeiture of
deposits.SS Agricultural traders may sometimes have
to lodge deposits with intervention agencies which
will act as a guarantee that the trader will fulfil
its commercial obligations. If the conditions laid
down are not complied with then the trader may lose
its deposit. The purpose of this forfeiture is to
enable the Community to gain a good idea of what
trade movements are being conducted by reflecting
real trade through the issue of licences subject to
deposits. The forfeiture of such deposits occurs
when goods are not imported or exported according
to licence. This forfeiture has both punitive and
deterrent effects in order to ensure the smooth
functioning of the CAP. In S.A. Buitoni v. Fonds
d'Orientation et de Regularisation des Marches
Agricoless6 the applicant had secured certificates
for imports of tomatoes from outside the Community
which had been subject to the provision of a
security. Having imported the produce the French
85 See R. Barents "The System of Deposits in Community
Agricultural Law: Efficiency v. Proportionality" (1985)
10 E.L.Rev. 239; Schwarze, op. cit. supra no. 1, pages
732-747; Emiliou, op. cit. supra no. 6, pages 212-223.
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intervention agency refused to return the security
because the applicant had failed to submit proof of
importation within six months.s7 The provision had
been introduced for administrative reasons. The
applicant argued that it was disproportionate to
apply the same penalty for a total failure to
import and for delay in the submission of the proof
of importation. The forfeiture of the deposit was
intended to guarantee the importation of the
produce. The European Court stated that to have the
same penalty for the failure to submit proof of
importation within the time limit as for the
failure to import was "excessively severe in
relation to the objectives of administrative
efficiency in the context of import and export
levies.nB8 The charge to penalise the late
submission of proofs should have been considerably
less onerous than the loss of the entire security
and more closely connected to its practical
effects. In R. v. Intervention Board for
Agricultural Produce (IBAP) ex parte E.D. & F. Man
86 Case 122/78 [1979] E.C.R. 677. See also Case 240/78
Atalanta Amsterdam B.V. v. Produktschap voor Vee en
Vlees [1979] E.C.R. 2137.
87 As required by Article 3 of Regulation No. 499/76, OJ
1975 L 59, p. 18.
88 Ibid.I paragraph 20.
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(Sugar) Ltd.89 the applicant traded in sugar and had
submitted tenders to export sugar subject to a
deposit of £1,670,370. The applicant had to apply
for an export licence by midday on a given date.
However, the intervention agency did not receive
the relevant telex communication until nearly four
hours after the deadline. Consequently the
intervention agency declared the security to be
forfeited, which was challenged as disproportionate
by the applicant. The European Court stated that
while the Commission could impose a time-limit for
the submission of applications for export licences,
the penalty should have been less severe. The loss
of the entire deposit for the late communication
was disproportionate.
In cases concerning the application of
proportionality to the forfeiture of deposits the
European Court does not use the manifest
proportionality test but draws a tighter framework
of review around the boundaries of decision-making
by the Community institutions.90 The European Court
is prepared to use proportionality for a more
89 Case 181/84 [1985] E.C.R. 2885.
90 See also Case C-155/89 Belgian State v. Philipp
Brothers SA [1990] E.C.R. I-3265; Case C-326/94 A. Maas
& Co. NV v. Belgische Dienst voor Bedrijfsleven
Landbouw, now the Belgisch Interventie- en
Restitutiebureau [1996] E.C.R. I-2643.
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intensive degree of control because of the nature
of the decision-making under review and hence the
different purpose served by the principle. In such
cases the decision is of a different kind to an
economic or policy choice. It is typically a
decision imposing a penalty upon the individual
trader and not a general, normative measure. The
Community institutions do not need to make an
overall assessment to decide whether the trader's
deposit should be forfeited. The decision is more
individualised and less polycentric. The Community
interest is in the smooth-running and efficiency of
the deposit system, while the trader's interest is
in not being subject to an excessive penalty. These
interests are more amenable to close judicial
scrutiny than those involved in the making of an
economic policy measure and the European Court sees
itself as the legitimate forum for an intense
scrutiny of the proportionality of a penalty or
sanction.
The forfeiture cases can be compared with
Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH v. Comrnission91 which
arose under the Euratom Treaty. The applicant
company had inadvertently exported nuclear
91 Case C-308/90 [1993] E.C.R. 1-309.
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materials from Germany to the United States. The
Commission decided to place the company under the
administration of an appointed board for the
maximum period of four months92 to ensure that any
similar mistakes did not recur. The applicant
argued that this penalty was disproportionate as
the Commission had exaggerated the seriousness of
the incident and that the penalty was unnecessary
to ensure that it was not repeated. Both arguments
were rejected by the European Court. According to
Advocate General Jacobs the accidental exportation
of nuclear material could not be treated as a
"trifling matter, undeserving of the efforts
required to prevent a recurrence of such an event
with the highest degree of assurance available. ,,93
The sanction was necessary as the board of
administrators could force the company to change
its internal regulation. Had a lesser penalty been
imposed, such as a warning,94 then the Commission
could not be sure that the incident would not re-
occur. Advocate General Jacobs recognised that
there was some merit in the argument that the
Commission's response exaggerated the seriousness
92 Under Article 83(1) (c) of the Euratom Treaty.
93 Ibid., paragraph 43 of the Advocate General's opinion.
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of the incident in that a single failure had given
rise to secondary failures which had also breached
the rules. However, this could not affect the
legality of the sanction as that single failure was
serious enough to justify the most demanding
penalty.95 The European Court found that because of
the nature of the breach it was appropriate to
impose the severest sanction available.96
The forfeiture cases and the Advanced Nuclear
Fuels case show what latitude the European Court
exercises within the application of proportionality
even though all the cases involve the review of
measures imposing a penalty. In the forfeiture
cases the applicants' interests were seriously
affected while the Community interest was
comparatively weak as in the E.D. & F. Man (Sugar)
case. This was reflected in the attention the
European Court showed in its review. Whereas in the
Advanced Nuclear Fuels case the European Court
recognised the considerable importance of the
Community interest in ensuring that nuclear
materials were not accidentally exported with no-
one having any knowledge of their whereabouts.
94Such an alternative penalty was available under
Article 83(1) (a) of the Euratom Treaty.
95 Ibid., paragraph 45 of the Advocate General's opinion.
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Advocate General Jacobs saw some strength in the
applicant's complaint but refused to allow this to
affect the legality of the penalty: the seriousness
of the subject-matter required the Community to
ensure that it never happened again. Within the
more individualised decision-making concerning
penalties, the European Court can adopt a more
intensive framework of review in which to apply
proportionality and will be able to modify its
framework in view of the strengths of the competing
interests involved.
B. The Principle of Proportionality Applied to
National Measures
Application of the principle of
proportionality in relation to Member State action
tends to arise when the individual seeks to rely
upon a Treaty right or a fundamental human right
which has been restricted by the Member State in
order to achieve a policy objective. In this
context Advocate General Trabucchi has stated that
"special importance attaches to the principle that
the obligation imposed should be proportionate to
96 Ibid., paragraph 27.
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the legal obj ecti ve sought by public authorities." 97
The European Court has to determine whether the
restriction was justified and proportionate. The
task of the European Court is made easier in that
it already has part of its framework of review in
place: the importance of the applicant's interest.
The European Court then has to determine the
relative importance to be accorded to the Member
State's interest. The proportionality framework for
reviewing Member State action therefore tends to be
more intensive than that of Community action: "[i]t
would be a fortiori illegal if the action were
found to be in breach of a fundamental personal
right. ,,98 However, the framework of review can
differ from case to case. The analysis here will
draw from the jurisprudence concerning the free
movement of goods, other fundamental freedoms and
the protection of fundamental human rights.
97 Case 118/75 Criminal Proceedings against Watson and
Belmann, supra no. 16, 1208 (col. 2) of the Advocate
General's opinion. For the situations where Member
States must follow the principle of proportionality see
generally J. Temple Lang "The Sphere in Which Member
States are Obliged to Comply with the General Principles
of Law and Community Fundamental Rights Principles"
[1990/1] L.I.E.I. 23.
98 Case 118/75 Criminal Proceedings against Watson and
Belmann, supra no. 16, 1209 (col. 1) of Advocate General
Trabucchi's opinion.
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The law of the free movement of goods99
provides many applications of the principle of
proportidone.l i ty .!" Article 30 provides that any
quantitative restriction on the free movement of
goods or any measure having equivalent effect to a
quantitative restriction is prohibited between the
Member States. Exceptions to this are provided for
under Article 36 on grounds of inter alia public
morality, public policy, public security and the
protection of health and life of humans, animals or
plants. According to the second sentence of Article
36 such restrictions should not constitute a means
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between member States. As
Article 36 constitutes a derogation from the
fundamental principle of the free movement of goods
the European Court has stated that it "must
therefore be interpreted in such a way as not to
extend its effects further than is necessary for
the protection of the interests which it seeks to
99 See generally S. Weatherill and P. Beaumont EC Law.
The Essential Guide to the Legal Workings of the
European Community. (London, 2nd edn., 1995) chapters
15-16.
100 For more comprehensive analyses of the principle of
proportionality in relation to the free movement of
goods see Schwarze, Ope cit. supra no. I, pages 773-806;
Emiliou, Ope cit. supra no. 6, chapter 7.
369
protect. ,,101 In other words, the European Court wi 11
not allow the free movement of goods to be
undermined by allowing measures to be justified
under the Article 36 derogations when such measures
are not strictly necessary to achieve the limited
purposes set out. The European Court examines the
derogation to ascertain whether it is
disproportionate and its objective could be
achieved by less restrictive means. Were it
otherwise then a Member State could easily evade
the principle of the free movement of goods for
reasons of self-interest such as protectionism by
providing a justification based upon Article 36.
The principle of proportionality is utilised to
ensure that this does not happen. The examination
here will concentrate upon some of the derogations
available under Article 36, such as the protection
of human and animal health, public security,
consumer protection.
The protection of public health is an
important obj ecti ve of the public interest. 102 When
public health is used to justify a derogation from
a Treaty right the purpose of proportionality is to
101 Case 124/81 Commission v. United Kingdom [1983]
E.C.R. 203, paragraph 13.
102 See, e.g., Case C- 331/88 Fedesa, supra no. 83.
370
examine whether the restriction is justified and
necessary. While the European Court is aware that
Member States need adequate discretion to protect
public health, it will require clear grounds on
which to justify the restriction as the following
case demonstrates. In Commission v. United
Kingdom103 (the 'UHT milk case') it was argued that
the requirement that imports of Ultra-Heat Treated
(UHT) milk had to be authorised by an import
licence was justified by the need to protect public
health under Article 36. It was argued that such
licences allowed conditions to be imposed on milk
imports to prevent milk from disease infected
cattle from entering the UK before the
administrative authorities could act. However, the
European Court stated that the issuing of licences
depended upon administrative discretion and
therefore gave rise to an element of uncertainty
for traders. This impediment to intra-Community
trade could have been eliminated without prejudice
to the protection of animal health if the UK
authorities obtained relevant information by means
of declarations signed by the importers and, if
necessary, accompanied by the appropriate
103 Ibid.
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certificates. The requirement for an import licence
was not necessary for the protection of health and
therefore a measure having equivalent effect to a
quantitative restriction. It may be suspected that
the European Court did not see the protection of
health of animals as the real reason for the
licence requirement. However, it did not allow the
measure to be justified without the Member State
showing that it corresponded to a legitimate
derogation of public health and that the measure
could actually promote that purpose and that no
other less restrictive means were available to it.
R. v. Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great
Britain ex parte Association of Pharmaceutical
Importers104 concerned the publ icheal th
justification to a restriction on the free movement
of pharmaceutical medicines. On the prescription of
a medicine from a doctor to the patient some
pharmacists chose to supply a functionally
equivalent imported parallel product which was
cheaper than the real products thereby allowing the
pharmacist to increase her/his profit. However, the
Royal Pharmaceutical Society declared that this
practice was contrary to its Code of Ethics even
104 Joined Cases 266/87 and 267/88 [1989] E. C.R. 1295.
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though the effect of the imported product was
exactly the same as the prescribed one. The purpose
of the prohibition was the protection of public
health by making the doctor solely responsible for
the patient's treatment. The Commission argued that
less restrictive means were available to achieve
the same end: first, the patient could be asked to
agree to the substitution and, secondly,
prescription forms could be introduced enabling the
doctor concerned to decide whether to prescribe
parallel medicines or ensure that the patient
received the actual drug prescribed. Advocate
General Darmon rejected both of these alternatives
as incapable of advancing the interests of public
health as effectively as the prohibition. The first
alternative was inadequate as the patient, unaware
of the difference between the products, would be
urged to take the substitute by the pharmacist
whose main motive was to increase her/his profit
margins. lOS With regard to the second alternative, a
presumption would be created in favour of the
substituted product. The Advocate General stated
that it was not for the European Court to establish
a questionable hierarchy of values over those of
lOS Ibid., paragraph 34 of the Advocate General's
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national medical ethics. 106 The European Court may
have been more cautious in its review as acceptance
of the Commission's second alternative would have
required substantial administrative change. 107 If
so, then this may have militated against the
effectiveness of this alternative for achieving the
objective for it could have been seen as causing
more difficulties than the level of harm to the
free movement of goods.
The European Court did not examine any
alternative measures but limited its review. It
stated that there was no evidence that the
prohibition against substitution was unnecessary to
protect public health. The European Court accepted
that for reasons of psychosomatic phenomena a
specific medicine might be prescribed rather than a
generic substitute having the same therapeutic
effect. Finally, the restriction did not form a
disguised restriction on intra-Community trade
under the second sentence of Article 36. The
European Court did not apply a rigorous framework
opinion.
106 Ibid., paragraph 38 of the Advocate General's
opinion. S. Weatherill "Article 30 EEC: Caution in the
European Court" (1990) 53 M.L.R. 699, 703 argues that
the second alternative was an attractive compromise
solution meeting the needs of public health whilst
promoting integration.
107 Weatherill, ibid.
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of review but hinted that it was prepared to
examine the measure more deeply if evidence that
the prohibition was unnecessary had been provided.
The framework of review was limited because of the
importance of the Member State making its own
arrangements for the demands of public health in
the absence of harmonization.
Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA and
Publivia SAE v. Departamento de Sanidad y Seguridad
Social de la Generali tat de Catalufia108 concerned
the possible public health justification of a
Catalan law prohibiting the advertising of alcohol
of a certain strength in the media and in public,
e.g., in the cinema and on public transport. The
purpose of the law was to protect public health by
reducing the level of alcohol dependency of young
people. Having found that the purpose of public
health was served by the measure the European Court
found that it had complied with the principle of
proportionality. First, the measure was of a
limited nature as it only covered beverages of a
certain alcoholic strength.109 The European Court
108 Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 [1991] E.C.R. I-
4151.
109 Thus the prohibiton would prohibit the advertising of
alcohol products such as whiskey or vodka but not beer
or wine.
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stated that this was not a "manifestly
unreasonable" cond.it i onv+" Also the measure was not
a blanket prohibition on advertising but only
prevented it in specific places used by motorists
and young people against which the campaign was
targeted.111 The European Court therefore could not
find the measure to be disproportionate to the aim
of protecting public health. It adopted a
deferential framework of proportionality to review
the measure because it served an important public
interest and was limited in its application. Had
the restriction on advertising been wider then the
European Court could have examined alternative
measures but here the measure had the effect of
achieving the aim without imposing an unnecessary
restriction.
The framework of review to apply
proportionality to review derogations based on
public health will differ according to the case
before the European Court. In the UHT milk case the
European Court was sceptical of whether public
110 Ibid., paragraph 17.
111 See paragraph 7 of the opl.nl.onof Advocate General
Van Gerven where the Advocate General stated that he
could not think of any equally effective alternative
that was less restrictive of trade; a warning with the
advertisement stating that "alcohol can damage your
health" was not considered to be as equally effective as
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health was the real reason for the restriction and
therefore required the Member State to prove that
the measure were necessary. In the Royal
Pharmaceutical Society case a limited framework of
review was adopted. The European Court did not
suspect that the measure amounted to a disguised
restriction on intra-Community trade but resulted
from a genuine desire on the part of the Member
State to protect public health. It was for the
applicant to show that the restriction was
unnecessary. For similar reasons the European Court
adopted a deferential framework of review in
Aragonesa. In other cases the European Court has
constructed different frameworks to express the
requirement of proportionality in the context of
public health.1l2
The European Court's review of restrictions
adopted for reasons of animal health is influenced
the partial prohibition as the consumer's attention was
still drawn by the advertisement.
112 Compare Case 174/82 Officier van Justitie v. Sandoz
BV [1983] E.C.R. 2245 and Case 97/83 Criminal
Proceedings against Melkunie BV [1984] E.C.R. 2367 with
Case 178/84 Commission v. Germany [1987] E.C.R. 1227. On
these cases see the different views of Schwarze, op.
cit. supra no. I, pages 790-797 and G. Slynn "The
concept of the free movement of goods and the
reservation for national action under Article 36 EEC
Treaty" in J. Schwarze (ed.), Discretionary Powers of
the Member States in the Field of Economic Policies and
their Limits under the EEC Treaty (Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988) page 17.
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by similar factors. In Commission v. United
Kingdom1l3 a challenge was made to an import ban
against poultry products from other Member States
into the UK while import licences were granted for
imports from Ireland and Denmark. The reason for
the ban was ostensibly to control the spread of
Newcastle disease in poultry. Imports of turkeys
from France had increased to the concern of British
producers and put the UK government under pressure
to act. It did so by imposing a ban before
Christmas 1981. The UK tried to support its action
as a means of preventing outbreaks of the disease.
However, the European Court considered that the
real aim of the ban was for protective, economic
reasons rather than a serious attempt to protect
animal health. 114 The ban was therefore to be
considered as a disguised restriction on the free
movement of goods unless the UK could prove that
its actions were no more than was necessary for the
protection of animal health. The European Court
also found that the UK could have adopted other
measures less restrictive than a ban such as those
113 Case 40/82 [1982] E.C.R. 2793. This case lead to the
subsequent action for damages before the Court of Appeal
in Bourgoin S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food [1986] Q.B. 716.
114 Ibi d., paragraph 37.
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adopted in Denmark. As the chance of infection was
slight and would be due to sheer hazard then it
could not justify the extent of the prohibition
against imports from other Member States. The ban
was therefore disproportionate.
The European Court was clearly suspicious that
the ban formed a disguised restriction on trade. If
so, then the protection of animal health was not
its real aim but economic protection of British
producers against competition. Having satisfied
itself that the timing and preparation of the ban
suggested a disguised restriction, the European
Court placed the burden on the UK to prove that the
ban was necessary and proportionate. While the
European Court may query the real purpose of the
measure, it will give the Member State a fair
opportunity to justify the measure subject to a
rigorous framework of proportionality.
Criminal Proceedings against Gourmetterie Van
den Burgl-1S concerned the validity of a Dutch law
prohibiting the importation and keeping of red
grouse with the free movement of goods and its
possible justification due to the protection of
health and life of animals. The defendant had been
115 Case C-169/89 [1990] E.C.R. 1-2143.
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prosecuted after trading in dead red grouse
originating from the UK. In seeking to justify the
restriction Advocate General Van Gerven stated that
it was quite clear "that the requirements of
necessity and proportionality ...must in such a case
be assessed with customary rigour.,,116A causal
connection existed between the measure and the
objective of protecting animals. A Dutch
prohibition on imports of red grouse would reduce
demand from the UK and therefore help protect the
birds in that country. Was the prohibition the
least restrictive alternative open? Under Directive
79/409117 on the conservation of wild birds the
Council had considered that the red grouse occurred
in such large numbers that it was not endangered by
hunting as regulated by the Member State of origin.
Advocate General Van Gerven stated:
"In the context of harmonization, another Member
State must be able to adduce powerful reasons
before it can be assumed that a prohibition on
imports, that is to say a breach of the
116 Ibid., paragraph 7 of the Advocate General's opinion.
See Advocate General Van Gerven's definition of
proportionality at paragraph 8 and also Case C-159/90
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland
Ltd. v. Grogan [1991] E.C.R. I-4685, paragraph 27 of the
opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven.
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fundamental principle of the free movement of
goods, constitutes the only, or at any rate the
least restrictive measure for the conservation of
a bird species occurring in the first Member
State."llS
The Dutch government did have an alternative open:
it could have, acting under the Directive,
collected information on the bird and then
submitted proposals to set up a Committee to
examine whether the bird should be considered as an
endangered species. The prohibition was
inconsistent with the principle of mutual
confidence between Member States by banning the
Dutch trade in a bird originating in the UK.
Further, the Advocate General considered that the
absolute nature of the prohibition made it contrary
to the requirement of proportionality in the narrow
sense when compared to the very small contribution
it would make to the protection of an animal which
was neither endangered nor whose protection was a
priority under Community law. The European Court
also found that the prohibition could not be
justified by concentrating more upon the
117 OJ 1979 L 103, p. 1.
l1S Ibi d., paragraph 9 of the Advocate General's opinion.
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harmonising effects of the Directive rather than
the application of proportionality to review the
derogation under Article 36 though it seemed to
agree with the opinion of Advocate General Van
Gerven. It is clear that an attempt to derogate
from a fundamental economic right of the Treaty by
a Member State will be reviewed in an intensive
manner using the principle of proportionality. One
important element in determining the legality of a
measure will be whether the sector concerned has
been subjected to Community harmonization and what
measures other Member States have adopted. It has
been commented that this case "suggests that the
proportionality test must be applied in the
Community context. That is, what is to be deemed
proportional must also be evaluated in light of
other Member States' standards.,,119
The following cases demonstrate how the
European Court reviews a derogation based on public
security. In Campus Oil Limited v. Minister for
Industry and Energy20 the Irish government had
adopted a measure which obliged importers of oil to
119 G.M. Kelly "Public policy and general interest
exceptions in the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice: Towards a 'European' conception of values and
fundamental rights?" (1996) 4 European Review of Private
Law 17, 30.
120 Case 72/83 [1984] E.C.R. 2727.
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purchase a certain quantity of their requirements
from a publicly owned company operating the only
Irish oil refinery. The purpose of this company was
to improve the security of the supply of oil into
Ireland and not allow Ireland to become dependant
on oil supplies from elsewhere. The applicants
argued that the Order was a restriction on intra-
Community trade and the maintenance of a public
security defence was, in reality a cover for the
protection of economic interests. The Irish
government claimed that this restriction was
justified by virtue of the public security
derogation which it was for the Member State to
determine. It is clear that the European Court was
impressed by the public security argument. It had
been argued that as oil consumption was extremely
important for the life of the country and that
Ireland depended on imports of oil, it was
necessary to maintain a national oil refinery
thereby allowing the national authorities to enter
into long-term contracts with countries producing
crude oil. The European Court accepted that
interference with the supply of oil was permissible
under the public policy ground as it was extremely
important as an energy source for the modern
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economy and fundamental to the country's existence
as its institutions, essential public services and
even the survival of its inhabitants depended on
it. As a result the supply of oil could seriously
affect the public security of the state. 121 Having
identified the strength of the relative interests,
it was not surprising that the European Court did
not adopt an intensive framework of
proportionality. The applicant doubted whether the
existence of a refinery could guarantee oil
supplies in a crisis. While the European Court
admitted that such a crisis would interrupt or
severely reduce the deliveries of crude oil, the
Member State was placed in a better position than
it had been before with its own refinery in the
case of a crisis. The European Court stated that
the requirement that oil importers purchase certain
quantities from the refinery in order to pay for
its costs was necessary was a question for the
national court to assess. It stated that such a
requirement could be necessary if the quantities of
petroleum covered by the measure did not exceed the
minimum requirements of the state. While the
European Court was deferential in its review it
121 Ibid., paragraph 34.
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found the issue to be justiciable. As the
requirements of public security are intrinsic to
the existence of the Member State it is not
surprising that the European Court adopted a
deferential framework of review. The subject-matter
was very sensitive and the decision as to what
public security demands is essentially a policy
assessment requiring specialist knowledge. However,
the European Court did lay down conditions to be
satisfied if the restriction on intra-Community
trade was to be considered necessary. In a
subsequent decision the European Court has shown
that it will be deferential to the Member State's
assessment of public security.
In Criminal Proceedings against Richardt and
Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC22 the defendant,
being the director of the defendant company faced
criminal charges for the unlawful transit of
military goods without a licence. He had agreed
with a Soviet central purchasing agency to export a
unit for producing bubble memory circuits, which
included a ten-inch Veeco Microtech, from France to
122 Case C-367/89 [1991] E. C.R. I -4621. See also Case C-
70/94 Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrustungen GmbH v.
Federal Republic of Germany [1995] E.C.R. 1-3189 and
Case C-83/94 Criminal Proceedings against Peter Leifer
[1995] E.C.R. 1-3231.
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the former Soviet Union. This equipment had a
strategic importance and was regulated by
Luxembourg law on the grounds of public security.
The defendant was to export the goods straight from
France to Moscow by air. However, the scheduled
flight was cancelled and without notifying the
defendant Air France sent the goods to Luxembourg
where the authorities seized them. The European
Court examined whether Article 36 precluded the
requirement for special authorisation and, in the
event of failure to comply with this, the
confiscation of the goods. The European Court
stated that the public security exception covered
both internal and external security. As the
movement of goods used for strategic purposes could
affect its public security, a Member State could
require the transit of such goods to be subject to
the grant of a special authorisation. With regard
to confiscation of the goods the European Court
stated that this could be considered
disproportionate where the return of goods to the
Member State of origin could suffice. The
proportionality of the penalty was however to be
determined by the national court "taking account of
all the elements of each case, such as the nature
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of the goods capable of endangering the security of
the State, the circumstances in which the breach
was committed and whether or not the trader seeking
to effect the transit and holding documents for
that purpose issued by another Member State was
acting in good faith. ,,123
From this case it can clearly be seen that the
European Court constructed two different frameworks
to express the principle of proportionality. For
the public security derogation the European Court
emphasised that this was subject to the
requirements of pr-oport Lona lLty':" but it refrained
from undertaking a close analysis of whether the
rules in question were absolutely necessary. The
European Court seemed to accept that the Member
State had a discretion to decide what the
requirements of public security were and would not
lightly interfere with this assessment. As regards
the penalty of confiscation of the goods the
European Court constructed a different framework
for the principle of proportionality. While leaving
the determination of the issue to the national
court, the European Court hinted that confiscation
would be considered to be disproportionate if the
123 Ibid., paragraph 25.
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goods could be returned to the Member State from
where they came and then listed the matters to be
taken into account by the national court. As de
Burca comments: "where the measure is concerned not
so much with setting out the policy or the kind of
restriction needed, but with penalizing breaches of
that policy or rule, then the Court seems prepared
to intervene more readily and to declare the
penal ty to be excessive. ,,125
In Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique
Laboratories SNC and Estee Lauder cosmetics GmbH126
Germany tried to justify a restriction on intra-
Community trade by reason of the protection of
consumers and human health. Two companies, Clinique
and Estee Lauder, had marketed cosmetics since 1972
under the name "Linique" in Germany and "Clinique"
elsewhere. In order to reduce costs the companies
decided to standardise their product labelling and
market the products everywhere under the "Clinique"
name. However, Germany prohibited the use of this
name on the grounds that it could confuse consumers
into thinking that the product had medicinal
124 Ibid., paragraphs 20-21.
125 de Burea, op. cit. supra no. 64, 136.
126 Case C-315/92 [1994] E.C.R. 1-317.
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purposes.127 With regard to the justification of the
rule the European Court was unimpressed by the
argument that consumer protection or the health of
humans required the restriction. The cosmetics
products concerned were sold in perfumeries and the
cosmetic departments of large stores and therefore
none of them were available in pharmacies. The
products were presented as cosmetics products and
not as medicinal products. Furthermore, as the same
products were marketed in other Member States under
the "Clinique" name the use of that name would not
seem to mislead consumers. The European Court
adopted an intensive framework of review to examine
whether the restriction was justified and concluded
that the possible danger to consumer protection or
the health of humans arising from medical
connotations from the "Clinique" name were not
sufficient to justify the prohibition of the use of
that name on the products.
The principle of proportionality is also
applicable in the review of penalties imposed on
individuals by the Member States to ensure
compliance with Community law. For example,
127 It was argued that in the German language there was a
similarity between the words "Clinique" and the German
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Criminal Proceedings against Messner28 which arose
in the context of the free movement of persons, l29
concerned a German national who had entered Italy
and failed to notify the authorities within three
days as prescribed by Italian law, the penalty for
which was imprisonment of up to three months and a
fine. While the European Court recognised that a
Member State could require other nationals to
report their presence to the authorities, such a
requirement could not be allowed to infringe the
right involved. The three day period in question
was excessively restrictive in view of the need of
those concerned to have enough time to travel from
the Member State's border to their destination and
then to find out which authority to report to. Also
the time-limit was not absolutely necessary in
order that the Member State have exact knowledge of
population movements. The European Court stated
that this view was confirmed by the fact that the
majority of Member States which imposed an
obligation to report to the national authorities
allowed those concerned appreciably longer periods.
words "Klinik" which means a hospital. See paragraph 5
of the opinion of Advocate General Gulmann.
128 Case C-265/88 [1989] E.C.R. 4209.
129 See Weatherill and Beaumont, op. ci t. supra no. 99,
chapter 18.
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Neither was the penalty justified. The European
Court has found that a penalty may be imposed in
order to ensure compliance with formalities but the
level of the penalty must not be so
disproportionate to the gravity of the infringement
that it becomes an obstacle to the right being
exercised.l3O The possibility of imprisonment for
breach of such a formality would be a drastic
restriction of the freedom of movement and so was
disproportionate. A rigorous degree of control was
employed to ensure that the Treaty right was not
restricted by administrative formalities. The
principle of proportionality was applied in an
intense way due to the importance of the
individual's interest: the interest of the Member
State was an important one but failure to follow it
could not be punished by such severe punishment
which would have the effect of diminishing the
freedom of movement.
Sometimes application of the principle of
proportionality may need to be reversed: instead of
the Member State going too far in its pursuit of
policy, it has not gone far enough. For example, in
130 Case 157/79 R. v. Pieck [1980] E.C.R. 2171, paragraph
19.
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Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen131
the European Court found that the relevant
directi ve132 left the Member State free to choose
the means available to achieve its objective of
prohibiting sex discrimination in access to
employment. However, the European Court stated that
should the Member State decide to penalise breaches
of the directive then it must be effective and have
a deterrent effect, the compensation must be
adequate in relation to the damage sustained and
therefore be more than purely nominal compensation.
In the actual case, the applicant had been
discriminated against when applying for a job and
had been awarded her travelling expenses. The
European Court held that this derisory sum was
insufficient to amount to adequate compensation. In
cases such as this the European Court is applying a
\reverse' principle of proportionality. 133
The European Court has developed a
jurisprudence to protect the fundamental human
rights of individuals through the general
principles of law. In doing so it has drawn
131 Case 14/83 [1984] E.C.R. 189l.
132 Directive No 75/207, OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40.
133 See also Case 79/83 Harz v. Deutsche Tradax GmbH
[1984] E.C.R. 1921 where the European Court stated that
it was for the national court to decide whether the sum
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inspiration from the standards of national
constitutions and the European Convention of Human
Rights.134 Breaches of fundamental rights are tested
against the principle of proportionality. In
Wachauf v. Bundesmat Fur Ernahrung und
Fors twi rt.scbet x:" the European Court was invi ted to
protect the right to property in regard to milk
quotas.136 The applicant was a tenant farmer who
upon the expiry of his tenancy asked for
compensation for the definitive discontinuance of
milk production pursuant to a German law which
implemented Regulation No 857/84.137 That Regulation
provided that an application by a tenant farmer
must be supported by the lessor's written consent.
As the applicant did not have this consent he was
refused the requested compensation. The referring
court asked the European Court whether the
applicant had to surrender the reference quantity
to the producer who takes over the holding. 138 A
reference quantity allows a producer to produce a
of DM 2.31 was adequate compensation for sex
discrimination.
134 See Craig and de Bur ea op. ci t. supra no. 31, chapter
7.
135 Case 5/88 [1989] E.C.R. 2609.
136 See generally M. Cardwell Milk Quotas. European
Community and United Kingdom Law. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996).
137 OJ 1984 L 90, p. 13.
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limited amount of milk in a given year. The
applicant argued that should he be prevented from
keeping the reference quantity then he could not
benefit from the compensation system as the lessor
opposed it and so would be deprived the fruits of
his labour. The European Court had to determine
whether the rules breached the applicant's right to
property. Following its previous case-Iaw139 the
European Court recognised that fundamental human
rights formed an integral part of the general
principles of law. However, such rights are not
absolute but must be considered in relation to
their social function. The European Court
continued:
"Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on
the exercise of those rights, in particular in
the context of a common organisation of a market,
provided that those restrictions in fact
correspond to objectives of general interests by
the Community and do not constitute, with regard
to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and
138 Under Article 5 (3) of Commission Regulation No
1371/84, OJ 1984 L 132, p. 11.
139 Case 44/79 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979]
E.C.R. 3727.
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intolerable interference, impairing the very
substance of those rights. ,,140
The European Court held that the Community
Regulations allowed the Member State enough
discretion to implement those rules without
breaching fundamental human rights either by
allowing the tenant to keep all or part of the
reference quantity if he intended to continue milk
production or by compensating him if he intended to
definitively abandon milk production. The national
rules went beyond what was necessary for the
fulfilment of the system's purpose. The European
Court seemed to adopt an intensive framework of
review to ensure that the Member State did not
infringe the applicant's fundamental human rights.
The European Court has been criticised for
devaluing the notion of fundamental human rights by
allowing them to be restricted in the name of
economic integration. 141 However, such rights may
need to be overridden in the interests of policy
objectives. It is for the European Court by
applying the principle of proportionality to
140 Ibi d., paragraph 18.
141 J. Coppel and A. 0'Neill "The European Court of
Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?" (1992) 29 C.M.L.Rev.
669, 691-2.
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determine whether the restriction of a fundamental
human right was necessary.
In regard to judicial review of national
measures the European Court tends to apply the
principle of proportionality in a more intensive
framework of review. This is due to the interests
of the individual which can be restricted by the
Member States. These interests largely cover Treaty
rights and fundamental human rights. However, it
can be seen that the European Court varies its
framework of review depending on the particular
case before it. It has been stated that the
European Court has tended to adopt a more intensive
framework of review with regard to similar cases
over time.142 This is perhaps because over time the
European Court has gained experience and confidence
in applying the principle of proportionality to
national measures. Finally, mention should be made
of the practice of the European Court in some cases
to refer the application of the proportionality
142 Craig and de Burca, op. cit. supra no. 31, page 348
encouraging comparisons of Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home
Office [1974] E.C.R. 1337 with Cases 115 and 116/81
Adoui and Cornuaille v. Belgian State [1982] E.C.R. 1665
and Cases 34/79 R. v. Henn and Darby [1979] E.C.R. 3975
with Case 121/85 Conegate v. Customs and Excise
Commissioners [1986] E.C.R. 1007. To this list could
also be added Case 118/75 Criminal Proceedings against
Watson and Belmann, supra no. 8 and Case C-265/88
Criminal Proceedings against Messner [1989] E.C.R. 4209.
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test back to the national court. In certain cases
it will be quite clear from the European Court's
judgment whether the impugned measure is
disproportionate or not, whereas in other cases it
will explicitly state that it is for the national
court to apply the principle. This practice should
not be seen as the European Court refusing to
decide how to apply the principle. Rather it views
the national court as the more competent forum to
apply the proportionality test. Even in such cases
the European Court will maintain some control over
the framework of review as it may impose certain
conditions to be followed if the national measure
is to be lawful. l43
6. The Construction of the Framework of
Proportionality
Proportionality is the strongest form of
substantive review. It enables the European Court
to balance the competing interests by examining
whether a measure was suitable, necessary and not
in any event excessive for the achievement of its
143 See, e.g., Case 72/83 CampusOil Limi ted v. Minister
for Industry and Energy, supra no. 120; Case C-367/89
397
objective. The precise requirements of
proportionality are articulated within different
frameworks of review. These expressions of the
principle range from being quite deferential to the
exercise of public power to be applying a strict
and rigorous standard. At the one end there are a
number of cases where the manifest framework of
review is applied. Going down the scale, there are
then cases where the European Court seems prepared
to examine the disproportionality of the measure if
the applicant can provide some evidence to this
effect and, following this, cases where the
European Court places the burden on the decision-
maker to justify its decision. Even within these
broad descriptions of the various frameworks there
are subtle differences of approach.
Proportionality requires the decision-maker's
action not to be out of proportion to the end
sought after. Application of that principle will
accordingly differ in proportion to the competing
interests. For example, when the decision-maker is
considering how to achieve a public health or
public security interest the European Court may
apply a less rigorous framework of review for it
Criminal Proceedings against Richardt and Les
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appreciates the importance of those public
interests. For a measure to be out of proportion to
the demands of public health or security may
require patently inappropriate means or an acute
interference with the applicant's interests.
Whereas if the decision-maker infringes an
important interest of the applicant's, such as a
Treaty right, then the European Court will be more
intensive in its approach to the matter. The range
of options as to what can be proportionate may be
more circumscribed because the importance of the
applicant's interest when compared with the public
interest. The European Court will not automatically
find that an important interest on the applicant's
behalf cannot be overridden but will place a burden
on the Member State to prove that the public
interest is sufficiently weighty to justify the
restriction. Identification of the competing
interests and their comparative weight will be the
first factors the European Court ascertains in
order to construct a framework of review. As the
competing interests involved vary from case to case
then so will their appraisal by the European Court.
For example, in Aragonesa the European Court
Accessoires Scientifiques SNC, supra no. 122.
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accepted the public health interest in the
reduction of alcoholism, while in the 'UHT Milk'
case the European Court seemed to suspect that the
public health interest was a cover for economic
protectionism.
Another central factor to the framework
adopted is the type of decision-making under
review. This is to some extent interrelated with
the nature of the competing interests. The purpose
of the principle of proportionality will vary with
the type of decision under review. whether the
measure affects Treaty rights or fundamental human
rights, imposes a penalty or is an economic policy
measure will define the specific purpose of the
court's review. 144 In relation to Treaty rights, the
European Court recognises that these rights are
fundamental to the common market and the
application of proportionality suggests that such
rights must be upheld unless a restriction is
necessary and justified. The purpose of
proportionality when applied to economic policy
measures is to ensure that any economic
intervention in the market is subsidiary and that
there is a connection between the extent of the
144 Supra section 4.
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intervention and any restriction on individual
freedom.
There are other reasons for applying certain
frameworks of review. The European Court tends to
stress that an applicant must show that the measure
was manifestly inappropriate or disproportionate
when it rejects a challenge to an economic policy
measure. When articulating the framework of review
in this context the European Court is influenced by
the following factors. The decision-maker must be
allowed a reasonable measure of discretion for the
performance of its task. If the European Court were
prepared to intensively apply proportionality where
the competing interests and the type of decision-
making seem to compel a more deferential review,
then the decision-maker could be prevented from
making any measure last the course of time to make
a difference, whether the measure was defective in
some way or not. There would also be difficulties
for the European Court to apply an intense review
and it would solve little. The nature of the
decision-making process demands that a decision be
made and it is inevitable that some interest is
going to be restricted in some way. The power to
balance such polycentric interests was given to the
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decision-maker because of its specialist knowledge.
An intense review by the European Court would be
difficult, costly, time-consuming and lead to many
other applicants trying their luck. If the impugned
measure is of a general, normative nature, such as
a Regulation, then the European Court will set the
framework of review to take account of the "global
situation,,145of all those concerned. If the
decision-maker has made an overall assessment then
it can only be invalidated if that overall
assessment is patently wrong and not on the basis
that one individual decision is disproportionate.
Such decisions are more suited to political
accountability where the merits can also be
challenged and the decision-maker can be brought to
account. The European Court is fully aware of the
need for decisions to be made quickly in trying
circumstances. Such measures may in hindsight
appear to be capable of improvement in some way but
this will not lead the European Court to criticise
a measure on the basis of how it operates in
practice after it was adopted. This is a
recognition of the need for certainty in decision-
making. Finally, it may be argued that the adoption
145' .Ner~, op. c~t. supra no. 39, 658.
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of the manifest framework of review serves the
function of limiting the case-load of the European
Court. Were the European Court to apply an intense
review framework where the manifest framework was
appropriate then it would move from examining the
disproportionality of the measure and come close to
telling the decision-maker how the competing
interests should have been balanced. By applying
the manifest framework the European Court avoids
undertaking such a cost-benefit assessment for
itself but allows for a review, albeit limited, to
cover those measures which clearly and patently go
beyond what is required in the circumstances.
There are also reasons for the European Court
adopting a more exacting framework of review. If
the applicant's interest is of an individual
nature, such a Treaty right or a penalty, then the
European Court can review the measure without
potentially upsetting the whole system in which the
interest exists. If the European Court is reviewing
the imposition of a sanction which was imposed for
good reason, as in the Advanced Nuclear Fuels case,
then this will be reflected in the amount of
discretion it allows the decision-maker. What the
Member State thinks is necessitated by the public
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interest may be out of line with other Member
States. If so, then the European Court will require
sufficient reason to justify this. Whereas if only
one other Member State adopts less restrictive
measures then the European Court will acknowledge
the discretion of the Member State to choose what
it deems fit within certain limits. If the Member
State's measure seems to the European Court to be a
disguised restriction, as in the Turkey case, or an
obstacle to the exercise of the Treaty right, as in
Messner, then it will place a corresponding burden
on the Member State to justify the measure.
7. The Principle of Proportionality and the Merits
of Public Decisions
The responsibility of the European Court when
applying the principle of proportionality is dual:
first, to ensure that the decision-maker achieved a
fair and proportionate balance between the
competing interests and, secondly, it must refrain
from assessing for itself the merits of
administrative action and then substituting its own
opinion for that of the decision-maker. The
European Court can only examine the legality of a
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measure and not substitute its discretionary and
subjective appreciation for that of the
admi.ni at r-at.Lon i v" However, the concern over
proportionality is that the European Court has
engaged in replacing its view for that of the
administration and testing "the 'intrinsic value of
the law', a test of expediency to which the judge
is not empowered.,,147 What conclusions can be drawn
following an examination of the case-law? Does the
European Court use the principle of proportionality
to substitute its view of the merits of public
decisions for that of the administration? These
question might be answered in the following manner.
First, the issue regarding the subject matter
of the legal disputes should be clarified. The
context in which a legal challenge is mounted
should not prevent the European Court from
determining administrative legality. That the
European Court is largely dealing with economic
interests and policy enacted into law is no reason
for it to refuse to apply the principle of
proportionality. As economic intervention can
impinge upon individual freedom like any other form
146 See G. Slynn "Judicial Review of Community Acts" (The
Exeter Lecture in European Community Law, University of
Exeter, 1985) page 5.
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of state intervention and it must be justified in
law in the same way as any other form of state
intervention. As Advocate General Capotorti has
stated, the European Court "...has no power to
evaluate the wisdom of choices of economic policy
made by the Councilor the Commission ...This does
not, however, mean that it is altogether out of the
question for the Court to appraise economic
considerations to the extent to which their
appraisal is necessary in determining the legality
or otherwise or the measure ....this will be the
case in particular when inquiry is made into the
observance of the principle of proportionality.,,148
The respective functions of the European Court
and the administrator or legislator differ. The
decision-maker makes and implements policy while
the European Court decides legal challenges to the
basis of that policy and its implementation. An
obvious difference is that the European Court
cannot initiate public decisions. The only way it
can decide that a measure is impermissible is if an
action is brought before it by an applicant. The
147 Lauwaars, op. ci t . supra no. 2, page 232.
148 Case 114/76 Bela-Mtihle Josef Bergmann KG v. Grows-
Farm GmbH& Co. KG supra no. SS, 1226 (col. 1) of the
Advocate General's opinion. See also Lord Mackenzie
Stuart, op. cit. supra no. 33, pages 67, 102.
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European Court can only declare decisions invalid
and not make new decisions of its own accord.149
Also the European Court can only state what
measures it cannot accept and not what measures it
would like to see adopted instead. It is impossible
for the European Court to set itself up as an
alternative and covert form of government by the
application of proportionality to decide issues
such as the allocation of resources or what the
demands of the public interest are. However, it is
open for the European Court to declare a measure to
be unlawful and this, it might be thought, could
allow it to covertly veto measures if their merits
did not find approval in the Court.
While the European Court has its own discrete
role so does the decision-maker. The administration
has the legal power and expertise to weigh up the
competing interests and prioritise them. The
decision-maker may then decide that a certain
policy objective ought to be attained, with the
possible attainment of sub-goals along the way.150
To do so it will have to decide how to achieve that
policy objective. The question facing the decision-
U9 See Article 174.
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maker is this: by what means should the policy
objective be attempted? The decision-maker may
choose a means of achieving the policy objective
which interferes with individual freedom in some
way. Under the principle of proportionality the
measure can be challenged before the European Court
on the basis that it is unnecessary for the
fulfilment of the policy objective to interfere
with individual freedom to such an extent as less
restrictive alternatives exist. Accordingly, it is
for the European Court to determine whether any
alternative measures exist. It is clear that should
no alternatives at all exist, then the measure will
be necessary and objectively justified. However, if
alternatives do exist then the European Court must
determine whether they are equally capable of
achieving the policy objective. This involves
examining the substantive merit of each alternative
course of action for attaining the end sought. The
European Court cannot state that the decision-maker
ought to follow one particular alternative course
of action but that alternatives are open to her/him
which have the equivalent function of achieving the
150 See generally D. Galligan Discretionary Powers. A
Study of Official Discretion. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986) chapter 3.
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policy objective and do not involve such an
interference with individual freedom. The European
Court will not question the necessity or
proportionality of the policy objective sought
after but of the form of implementation needed for
that policy objective. Does this examination of the
merit of less restrictive alternatives for
achieving the objective involve a questioning of
the merits of the measure and lead the European
Court into restricted waters?
Some commentators take the view that as the
principle of proportionality operates on a sliding
scale of review it does not necessarily involve a
substitution of the court's view of the merits for
that of the decision-maker.1s1 The framework of
review is certainly relevant. Were the European
Court to apply an intensive framework of review
where the manifest framework was more suitable then
it might soon find itself closely shadowing the
decision-making process. However, this does not
provide a watertight explanation. The framework of
review determines whether the European Court should
examine whether alternative measures exist which
151 de Burca, op. cit. supra no. 63, 107-113; J. Jowell
"Is Proportionality an Alien Concept?" (1996) 2 E.P.L.
401, 405.
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can achieve the same end. What then of the cases
where the European Court has applied an intensive
framework of review and looked at alternative
measures?
Application of the proportionality principle
involves determining whether the alternatives, if
any, open to the decision-maker are equally capable
of achieving the policy objective as the challenged
measure. The European Court will have to examine
the merits, in one sense, of the various
alternatives against the fulfilment of the policy
objective to determine whether any less restrictive
options exist which are equally useful to attain
the policy objective. However, the European Court
will not examine the merits, in another sense, of
acting for the defined policy objective. According
to Asso:
"Les cas sont nombreux ou une decision ne peut
@tre legalement prise que dans la mesure ou
elle est necessaire. Aussi le juge, lorsqu'il
contr8le la legalite peut @tre oblige de
contr8ler l'opportunite. Celle-ci ne serait
alors appreciee, par le juge, qu'en tant
qu'element de la legalite d'une decision. II
faut done operer une distinction entre
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l'opportunite-condition, element de la
legalite et l'opportunite pure ou le juge
substituera sa propre appreciation des faits a
celIe retenue par l'administration.,,152
The examination of the merits when, in Asso's
phrase, they are an element constituting the
legality of the decision concerns nothing more than
deciding whether alternative measures exist which
are equally capable of achieving the policy
objective sought after. It means the merit of those
means for achieving the policy objective. Either
alternative measures exist which are capable of
attaining the policy end or not. If so, then the
European Court proceeds to examine whether such
alternatives are less restrictive of individual
freedom. Examining the merit of those alternatives
does not involve the European Court in questioning
the merits, in the sense of the intrinsic rights
152B. Asso "Le contrOle de I'opportunite de la decision
economique devant la Cour europeenne de justice." (1976)
12 R.T.D.E. 21, 27: "There are many cases where a
decision cannot legally be taken unless such a measure
is necessary. Thus the judge who is called upon to
examine its legality may be obliged to examine its
merits. However, this is only considered by the judge as
an element pertaining to the legality of the decision.
It is accordingly necessary to make a decision between
the merits of a decision as an element of its legality
and the proper merits of a decision where the judge
substitutes his assessment of the facts for that put
forward by the administrator."
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and wrongs, of the policy objective. Rather the
European Court is ensuring that the defined policy
objective can be achieved by other measures less
restrictive of individual freedom. Temple Lang
states that "[t]he Court does not, under the
principle of proportionality, question the
desirability of the policy result chosen, but may
have to consider whether it could have been
satisfactorily obtained by a better-designed and
less onerous measure.,,153Alternatively, according
to Shapiro, in effect the court is saying to the
administrator: "[w]e invalidate the law you have
made because we can think of a better law - one
that achieves your goals at less cost to the
competing interests. ,,154Review for proportionality
is a way of developing judicial opinions about
policy implementation and the achievement of policy
objectives when private interests are affected. The
European Court undertakes a goal-oriented balancing
process to determine whether it was factually
permissible for alternative measures to have been
adopted.
153J. Temple Lang "The Constitutional Principles
Governing Community Legislation" (1989) 40 N.I.L.Q. 227,
242. See also Lord Mackenzie Stuart, Ope cit. supra no.
33, pages 54-55; G. Slynn Introducing a European Legal
Order, op. cit. supra no. 22, page 36.
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Many examples from the case-law support this
view. In the 'skimmed-milk' case Advocate General
Capotorti examined the feasibility of two
alternatives open to the Council to achieve its
policy obj ecti ve of reducing the milk surplus. lSS As
the Advocate General concluded that the two
alternatives were equally useful and imposed less
of a burden upon those affected, the challenged
measure was therefore disproportionate. The
European Court did not criticise the Council's
policy objective but the means chosen to implement
it. In the Mignini case1S6 the effect of the
application of proportionality by the European
Court was to actually strengthen the effectiveness
of the aid policy by removing the obligation that
producers store the produce on their premises
rather than to substitute its own view for that of
the decision-maker. Equally effective measures
intended to reduce fraud could have been adopted
which did not impose such a high burden on the
producer. Similarly, in the forfeiture of deposit
caseslS? the European Court reviewed the penalties
154 M. Shapiro "The Giving Reasons Requirement" [1992]
University of Chicago Legal Forum 179, 217.
155 Supra no. 55, at 1234 of the Advocate General's
opinion.
156 Supra no. 81.
lS? Supra text at no. 85.
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imposed as they went beyond what was necessary for
the achievement of promoting the smooth functioning
of the CAP. Less severe sanctions could have chosen
which achieved the same end. By being critical of
the sanction, the European Court was not examining
the purpose they served.
The tendency of the European Court to impose
more onerous requirements on the Member States to
justify the infringement of Treaty rights does not
mean it replaces the assessments of the Member
States with its own views. For example, in the
Royal Pharmaceutical Society case Advocate General
Darmon examined the merit of the Commission's
suggested alternatives to the prohibition on
substituting medicinal products. This examination
of whether those alternatives had sufficient merit
to be equally capable of achieving the same end as
the impugned measure did not involve either the
Advocate General or the European Court in
substituting their views of the demands of public
health for that of the decision-maker. In the
Campus Oil and Richardt cases the European Court
showed deference to the Member State's assessment
of the demands of public security but this did not
prevent it from placing conditions to the legality
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of the penalty imposed in the latter case. The
imposition of such conditions did not allow it to
question the merits of the policy. In the Clinique
case the European Court did not question the
worthiness of the aim of protecting consumers but
concluded that the danger to consumer protection
was insufficient to justify the impugned measures
as less restrictive alternatives existed. In
Messner the European Court ensured that the Member
State did not impose a penalty for the failure to
follow a formality which could form an obstacle to
the free movement of persons itself. In doing it
did not question the need for Member States to know
of exact population movements on their national
territory.
The task of assessing the effectiveness of
hypothetical alternative measures requires
knowledge of administrative process and can be a
difficul t task for a court to perform.158 For
example, in Commission v. Denmark159 Advocate
General Slynn and the European Court disagreed over
the usefulness of alternative measures for
achieving the policy objective. According to Nolte,
158 Lord Mackenzie Stuart, op. ci t. supra no. 33, page
43; Slynn Introducing a European Legal Order, op. cit.
supra no. 22, page 36.
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as the necessity test forms the hard core of the
proportionality enquiry, the Court is less
susceptible to criticism that it is replacing the
administration's policy choices with its own. 160 The
case-law shows that the European Court will not
undertake a re-examination of what the public
interest requires but it will examine whether the
measures adopted for that end are suitable,
necessary and not excessive in view of affected
private interests. According to Sir Gordon Slynn:
"The European Court has always been unwilling
to interfere where an economic or political
assessment is needed; second-guessing the
Commission ...[or the Member States] ...is not
its function, though if provisions which can
be objectively shown to be excessive are adopted
then the Court of Justice would interfere. ,,161
8. Conclusion
159 Case 302/86 [1988] E.C.R. 4607.
160 Nolte, op. cit. supra no. 5, 193.
161 G. Slynn "European Law and the National Judge" in
Butterworths Lectures 1991-92 (London: Butterworths,
1993) page 28.
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Rather than summarise the preceding analysis,
some general comments on the nature of the
principle of proportionality are warranted.
Proportionality concerns the relationship between
administrative action and individual freedom.
However, exactly what this means is rather unclear.
Proportionality is sometimes characterised as being
inspired by the ideas underpinning liberal
democz acyt'" and therefore it is interpreted as a
principle serving the protection of the freedom of
the individual against the State. In other words,
proportionality is viewed as an essential principle
within a liberal framework of law.163 This
conception of proportionality, I suggest, has
162 T. Tridimas "Proportionality in Community Law:
Searching for the Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny"
(Institute of European Law, University of Birmingham,
20th March 1998) page 1. See also Schwarze, op. cit.
supra no. 1, pages 678-679; I. Ward "Fairness,
Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights: The Case For a
Unified Administrative Law Within the European
Community" (1994) 5 Touro International Law Review 279.
Even when the view is not expressly articulated the
adoption of a rights-based liberal framework appears to
be implied, see de Burca, op. cit. supra no. 64. This
view is linked to the idea of the European Court
elaborating democratic principles in order to compensate
for the "democratic deficit" in the European Union, see
A.M. Burley "Democracy and Judicial Review in the
European Community" [1992] University of Chicago Legal
Forum 81; C. Harlow "Towards a Theory of Access for the
ECJ" (1992) 12 Y.E.L. 213. Furthermore, this view of
proportionality is in particular adopted by common
lawyers dissatisfied with the lack of protection for
fundamental rights in the UK see chapter 7, section 2.
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developed for the following reasons. First, the
principle is closely associated with the protection
of fundamental human rights in the jurisprudence of
both the German Federal Constitutional Coure64 and
the European Court of Human Rights, 165 and there is
a wide-ranging debate over the protection of human
rights within the European Union.166 Secondly,
rights-based liberal constitutionalism has recently
emerged as the new form of normal legal-
constitutional discourse in which such issues tend
to be analysed and "is conducted within an agreed-
upon set of conventions about what counts as a
relevant contribution, [and] what counts as
answering a question". 167 These factors tend to
163 Cf. the "liberal normativist" style of public law
thought identified in M. Loughlin Public Law and
Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
164 See Emiliou, op. ci t. supra no. 6, chapter 2. Cf.
Nolte, op. cit. supra no. 5, page 205 stating that
German administrative law was the product of "a specific
crisis of legitimacy in the national legal system", in
particular concerning the protection of fundamental
human rights against the State.
165 See M. Eissen "The Principle of Proportionality in
the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights" in
R. St. J. MacDonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.),
The European System for the Protection of Human Rights
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) page 125.
166 See generally Craig and de Burca, op. cit. supra no.
31, chapter 7.
167 R. Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Na ture (Oxford :
Blackwell, 1980) page 320. This trend is mirrored by
developments in political theory by the transformation
of liberalism into the dominant political tradition see
A. MacIntyre Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London:
Duckworth, 1988) chapter 17. For critiques of liberalism
see generally R. Beiner What's the Matter With
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contribute to a distinct view of proportionality as
a tool to be employed solely for the protection of
the individual and the control of the
administration. However, I think that this view
overlooks the equally important role
proportionality has in structuring and guiding
administrative action. Continental administrative
law adopts a purposive approach whereby the review
of administrative action is adapted to the
achievement of the administrative function for
which the power was exercised; law is concerned not
just with controlling but also structuring
administrative activity.168 If this is so, then the
conception of proportionality as a means of
protecting individual freedom may be an incomplete
and therefore inadequate way of understanding the
principle.
I would suggest that the nature of the
exercise undertaken by the European Court as a
goal-oriented balancing of interests test and the
examination of the usefulness of alternative
courses of action for the achievement of the
Liberalism? (London, 1992); M. Ramsay What's Wrong With
Liberalism? A Radical Critique of Liberal Political
Philosophy (London, 1997).
168E. Schmidt-ABmann "Basic Principles of German
Administrative Law" (1993) 35 Journal of the Indian Law
Institute 65, 66, 77.
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administration's objectives serves the purposes of
the administration as well as the protection of the
individual. This is because the European Court is
concerned to ensure that the administration is able
to achieve its end objectives. In other words, by
applying proportionality the European Court serves
not just to control the administration but also to
structure and guide the administration in the
achievement of its objectives. Therefore, by
interpreting proportionality as within a specific
liberal framework of individual exercising their
rights against the State would appear to distort
the meaning of the principle within a Continental
tradition of administrative law. Furthermore, as
these control and purposive functions are closely
linked, to suggest, following van Gerven,169 that a
distinction in the formulation of the principle can
be made between an intensive control of
disproportionality and a more purposive form of
review on the basis of what is regarded to be
169van Gerven, op. cit. supra no. 6, page 32. It is
significant that van Gerven, at pages 37-38,
characterises proportionality as part of the
"proceduralisation of the law", a view which corresponds
with a liberal conception of law as a means of enabling
individuals to secure their own goals but ignores the
importance of law in achieving wider social objectives.
See, e.g., J. Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1972) page 88 who develops a model of
"pure procedural justice".
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proportionate would appear to be an attempt to
divide up proportionality review into static
dualistic categories. State action and individual
freedom cannot be exclusively separated from each
other and therefore neither can the control of the
administration be separated from the task of
guiding and structuring the administration in the
achievement of its purposes.
Proportionality is a necessary and basic idea
of the democratic State which guarantees individual
freedom to its citizens which elect government to
make and implement policy initiatives. In the
course of achieving these objectives individual
freedom may need to be restricted. Accordingly,
\\[t]he requirements of life in a community and the
fulfilment of tasks incumbent on the State may call
for adjustments in the degree of freedom which the
subj ecti ve right of the individual represents." 170
The role of proportionality is to ensure that such
administrative action interferes as little as
possible with the individual's capacity and
simultaneously it guides the administration in the
achievement of its objectives.
170 Case 118/75 Criminal Proceedings against Watson and
Belmann, supra no. 8, 1209 (col. 1) of Advocate General
Trabucchi's opinion.
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Chapter 7: The Possible Adoption of the Principle
of Proportionality in English Law
1. Introduction
The possible adoption of the principle of
proportionality into English law has been a
contentious issue from 1984 when it was raised by
Lord Diplock.l Since then judicial and academic
debate have identified the main issues concerning
the possibility of transplanting this principle.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine this
debate and analyse the response of the English
judiciary to the principle of proportionality as
domestic courts and in their role as Community
courts. Proportionality is not an established
ground of judicial review in English law. By
suggesting its possible adoption Lord Diplock had
in mind utilising proportionality as a separate
head of judicial review in addition to his
tripartite classification.2 The debate therefore
initiated as a possible addition to the established
1 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the
Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374, 410E (hereinafter the
GCHQ case). See also Hansard 397 H.L. Deb. col. 994 (3rd
February 1977) .
2 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696, 750D per Lord Roskill.
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common law rules to be applied by the ordinary
courts as opposed to the development of a distinct
body of public law to be applied by a specialist
administrative jurisdiction.
While proportionality is not a formally
recognised principle of English law, there is
conflicting authority for and against its adoption.
What is clear is that this area of law is in a
state of flux. Different judges hold different
views on the possible role of proportionality.
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson, it can only be
a matter of time before the principle is finally
accepted as part of English law,3 while Sir Thomas
Bingham has stated that "it would be worth a modest
investment in proportionality as a growth stock.,,4
Millett J. has described it as a "novel and
3 Lord Browne-Wilkinson "Some Comparative Reflections:
The Impact of European Law on English Human Rights and
Public Law" in B.S. Markesinis (ed.), The Gradual
Convergence. Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences and
English Law on the Eve of the 21st Century. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994) page 202. See also Lord Browne-
Wilkinson "The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights" [1992]
P.L. 397.
4 T.H. Bingham '''Thereis a World Elsewhere': The
Changing Perspectives of English Law" (1992) 41 I.C.L.Q.
513, 524. See also Lord Scarman "The Development of
Administrative Law: Obstacles and Opportunities" [1990]
P.L. 490-491; Lord Justice Glidewell "English
Administrative Law: Past, Present and Future" (1993) 15
Liverpool L.R. 3, 18; D. Oulton "How Widely Accepted as
a General Principle is Proportionality?" (1997) 12
Commonwealth Judicial Journal 17.
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danqe rous= " principle whereas Sir John Laws has
intimated that proportionality should now be
considered as part of English law.6 Beneath such
views underlie tensions inherent in the application
of proportionality and the role of the judiciary in
reviewing the substance of administrative
decisions.
2. The Proportionality Debate
In order to understand the underlying tensions
involved in the proportionality debate it is
necessary to identify the different conceptions of
administrative law held by the contributors. Those
seeking to uphold the traditional model of judicial
review have generally rejected calls for the
adoption of proportionality. Under this model the
courts are viewed as the guardians of liberty
against executive power by using the artificial
reason of the common law. The courts will review
the exercise of public power if it is ultra vires
or Wednesbury unreasonable in order to prevent the
5 Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd. v. Frank
Weisinger (1988) 17 I.R.L.R. 60, 65.
6 J. Laws "Law and Democracy" [1995] P.L. 72, 77, 79.
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abuse of power.7 Legality is a universal concept
which demands that all public bodies and
individuals are subject to the ordinary law of the
land. The judiciary is viewed as holding a
customary wisdom which is expressed through the
common law. Underpinning this view is the
acceptance of an anti-rationalist approach to the
place of law in government. Due to changes in the
role of government and dissatisfaction with the
limits placed on judicial review by the traditional
model, some writers have sought to develop a more
rationalist model of judicial review in order to
protect fundamental rights.s Under what might be
termed a "rights" model, law is seen to be founded
not upon rules but principles.~ Judges can
articulate points of principle but not policy. In
7 In R. v. Lord President of the Pri~ Council ex parte
Page [1993] A.C. 682, 7010 Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated
that "[i]f the decision-maker exercises his powers
outside the jurisdiction conferred, in a manner which is
procedurally irregular or is Wednesbury unreasonable, he
is acting ultra vires his powers and therefore
unlawfully." See generally H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth
Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 7th edn.,
1994) .
8 See T.R.S. Allan Law, Liberty, and Justice. The
Foundations of British Constitutionalism. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993). Cf. the "liberal normativist"
style of public law thought identified by M. Loughlin
Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992) pages 206-210. See also C. Harlow and R.
Rawlings Law and Administration (London: Butterworths,
2nd edn., 1997) chapter 4.
9 R. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth,
1977); R. Dworkin Law's Empire (London: Fontana, 1986).
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judicial review proceedings, the law is to be
expressed through rational principles such as
proportionality. In developing this model some
writers have sought to make explicit the
fundamental rights they view as embedded in the
common law10 and to give the Rule of Law a
substantive, rather than a merely formal, meaning.ll
Recently, some judges have expressed their views on
administrative law by adopting a rights model of
judicial review.12 The issue of whether English law
should recognise a principle of proportionality has
formed a focal issue between the traditional and
rights based approaches to administrative law and
can be seen as part of the wider debate of which
model of judicial review should be adopted.
The foremost advocates of proportionality have
been Jowell and Lester who have sought to extend
the approach of Lord Diplock in the rationalisation
10 Allan, op. cit. supra no. 8, chapter 6.
11 See P.P. Craig "Formal and Substantive Conceptions of
the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework" [1997] P.L.
467.
12 See in particular J. Laws "Is the High Court the
Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights?" [1993]
P.L. 59; J. Laws "Law and Democracy", op. cit. supra no.
6; J. Laws "The Constitution: Morals and Rights" [1996]
P.L. 622. See also S. Sedley "The Sound of Silence:
Constitutional Law Without a Constitution" (1994) 110
L.Q.R. 270; S. Sedley "Human Rights: A Twenty-First
Century Agenda" [1995] P.L. 386; Lord Steyn "The Weakest
and Least Dangerous Department of Government" [1997]
P.L. 84.
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of the heads of judicial review.13 Their argument is
that Wednesbury unreasonableness is an inadequate
articulation of substantive review and that
principles such as proportionality are required in
order to provide a more principled justification
for judicial review and in order to protect
individual rights. For Jowell and Lester the
requirement that the means bear a proportionate
relationship with the desired end seems so
"characteristically English,,14 that there should be
little difficulty in absorbing this principle into
English law. In support of this they argue that
implicit applications of the principle can be found
"lurking within the underbrush of Wednesbury"
unreasonableness.1s Judges have applied notions of
proportionality without knowing it or more likely
admitting it. Jowell and Lester argue that in the
interests of a principled and coherent approach to
13J. Jowell and A. Lester "Beyond Wednesbury:
Substantive Principles of Administrative Law" [1987]
P.L. 368; J. Jowell and A. Lester "proportionality:
Neither Novel Nor Dangerous" in J. Jowell and D. Oliver
(eds.), New Directions in Judicial Review (London:
Stevens, 1988) page 51; J. Jowell "Courts and the
Administration in Britain: Standards, Principles and
Rights" (1988) 22 Israel L.R. 409; A. Lester "The
Influence of European Law on English Administrative Law"
[1991] Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario
921; J. Jowell "Is Proportionality an Alien Concept?"
(1996) 2 E.P.L. 401.
14 "Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of
Administrative Law" ibid., 375.
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judicial review proportionality should now be
openly acknowledged as a principle of English law.
In one sense their argument could be viewed as an
invitation for the judiciary to just change its
language of review. Indeed Jowell has stated that
"it does not matter whether or
not ... [proportionality] ...is sheltered under the
Wednesbury umbrella, or allowed to stand alone" so
long as it is openly accepted in English law.16
However, adoption of proportionality would require
a different focus of review away from the
. . I 17
concentration on remedies and towards pr1nc1p es.
The model of judicial review Jowell and Lester
adopt is the rights based model and judicial
acceptance of proportionality is viewed as a means
of achieving this.
This argument has been significantly boosted
by the extra-judicial publications of Sir John Laws
who has argued that despite the lack of any
explicit protection of fundamental rights in the
British Constitution, the common law can and should
be developed in order to remedy this deficiency.
15 Ibid., 374.
16 J. Jowell "Is Proportionality an Alien Concept?", op.
cit. supra no. 13, 410.
17 Cf. Davy v. Spelthorne Borough Council [1984] A.C.
262,276 per Lord Wilberforce: "...typically, English
law fastens, not upon principles but upon remedies."
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Laws' argument is that a differential standard of
judicial protection needs to be developed depending
on the impact of public power upon the individual:
"the greater the intrusion proposed by a body
possessing public power over the citizen into an
area where his fundamental rights are at stake, the
greater must be the justification which the public
authority must demonstrate. ,,18 Accordingly, the
"monolithic" standard of irrationality is seen by
Laws as "an imperfect and inappropriate mechanism
for the development of differential standards in
judicial review.,,19When a public authority makes a
discretionary decision affecting an individual's
fundamental rights it should accord the first
priority to the affected right unless it can
provide substantial justification for overriding
it. In applying the principle of proportionality
the courts would be applying a tool suited to a
differential standard of review by requiring
greater justification in proportion to the
interference with fundamental rights.
Proportionality is then viewed as enabling the
court to give a more finely tuned approach as
18 J. Laws "Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental
Constitutional Rights?", op. cit supra no. 12, 69.
19 Ibid.
430
opposed to an expression of judicial indignation
implied within the language of administrative
irrationality, in its review of the exercise of
discretionary powers. A strong tendency has
therefore appeared in which the adoption of
proportionality is seen as inextricably linked with
the issue of giving protection to fundamental
rights. The views of Laws have found support in
other members of the higher judiciary. For example,
Lord Steyn has stated that U[t]he real question is
whether the principle of Wednesbury
unreasonableness is adequate protection of human
rights, or whether only a recognition of the
principle of proportionality can adequately protect
human rights. ,,20
Arguments against the adoption of
proportionality have come from those seeking to
uphold the traditional model of judicial review.
Lord Irvine has called for the uconstitutional
imperative of judicial self-restraint" as
exemplified in the Wednesbury principles to be
honoured by refusing to recognise proportionality
20 Lord Steyn, OPe cit. supra no. 12, 94.
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as part of English law. 21 Lord Irvine states that
"[t]he fundamental objection to proportionality is
that it invites review of the merits of public
decisions on the basis of a standard which is
considerably lower than that of Wednesbury
unreasonableness and would involve the court in a
process of policy evaluation which goes far beyond
its allotted constitutional role."22
Lord Hoffman shares the view that
proportionality should have no place as a separate
principle from unreasonableness but employs a
different line of argument.23 Like Lord Irvine, Lord
Hoffman states that unreasonableness is the key
concept for controlling the exercise of public
power. However, irrationality or unreasonableness
is viewed as a higher level concept which includes
lack of proportionality as one of its forms.
According to Lord Hoffman, the fact that English
law adopts a general principle of unreasonableness
saves English judges from the task of assigning
particular cases to the sub-categories of
21 Lord Irvine of Lairg Q. c. "Judges and Decision-Makers:
The Theory and Practice of Wednesbury Review" [1996]
P.L. 59, 60.
22 Ibid., 74.
23 Lord Hoffman "The Influence of the European Principle
of Proportionality upon English Law" (Institute of
European Law, University of Birmingham, 20th March
1998) .
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suitability, necessity and proportionality in the
narrow sense, "which seems to afflict" other
systems of administrative law.24 Lord Hoffman sees
the real problem as not which principle should be
observed but who should decide whether it has been
observed or not. Comparing the importance of the
object of a measure with the burdens it imposes is
a matter upon which reasonable people may differ
and is normally left to democratic institutions to
resolve. However, the courts retain their power of
review for unreasonableness. Lord Hoffman states
that "the whole art of judicial review ...requires a
political sensitivity to the proper boundaries
between the powers of the legislative, executive
and judicial branches of government. "25
Proportionality is viewed as a distraction from the
real task the court has to undertake which is to
determine the margin of appreciation to be given to
the decision-maker and the grounds upon which it is
allowed. Compared with this, the exercise of
assigning particular cases to various sub-
categories seems to Lord Hoffman to be "no better
24 Ibid., page S.
25 Ibid., page 7.
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than trainspotting". 26 As there are no hard and fast
rules as to how judges should reconcile democratic
government with the protection of fundamental
rights, the courts have to "tread a delicate line
which avoids the extremes of populism on the one
hand and judicial over-activism on the other.,,27 In
other words, the customary wisdom of the courts,
articulated through the language of
unreasonableness cannot, except in a very crude
manner, be better expressed through the technical
rules of proportionality. Instead the art of
judicial review for unreasonableness requires
practical experience in the traditions of the
common law and any attempt to rationalise this art
by drawing upon the technical distinctions of
proportionality only serves to devalue the courts'
accumulated wisdom.
From the traditionalists' point of view
proportionality is seen as a European threat to the
common law which would force the judges to subvert
the role and function of both Parliament and the
26 Ibid., page 14. At page 6 Lord Hoffman states: "[t]0
go down the road of classification can lead only to
metaphysical problems of distinguishing different forms
of irrationality which would truly be worthy of medieval
schoolmen and, if such distinctions are to have any
practical meaning, differences in the treatment of
different kinds of irrationality which could fairly be
characterised as irrational."
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courts. The principle is seen as encouraging
judicial supremacism and threatening democratic
government through political institutions.
Traditionalists are therefore highly sceptical of
proportionality.
Adopting a comparative perspective Boyron has
argued that proportionality would not fit within
the theoretical framework of English constitutional
and administrative law.28 The domination of the
English legal system by the sovereignty of
Parliament means that the English courts lack the
same status as the French Conseil d'Etat which
operates a proportionality review. The distinction
between appeal and review is one of the main
organising principles of English administrative law
and this would be threatened if proportionality
were to be adopted. Furthermore, the difference
between French inquisitorial procedures and English
adversarial procedures and the different attitudes
towards the administration would make the adoption
of proportionality problematic.29 In response to
Jowell and Lester, Boyron has argued that
27 Ibid., page 9.
28 S. Boyron "Proportionality in English Administrative
Law: A Faulty Translation?" (1992) 12 O.J.L.S. 237.
29 Ibid., 262-263. See also J.W.F. Allison A Continental
Distinction in the Common Law. A Historical and
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proportionality would result in a similarly
inadequate and tautologous justification for
judicial intervention as Wednesbury
unreasonableness does. The courts could justify
intervention on the basis of proportionality
because the challenged decision was
disproportionate and thereby engage in a similar
question-begging circularity. 30
From a functionalist perspective Harlow has
also cautioned against the adoption of
proportionality.31 Harlow states that claims about
the precision and rationality of civil law are
exaggerated and arguments in favour of
proportionality show little awareness of the real
nature of the principle as a "'balancing test'
replete with judicial discretion". 32 Under green
light theory, the matters involved in a
proportionality inquiry are considered to be too
Comparative Perspective on English Public Law. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996) chapter 10.
30 Ibid., 255.
31See Harlowand Rawlings, op. cit. supra no. 8. Cf.
the empiricist strain in the functionalist style
exemplified by J.A.G. Griffith, see Loughlin, op. cit.
supra no. 8, pages 197-201.
32C. Harlow "Changing the Mindset: The Place of Theory
in English Administrative Law" (1994) 14 O.J.L.S. 419,
428-429.
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important to be left solely to judges.33 From this
viewpoint proportionality would simply enable the
judiciary to replace administrative discretion with
judicial discretion and so is to be resisted as a
potential restriction of democratic government;
"law is not and cannot be a substitute for
politics .,,34
Other contributions to the debate have sought
to deal constructively with what role
proportionality could possibly play in English law.
Craig has recognised that while the development of
substantive principles of review may be the best
option, proportionality should not be viewed as a
panacea.35 Proportionality is a not a self-executing
doctrine providing a ready-made answer but a
repository for the conclusion reached by a
normative background theory. Application of
proportionality will require some decision to be
33 C. Harlow "Back to Basics: Reinventing Administrative
Law" [1997] P.L. 245, 261. On green light theory see
Harlow and Rawlings, op. cit. supra no. 8, chapter 3.
34 J.A.G. Griffith "The Political Constitution" (1979) 42
M.L.R. 1, 16. See also J.A.G. Griffith "Constitutional
and Administrative Law" in P. Archer and A. Martin
(eds.), More Law Reform Now. A Collection of Essays on
Law Reform. (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1983) pages 49, 54-
59.
35 P.P. Craig Administrative Law (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 3rd edn., 1994) page 421. See also P.P. Craig
"Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law"
(Institute of European Law, University of Birmingham,
20th March 1998) .
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made, either explicitly or implicitly, over which
particular background theory is being adopted and
what particular conception of proportionality is
being advanced.36 Intellectual honesty requires a
reasoned argument as to why a decision was
disproportionate, making it clear which particular
conception of proportionality is being applied and
at what level of intensity. For Craig this does not
mean that proportionality should be rejected but
that we should be aware of what its successful
application requires.
The debate over proportionality has mainly
been led by the liberals who want to reform
judicial review to a more rights based model. In
response traditionalists have argued that the
established model of judicial review should be
maintained. One consequence of leading the debate
has been that the liberalists have also been able
to set the agenda for the debate. For example, the
issue of proportionality has become bound up with
the protection of fundamental rights within the
constitution. While this important issue has been
recognised and discussed, the focus of debate has
marginalised other issues such as whether
36 Ibid., page 444.
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proportionality should be applied across the whole
range of administrative decision-making. However,
before specific issues in the proportionality
debate are addressed, the judicial debate will be
analysed.
3. Proportionality in English Law
In this section the case-law concerning
proportionality will be examined. Although
proportionality is "unknown" to English public law37
and the judiciary are unaccustomed to the
principle, it has been argued that several cases
can be interpreted as implicit applications of the
principle. However, there is another reason for
examining the case-law which is to present the
tradition of substantive review which has become
known as \\Wednesbury review" .38 The important
decision of the House of Lords in Brind requires
separate examination and the subsequent case-law
will also be examined. The application of the
37 J. F. Garner "The Principle of Proportionality" in U.K.
National Reports Submitted to the Xth International
Congress on Comparative Law (Budapest, 1978) section
IVD2/1.
38 Cf. Lord Irvine, op. cit. supra no. 21.
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principle by the English courts in their role as
Community courts provides an opportunity to assess
the suitability of the principle as a full-scale
transplant into English law.
A. The Pre-Wednesbury Case-Law.
As proportionality is not a developed ground
of judicial intervention discerning whether there
are impressions of proportionality can be
difficult. Applications of the notion of proportion
may be found under the principle of reasonableness
before it came to be defined in the Wednesbury
sense. For example, in Kruse v. aobneon" Lord
Russell C.J. stated that by-laws could be held to
be unreasonable and void by the court if they were
partial and unequal in their application as between
different classes, manifestly unjust or if they
"involved such oppressive and gratuitous
interference with the rights of those subject to
them as could find no justification in the minds of
reasonable men. ,,40 Lord Russell continued by stating
that a by-law will not be unreasonable merely
39 [1898] 2 Q.B. 91. See generally A.N. Schofield Byelaws
of Local Authorities (London: Butterworth, 1939) pages
48-70.
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because the court thinks that it goes further than
is prudent or necessary. In examining by-laws the
courts used to adopt a more interventionist
attitude in guarding property rights against state
intervention. In Repton School Governors v. Repton
Rural District CouriciT" a by-law requiring that
anyone who constructed a building had to provide at
the rear an open area was challenged as
unreasonable. Bailhache J. referred to Lord
Russell's statement and added:
"...if the effect in a given case, which might
be of frequent occurrence, of construing a by-
law in a particular way would lead to a result
quite unnecessary for the protection of public
health, and would impose a serious restriction
upon the ordinary rights of a property owner
with no good object, I think one would be
entitled to say that the by-law was void because
it was unreasonable."4:l
The by-law was found to be unreasonable. In
protecting property rights the judge was willing to
determine whether the extent of interference was
40 Ibid., 99-100.
41 [1918] 1 K.B. 26. Decision affirmed by the Court of
Appeal [1918] 2 K.B. 133.
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necessary in view of the purpose of public health.
Scott v. Pilline~3 concerned the validity of a by-
law which prohibited anyone from using any street
or public place for the purpose of selling
newspapers devoted to the probable result of
"races, steeplechases, or other competitions.1t The
court found that the width of the by-law could not
be supported. The definition was so wide that it
could cover the probable result of any athletic
contest not at all concerned with betting. Kennedy
J. stated that "[o]ne may have a strong view as to
the mischief of betting, but one's objection to
betting ought not to govern the decision of this
case. The question for us is whether it is
reasonable for the county authority to penalise the
sale or distribution of such newspapers or other
documents as may be held to come within the very
wide description given in the by-Iaw.lt44 The width
of the by-law went beyond what was necessary to
achieve its purpose of deterring betting and was
therefore unreasonable.
42 Ibid., 30 (emphasis added) .
43 [1904] 2 K.B. 855.
44 Ibid., 857.
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In Attorney-General v. Hodgson45 a by-law which
prohibited the use of cars in a park for public
safety reasons was upheld. It had been argued that
the same purpose could be secured by imposing speed
limits. However, in rejecting this Peterson J. held
that the council might well have thought that a
speed limit would not necessarily be observed and
the interests of public safety could be threatened.
In Arlidge v. Mayor, Aldermen, and Councillors of
the Metropoli tan Borough of Islington46 a by-law
imposed a duty on the landlords of lodging houses
to clean every part of the house once a year. The
definition of landlord was wide enough to include
people receiving the rent as an agent or trustee.
The problem with this was that in the event of non-
performance a penalty would be imposed on the
landlord when he might be quite unable to carry out
the work without breaking a contract or committing
a trespass. The King's Bench Division held that to
impose an obligation on a landlord to carry out
certain work for which he could render himself
liable as trespasser or be subject to a penalty for
non-performance was unreasonable. Lord Alvertsone
45 [1922] 2 Ch. 429.
46 [1909] 2 K.B. 127. See also Stiles v. Galanski [1904]
1 K.B. 615.
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C.J. stated that the by-law "seems to me to go
beyond anything which the necessity of the case
demands. ,,47 The notion of proportionality here is
that suitable means should be adopted in order to
achieve the desired end. To impose an obligation to
either commit a trespass or pay a penalty was
clearly unsuitable in order to achieve the
objective.
These old cases show that the ideas of
suitability, necessity and proportionality are not
altogether alien to the common law, though it would
be going too far to state that the principle of
proportionality is part of English law but just
needs to be more clearly articulated. These common
law notions of not going beyond what is necessary
were applied by the judges in the early part of the
century to protect property rights against
collectivist State intervention. With the increase
in public power over the individual in the modern
State, such doctrines could be in the process of
being rediscovered by today's judiciary.48 However,
so far the courts have been unable to reapply such
47 Ibid., 134.
48 See S. Sedley "The Sound of Silence: Constitutional
Law Without a Constitution", op. cit. supra no. 12, 278;
S. Sedley "The Moral Economy of Judicial Review" in G.P.
Wilson (ed.), Frontiers of Legal Scholarship
(Chichester: Wiley, 1995) page 156, 158.
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doctrines due to their attachment to Wednesbury
unreasonableness. What these old cases show is that
the Wednesbury doctrine was not the product of
ineluctable design but a new and novel doctrine
quickly thought up in an ex tempore judgment
delivered late on a Friday afternoon in 1947.49
Before then the courts had on occasion assimilated
notions of proportionality within the doctrine of
unreasonableness in order to protect the rights and
interests of individuals.
B. Wednesbury.
In the case of Associated Provincial picture
Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation50 the Court of
Appeal set out the basis on which the courts may
legitimately interfere with administrative
decision-making. At a time when the courts were
still in the throes of the wartime tendency of
leaning "over backwards to the point of falling off
the bench, in favour of the executive", 51 the basis
of judicial intervention came to be articulated by
49 J. Laws "Judicial Review I. The Ghost in the Machine"
[1989] P.L. 27, 30.
50 [1948] 1 K.B. 223.
51 J .A.G. Griffith "Administrative Law and the Judges"
(London: The Pritt Memorial Lecture, 1978) page 13.
445
Lord Greene M.R., a judge with a highly formalist
approach to the judicial role.52 This judgment and
the epithet of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" have
subsequently become deeply embedded in judicial
discourse.53 The case itself concerned a challenge
to the lawfulness of a condition placed on the
grant of licences to cinemas operating on Sundays
to the effect that children under the age of
fifteen were not to be admitted.54 The power of the
local authority was to issue licences subject to
such conditions as it thought fit to impose.55 The
condition was challenged as unlawful. Lord Greene
began by asking what power did the court have in
examining decisions taken by public authorities.
The court could strike down a decision if the
authority was found to have contravened the law but
it could not substitute itself for the authority.
The grant of power by Parliament to the authority
ensured that the courts could only review the
52 See Lord Greene The Judicial Office (Birmingham: The
Holdsworth Society, 1938); Lord Greene "Law and
Progress" (1944) 94 The Law Journal 349, 357, 365. See
also J.A.G. Griffith Judicial Politics since 1920: A
Chronicle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) pages 55-57.
53 The Wednesbury case is one of the most cited cases of
all time. See G. Slapper "Half a century of being
unreasonable" The Times, 25th November 1997.
54 For a more detailed background see R. Carnwath "The
Reasonable Limits of Local Authority Powers" [1996] P.L.
244, 246-248.
55 Section 1(1) Sunday Entertainment Act 1932.
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exercise of such power in a strictly limited class
of case for it was a court of review and not of
appeal. After setting out the doctrine of
considerations and the other overlapping heads of
review - bad faith, dishonesty, unreasonableness,
and disregard of public policy - Lord Greene asked
what did it mean for discretionary power to be
exercised unreasonably? Using the example of the
teacher dismissed because of her red ha ir" Lord
Greene stated that such a decision could be
unreasonable in the sense of taking into account
irrelevant matters or in the sense that it was made
in bad faith "and, in fact, all these things run
into one another." 57 The challenged condition was
found to be within the authority's wide
discretionary power. The argument that it was
unreasonable was rejected:
"[Counsel] is bound to say that the decision
of the authority was wrong because it is
unreasonable, and in saying that he is really
saying that the ultimate arbiter of what is
and is not reasonable is the court and not the
56 See Short v. Poole Corporation [1926] Ch. 66, 91 per
Warrington L.J.
57 Supra no. 44, 229.
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local authority. It is just there, it seems to
me, that the argument breaks down." 58
However, Lord Greene did allow for a decision to be
challenged as unlawful if it was unreasonable but
in a different sense. Here it would have to be
shown that the decision was so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have arrived at it.
This is what is commonly known as Wednesbury
unreasonableness. Lord Greene stated that
"something overwhelming" would be required for a
challenge to succeed on this ground as it was not
what the court thought to be unreasonable but what
no reasonable authority could ever have arrived at.
This sense of unreasonableness was defined as an
aspect of determining whether a decision was ultra
vires, in the sense that it was beyond the four
corners of the authority's jurisdiction. It was
only in 1984 that Lord Diplock could suggest that
this ground of review, which he re-defined as
"irrationality", could stand on its own feet and
need no longer be justified as an inferred though
unidentifiable mistake of law.59
58 Ibid., 230.
59 GCHQ case, supra no. 1, 410H-411A. Cf. Edwards
(Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow [1956] A.C. 14, 36 per
Viscount Radcliffe.
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Wednesbury unreasonableness has been
identified by some commentators as indicative of
the myth-making of English administrative law.
Jowell states that one myth is that judicial review
is only concerned with the decision-making
procedure and not substance and that it takes no
account of the merits,60 whereas Sedley identifies
another myth to be that judicial review is a modern
Lnvent.Lon i " Analytically Wednesbury
unreasonableness has been viewed as an unnecessary
safety net as the controls of relevancy and
propriety of purpose adequately cover the cases
which would fall into unreasonableness.62 However,
if "...Wednesbury invented nothing and clarified
little ...,,63then why has it proved to be of such
importance in modern judicial review? The answer is
that is it the very imprecision of this ground of
review that has made it so prominent. According to
carnwath: "...the fusion of different legal strands
60 Jowell "Courts and the Administration in Britain:
Standards, Principles and Rights", op. cit. supra no.
13, 415.
61Sedley, op. cit. supra no. 12, 277.
62Craig, op. cit. supra no. 30, page 410. P. Atiyah
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (London, The Hamlyn
Lectures, 1987) pages 123-124 identifies a general trend
of English judges to pile new doctrines on old doctrines
as a consequence of their pragmatism.
63S. Sedley "Governments, Constitutions, and Judges" in
G. Richardson and H. Genn (eds.), Administrative Law &
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made Wednesbury unreasonableness a highly
convenient shorthand for judges looking for a quick
way to dispose of complex arguments. This, combined
with its quasi-alliterative resonance, assured its
durability."64 The use of the test formed the
judiciary's pragmatic response to the question of
whether a given decision is lawful or not. It is a
formal test that the judges have developed through
the artificial reason of the common law to signify
their (dis-)approval of an administrative decision.
Wednesbury unreasonableness has come to mean
judicial restraint and non-intervention but has at
the same time allowed judicial intervention and
even usurpation but not on any principled or
rational basis. It is this apparent contradiction
and \\inherent vagueness" 65 which has appealed to
judges minded to deal pragmatically with the case
before them. Today Wednesbury describes a species
of review under the traditional model of judicial
Government Action. The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms
of Review. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) page 35, 38.
64Carnwath, op. cit. supra no. 54, 248. According to
Sedley, op. cit. supra no. 12, page 278 footnote 30:
"...far from demonstrating any originality in the
decision [Wednesbury] may demonstrate only the
unoriginality of much advocacy and some lawmaking in
this field: in the mouths of many advocates 'Wednesbury'
has become an adjective meaning inchoately
objectionable ...".
65 P. Cane An Introduction to Administrative Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 3rd edn., 1996) page 208.
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review used by some to argue against any extension
or development of judicial review. According to
Lord Irvine, only by applying the Wednesbury test
can the courts give due weight to the
"constitutional imperative of respect for the
merits of public decisions. ,,66 Wednesbury is then a
rule of artificial reason which the courts will
apply in order to enforce the will of Parliament
and to avoid questions of policy but which
simultaneously allows the judges sufficient
discretion to test how reasonable an administrative
decision is.
The development of Wednesbury unreasonableness
is testament to its ambiguity.67 The formulation was
born at a time when the courts were positively
opposed to questioning administrative decision-
making. Cases such as Local Government Board v.
Arlidge68 set the tone for judicial review of
administrative action from the early part of the
century to the 19608.69 The courts refused to
intervene for fear of questioning Parliamentary
66Lord Irvine, op. cit. supra no. 21, 72.
67See G.L. Peiris "Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The
Expanding Canvas" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 53.
68 [1915] A.C. 120. See A.V. Dicey "The Development of
Administrative Law in England" (1915) 31 L.Q.R. 148.
69 For a detailed overview see Griffith Judicial Politics
since 1920: A Chronicle, op. cit. supra no. 47, chapters
1-4.
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sovereignty or ministerial accountability. It was,
however, in a different climate that Wednesbury was
more generously applied when the House of Lords
held that a Minister did not have an unlimited
statutory di scret i.on.."According to Sedley: "far
from being the point at which public law woke up,
the Wednesbury case is a long snore in its sleep."n
In 1984 Lord Diplock redefined unreasonableness to
irrationality which covers those decisions which
outrageously defy logic or accepted moral standards
so that no sensible person who applied his or her
mind to the question could have arrived at it.72
This re-classification and re-definition was
motivated by a rationalisation of the common law
doctrine of reasonableness. However, not all judges
have accepted this. Lord Donaldson M.R. has
questioned the definition of irrationality as
"casting doubt on the mental capacity of the
decision-maker,,73 and preferred the Wednesbury test
or rather to ask whether the decision could elicit
70 Padfield v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food [1968] A.C. 997.
71 Sedley, op. ci t. supra no. 12, 278.
72GCHQcase, supra no. 1, 41OG. See P. Walker "What's
Wrong With Irrationality" [1995] P.L. 556.
73 R. v. Devon County Council ex parte G [1989] A.C. 573,
577G.
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the response "my goodness, that is certainly
wrong" .74
The central issue concerning Wednesbury
unreasonableness is that the courts cannot
interfere with the merits of public decisions.
There is widespread agreement against the courts
substituting their judgement on the merits.
Traditionalists, liberalists and empirical
functionalists, such as Griffith, would all agree
that the courts have no jurisdiction to engage in
an appeal on the merits or to remake the original
administrative decision. The rule against merits
review may then be described as a "narrow-gauge
discovery" because it is, when taken alone,
compatible with a wide number of competing
frameworks and can therefore "bathe in an
atmosphere of value neutrality.,,75 However, beneath
such ostensible agreement lies intractable
disagreement over what exactly constitutes "the
merits" and therefore what constitutes "legality"
also. Only by identifying the different conceptions
of administrative law and in acknowledging that the
74 Ibid., 583H.
75C. Taylor "Neutrality in Political Science" in
Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers
Volume 2 (Cambridge: University Press, 1985) page 58,
90.
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rule against merits review does not exist within a
matrix of value neutrality can the real issues be
examined.
Rhetorically judicial review is only concerned
with the decision-making process.?6 However, the
Wednesbury test has certainly been applied to the
substance of administrative decisions.?? The
tautologous definition given to unreasonableness is
an outcome of Lord Greene's approach as to what
constitutes the merits of administrative decisions.
Lord Greene's reasoning proceeded on the following
lines. First, it was recognised that the court
cannot substitute its view for that of the public
authority. Secondly, the notion of reasonableness,
having a well-established lineage,?S is recognised
as an aspect on which the court can review the
decision of the authority. However, in order that
the second proposition does not undermine the
first, review for unreasonableness must be a
certain type. Therefore, Lord Greene formulated the
Wednesbury definition; the court must decide not
?6 See, e.g., Chief Constable of the North Wales Police
v. Evans [1982] 3 All E.R. 141, 155c per Lord Brightman.
??See, e.g., Wheeler v. Leicester City Council [1985]
A.C. 1054.
?8 See Rooke's Case (1598) 5 Co. Rep. 99b; R. v. Askew
(1768) 4 Burr. 2186, 2189; Kruse v. Johnson, supra no.
34; Theatre de Luxe (Halifax) Ltd. v. Gledhill [1915] 2
K.B. 48, 58-60.
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whether the decision was unreasonable but whether
the authority has been unreasonable by arriving at
a decision which no reasonable authority ever could
have come to. In this rough and ready way Lord
Greene purported to distinguish between the merits
of a decision and its legality. This formulation is
seen by some as the inexorably logical standard of
review whereby the courts cannot substitute their
view for that of the public authority. The
importance attributed to Wednesbury is shown by the
fourth proposition which is implicit in the
reasoning of Lord Greene and has been subsequently
expressed.79 It is inferred that any extension of
judicial review beyond the limits set down by
Wednesbury unreasonableness would necessarily and
inevitably result in the judiciary substituting
their opinion of the substantive merits for that of
the public authority. However, the validity of this
statement rests upon the questioning-begging
premise that Wednesbury is the only way of
preventing the courts from usurping the public
authority's power. Wednesbury defines the merits of
administrative decisions as anything which is
79 See Brind, supra no. 2, per Lord Ackner and Lord
Lowry; Lord Irvine, op. cit. supra no. 21.
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outside the scope of the unreasonableness test
which is to be applied by reference to itself.
The importance of this for the traditionalists
is that they are wedded to the Wednesbury
definition of what constitutes the merits of public
decision-making. The merits form anything which is
outside the limits set down by Wednesbury and it is
for the judiciary to decide what falls within the
Wednesbury formulation. The Wednesbury test enables
the judiciary to give the appearance that they are
far removed from questions of policy and
administration but is flexible enough to enable
them to intervene when a sufficiently serious case
arises. For those who adopt a rights model of
judicial review the Wednesbury test is out of date
and inadequate. Jowell and Lester criticise the
test as inadequate in that it does not provide
sufficient justification and encourages suspicion
of judicial prejudice, unrealistic in that it sets
a high threshold for applicants and tautologous.so
Allan states that as the distinction between
legality and the merits though fundamental, is in
practice one of degree, it is neither
80 Jowell and Lester "Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive
Principles of Administrative Law", op. cit. supra no.
13, 371-372.
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straightforward nor self-evident and "cannot be
captured by any simple formulas, mechanically
applied. uBI This distinction cannot be elaborated as
a legal principle but depends on cautious
evaluation constituting essentially a plea for
judicial self-restraint.B2
C. The Post-Wednesbury Case-Law.
Wednesbury did not become established as the
locus classicus of English administrative law until
the 1960s. While the judges were extending the
B3 f . 84scope for error of law and procedural a1rness,
substantive review remained relatively static.
Following the procedural reforms of Order 5385 and
the drawing of a procedural distinction between
public and private law, the way was opened for the
judiciary to develop a substantive public law. Lord
Diplock's suggestion that English law might adopt
proportionality can be read in this light. However,
such a development would run against the
traditional common law approach and the universal
8l Allan, op. cit. supra no. 8, page 187.
82 Ibid., pages 187-188.
83 Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission
[1969] 2 A.C. 147.
84 Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40.
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conception of legality. Jowell and Lester argue
that during this period judges used other
principles, such as proportionality, "without
knowing or, more likely, admitting it."s6
Unsurprisingly, Jowell and Lester would like to
classify as many cases as possible as hidden
applications of proportionality. The liberals
therefore argue that the common law can develop a
public law jurisprudence by reinterpreting common
law precedents within a rights model of judicial
review. Jowell and Lester argue that
proportionality is not all that different from what
the judges are well-accustomed to doing in order to
allay concerns over its application. Alternatively,
it may be thought that if proportionality is not
all that different to Wednesbury review there is no
need to transplant it into English law. Whatever
conclusions may be drawn, this debate over the
interpretation of the previous case-law is arguably
tendentious in that it is concerned to vindicate a
particular conception of judicial review rather
than determine how proportionality can be best
developed in the future. Furthermore, the focus
85 Order 53 R.S.C., S.l. 1977 No. 1955; section 31
Supreme Court Act 1981.
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over which cases can be viewed as containing hidden
notions of proportionality has overshadowed other
issues.87 Other commentators have noted the limits
of this form of debate. For example, Jowell and
Lester state that the House of Lords decision in
Bromley London Borough Council v. GLC,88 which
concerned the use of the fiduciary trust concept
against spending for transport policy, could be
seen as displaying a hidden notion of
proportionali ty.89 As Craig states, this re-
categorisation does not solve the difficult issues
there raised.gO Reclassifying the reasoning employed
as better expressed through the language of
proportionality cannot be a substitute for an
analysis of the purpose of the legislation and a
86 "Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of
Administrative Law", op. cit. supra no. 13, 374.
87 Ibid., 375-376, 381-382; "Proportionality: Neither
Novel Nor Dangerous" and Jowell "Is Proportionality an
Alien Concept?" are concerned with the reinterpretation
of case-law under a proportionality friendly framework.
Boyron "Proportionality in English Administrative Law: A
Faulty Translation?", op. cit. supra no. 23, 249-254
argues against Jowell and Lester's views. Craig
Administrative Law, op. cit. supra no. 30, pages 411-418
is less concerned with the case-law than with the place,
meaning and application of proportionality.
88 [1983] 1 A.C. 768. See generally M. Loughlin Legality
and Locality. The Role of Law in Central-Local
Government Relations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
chapter 4.
as "Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor Dangerous", op.
ci t. supra no. 13, page 62; "Beyond Wednesbury:
Substantive Principles of Administrative Law", op. cit.
supra no. 13, 381-382.
90 Craig, op. cit supra no. 30, pages 442-443.
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normative judgment on the competing interests
involved. Indeed such re-categorisation may have
the danger that proportionality is seen as a self-
executing conclusionary principle just the same as
Wednesbury unreasonableness.
Without considering every case Jowell and
Lester discuss, the following analysis will examine
some of the leading cases. R. v. Barnsley
Metropoli tan Borough Council ex parte nook"
concerned the revocation of a market trader's
licence and a life ban from trading because he had
been caught urinating into a side street. The Court
of Appeal quashed the decision because inter alia
the punishment was "altogether excessive and out of
proportion to the occasion."~ Lord Denning M.R.
referred to the ability of the Court of King's
Bench to quash unreasonable punishments which
stemmed from the 17th century when the court struck
down an excessive fine imposed by the Commissioners
of Sewers.93 The case can be seen as a simple
application of the maxim that the punishment should
fit the crime. Similarly in R. v. London Borough of
91 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1052.
92 Ibid., 1057H per Lord Denning M.R.
93 Commins v. Masam (1643) March 196, 202. See L.L. Jaffe
and E.G. Henderson "Judicial Review and the Rule of Law:
Historical Origins" (1956) 72 L.O.R. 345, 348-350, 355-
357.
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Bren t ex parte Assegai 94 a school governor was
banned from visiting any Council premises and
dismissed. Woolf L.J. (as he then was) regarded the
ban as wholly out of proportion to the applicant's
conduct: "[w]here the response is out of proportion
with the cause to this extent, this provides a very
clear indication of unreasonableness in the
Wednesbury sense." Proportionality has therefore
been assimilated with unreasonableness in cases
concerning the imposition of penalties on an
individual. In such situations the decision-making
is more individualised and application of
proportionality seems more suitable in assessing
whether the penalty imposed was lawful.
Two of the main cases relied upon by Jowell
and Lester are Congreve v. HomeOffice95 and Wheeler
v. Leicester City Council.96 Jowell and Lester state
that at the heart of both cases was the refusal of
the court to countenance the achievement of a
legitimate end by disproportionate means.97 The
explicit use of proportionality could have
therefore strengthened the intellectual cogency of
94 Queen's Bench Division, (CO/20/87, CO/21/87), 11th
June 1987, LEXIS transcript. See J. Beatson
"Proportionality" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 180.
95 [1976] Q.B. 629.
96 [1985] A.C. 1054.
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these decisions. The Congreve case concerned the
withdrawal of television licences from those people
who had bought a licence at the price of £12 when
the cost was being raised to £18. Lord Denning held
that the demands for payment of the difference or
revocation was contrary to the 1689 Bill of Rights
for raising taxation without statutory authority
and an unlawful punishment. If so, then the purpose
of the administrative decision cannot have been a
legitimate or proper purpose and it was an illegal
decision in that the Home Secretary never had the
power in the first place rather than a
disproportionate exercise of that power.
Classifying this case as an example of
proportionality therefore assumes that the Home
Secretary actually had the power and so overlooks
the primary control of legality and purposes.98
The Wheeler case arose from the actions of a
city council which was under a statutory duty to
promote good race relations. Three members of the
Leicester Rugby Football club were members of the
English side touring South Africa, which then
operated a policy of apartheid. The city council
97 "Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor Dangerous", op.
cit. supra no. 13, page 61.
9S Co.
ra1g, op. c~t. supra no. 30, page 414.
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asked the club to condemn the tour but the club
refused. Following this the council suspended the
club from using the council's recreation field for
one year as it considered the refusal to constitute
an affront to the city's ethnic minority
population. In the House of Lords, Lord Roskill
held that the council's decision was unlawful as it
was Wednesbury unreasonable and procedurally
improper. This justification can be criticised
because the procedural propriety of the decision
was never an issue and Lord Roskill gave no reason
why the decision was unreasonable. Lord Templeman
considered the ban to be a form of punishment which
the council placed on the club for not adopting its
views: "[t]he council could not properly seek to
use its statutory powers of management or any other
statutory powers for the purposes of punishing the
club when it had done no wrong. ,,99 This decision has
been viewed as the House of Lords acting as a court
of appeal from the ccuncd Lv "" Jowell and Lester
prefer the reasoning of Browne-Wilkinson L.J. (as
he then was) in the Court of Appeal which Lord
99 Ibid., 1081C.
100 T.R.S. Allan "Rac iaI Harmony, Public Policy and
Freedom of Speech" (1986) 49 M.L.R. 121, 123.
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Roskill explicitly declined to endorse. lOl In his
speech Browne-Wilkinson L.J. represented a change
in the focus of review toward the rights model of
judicial review by analysing the case in terms of
basic constitutional rights. l02 According to this
view, the ban was an unacceptable constraint on the
freedoms of speech and conscience. While couched in
the language of constitutional rights, this opinion
held the ban to be unlawful for the same reasons
employed by the House of Lords; that its purpose
was to punish the club. 103 If the purpose of the
exercise of the power was to punish, then Browne-
Wilkinson L.J. did not consider this to be a proper
purpose. Interpreting this reasoning as an
application of proportionality may only serve to
confuse what is exactly required by that principle.
For example, it was not considered that the court
could examine alternative courses of action open to
the council in order to achieve its objective. Was
101 Ibid., 1079D.
102 The dissent of Browne-Wilkinson L.J. has been a
rallying point for the liberalists. See Jowell and
Lester "Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of
Administrative Law", op. cit. supra no. 13, 373-374;
Allan, op. cit. supra no. 8, pages 137-138, 168-169.
103 Ibid. I 1063A-B: "Lt l he question, therefore, is
whether general powers conferred on elected public
bodies for the administration of public property or
money can lawfully be used to punish those who lawfully
and reasonably decline to support the view held by the
public body". See also at 1064D.
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the ban necessary and indispensable for the
achievement of good race relations? Could the
council, for instance, have lawfully called for a
boycott of the club by local residents and
spectators which might have had the effect of
promoting good race relations without restricting
the freedom of conscience of the club members?
Could such an alternative course of action allow
members of the public to decide for themselves
without compelling anyone to uphold any particular
view. Such questions were not addressed by Browne-
Wilkinson L.J. who preferred to use his moral
judgment about the club's constitutional rights and
the House of Lords who used the more customary
approach in order to make a finding of
unreasonableness. Beneath both approaches lies the
view that the council's objective itself was to be
constrained in order to limit the power of the
council. The judges' reasoning, whether expressed
in terms of customary wisdom or the discourse of
constitutional rights, was concerned with the
purpose for which the power was being exercised and
not whether the means adopted for the attainment of
that purpose were proportionate. Classifying the
Wheeler case as an application of proportionality
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does little to enlighten us as to the possible
adoption of that principle. What the case and its
interpretation by Jowell and Lester demonstrates is
that proportionality can, like Wednesbury
unreasonableness, be manipulated in order to allow
the judiciary some control over the ends for which
administrative power is exercised.
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D. Brind.
Following Lord Diplock's reference to the
possible adoption of proportionality there followed
a series of attempts to establish it as a separate
head of review. 104 In a few instances the courts
decided cases without finding it necessary to rely
on proportionality, 105 whereas in other cases the
courts found proportionality to be relevant in
determining whether the decision was
unr-eaaonable v ''" Attempts to introduce
proportionality as a separate head of review
culminated in the House of Lords decision in R. v.
secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Brind.107
This case concerned a challenge to a directive
issued by the Home Secretary under the Broadcasting
104 See R. v. Warwick Crown Court ex parte Smalley [1987]
1 W.L.R. 237, 245G-H; R. v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department ex parte Yeboah [1987] 3 All E.R. 999,
1005j-1006a.
105 See R. v. The London Borough of Enfield ex parte TF
Unwin (Roydon) Ltd. 46 Building L.R. 5, 18; R. v. Legal
Aid Area Committee No. 10 ex parte McKenna [1990] 2
Admin.L.R. 585, 604; R. v. British Coal Corporation ex
parte Vardy [1993] I.C.R. 720, 760E-F.
106 See R. v. London Borough of Bren t ex parte Assegai,
supra no. 83; R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex
parte Pegasus Holdings (Transport) Ltd. [1988] 1 W.L.R.
990, 1001G per Schiemann J.; R. v. Secretary of State
for Health ex parte United States Tobacco International
Inc. [1992] 1 Q.B. 353, 366G per Taylor L.J.
107 Supra no. 2.
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Act 1981 for the BBC and IBA to refrain from
broadcasting on radio and television the words of
persons who represented organisations prohibited
under the Prevention of Terrorism legislation. In
justifying the prohibition the Home Secretary
reasoned that these forms of media had allowed such
people the opportunity to justify their criminal
activities, caused offence to viewers, including
the relatives of those killed by terrorists, and
allowed terrorists to draw support and sustenance
from the media. Pictures or film of people who
represented the prohibited organisations could be
broadcast and the spoken words could be voiced over
by another person so that the person's lips and the
actor's voice were synchronised. It was the
broadcasting of the speaker's actual voice which
was prohibited. A number of grounds of challenge
were advanced including separate arguments based on
Wednesbury unreasonableness and proportionality. 108
In the applicant's argument it was emphasised that
a clear distinction existed between an appeal on
the merits and review for proportionality. 109
However, it was partially conceded that the court
108 Significantly A. Lester Q. C. appeared as counsel for
the applicant.
109 Ibid., 73 7B.
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needed to look to some extent into the merits when
the European Convention of Human Rights was
relevant and proportionality was to be applied.l1O
All five Law Lords agreed that the applicants could
not succeed but employed significantly different
reasoning.
Lord Bridge stated that when a restriction is
made on the freedom of speech it must be justified
by an important competing public interest. The
court in such circumstances can exercise a
secondary judgment by asking whether a reasonable
Secretary of State could reasonably make the
primary judgment.ll1 However, in this case Lord
Bridge thought that the Home Secretary had not
acted unreasonably as the defeat of the terrorist
is a public interest of the highest order in
civilised society. Lord Bridge did not see how
reliance on proportionality could help the
applicants but agreed with Lord Roskill's comments
on the possible future development of the law. Lord
Roskill himself agreed with Lord Bridge on the
substantive issue and only added a few words on
proportionality. Lord Diplock's reference to
proportionality in the GCHQ case had been made in
110 Ibid., 738G
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view of the increasing influence of Community law
and it would be best to develop that principle on a
case by case basis. However, the first step could
not be taken in the present case as it would
involve the court substituting its judgment of what
was required to achieve the objective for that of
the Home Secretary. However, Lord Roskill stated
that the possible development of proportionality
was to be left open.
Lord Templeman gave a short opinion. In his
view freedom of expression existed as a matter of
principle in every democratic constitution whether
written or not. However, that principle was not
absolute and restrictions of it could be subject to
judicial review. After referring to the Wednesbury
principles Lord Templeman stated:
"The subject matter and date of the Wednesbury
principles cannot in my opinion make it either
necessary or appropriate for the courts to judge
the validity of an interference with human rights
by asking themselves whether the Home Secretary
has acted irrationally or perversely. It seems to
me that the courts cannot escape from asking
themselves whether a reasonable Secretary of
111 Ibid., 74lG-742A.
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State, on the material before him, could
reasonably conclude that the interference with
freedom of expression which he determined to
impose was justifiable. In terms of the [European]
Convention [of Human Rights], as construed by the
European Court [of Human Rights], the interference
with freedom of expression must be necessary and
proportionate to the damage which the restriction
is designed to prevent. ,,112
Lord Templeman clearly thought that restrictions of
human rights demanded a more searching judicial
review of substance than the Wednesbury principles
could provide and proportionality was the
appl icable tool for this task. 113
So far proportionality seemed to have been
treated neutrally by Lords Bridge and Roskill and
favourably by Lord Templeman. It is a credible view
that Brind was not the "right" case for
proportionality to be adopted.114 Taking account of
the relatively limited extent of the broadcasting
112 Ibid., 751D-F.
113 In R. v. Independent Television Commission ex parte
TSWBroadcasting Ltd., House of Lords, 26th March 1992,
LEXIS transcript, Lord Templeman expressed the will to
apply proportionality and undergo a close scrutiny of a
possible threat to human rights if necessary.
114 See Carnwath, op. cit. supra no. 54, 248; S. Sedley
"Freedom of Expression, The Media and the Courts" (1996)
8 E.R.P.L. 677, 681.
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ban which affected the representatives of
terrorism, it was perhaps unlikely that the House
of Lords would intervene. However, while three Law
Lords kept open the possible use of proportionality
by English law, the other two Law Lords did not
happily contemplate applying it in this case or any
other. Lord Ackner began with the observation that
while the Wednesbury test had been criticised as
being too high,llSit was formulated in a way which
ensured that the court's jurisdiction remained one
of supervision and not one of appeal. Lord Ackner
stated that were the court to accept an invitation
to intervene on the basis that the decision was
incorrect or objectively unreasonable then this
would involve the judiciary in substituting its
view for that of the decision-maker.1l6 Concerning
proportionality Lord Ackner found it to be a
severer test than Wednesbury though a total lack of
proportionality could qualify as being
unreasonable. As such proportionality was another
way of asking whether the decision was acceptable
or not and so it necessarily involved a review of
115 Ibid., 757G. In R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex
parte Unilever pic [1996] S.T.C. 681, 692d Lord Bingham
M.R. stated that the "threshold of public law
irrationality is notoriously high."
116 Ibid., 757F-758A.
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the merits. Lord Ackner's reasoning has been
criticised as "oversimplistic"U7 in that it
mistakenly confused the proportionality test with
the substitution of the court's view of the
merits.US On this basis Lord Ackner rejected
proportionality.
Lord Lowry dealt at length with
proportionality. In one sense it could be seen as a
deeply rooted idea of English law. For example, in
a negligence action the court has to weigh up the
competing factors such as the risk of injury, the
likely severity of the consequences, the cost and
inconvenience of precautions. However, Lord Lowry
emphatically rejected any attempt to import
proportionality into the law of judicial review for
four reasons.U9 First, review beyond the present
limits would result in an abuse of the courts'
supervisory jurisdiction. Secondly, judges lack the
necessary training, experience and knowledge to
engage in a balancing act of the competing
interests. Thirdly, stability and certainty would
be diminished as there is nearly something that can
117 I. Loveland Constitutional Law: A Critical
Introduction (London: Butterworths, 1996) page 599.
118 G. Marshall "Lions Around the Throne: The Expansion
of Judicial Review in Britain" in J.J. Hesse and N.
Johnson (eds.), Constitutional Policy and Change in
Europe (Oxford: University Press, 1995) page 178, 184.
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be said against any administrative decision and
proportionality would be frequently invoked by
applicants who wished to try their luck with an
application for judicial review. Fourthly, the
adoption of proportionality would lead to an
increase in applications for judicial review
thereby increasing uncertainty and the courts'
caseload. The cogency of these and other arguments
will be considered later.
From both a precedent and conceptual basis it
is difficult to determine exactly what Brind
decided. Very little conceptual discussion of
proportionality was conducted and the constant
repetition of the word "proportionality" perhaps
served to confuse rather than elucidate the issues
involved. The following formulation was advanced
before the Law Lords in argument: "could the
minister reasonably conclude that his direction was
necessary?,,120Exactly what this question was
supposed to mean is far from clear. Was it intended
to refer to the necessity test of proportionality
by requiring the court to ask whether there were
alternative means open to the minister which were
equally effective of achieving the same objective
119 Ibid., 766H-767C.
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thereby securing minimal interference with the
affected right or interest? However, from Lord
Ackner's opinion it seems that the question was not
attributed this meaning. Lord Ackner stated that it
involved the court in "balancing the reasons, pro
and con, for [the Home Secretary's] decision. ,,121 In
Lord Ackner's opinion the necessity test was viewed
as a way of enabling the court to decide whether
the purpose to be achieved was necessary or
desirable rather than assessing whether the
decision-maker adopted the least restrictive means
in order to achieve this purpose. On this mistaken
basis proportionality was rejected as an
illegitimate extension of the court's jurisdiction.
Similarly others have stated that there is no
difference between the concepts of reasonableness
and proportionality. 122 This may be viewed as the
common lawyer's misunderstanding of exactly what
120 Ibid., 762G, 766F.
121 Ibid., 762H.
122 See L. Neville Brown "General Principles of Law and
the English Legal System" in M. Cappelletti (ed.), New
Perspectives For a Common Law of Europe (Florence, 1978)
page 171, 178; G. Slynn "Judicial Review of Community
Administrative Acts" (The Exeter Lecture in European
Community Law, 10th May 1985) page 4; Lord Mackenzie
Stuart "Recent Developments in English Administrative
Law - The Impact of Europe?" in M. Capotorti (ed.), Du
Droit International au Droit de l'integration. Liber
Amicorum Pierre Pescatore. (Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987) page 411, 418.
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Continental legal principles mean123 or
alternatively as seeking to assimilate a new
principle into the common law through the myth of
continuity but actually changing its meaning in the
process.
Brind is an unsatisfactory leading authority
on proportionality for several reasons. The lack of
a full understanding of what proportionality and
its constituent tests require; the way
proportionality was argued as a subsidiary point to
the main argument concerning the European
Convention of Human Rights; the ambiguous
formulation advanced; the underlying attachment to
the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness and its
implicit assumption of what the merits of public
decisions comprise; and a Diceyan distrust of a
doctrine of Continental administrative law compared
to the common law pragmatism, all contributed to
render the judgments unconvincing. However, the
decision allows an insight into the reception of
the idea of proportionality. Lords Bridge, Roskill
and Templeman seemed to be open to the idea of a
m J. Bell "The English Lawyer in the Europe of 1993"
(1991/2) 34 University of Leeds Review 181, 186; c.
Graham "Towards a European Administrative Law? The
English Case" [1993] Rivista Trimstrala di Diritto
Publico 3, 9.
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variable standard of review by applying
proportionality, whereas for Lords Ackner and
Lowry, the idea that the court's limited role of
supervision should be extended beyond the
traditional limits of Wednesbury review by a
European principle was wholly unacceptable. The
House of Lords seemed to be split between a
traditional and a more rights orientated model of
judicial review. While liberalists, such as Allan,
mourn the rejection of proportionality as
"misplaced" 124 and traditionalists, such as Irvine,
view it as "the high water mark of the courts'
strict adherence to the Wednesbury principles" ,125
the Brind decision actually did little to clarify
the debate over the possible adoption of
proportionality.
E. The Post-Brind Case-Law.
The legal position following Brind was not
entirely clear due to the inconclusive and
different comments made by their Lordships. Was
proportionality, following Lords Ackner and Lowry,
124 Allan, Ope cit. supra no. 8, page 189. See also
Jowell "Is Proportionalityan Alien Concept?" Ope cit.
supra no. 13, 404.
477
to be considered as having been completely
rejected, or, following Lords Bridge and Roskill,
was it to be applied when the European dimension
became more prominent, or, following Lord
Templeman, was it already applicable in fundamental
rights cases? It was not long after Brind that the
High Court was asked to respond. popplewell J.
refused to recognise proportionality outside the
limits of irrationality.126In another case
Hutchinson J. refused to apply proportionality. 127
Following Lord Roskill, the judge stated that the
gradual encroachment of the tide of European law
had not been so great in the intervening ten months
that the principle ought to be applied as a
separate head of review. On appeal Neill L.J.,
after a review of Brind, concluded that it was not
open for any court below the House of Lords to
depart from the traditional Wednesbury criteria
when the discretion reviewed belonged to a Minister
of the Crown granted by Parliament. Neill L.J.
intimated that "[i]n time the English courts will
become increasingly familiar with the principle of
m Lord Irvine, op. cit. supra no. 21, 74.
126 R. v. Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment ex
parte Cox [1992] C.O.D. 72.
127 R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte
National and Local Government Officers Association
[1992] C.O.D. 282.
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proportionality. It may well be therefore that in
cases involving the judicial review of decisions
made at a lower level than government level, the
law will develop on the lines that lack of
proportionality will come to be recognised as a
separate ground of intervention ... ".128 Neill L.J.
considered that applying proportionality to
decisions of central government caused difficulty
because the "constitutional balance between the
courts and the executive is a delicate one." 129
Inside the limited area left open by Neill
L.J. certain judges have found scope to apply the
principle of proportionality. In two cases decided
by Laws J. the principle has been applied in the
review of sanctions imposed by Magistrates's
Courts. In R. v. Eastbourne Magistrates' Court ex
parte Hall130 the applicant had been imprisoned for
three months, the maximum penalty, for non-payment
of community charge due to culpable neglect. Laws
J. stated that something quite exceptional was
128 R. v. Secretary of State for Environment ex parte
National and Local Government Officers' Association
[1993] 5 Admin.L.R. 785, 800H-801A.
129 Ibid., 80lB. However, see R. v. Secre tary of Sta te
for Social Security ex parte Joint Council for the
Welfare of Immigrants [1996] 4 All E.R. 385, 392b per
Neill L.J. in favour of proportionality.
130 Queen's Bench Division, (CO/2026/92), 22nd September
1992, LEXIS transcript. See also R. v. Highbury Corner
Justices ex parte Uchendu, The Times, 28th January 1994.
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required for the Magistrates' Court to impose the
maximum penalty. The review by the court was for
irrationality but in a case like this, stated Laws
J., it was more accurately described as the
application of a requirement of proportionality.
The penalty was excessive without good reason and
was therefore quashed. Similarly in R. v.
Manchester Metropoli tan Universi ty ex parte Nolanl31
it was assumed, for the purpose of reviewing
administrative penalties, that proportionality was
available as a discrete head of challenge.
The decision of the Court of Appeal case of R.
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte t.eecti:" is remarkable for the way in which
the court tested the necessity of an administrative
rule. The case concerned the basic right of
correspondence between a client and a legal adviser
was protected by the Court examining the necessity
of a measure. Rule 33(3) of the Prison Rules stated
that every communication to or from a prisoner
could be examined by the Prison Governor who could
131 Queen's Bench Division, (CO/2856/92), 14th July 1993,
LEXIS transcript. See also Customs and Excise
Commissioners v. Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Co. [1992] S.T.C. 809; Bolton v. Law Society
[1994] 2 All E.R. 486; R. v. Tamworth Magistrates' Court
ex parte Walsh, Queen's Bench Division, (CO/1756/92),
25th February 1994, LEXIS transcript.
132 [1994] Q.B. 198.
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stop any communication if it was thought that its
contents were objectionable or too long. The issue
raised in this case was whether such a wide power
enabled the reading of letters between a prisoner
and his legal adviser on such grounds. As the rule
infringed the doctrine of legal professional
privilege Steyn L.J. stated that the ability to
stop such communications on the grounds of
objectionability or prolixity had to be objectively
justified. It was accepted that the width of the
statutory power allowed some examination of
correspondence but that the "authorised intrusion
must ...be the minimum necessary to ensure that the
correspondence is in truth bona fide legal
correspondence."133 In examining the rule, the court
held that stopping communications on the grounds of
length or objectionable content was not necessary
in order to ensure that it was bona fide legal
correspondence. The ground of prolixity was
inappropriate as a counsel's opinion could run for
many pages. Neither was there an objective need to
stop letters on the grounds of objectionability.
Another prison rule dealing with current legal
proceedings only allowed the Governor to stop such
133 bidI ~ ., 217G per Steyn L.J.
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communications if there was reason to believe that
it contained matter not relating to the legal
proceedings. The court considered that as the
distinction between possible and current legal
proceedings was only technical, no objective need
had been shown as to why Rule 33(3) should allow
correspondence concerning possible proceedings to
be stopped on the ground of objectionability while
those concerning current legal proceedings could
not. The Court of Appeal concluded that the width
of the rule had not been objectively justified. In
tackling the issue of infringement of the
fundamental right of legal professional privilege
as a vires issue, rather than as an exercise of
discretion, the court was able to effectively side-
step arguments over unreasonableness in order to
determine the necessity of the rule. Rather than
questioning whether the rule was a reasonable one,
the court was asking whether the legislature could
have intended to allow such a broad interference
with an individual's fundamental rights. In doing
so the court was able to engage in a close scrutiny
of the justification of the rule.134
134 See also R. v. Lord Chancellor ex parte Witham [1997]
2 All E.R. 79.
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The leading case concerning the review of an
administrative policy affecting fundamental rights
is R. v. Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith.l3S The
Ministry of Defence's blanket policy to discharge
homosexuals and lesbians in the armed forces was
challenged as an irrational interference with their
fundamental rights. The Ministry of Defence had
provided detailed reasoning for this policy. Sir
Thomas Bingham M.R. accepted the following approach
to the question: the court could only interfere
with the exercise of a discretion on substantive
grounds when it was satisfied that the decision was
unreasonable in that it was beyond the range of
responses open to a reasonable decision-maker.
However, in determining whether a decision-maker
had exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded
it, the human rights context was important in that
the more substantial the interference with human
rights, then the more the court would require by
way of justification before it is satisfied that
the decision is reasonable. According to Sir Thomas
Bingham M.R., this test was a correct distillation
of the principles laid down by decisions of the
135 [1996] Q.B. 517.
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House of Lords. 136 While the court should properly
defer to the expertise of decision-makers,
particularly in policy matters, it could not shrink
from its fundamental duty to "'do right to all
manner of people'''.137 The precise wording of the
unreasonableness formulation was to enable the
court to undertake a more intensive approach
without explicitly mentioning the word
"proportionality".
However, whether it actually amounts to a test
equivalent to the principle of proportionality is
uncertain. The concept of "justification" that an
infringement of a fundamental right must be
justified by a sufficiently important public
interest is an important refinement of the
traditional Wednesbury test. 138 Hunt states that
once the courts accept a role in ensuring that
decisions are "justified", they have inescapably
accepted a role in evaluating the reasoning
supporting the decision which inevitably involves a
balancing exercise which amounts to applying the
136 Bugdaycay v. Secretary of Sta te for the Home
Department [1987] A.C. 514; Brind, supra no. 2.
137 Ibid., 556E per Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.
138 This approach was instigated by Lord Bridge in
Bugdaycay and Brind.
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principle of proportionality.139 However, even
though the courts appear to require greater
justification for a decision, does this actually
mean that they are applying proportionality or
merely requiring more justification for the
decision? For example, Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.
stated that the criticisms of the policy had
"considerable cogency" but he was not prepared to
stigmatise them as irrational. The court did not
assess whether the infringement of the applicants'
interests was indispensable for the achievement of
the stated policy objective of ensuring the
operative effectiveness of the armed forces. The
court did not question whether a less restrictive
policy such as the individual discharge of people
from the armed services when they had threatened
the operational effectiveness rather than a blanket
policy of compulsory dismissal was equally
effective and less restrictive of personal liberty.
Neither did it ask whether the policy was a
suitable means of achieving this objective or
whether it imposed a disproportionate burden on
those affected. Instead the court stressed that the
greater the policy content of a decision, then the
139 M. Hunt Using HumanRights Law in English Courts
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more hesitant it would be in reviewing the
decision.
While the development of a requirement of
justification is an important conceptual
development, it is difficult to read it as the
imposition of "proportionality in all but name". 140
Rather than implicitly undertaking an evaluation of
means against ends, the concept of justification
proves that the Wednesbury test "is sufficiently
flexible to cover all situations. ,,141The difficulty
of applying proportionality can be seen in the
approach to the question of legality. The Court of
Appeal was asking whether sufficient justification
has been provided rather than whether the
administration could achieve the same policy
objective with less restrictive effects on the
applicants by an alternative course. As the court
acknowledged, it lacked the necessary knowledge of
policy in order to determine such questions.
Commentators, such as Hunt142and Norris,143do not
appear to question whether the court should have
the policy expertise in order to determine whether
(Oxford: Hart, 1997) page 217.
140 Ibid., page 216.
141 Smith, supra no. 129, 556C per
M.R.
142 Ibid.
Sir Thomas Bingham
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equally effective means less restrictive of
individual interests could have been adopted.
The cases decided in the aftermath of Brind
show a variety of approaches. 144 The orthodox
interpretation of Brind is that proportionality
forms no part of English law. 145 However, in some
cases judges have explicitly refered to
proportionality,146 while in other cases the judges
do not explicitly refer to the principle but apply
the tests of proportionality and necessity. 147 In
other cases judges have maintained that the
threshold of reasonableness is not to be lowered
but they will require greater justification for an
infringement of fundamental rights. 148Sometimes,
the higher courts seem to have adopted an attitude
that even mentioning the "p-word" is a ground for
overruling a decision of a lower coure49 thereby
forcing other judges to attempt to undertake
143 M. Norris "Ex Parte Smith: Irrationality and Human
Rights" [1996] P.L. 590.
144 See also G. de Burca "proportionality and Wednesbury
Unreasonableness: The Influence of European Legal
Concepts on UK Law" (1997) 3 E.P.L. 56l.
145 Nalgo, supra no. 122.
146 Hall, supra no. 124; Uchendu, supra no. 124.
147 Leech, supra no. 126.
148 Smi th, supra no. 129.
149 R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte
Gambles, Queen's Bench Division, (CO/2674/91), 3rd
December 1993, LEXIS transcript (Sedley J.) overuled in
R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Cook
[1996] 2 All E.R. 144, 1S7d-158a per Hobhouse L.J.
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proportionality type tests without openly
discussing what they are doing. 150 Occasionally a
judge has stated that his decision, using
unreasonableness, would have been the same even if
proportionality formed part of domestic law151 but
whether such assurances are made on the basis of
detailed knowledge of applying the European
principle is doubtful. The judiciary seem to be
continuing their practice of saying one thing and
doing another. 152 Hunt has argued that in effect
proportionality has come to be recognised as being
part of English law "but without, so far, daring to
speak its name." 153 Whether or not this is a correct
assessment of the variety of approaches which have
emerged, it is unfortunate that judges have been
unable to undertake this development without being
open and clear about it. Inevitably the suspicion
is raised that the judiciary is reviewing decisions
150 See R. v. Advertising Standards Authority ex parte
Vernons Organisation [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1289; R. v.
Cambridge District Health Authority ex parte B, The
Times, 15th March 1995; R. v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department ex parte Moon [1996] C.O.D. 54.
151 R. v. Governors of St Gregory's RC Aided High School
ex parte Roberts, The Times, 27th January 1995.
152 SAn' .. 77ee, e.g., ~srn~n~c, supra no. .
153 Hunt, op. cit. supra no. 133, page 216. Jowell "Is
Proportionality an Alien Concept?", op. cit. supra no.
13, 402 states that proportionality is "often smuggled
in under different names."
488
more intensively without providing a coherent
explanation of what they are doing or why.
F. Application of Proportionality under Community
Law by the English Courts
In fulfilling their obligations under
Community law the English courts have been required
to apply the principle of proportionality with the
possibility of a reference to the European Court.
In this way Community law could be performing an
educative function by familiarising the English
courts with the principle. 154 It was the increasing
importance of Community law which influenced Lord
Diplock to consider the possible adoption of
proportionality into English law. By examining the
cases in which English courts have applied the
principle, it can be assessed whether Community law
has been performing an educative function. It will
be seen that proportionality has been applied with
a mixed record of success.
154 Cf. O. Kahn-Freund "Common Law and Civil Law -
Imaginary and Real Obstacles to Assimilation" in M.
Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives For a Common Law of
Europe (Florence, 1978) page 137, 159.
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R. v. Goldstein155 concerned the question of
whether a prohibition on importing goods into the
UK was contrary to Article 30 concerning the free
movement of goods156 or whether it was covered by
one of the exceptions in Article 36. Lord Diplock
stated that it was necessary for the Member State
to adduce evidence to identify the various
mischiefs which the restriction was intended to
prevent, to show that such objectives could not
have been just as effectively achieved by less
restrictive measures and to show that the measures
were not disproportionately severe having regard to
the gravity of the mischief to which they were
directed. According to Lord Diplock "[i]n plain
English ... [the principle of
proportionality] ...means 'You must not use a steam
hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would
do' ."157
In R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food ex parte Bell Lines Ltd.158 a challenge was
made to a system limiting the importation of milk
155 [1983] 1 All E.R. 434.
156 See generally S. Weatherill and P. Beaumont EC Law.
The Essential Guide to the Legal Workings of the
European Community. (London, 2nd edn., 1995) chapter 15.
157 Ibid., 436e.
158 [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 502. See also R. v. Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Roberts [1990]
1 C.M.L.R. 555.
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and cream into the UK. The Minister had banned all
imports unless they came through one of the 17
designated ports used for meat imports. The two
ports traditionally used for milk imports were
excluded. The applicants claimed that this amounted
to a restriction on inter-state trade contrary to
Article 30. The justification for the restriction
offered by the Minister was that the 17 meat ports
had greater experience in dealing with health
problems. However, none of them had any experience
with milk examination. In deciding which test of
review to apply Forbes J. recognised that the
English court must give full protection for rights
arising under Community law and therefore go beyond
the Wednesbury test and ask whether the measures
were disproportionate. Forbes J. held that the
obligation to use the designated ports went beyond
what was necessary to ensure the safety of imported
milk. The Minister did not necessarily have to use
the designated ports as they had been previously
used for meat imports. As the testing of meat and
milk differs greatly it was not necessary for the
milk imports to pass through the designated ports;
milk tests could be conducted in laboratories and
not at the place of entry. The system was therefore
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struck down as an unnecessary restriction of the
free movement of goods. Forbes J. commented that if
the restriction had been reviewable only on the
basis of Wednesbury unreasonableness, then it would
have been difficult to suggest that the court
should interfere. In accepting the need to give
full protection to Community law rights, Forbes J.
recognised that the court is inevitably drawn into
the business of fact-finding. The decision has been
welcomed as an exemplary judgment.159 However, not
all English courts have been so at ease in applying
proportionality.
The Sunday trading litigation160 provides an
example of the English courts experiencing
difficulty in applying proportionality. The issue
was whether the restrictions of Sunday trading
under the Shops Act 1950 amounted to a measure
having equivalent effect to a quantitative
restriction under Article 30 by preventing
Community goods from being sold and whether the
restriction was disproportionate. The authorities
sought to justify the restrictions as a political
159 J. Steiner Enforcing EC Law (London: Blackstone,
1995) page 91.
160 See generally A. Arnull "What Shall We Do on Sunday"
(1991) 16 E.L.Rev. 112; R. Rawlings "The Eurolaw Game:
Some Deductions from a Saga" (1991) 20 J.L.S. 309.
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choice to ensure that working hours are arranged in
accordance with national or regional socio-cultural
characteristics. The cases involved the English
courts in assessing the constitutionality of an Act
of Parliament against the free movement of goods
provisions by applying the principle of
proportionality and therefore put into sharp relief
the difference between the traditional model of
judicial review against more European notions of
assessing the proportionality of measures. In
Stoke-On-Trent City Council v. B. & Q. plC161
Hoffman J. stated that the public authority did not
have to adduce evidence before the court concerning
the proportionality inquiry if the court was
satisfied on the basis of judicial notice that the
requirements of proportionality had been met. In
other words Hoffman J. was unwilling to undertake
an examination of the factual basis on which the
public authorities sought to enforce the Act
against the traders, and therefore the basis upon
which the Act remained in force under Community
law. In considering the nature of the
proportionality inquiry Hoffman J. stated:
161 [1991] Ch. 48. See also W.H. Smith Do-It-All Ltd. v.
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"In my judgment it is not my function to carry
out the balancing exercise or to form my own
view on whether the legislative objective could be
achieved by other means. These questions involve
compromises between competing interests which in a
democratic society must be resolved by the
legislature. The duty of the court is only to
inquire whether the compromise adopted by the
United Kingdom Parliament, so far as it affects
community trade, is one which a reasonable
legislature could have reached. The function of
the court is to review the acts of the legislature
but not to substitute its own policies or
values .,,162
Hoffman J. denied that this was an abdication of
judicial responsibility; the balancing of interests
involved was for the legislature and the judicial
role was limited to deciding whether that view was
a reasonable one. The primacy of the democratic
process was more important than whether Sunday
trading laws could be improved. On a subsequent
reference to the European Court Advocate General
Van Gerven expressly doubted the approach taken by
Peterborough City Council [1991] 1 Q.B. 304.
162 Ibid., 69D-E. Cf. Lord Hoffman, op. cit. supra no.
23.
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Hoffman J. 163 It was not for the national court to
automatically accept the legislative view or limit
itself to deciding whether the legislature could
reasonably have adopted the provisions in question.
In applying Community law, Advocate General Van
Gerven stated that the national court should assess
the proportionality of a measure by examining the
following issues. First, whether the means had a
causal connection with the objective pursued.
Secondly, whether the same objective could be
equally well attained by other measure less
restrictive of the free movement of goods and,
thirdly, whether the restriction was
disproportionate to its objective which was to be
examined by weighing the two values against each
other.164 The proportionality inquiry was to be
achieved by comparing the various courses of action
which could achieve the greatest possible freedom
of intra-Community trade and the policy objective
in protecting staff from being forced to work on
Sundays. It is clear that in restricting the
application of proportionality test to a
163 Case C-306/88 Rochdale Borough
John Anders [1992] E.C.R. 1-6457,
Advocate General's opinion.
164 Ib'd
~ ., paragraphs 30 and 31 of
opinion.
Council v. Stewart
paragraph 27 of the
the Advocate General's
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reasonableness test and refusing to allow the
public authorities to submit evidence before the
court, Hoffman J. had not given full protection to
Communi ty rights. 165 Though the actual result, that
the Act was not contrary to Article 30, was the
same, the English court had adopted an approach
substantially different from that of the European
Court. The case is instructive in that it shows the
lack of an institutional confidence by an English
court to ask the questions required of it by
Community law.
In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department ex parte Adams166 the question was raised
as to how proportionality should be applied in the
conflict between national security and freedom of
movement. The applicant, being the President of
Sein Fein, had been invited to talk in London.
However, the Home Secretary issued an exclusion
order under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989.
Before the High Court it was claimed that Article
8a(1) of the European Treaty provided that every
citizen of the European Union had the right to move
freely within the Member State. The court was
165 Arnull, op. cit. supra no. 154, 120-121, 123;
Steiner, op. cit. supra no. 153, page 90.
166 [1995] All E.R. (E.C.) 177.
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uncertain about the application of proportionality
under Community law and sought a reference from the
European Court. 167The court appeared to be
uncertain concerning proportionality as
"explanations of that principle are not in
harmony. ,,168According to Steyn L.J . :
"As English judges it seems to us that
explanations of the principle span a spectrum
of views from a narrow doctrine not essentially
very different from Wednesbury unreasonableness to
a de novo review of the administrative decision.
On the other hand, there may be better
explanations placing the principle between these
extremes. Even in respect of proportionality there
may be a margin of appreciation.,,169
By asking the European Court to determine the
precise requirements of proportionality, the High
Court was effectively asking the European Court to
apply the proportionality test in order to avoid
doing so itsel f .170
167Arguments based on domestic law were quickly rejected
by the court, ibid., 18Sd-h.
168Ibid., 191j.
169Ibid., 192a.
170As the exclusion order was later lifted, the Article
177 reference to the European Court lapsed. See R. v.
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The leading case for the application of
proportionality by an English court under Community
law is R. v. Secretary of State for Employment ex
parte Equal Opportunities Commi ssi oru?"? This
concerned a challenge to provisions in the
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978
which granted certain employment rights if an
employee worked a specified number of hours during
a period of continuous employment. Part-time
workers who did not reach the thresholds could not
claim the statutory rights. As the majority of
part-time workers are female, it was argued that
the Act indirectly discriminated against women
contrary to Article 119.172 Such indirect
discrimination could be objectively justified if
the test laid down by the European Court was
satisfied.173 That is, the national court must find
that the measures correspond to a real need on the
part of the business, are appropriate for achieving
the objective pursued and are necessary for that
end. It was argued that the thresholds made more
part-time work available as employers would be more
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Adams [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 476.
171 [1995] 1 A.C. 1.
172 See generally Weatherill and Beaumont, op. cit. supra
no. 150, chapter 20.
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likely to employ part-time workers who could not
enforce such employment rights against them. In the
House of Lords, Lord Keith stated that this aim was
a beneficial social policy aim. The question was
whether the provisions were a suitable and
necessary means of achieving it. The measures were
found to be unsuitable as they involved nationwide
differential employment rights between full and
part-time worker. Neither were the measures
necessary to achieve their aim. The Department of
Employment had not presented any evidence to
justify the view that the thresholds would increase
part-time work. The Equal Opportunities Commission
relied on reports of the House of Commons
Employment Committee and the House of Lords Select
Committee on the European Communities which
revealed a diversity of views with employers taking
the view that removal of the provisions would
reduce the availability of part-time work while
trade unions, some employers and academics took the
opposite view. Furthermore, no other Member State,
apart from Ireland, had adopted similar provisions.
France which had equal rights for full and part-
time employees since 1982 had experienced an
173 Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufaus v. Karin Weber von Hartz
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increase of part-time work of 36.6% between 1983
and 1988 compared with an increase of 26.1% in
Britain. Lord Keith concluded that the measures had
not been objectively justified and therefore the
provisions were unlawful.
The tension between democratic processes and
judicial protection under proportionality becomes
more acute in relation to an Act of Parliament.
Examining the proportionality of a Parliamentary
measure is completely at odds with the Diceyan
heritage. That problems have arisen is therefore
unsurprising. Such tensions are reflected in the
views of Hoffman J. where the application of
proportionality is assimilated with the judge
simply replacing his views for that of the
legislature. However, in the Equal Opportunities
Commission case the House of Lords appears to have
confidently applied proportionality and the
different judicial techniques required. For
example, the reliance on economic and social
evidence in order to determine whether a measure is
objectively justified requires the court to adopt a
more purposive attitude rather than the traditional
formalistic approach. In applying proportionality
[1986] E.C.R. 1607, paragraph 36.
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judges have been introduced to new judicial
techniques.
In their role as Community courts, the English
courts have had to apply the principle of
proportionality. Inevitably tensions arise. If
proportionality is considered to be unacceptable
under domestic law then why should it be acceptable
under Community law? Should the courts maintain a
sovereignty based Wednesbury review for domestic
law issues now that the doctrine of Parliamentary
sovereignty has had to be adjusted to allow for
Community law thereby upholding the strict dualist
position?174 Or should the courts allow themselves
to be influenced in their articulation of domestic
law by the methods of review which they have to
apply under Community law? A variety of responses
have emerged. For example, in the Stoke-on-Trent
case Hoffman J. refused to apply proportionality as
a matter of Community law. In the Adams case, Steyn
L.J. maintained a strictly dualist approach by
reserving the Wednesbury standard of review under
English law but acknowledged that proportionality
was a cardinal principle of Community law. Some
174For a discussion of the breakdown of the dualist
position due to Community law see Hunt, op. cit. supra
no. 133, chapters 1 and 2.
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judges have recognised the fact that
proportionality is applicable under Community law
may affect the review under English law. For
example, Lord Slynn has stated that although
English judges have no duty to apply
proportionality in solely domestic law cases "it
may creep in, particularly in situations where
Community law and domestic law issues coincide or
overlap ....When a judge in the same case is going
to have to decide national law and Community law
issues, it is almost too much to ask that he should
try to keep wednesbury unreasonableness for one,
proportionality for the other. It may even be
undesirable that he should try to do so." 175 Similar
concerns have been expressed by Sedley J. when
faced with a challenge to an exclusion order under
both Community and English law. When reviewing a
measure which threatens the right to life the
common law would subject it to the most anxious
scrutiny. However, Sedley J. stated that this did
not mean that the European Convention of Human
Rights was otiose for "[o]nce it is accepted that
the standards articulated in the convention are
175 Lord Slynn "European Law and the National Judge" in
Butterworth Lectures 1991-92 (London: Butterworths,
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standards which both march with those of the common
law and inform the jurisprudence of the European
Union, it becomes unreal and potentially unjust to
continue to develop English public law without
reference to them. ,,176
Such statements reflect the concerns of Lord
Diplock that the common law should keep in a moving
relationship with the increasing influence of
Community law.177 However, while the desire to keep
English law up to standard with Community law has
been expressed by some judges, others have
preferred to maintain the strict dualist position
in order to shield the common law from European
notions of proportionality. None of the possible
options seem adequate. To maintain a dualist
position ignores the consequently unequal
protection of the individual between English law
and Community law. Alternatively to apply
proportionality in both Community and English law
will require the courts to make decisions, such as
the Stoke-on-Trent case, which they feel ill-
1993) page 18, 27-28. See also Lord Justice Glidewell,
op. cit. supra no. 4, 18.
176 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte McQuillan [1995] 4 All E.R. 400, 422h. Sedley J.
referred to Laws "Is the High Court the Guardian of
Fundamental Constitutional Rights?", op. cit. supra no.
12.
177 See chapter 3, section 1.
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prepared to undertake and which they think should
properly be left to Parliament. Neither is it
certain that allowing proportionality to "creep in"
when issues of domestic and Community law coincide
or overlap will adequately address the necessary
issues such as a proper understanding of the
principle and the procedural competence of the
court to effectively undertake its application.
4. A Variable Standard of Review
A variable standard of review enables the
court to go about its task of reviewing
administrative action in a more or less rigorous
manner. Principles of review such as reasonableness
and proportionality can be applied at different
standards of review by the court thereby allowing
the decision-maker a correspondingly variable
margin of appreciation. Often the level at which
the intensity of review is set can determine
whether the challenged decision stands or not. The
means by which such a standard is set therefore has
great practical and conceptual importance. This can
be shown by the following cases.
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It has already been mentioned that in Brind
some Law Lords favoured a close analysis of any
restriction of a fundamental right. Such comments
follow a previous House of Lords decision in
Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home
Depe rtzmenti:" which concerned a decision to deport a
person to a country where there was a serious
threat to his life. Lord Bridge explained the role
of the court:
"The limitations of the scope of that power
[of judicial review] are well known and need
not be restated here, Within those limitations
the court must, I think, be entitled to subject an
administrative decision to the more rigorous
examination, to ensure that it is in no way
flawed, according to the gravity of the issue
which the decision determines. The most
fundamental of all human rights is the
individual's right to life and, when an
administrative decision under challenge is said to
be one which may put the applicant's life at risk,
the basis of the decision must surely call for the
most anxious scrutiny." 179
178 [1987] A.C. 514.
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A restriction on a fundamental right will require
the court to operate a more rigorous review process
and have a greater readiness to intervene than
would normally be the case. An important competing
interest must be provided which could reasonably be
judged to justify the restriction of the
fundamental right. 180 Similarly, the courts have
stated that they will impose a more relaxed degree
of control when they are concerned with decisions
involving policy matters. For example, in R. v.
Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte
Hammersmi th and Fulham London Borough CounciL''" the
House of Lords was met with a challenge to the
rates for charge capping which had been set by the
Secretary of State. Lord Bridge stated:
"The formulation and implementation of
national economic policy are matters depending
essentially on political judgment. The
decisions which shape the, are for politicians
to take and it is in the political forum of
the House of Commons that they are properly to
be debated and approved or disapproved on their
179 Ibid., 531F-G. See also at 537H per Lord Templeman.
180 Smi th, supra no. 123, 554E-F per Sir Thomas Bingham
M.R.
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merits. If the decisions have been taken in good
faith within the four corners of the Act, the
merits of the policy underlying the decisions are
not susceptible to review by the courts and the
courts would be exceeding their proper function if
they presumed to condemn the policy as
unreasonable. ,,182
In assessing whether the decisions were
unreasonable the court could only ask whether they
were made on the "extremes of bad faith, improper
motive or manifest absurdity.,,183 The House of Lords
did not therefore hold that such decisions were in
principle non-justiciable but that a court could
only properly make a finding of illegality in the
most exceptional circumstances.
The evolution of a variable standard of review
has been welcomed by the liberalists. According to
Allan "...the distinction between appeal and review
must be an elastic one, permitting more intensive
scrutiny of executive action which threatens basic
liberties than might be appropriate in other
cases ... [t]here must inevitably be a spectrum of
181 [1991] 1 A.C. 521. See generally Loughlin Legali ty
and Locality. The Role of Law in Central-Local
Government Relations., op. cit. supra no. 88, chapter 5.
182Ibid., 597G-H.
183 Ibid., 597F.
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legitimate judicial responses to administrative
acts and decisions. ,,184Commentators advocating the
adoption of proportionality have seen these cases
as the judicial development of a variable standard
of review suited to the transplantation of that
principle. For Sir John Laws the recent authorities
represent "a conceptual shift away from Wednesbury
unreasonableness: or ...at any rate a significant
refinement of it ... [towards] ...the development of
differential standards in judicial review.,,185
Jowell comments that English law now has a sliding
scale of deference similar to Community law which
would allow proportionality to fit comfortably into
existing English law. 186
However, the extent to which such developments
form an effective variable standard of review and
whether this amounts to a suitable environment for
the growth of proportionality is open to question.
While the courts have been identifying areas where
they feel more comfortable in engaging in a more or
less intensive review, this does not necessarily
184Allan, op. cit. supra no. 8, pages 187-188.
185Laws "Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental
Constitutional Rights?", op. cit. supra no. 12, 69. For
a traditional view see Lord Irvine, op. cit. supra no.
21, 63-67.
186Jowell "Is Proportionality an Alien Concept?", op.
cit. supra no. 13, 406, 410. Cf. G. de Burca "The
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mean that they have been developing a similar
framework of review as that adopted by the European
Court in its review for proportionality. For
instance, in the Hammersmith case did the House of
Lords draw an appropriate framework of review in
which to assess the legality of the challenged
decisions or was it signalling that it was
incapable of adequately dealing with the issues
raised except on the extremes of bad faith or
manifest absurdity? Unlike the European Court in
its review of economic policy decisions, the House
of Lords was not determining the function being
served by the administration and then shaping its
framework of review around that function. According
to Loughlin, the Hammersmith case shows that the
courts simply lack "both the institutional capacity
and constitutional legitimacy to perform the
exercise being demanded of them. ,,187 Rather than
supporting the view that the courts have been
elaborating differential standards of review, the
case shows that the courts are not competent to
exercise an effective form of review outside the
exceptional circumstances of bad faith and manifest
Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC
Law" (1993) 13 Y.E.L. 105.
187 Loughlin, op. cit. supra no. 175, page 320.
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absurdity. Similarly, the courts may now state that
they will adopt a more interventionist role when
reviewing an infringement of fundamental rights188
but does this amount to a proportionality test? The
concept of "justification" may require the
decision-maker to provide justification for its
decision infringing fundamental rights but the
focus of such an approach is on the policy itself
and the strength of the reasons underlying it
rather than with the proportionality question of
whether the infringement was indispensable for the
achievement of the policy objective. While the
courts may say that they are engaging in more
intensive controls, if they still feel inhibited by
their lack of knowledge as regards policy, this
will prevent them from effectively applying
proportionality. While advocates of proportionality
would interpret the recent judicial developments as
evidence of an emerging variable standard of
review, it remains to be seen whether the English
judiciary can effectively utilise it in a similar
manner to that of the European Court.
5. Issues in the Proportionality Debate
lBB R. v. coventry City Council ex parte Phoenix Aviation
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In this section issues concerned in the
possible adoption of proportionality will be raised
and discussed. A consequence of the tendency of the
debate to become conducted by two broad camps - the
traditionalists and the liberalists - has been that
certain issues have not been raised or adequately
explored. It is the purpose here to identify such
issues.
A. Different Meanings Given to the Concepts of
Proportionality and Freedom
Unsurprisingly, there are disagreements over
the actual meaning of the principle of
proportionality. This may be viewed as a
consequence of the fact that the principle is
rooted in the Civilian tradition of public law.
Lord Diplock envisaged the adoption of
proportionality as a means of borrowing from the
European tradition. Therefore, a thorough knowledge
of the meaning and place of proportionality within
the different Civilian systems would be required.
However, some advocates have sought to eschew the
[1995] 3 All E.R. 37, 62g per Simon Brown L.J.
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development of proportionality as a transplantation
towards the articulation of a more home grown
principle within a particular model of judicial
review. The difficulty with such an approach is
that it overlooks the benefit that could be drawn
from comparative work. The articulation of a
different conception of proportionality can be seen
in the views of Sir John Laws whose purpose has
been to determine how the common law can give
protection to fundamental rights. 189
According to Laws, proportionality is the tool
with which to determine whether an infringement of
fundamental rights in the exercise of a statutory
discretion is legal. In the exercise of such a
discretion the decision-maker has to decide how to
order its priorities and in doing so it may reach a
decision which affects fundamental rights. 190 For
Laws, it is in the ordering of such priorities that
proportionality comes into play. If a decision
affects fundamental rights, then under the variable
standard of review and the principle of
proportionality, it will be for the decision-maker
to "accord the first priority to the right unless
189 Laws "Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental
Constitutional Rights?", op. cit. supra no. 12.
190 Ibid., 73.
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he can show a substantial, objective public
justification for overriding it. ,,191 Proportionality
is the means by which to assess whether the public
authority has given enough weight to the affected
right. Under this approach, it is the court's role
to judge which order of priorities are acceptable
when fundamental rights are affected. The court
would examine the proportionality of the
infringement of fundamental rights by the quality
of the reasons given by the public authority. For
example, whether funding for a hospital operation
should be wi thdrawn. 192
What this type of inquiry seems to exclude is
the examination of other alternative means of
achieving the same policy objective and thereby
reconciling the needs of the public authority and
the individual. For Laws the proportionality
principle is constructed as a rule of permissible
priorities rather than an examination of
permissible courses of action open to the
administration to be tested in a goal-oriented
balancing exercise. By adopting such a conception
of the principle the danger is that the court will
191 Ibi d ., 74.
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moralise over what objectives the public authority
should or should not adopt rather than examine the
various alternatives open to it, in order to
determine a more suitable and less restrictive
means of implementing a given policy objective.
Consider the following passage by Laws:
n • • • if we are to entertain a form of review in
which fundamental rights are to enjoy the court's
distinct protection, the very exercise
consists in an insistence that the decision-
maker is not free to order his priorities as
he chooses ...lf a government or local authority,
perhaps too much in love with a particular policy
objective, were to take a decision which curtails
free speech for no convincing reason, to excoriate
it as having lost its sense looks too much like
sending people with unacceptable politics to the
psychiatric hospital. The deployment of
proportionality sets in focus the true nature
of the exercise: the elaboration of a rule about
permissible priori ties. ,,193
192 R. v. Cambridge District Health Authority ex parte B,
The Times, 15th March 1995 decided by Laws J and later
overruled by the Court of Appeal [1995] 2 All E.R. 129.
193 Ibid., 73-74 (italics added) .
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Such an approach would involve the court moving
away from deciding how public administration can
best be conducted and toward telling the
administration how to conduct itself by detailing
its permissible priorities. Furthermore, a concern
over adopting this rights model of judicial review
is that it has a tendency toward an absolutist
rights discourse to the effect that an individual's
rights must be protected even when the general
interest requires otherwise. 194 While Laws
recognises the difficulties of determining what is
to count as sufficient justification for the
infringement of a fundamental right, he discounts
the benefit of the court in examining whether the
policy objective could have been achieved by less
onerous means. In doing so Laws effectively
reformulates the principle of proportionality from
a means of reconciling the achievement of policy
objectives with private interests to a means of
moralising over the permissible priorities of
policy formulation. Put shortly, the conception of
194 See, e.g, Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit.
supra no. 9, pages 146, 269-270; Norris, op. cit. supra
no. 137, 598. Cf. Dworkin, ibid., pages 197-200 states
that a balancing test amounts to a utilitarian
limitation of rights and that rights should only be
limited by some compelling reason which "is consistent
with the suppositions on which the original right must
be based."
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proportionality Laws advocates requires the court
to judge the purpose which the public authority
adopted rather than advise on the most suitable and
proportionate means of achieving that purpose.
In a more recent publication Laws seems to
moderate his position towards the development of a
proportionality based review within the limits of
Wednesbury unreasonableness. Emphasising "the true
nature of the common law" as an "incremental
quality which above all else allows it to harness
old principles to new conditions without offence to
the democratic arms of government", Laws states
that the challenge for the common law is to define
the substantive content of the rule of law. 195 The
courts should develop the evolutionary standards of
common law reasonableness in the "interaction
between informed public opinion and the independent
judicial mind, which must pay heed to all the law
that has gone before." 196 The principle of
reasonableness reigns supreme in the courts'
endeavour to articulate the principles of a free
society which are logically prior to the policies
195 J. Laws "Wednesbury" in C.F. Forsyth and I. Hare
(eds.), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord. Essays
on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998) page 185, 199.
196 Ib od
~ ., page 200.
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of elected government. It is for these reasons that
Laws thinks that the courts will not "make much
progress towards the acceptance of a concept such
as proportionality as an engine of principle in
judicial review until we cast it in the language of
reasonableness, and also firmly leave behind us the
misleading notion that Wednesbury can only
represent a monolithic standard of
review ...Proportionality need not be a separate
category for it to have independent life. The
tendency to institutionalize Wednesbury and
proportionality in rigid terms, each excluding the
other, forgets the common law's incremental
method. ,,197
Indeed Laws suggests, alongside Lord
Hoffman,198that the difficulties surrounding the
adoption of proportionality have their beginnings
in the language of Lord Diplock who redefined
unreasonableness into irrationality and envisaged
proportionality as a separate category of review.
This development of Laws' argument can be read as a
means of transcending the difficulties over
proportionality by relying upon the common law
tradition of continuity and innovation.
197 Ibid., page 201.
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Proportionality is redefined away from being a
transplant and towards an element of the supreme
test of unreasonableness. In this process, the
principle has essentially been rewritten in a
manner acceptable to the common law but is very
different from the principle as applied in European
law. Laws' conception of proportionality does not
view the courts as enabling government to carry out
its policy objectives or determining the most
suitable means of policy implementation. Rather it
is a conception of proportionality to be developed
within the common law tradition of the "interaction
between informed public opinion and the independent
judicial mind." 199 In other words, the common law
allows the courts to retain the value of political
experience allowing them to determine which
particular decisions are appropriate and which are
not.
That English law should be considering the
adoption of a principle which is not given a
settled meaning is unhelpful. Whereas the
traditionalists have been prepared to assume that
proportionality is simply a disguised form of
remaking the original decision, some liberalists
198 Lord Hoffman, op. cit. supra no. 23, page 5.
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too have distorted its meaning. This is not to
overlook other writers who have provided useful
analyses of the principle200 but that this has not
always informed the debate.
As well as disagreement over the meaning to be
accorded to proportionality, different conceptions
of freedom are adopted by participants in the
debate which, unless such differences are clearly
articulated, remain ambiguous and therefore
unexplored areas of debate. While both the
traditionalists and the liberalists tend to view
freedom as the absence of external restraint this
manifests differently. For instance, the
traditionalists would not base freedom upon a
theoretical concept of human nature but as
encapsulated within the traditions of the common
law201 whereas for the liberalists freedom is an
ideal to be protected by the rule of law which
enables the individual to enforce his fundamental
rights against the State. 202
199 Ibid., page 200.
200 See Craig, op. cit. supra no. 30, page 414-415.
201 See M. Oakeshott "Political Education" in Rationalism
in Politics and other essays (Liberty Fund, new and
expanded edn., 1991) page 43, 54.
202 See Allan, op. cit. supra no. 8, chapters 2, 3 and 6;
F.A. Hayek The Constitution of Liberty (London, 1960)
chapter 1.
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What is at issue here is an appropriate
framework in which to conceptualise the principle
of proportionality. The traditionalist conception
of freedom rejects proportionality as freedom is
viewed as being imparted within the practical
knowledge of the anti-rationalist tradition of the
common law. Is then the liberalist conception of
freedom suitable? The tendency of the liberalist
conception is to adopt an individualistic or
atomistic view of individuals using society in
order to serve their own ends which de-emphasizes
the collective ends served by society. It is
questionable whether this provides the most
appropriate framework in which to transplant
proportionality as that principle is concerned with
the purpose served by administrative action and is
used to ensure that while individual freedom is
restricted as little as possible, the
administration is able to achieve its end
objective. The liberalist conception of freedom
ignores the role proportionality has in guiding
administrative action and concentrates solely upon
the protection of individual fundamental rights.
The tradition of Continental administrative law is
characterised by "a continuous dialectic between
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authority and liberty,,203and the principle of
proportionality is used to structure as well as
control the administration. If so, then the liberal
ideal of freedom would not appear to be most suited
to adopting proportionality as it fails to account
for the freedom which may be created by
administrative action. In other words, freedom
needs to be thought of in both negative and
positive senses.204 What would seem to be required
is a more organic conception of freedom which can
change with the relationship between the individual
and the State rather than a fixed and static
conception of freedom. That such issues have not
been expressly articulated as part of the debate
concerning the possible adoption of proportionality
means such differences have been largely ignored
thereby making their resolution more distant.
B. Proportionality and Procedure
203 M.P. Chiti "Administrative Comparative Law" (1992) 4
E.R.P.L. 11, 19. See also G. Arena "Rights vis-A-vis the
Administration" in A. Cassese, A. Clapham and J. Weiler
(eds.), Human Rights and the European community: Methods
of Protection (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
1991) page 495, SO.
204 Cf. I. Berlin "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four
Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969) page 118; C. Taylor
"What's Wrong With Negative Liberty" in Philosophy and
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There are important questions concerning the
institutional ability of the courts to apply the
principle of proportionality which have not been
sufficiently considered in the debate. The English
tradition is of an adversarial court hearing where
two parties battle for the truth. The judge takes
the role of umpire between the two sides. However,
this traditional bi-polar structure is unsuited to
deciding the more polycentric questions of public
law.205 A proportionality inquiry will by its very
nature involve more than just the two or more
parties appearing before the court. For example, if
an applicant complains that the impugned measure
adversely affects his or her interests, then how
can the court determine whether this was
disproportionate and whether other measures could
have been adopted, when alternative measures may
equally affect another's interests and possibly
have wide-ranging ramifications. If the court is
unable to determine what the possible consequences
of applying proportionality are, then it will be
procedurally ill-equipped for the task.
the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers Volume 2
(Cambridge: University Press, 1985) page 211.
205 See A. Chayes "The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv.L.R. 1281; J.W.F. Allison
"The Procedural Reason for Judicial Restraint" [1994]
P.L. 452.
522
The ability of the court to undertake a
proportionality inquiry can be examined in relation
to fact-finding. The general principle in English
law is that "[u]nder public law, it is not the role
of the courts to find facts: it is not for the
courts to specify what is reasonable and its views
on policy questions are normally of no
relevance. ,,206 The judicial review court is confined
in its approach to fact-finding for fear of
substituting its views of the merits for that of
the public authority. However, advocates of
proportionality have not adequately addressed how
that principle is to be applied within the present
limitations on judicial fact-finding. The
application of that principle requires the court to
engage in a goal-oriented fact-finding process to
determine whether the chosen policy objective could
have been achieved by alternative measures, which
had an equal effectiveness in achieving the same
result but imposed a less onerous restriction on
the affected interest. If the courts are unable to
206 H. Woolf "Public Law-Private Law: Why the Divide? A
Personal View" [1986] P.L. 220, 225. See also O'Reilly
v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237, 282E-F per Lord Diplock.
However, Lord Woolf "Judicial Review: A Possible
Programme For Reform" [1992] P.L. 221, 230 has
recognised that "[t]he European dimension could well
act ...as a catalyst" for the English courts to adopt \la
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probe behind the formal account of how a measure
was made then their power to review will be
severely limited.207 The suggested improvements such
as the possibility of interventions in public
interest cases20B and the establishment of a
Director of Civil Proceedings209 appear to be
limited solutions to the problem. In order to
facilitate the development of judicial review and
accommodate the changes resulting from the European
influence, a fundamental reorientation in judicial
procedure may be required. 210 The European Coure11
and French212 and German213 administrative courts,
greater readiness to allow discovery and cross-
examination."
207 M. Purdue "The Scope For Fact Finding in Judicial
Review" in G. Hand and J. McBride (eds.), Droit Sans
Frontieres. Essays in Honour of L. Neville Brown.
(Birmingham: Holdsworth Club, 1991) page 193, 201.
208 JUSTICE REPORT A Matter of Interest: Reforming the
Law and Practice on Interventions in Public Interest
Cases (JUSTICE, 1996). See K. Schiemann "Interventions
in Public Interest Cases" [1996] P.L. 240.
209 H. Woolf "Public Law-Private Law: Why the Divide? A
Personal View", op. cit. supra no. 195, 235-237; H.
Woolf Protection of the Public - A New Challenge
(London, The Hamlyn Lectures, 1990) pages 109-113. See
also J.A.G. Griffith "Judicial Decision-Making in Public
Law" [1985] P.L. 564.
210 Allison, op. cit. supra no. 194, 473.
211 J. Mertens de Wilmars "The Case-Law of the Court of
Justice in Relation to the Review of the Legality of
Economic Policy in Mixed-Economy Systems" [1982/1]
L.I.E.I. I, 7-8.
212 L. Neville Brown and J.S. Bell French Administrative
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 4th edn., 1993) pages 245-
250; J. Bell "The Expansion of Judicial Review Over
Discretionary Powers in France" [1986] P.L. 99, 113-116.
213 M.P. Singh German Administrative Law in Common Law
Perspective (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985) pages 71,
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which all apply the principle of proportionality,
have the ability to review the factual basis of
decisions. The English courts lack that same
ability and for that reason may be precluded from
operating a comparable review for proportionality.
Such concerns have been expressed by Lord
Lowry who has stated that the judges "are not,
generally speaking, equipped by training or
experience, or furnished with the requisite
knowledge and advice, to decide the answer to an
administrative problem where the scales are evenly
balanced" .2l4 A significant problem concerning the
debate over proportionality is that its advocates
have failed to respond to these concerns. Jowell
and Lester state that proportionality "by no means
releases judges from their proper reserve in
interfering with decisions on the ...assessment of
fact" .215 How then are judges to apply the principle
at all? In a subsequent publication Jowell argues
that proportionality would be beneficial as it
would require administrators to consider
77, 88-92. German commentators view the inability of the
British courts to inquire into questions of fact as a
serious shortcoming: D. Conrad "Introduction" in Singh,
ibid., page xii; M. Brenner "Administrative Judicial
Protection in Europe: General Principles" (1997) 9
E.R.P.L. 595, 614.
214 Brind, supra no. 2, 767A.
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alternative courses of action.216 However, if the
courts are incapable of assessing whether equally
effective alternative courses of action are open to
the administration, then how can the adoption of
proportionality have the effect of encouraging
administrators to consider such alternatives? If
the courts lack the institutional ability to
determine such issues then adopting a principle
which enables it to state whether a given measure
was disproportionate makes little sense as it
depends upon the assessment of whether alternative
measures exist which in turn requires the court to
have the institutional ability to examine their
effectiveness. Alternatively, if a court decides to
make a finding of disproportionality without being
able to assess the alternatives, such a decision
would be ill-informed and have unforseeable
consequences for the administration. Both options
seem inadequate for the effective deployment of
proportionality. Furthermore, some advocates have
215 Jowell and Lester "Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor
Dangerous", op. cit. supra no. 13, page 68.
216 Jowell "Is Proportionality an Alien Concept?", op.
cit. supra no. 13, 410-411. Cf. I. Harden and N. Lewis
The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of
Law (London: Hutchinson, 1986) chapter 9 and the
comparison of European proportionality and review for
the "least drastic means" in American law by G.A.
Bermann "The Principle of Proportionality" (1978) 26
A.J.C.L. (supplement) 415, 430-432.
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denied that proportionality has any place in
relation to fact-finding. For example, in
distinguishing between two variants of the
irrationality rule, those involving questions of
fact and those involving the ordering of
priorities, Laws states that proportionality has no
role in the fact-finding case at all.217 By adopting
a significantly different conception of
proportionality Laws has effectively dismissed the
role that the court might have in assessing whether
it was factually possible for the administration to
have adopted different measures.
A related issue is the lack of judicial
knowledge and experience of governmental processes.
Judges are drawn from the bar and not from the
Civil Service. They receive their political
education in the traditions of the common law and
public life and know how to maintain the "delicate
constitutional balance" between themselves and
Ministers of the Crown.218 Judges are not given any
training in public administration and have little
217 Laws "Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental
Constitutional Rights?", op. cit. supra, no. 12, 73.
218 See text at no. 117 above per Neill L.J. Cf. Wade &
Forsyth, op. cit. supra no. 7, page 25: the judges "must
rely on their own judgment, sensing what is required by
the interplay of forces in the constitution."
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experience of governmental processes. 219This lack
of knowledge of public administration would
seriously prejudice the effective application of
proportionality. For a judge to determine the
effectiveness of alternative measures for achieving
a specific objective without the necessary
knowledge and experience of governmental processes
seems little more than guesswork. According to Lord
Woolf "complaints are raised by government
departments that judges are insufficiently aware of
the problems with which administrators are faced
and that on occasions they are required to adopt
unrealistically high standards in order to comply
with decisions of the court.,,220The likelihood is
that such complaints would increase if the judges
began to undertake proportionality review without
the requisite knowledge and procedural equipment.
The present evidence shows that the courts
simply lack the institutional ability to undertake
this type of inquiry in certain areas such as
national economic policy. Furthermore, the
219 L. Blom-Cooper "Lawyers and Public Administrators:
Separate and Unequal" [1984] P.L. 215, 230. For
comparison with Continental judges see Neville Brown and
Bell, op. cit. supra no. 212, pages 76-80; Singh, op.
cit. supra no. 213, pages 107-110, 114-115; N. Johnson
State and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Executive at Work. (Pergamon, 2nd edn., 1983) pages
208-209.
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judiciary has traditionally separated itself from
the public administration for fear of destroying
judicial independence. 221 For the judiciary to
decide whether it was factually possible for the
administration to adopt an alternative course of
action could be viewed as threatening their highly-
prized judicial independence. According to Lord
Lowry, the judges "have a much better chance of
reaching the right answer where the question is put
in a Wednesbury form." 222
C. Proportionality, Function and Policy
If the tendency for traditionalists is to view
law as a hierarchical system of rules, then the
liberals view law as "purpose-independent rules" of
just conduct?" or principles of good administration
which "are independent of any particular purpose or
policy" .224 Just as the traditional model of
judicial review makes a distinction between appeal
220 Woolf, op. cit. supra no. 198, 18.
221 Blom-Cooper, op. cit. supra no. 219, 234. See also G.
Drewry "Public Lawyers and Public Administrators:
Prospects for an Alliance?" (1986) 64 Public
Administration 173; G. Drewry "Public Law" (1995) 73
Public Administration 41.
222 Brind, supra no. 2, 767A.
223 F.A. Hayek Law, Legislation and Liberty. Volume I
Rules and Order. (London, 1973) page 85.
224 Allan, op. cit. supra no. 8, page 5.
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and review through Wednesbury unreasonableness, a
rights based model of review is predicated on the
difference between questions of principle and
policy. For example, Allan states that though this
difference may be elastic and sometimes difficult
to discern, it is nonetheless fundamental.225 This
can be seen in the purpose of the court's review
which is to protect the individual "as opposed to
the wider objectives of the public authority.,,226
Within this model of judicial review,
proportionality is given a distinct place as an
objective principle which does not draw the court
into policy decisions. Jowell and Lester argue that
"[b]y concentrating on the
specific ... [proportionality] ...is more effective in
excluding general considerations based on policy
rather than principle. ,,227Under the rights model of
judicial review, the courts have no creative role
in relation to policy. Instead the courts are to
exercise their "independent moral judgment,,228 to
determine those "principles of justice, fairness
225Ibid., pages 8, 57-58, 185, 204-206.
226 Ibid., page 184.
227Jowell and Lester "Proportionality; Neither Dangerous
Nor Novel", op. cit. supra no. 13, page 68.
228Allan, op. cit. supra no. 8, page 185. See also Laws
"Law and Democracy", op. cit. supra no. 6, 80: the
substantive principles of judicial review are "not
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and procedural due process that provide the best
constructive interpretation of the community's
legal practice. ,,229 The tendency is then for the
debate to have ignored the issues of whether the
application of proportionality can legitimately
involve questions of function and of policy.
It is submitted that this has been unfortunate
and unhelpful. In Community law the purpose for
which the power is exercised is central to the
European Court's review. Proportionality is a tool
which serves the function for which the power is
exercised. For example, the philosophy of the
European Community is founded on market
liberalisation with the Community institutions
intervening for the purpose of creating the
conditions for workable competition and the
European Court's review is shaped by this.
Proportionality is used as a tool to ensure that
economic intervention is subsidiary in nature. 230 By
failing to address the different functions that
could be served by the principle, advocates of
proportionality have ignored the central meaning of
the principle: that it can enable the
morally colourless...[t]hey constitute ethical ideals as
to the virtuous conduct of the state's affairs."
229 Dworkin Law's Empire, Ope ci t. supra no. 9, page 225.
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administration to achieve its functions more
efficiently and effectively while protecting the
interests and rights of individuals as far as
possible. It is this purposive element of
proportionality which is incompatible with the
traditional common law approach which views the law
as a means of controlling, as opposed to promoting
and guiding, the administration. 23l Similarly, the
liberals focus solely on the function of
proportionality in giving protection to fundamental
rights and view it as a means of preventing State
action which affects individual rights. In doing so
they overlook the role proportionality could play
in relation to other areas of public administration
and its purposive element. Throughout the debate
the principle has been viewed as a self-standing
principle rather than a tool by which the law can
contribute to the achievement of governmental
functions.
The traditional view of law acting as a
control on bureaucracy has become so deeply
entrenched that when proportionality is examined it
230 Mertens de Wilmars, Ope ci t. supra no. 211, 13.
231 Cf , Wade and Forsyth, Ope ci t. supra no. 7, page 5:
"[t]he primary purpose of administrative law ...is to
keep the powers of government within their legal bounds,
so as to protect the citizen against their abuse. The
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is through that framework of ideas rather than as a
principle which has developed within a distinctive
Continental tradition of administrative law. For
example, according to Greene proportionality in
Community law acts "as a curb on the powers of
legislatures" and shares the general characteristic
of the general principles of Community law of being
able to be used "as a sword against legislation". 232
Such views betray the dangers of misunderstanding
by viewing a Continental principle of law from
within a common law perspective. More fundamentally
the limited patterns of thought in English
administrative law appear to be incapable of being
able to adequately adopt the full meaning of
proportionality.
The difficulties of adopting proportionality
in this regard intensify when it is considered as a
principle of constitutional review. 233 The British
constitution conforms to no agreed or clearly
articulated principles or values. The State is
powerful engines of authority must be prevented from
running amok."
232 N. Greene "Proportionality and the Supremacy of
Parliament in the UK" (Institute of European Law,
University of Birmingham, 20th March 1998) page 3.
233 See Laws "The Constitution: Morals and Rights", op.
cit. supra no. 12, 631 where the author argues that
proportionality is a requirement of "the good
constitution" which recognises both positive and
negative rights.
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represented by the interests of whichever party
commands a majority in Parliament through the
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. There is no
distinct set of purposes or functions of government
against which the constitutionality of statutes can
be assessed. This is in distinct contrast to
Continental constitutions and the European
Community. For instance, under the German Basic
Law, the Federal Republic of Germany is a
Sozialstaat which the Federal Constitutional Court
has held imposes a duty on the legislature to take
up constitutional social welfare activities and
balance the competing interests in doing SO.234
Proportionality is used as a constitutional
requirement to be observed in the achievement of
the social state. The adoption of proportionality
as a principle of review in British constitutional
law would make little sense in the absence of a
distinct set of purposes for the government to
pursue. Similarly, it would be undesirable to
require the judiciary to articulate such purposes
and values. 235
234 Singh, op. cit. supra no. 213, pages 7-8.
235 While it could be argued that Laws' positive rights
could set out the functions of government, as they are
neither expressly articulated nor agreed upon, then they
would be subject to the substantial disagreement and
different interpretations. Such a course would suffer
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As well as sidelining the purposive element of
proportionality, its advocates have also argued
that application of the principle does not involve
the court in making policy decisions but only
articulating principles of law. However, the
application of proportionality requires the court
to determine whether the policy objective could
have been achieved by other means or whether the
methods of policy implementation could have been
changed in favour of a less onerous course of
action. Proportionality involves making judicial
decisions about the implementation of policy.
Functionalist writers, such as Robson236 and
from the very imprecision and ambiguity of what the
phrases "fundamental law" or "positive rights" actually
mean. Cf. C. Hill The Century of Revolution 1603-1714
(London: Routledge, 2nd edn., 1980) page 55: "In 1641
Strafford was impeached, among other charges, for
subverting the fundamental laws of the kingdom. The
Commons were just about to vote the charge when the
witty and malicious Edmund Waller rose, and with seeming
innocence asked what the fundamental laws of the kingdom
were. There was an uneasy silence. No-one dared to
attempt a definition which would have divided the
heterogeneous majority ...The situation was saved by a
lawyer who leapt to his feet to say that if Mr Waller
did not know what the fundamental laws of the kingdom
were, he had no business to be sitting in the House."
236 W.A. Robson Justice and Administrative Law. A Study
.of the British Constitution. (London: Stevens, 3rd edn.,
1951) pages 432, 572-573. See also K.C. Davis "The
Future of Judge-Made Public Law in England: A Problem of
Practical Jurisprudence" (1961) 61 Columbia L.R. 201,
211. On the functionalist style in public law see
Loughlin, op. cit. supra no. 8.
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Mitchell,237 have argued that the distinction
between questions of legality and policy cannot be
drawn with any precision. The issue of whether a
means of policy implementation is legal is
virtually inseparable from the question of which
other means of implementation could better serve
the chosen policy objective. By insisting on the
fundamental distinction between principle and
policy, the liberals confuse the role of
proportionality with that of moralising over
principle rather than viewing administrative law as
a series of individual disputes concerning the
application of policy and determining how public
administration can be best conducted. The
traditionalists may be wedded to a distinction
between appeal and review that is out of date, but
this does not mean that the distinction between
principle and policy is adequate either. In
separating proportionality from both function and
policy, the rights based model of judicial review
may be equally inappropriate as the traditional
model for the successful transplantation of
proportionality.
D7 J.D.B. Mitchell "The Flexible Constitution" [1960]
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D. Statutory Drafting and Interpretation
The proportionality debate has ignored the
extent to which the application of the principle is
dependent on the particular style of drafting and
interpretation of Community legislation. If the
process of reviewing the proportionality of
administrative measures is connected with the way
in which those measures are drafted and
interpreted, then this should be a relevant factor
in debating whether that principle should be
adopted by another legal system with different
methods of drafting and interpretation. However,
the proportionality debate has overlooked the issue
of whether the effective application of that
principle requires a different approach to
statutory interpretation.
The traditional English approach is for
Parliament to lay down detailed rules in advance in
a statute. The legality of official action is then
determined by whether it falls within the ordinary
meaning of the legislative wording. The role of the
court is not to give effect to any policy but
merely to apply the intention of Parliament as
P.L. 332, 349.
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expressed through the literal interpretation of the
measure against the established common law
preaumpt Lons .?" In contrast the European approach
is to determine the objectives or functions of the
administration and for the administrative courts to
determine the general principles which should
govern such action. 239
The style of legislative drafting in the
European Community follows the European tradition.
The Treaties set out the general objectives for
Community action and secondary legislation, such as
directives and regulations, are adopted to give
effect to such objectives. Even secondary
legislation may be worded at a very general level
and will be complemented by a preamble setting out
the purposes for which the measure was adopted and
its aims and objectives. When a dispute arises it
falls to the European Court to interpret the
measure. The European Court has a number of methods
of interpretation; the most important being the
238 See generally J. Bell and G. Engle Cross Statutory
Interpretation (London: Butterworths, 3rd edn., 1995).
239 See generally J.A.C. Smith "Legislative Drafting:
England and Continental" (1980) 2 Statute L.R. 14; D.N.
MacCormick and R.S. Summers (eds.), Interpreting
Statutes: A Comparative Study (Dartmouth, 1991).
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teleological method. 240 According to Dumon II [t]he
purpose of the legal teleological method is to
interpret a rule taking particular account of the
purpose, the aim and the objective which it
pursues. ,,241 A specific measure will fall to
interpreted against the actual purpose and
objective for which it was adopted. This method of
interpretation is facilitated by the preamble to
Community legislation which sets out the purposes
for which it was adopted and its aims and
obj ect ives .242
According to Lord Mackenzie Stuart, the form
of Community legislation enables the European Court
to perform its task of reviewing the legality of a
measure; the importance of a preamble in terms of
ascertaining whether a measure is in conformity
with its empowering instrument and whether it is
justifiable in fact and in law cannot be over-
240 T. Millett "Rules of Interpretation of E.E.C.
legislation" (1989) 10 Statute L.R. 163, 173; Bell and
Engle, op. cit. supra no. 239, page 108.
241 F. Dumon "The Case-Law of the Court of Justice - A
Critical Examination of the Methods of Interpretation"
in Judicial and Academic Conference 27th-28th September
1976 (Luxembourg, 1976) page III-a7. See also H.
Kutscher "Methods of Interpretation as seen by a Judge
at the Court of Justice" in Judicial and Academic
Conference 27th-28th September 1976, ibid., pages I-39-
42; Millett, op. cit. supra no. 240, 170-173.
242 Lord Slynn "Looking at European Community Texts"
(1993) 14 Statute L.R. 12, 16-17.
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emphae i sed ,"" For example, when the European Court
is applying the principle of proportionality, the
preamble of the measure has a special importance in
setting out the purpose and objective of the
measure. The European Court then tests the
proportionality of the substantive measure against
the objective for which it was adopted by examining
whether alternative means were open to the
administration which were equally effective for the
achievement of that same objective. The application
of proportionality in Community law is dependent on
the existence of preambles and the teleological
method of interpretation. For example, in the
"skimmed-milk" case, 244 the European Court
acknowledged that the impugned measure "was
promulgated at a time when the stocks of skimmed-
milk powder brought in by the intervention
agencies ...had reached considerable proportions and
were continuing to increase" and that the measure
"was designed to reduce stocks through the
increased use of feeding-stuffs of the protein
243 Lord Mackenzie Stuart The European Communities and
the Rule of Law (London, The Hamlyn Lectures, 1978) page
66.
244 Case 114/76 Bela-Muhle Josef Bergmann KG v. Grows
Farm GmbH& Co. KG [1977] E.C.R. 1211. See chapter 6,
section SA.
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contained in skimmed-milk powder. ,,245 On the basis
of the actual objective served by the measure and
the context of the situation in the skimmed-milk
sector, the European Court proceeded to find that
the measure imposed a disproportionate financial
burden on milk and agricultural producers by
requiring them to purchase certain quantities of
animal feed made from skimmed-milk powder at a cost
three times its value. The objective of the measure
was derived from its preamble and the teleological
method of interpretation was essential for the
application of proportionality. Against this, it
must be asked whether the English style of drafting
and interpretation is suitable to the application
of proportionality.
The common law tradition contains a deep-
seated attitude that "Parliament generally changes
the law for the worse"246 and legislation is
sometimes viewed as a foreign intrusion on the
purity of the common law. Such ideas derive from
the time when legislation was primarily made for
and by lawyers. However, with the vast development
245 Ibid., paragraph 2.
246 Pollock Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics page 85
quoted by H.J. Laski in The Report of the Committee on
Ministers' Powers Report Cmd. 4060 (London:HMSO,
Donoughmore Report, 1932) Annex V "Note by Professor
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in the role of the State, which has been possible
through the use of legislation, the common law
tradition has remained dominant and still informs
the style of drafting and interpretation. English
statutes are drafted by Parliamentary draftsmen247
and set out the detailed rules to be interpreted by
the judges by giving the words their literal
meaning. Statutes are viewed as passed in order to
correct some mischief rather than as a means of
achieving a distinct social function. It is the
judge's role to give effect to the ordinary meaning
of the words used by Parliament subject to certain
common law presumptions about the intention of
Parliament. The judge does not seek to give effect
to the aims and objectives of a measure but merely
to interpret it literally. When a judge does
interpret a measure in light of its "mischief",
that purpose has to be gleaned from the language of
the statute. The result is that the court does not
apply the purpose which was behind the measure but
Laski on the Judicial Interpretation of Statutes" page
135, 137.
247 See A.G. Donaldson "The High Priests of the Mystery:
A Note on Two Centuries of Parliamentary Draftsmen" in
W. Finnie, C.M.G. Himsworth and N. Walker (eds.),
Edinburgh Essays in Public Law (Edinburgh: University
Press, 1991) page 99.
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the purpose which the court itself induces from the
language of the measure. 248
Despite advocates, such as Laski, who argued
that the courts' "method of interpretation should
be less analytical and more functional in
character; it should seek to discover the effect of
the legislative precept in action so as to give
full weight to the social value it is intended to
secure" ,249 the courts still generally interpret
legislation by the ordinary meaning given to its
wording. As Corry observes, this approach is
somewhat unreal: "[n]o enactment is ever passed for
the sake of its details; it is passed in an attempt
to realize a social purpose ...The statute must be
treated as a means to an end; the end should be
determined by social forces which brought it about
and not by private choice of the judge.,,250While
English judges have in recent years begun to adopt
a more purposive method of interpretation, these
seem like small steps when compared with the
European approach. 251 According to Bennion, the
248 W.I. Jennings "The Report on Ministers' Powers"
(1932) 10 Public Administration 333, 339; J.A. Corry
"Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes"
(1936) 1 University of Toronto L.J. 286, 308-309.
249 Laski, op. cit. supra no. 246, page 135, 137.
250Corry, op. cit. supra no. 248, 292.
251 Lord Oliver "A Judicial View of Modern Legislation"
(1993) 14 Statute L.R. 1, 2-3, 5 is suspicious of a
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British doctrine of purposive construction is more
literal than the European variety, and permits a
strained construction only in comparatively rare
cases.252 For example, the House of Lords has
reversed the rule that the courts should not have
reference to Hansard but only when the ordinary
meaning of the legislation is ambiguous or obscure
or it woul d to an absurdi ty .253 Al so, in order for a
court to give effect to a purposive interpretation,
the judge must be aware of the specific context and
function of the administration in that specific
area. The court must know what the measure is
trying to do within that area of public
administration. Doubts have already been raised
over judicial knowledge of public administration.
Furthermore, the sheer volume of legislation and
the pressure on Parliament has reduced the clarity
of statutory drafting and Parliament does not
clearly set out its purposes in preambles like
European legislation. 254
purposive approach because in the absence of Parliament
clearly stating its purpose and objective, the judge has
to impose a policy on the ordinary meaning of the
statutory wording.
m F.A.R. Bennion Statutory Interpretation: A Code
(London: Butterworths, 1997) section 311.
253 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1993] A. C. 593.
254 See Making the Law: The Report of the Hansard Society
Commission on the Legislative Process (London, 1993)
chapter 4.
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Statutes and administrative measures are
adopted for distinct purposes and the principle of
proportionality can be applied in order to
determine that the administration does not go
beyond what is necessary for the achievement of
such purposes. However, the style and
interpretation of English law hinders the effective
application of the principle. Legislative drafting
does not clearly state the purpose and objectives
for which measures can be adopted. The literal
interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the
statutory wording precludes courts from giving
effect to those purposes and ensuring that in the
achievement of those objectives, the administration
does not adopt disproportionate means. If
proportionality is to be adopted then changes will
need to be made to the English style of statutory
drafting and interpretation.
6. Conolusion
When Lord Diplock intimated that he had
contemplated the potential development of a ground
of proportionality in view of the increasing
influence of Community law he identified one of the
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most important contemporary issues facing English
administrative law. Were English law to adopt this
principle then it would show that it is concerned
about the equal protection of individuals between
English and Community law, open to outside
influence and prepared to develop towards a sound
body of administrative law. However, while the
debate has raised issues central to the possible
adoption of proportionality in English law, it has
sometimes been ill-informed and has sidelined
important issues. The discussion has largely been
conducted between the adherents of two conceptions
of administrative law - the traditionalists and the
liberalists - with little genuine debate as to
whether the transplant would be a beneficial step
towards a better system of administrative law and a
means of accommodating the growing influence of
Community law.
Those adopting the traditional conception of
administrative law have rejected proportionality
because it threatens to assimilate appeal and
review and therefore the legitimacy of the judicial
function. The rejection of proportionality is
viewed as a means of defending the purity of
judicial independence and the traditional common
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law method of review articulated through the
principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness. However,
in order to understand why there is a felt need to
reject proportionality, attention should be focused
upon the cultural differences between English and
European administrative law. Proportionality is
viewed as incompatible with the culture of the
common law which informs the traditional approach
to judicial review. The proposed transplantation of
the principle forms part of the cultural challenge
of Community law which is viewed as a threat by the
traditionalists. It is because of this perceived
threat to the dominant paradigm that the search has
been made for a defining rule in order to ensure
that the new principle can be excluded. This
defining rule has taken the form that only
Wednesbury unreasonableness provides the correct
division between the judicial and administrative
roles. The traditionalists reject the need to re-
equip the judiciary with a new tool of review
precisely because the Wednesbury test best serves
the purposes of the traditional approach; it allows
the judges to express their views on administrative
decisions through the accumulated wisdom of the
common law. By contrast the liberalists
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enthusiastically welcome proportionality. For them
proportionality is a principle of good
administration independent of any purpose or
policy. Proportionality is a rational principle of
review and can therefore provide more intelligible
judicial reasons as to why a certain decision is
impermissible than reliance upon Wednesbury
unreasonableness.
These two views have come to dominate the
debate; yet neither of them seem appropriate to the
successful transplantation of the principle. By
turning the possible adoption of proportionality
into a question of the legitimacy of judicial
review, the traditionalists have developed an
argument to trump all others. However, this
argument itself rests upon a question-begging
premise that Wednesbury unreasonableness is the
only way of distinguishing between the merits and
legality. By arguing for the adoption of
proportionality, the liberalists recognise that the
English courts would be significantly departing
from their more formal traditional approach.
However, it should not be assumed that the adoption
of proportionality under a rights model of judicial
review will be able to successfully accommodate the
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growing European influence. The tendency of this
approach is to moralise over the infringement of
fundamental rights by the State and ignore the
other purposes served by proportionality. Rather
than being suited to the growing European
influence, the rights model may adopt an equally
rigid conception of the relationship between the
State and the individual as the traditional model.
Furthermore, while some judges have desired to
speak in terms of rational principles, others still
prefer to articulate through the customary language
of the common law. The Wheeler and Brind cases are
classic examples of these different influences. In
Wheeler Browne-Wilkinson L.J.'s rights discourse
was not endorsed by the House of Lords who
preferred the traditional common law approach. In
Brind the House of Lords was itself split between a
sovereignty and a rights model. Cotterrell has
recognised the "sheer difficulty of finding a
rigorous grounding for principle in a climate of
legal thought dominated by the image of
imperium. ,,255 Whether a rights model of judicial
review can be successfully superimposed on the
255 R. Cotterrell "Judicial Review and Legal Theory" in
G. Richardson and H. Genn (eds.), Administrative Law &
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distinct traditions of the common law remains to be
seen.
The proportionality debate has also been
conducted through the established dualisms of
procedure and substance, judicial restraint and
activism, appeal and review, principle and policy,
administration and adjudication, which have
concealed more than they illuminate in that they
have served to distort analysis of administrative
reality. As the proportionality debate has formed
part of the wider debate in public law, such
dualisms can be seen as reflecting the question of
the conception of English law; is law a product of
legislative will (the Crown in Parliament) or a
product of judicial (artificial) reasoning (the
Crown as represented in Her Majesty's Courts)?256
The issue of proportionality has entered into this
existing debate rather than as a means of
Government Action. The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms
of Review. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) page 13, 27.
256Cf. Robson, op. cit. supra no. 236, page 421. These
dualisms can be seen in the famous conversation between
James I and Sir Edward Coke C.J. in Proclamations del
Roy (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 63. For a recent attempt to
reconcile this dualism see X Ltd. v. Morgan Grampian
Ltd. [1991] A.C. 1, 48E per Lord Bridge and Sedley, op.
cit. supra no. 12, 289, 291 where the rule of law is
said to rest on the twin foundations of Parliamentary
sovereignty and the sovereignty of the common law. Such
a view is undercut by the very concept of sovereignty
itself which requires that unified power is one and
indivisible otherwise sovereignty is lost.
550
developing towards a sound body of administrative
law which can accommodate both the protection of
the individual and the purpose for which
governmental power is exercised. 257
Within this debate significant issues
concerning the successful transplantation of
proportionality have been either ignored or
sidelined. First, the debate has been conducted by
some under a limited or mistaken understanding of
what the concept of proportionality actually means
and how it works in Community law. Second, little
regard has been to the purposes that may be served
by the principle across the broad range of
governmental activity. Third, within the debate it
has been unquestionably accepted that questions of
law are completely separate from questions of
policy. The application of proportionality requires
the court to address questions of policy in
assessing whether the policy objective could be
adequately achieved by other means. Fourth, the
courts are currently limited in their knowledge of
public administration and procedurally ill-equipped
to effectively apply the principle of
proportionality; they appear to lack the necessary
257 ef. Robson, op. ci t. supra no. 236, page 640.
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institutional confidence. Finally, the style of
statutory drafting and interpretation needs to be
more purposive in order to facilitate the
application of proportionality. If proportionality
is to be successfully adopted then attention should
be paid to what role it could most effectively
serve in evaluating governmental performance by
focusing on the functions of governance. Also
institutional reform will be necessary to ensure
that a review body can effectively apply the
principle.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
This study has examined the principles of
legitimate expectations and proportionality in
English and Community law against the different
traditions of public law. The main objective has
been to examine the relationship between English
and European Community administrative law and this
has been conducted through an assessment of the
success of the principles as legal transplants. A
related purpose has been to examine the challenge
presented by Community law for English law. On the
basis of the detailed studies the following
conclusions can be made.
According to the political philosopher
Oakeshott "[a] tradition of behaviour is not a
fixed and inflexible manner of doing things; it is
a flow of sympathy ...even the help we may get from
the traditions of another society ...is conditional
upon our being able to assimilate them to our own
arrangements and our own manner of attending to our
arrangements."l By viewing the common law as a
"tradition of behaviour", it may be possible to
1 M. Oakeshott "Political Education" in Rationalism in
Politics and other essays (Liberty Fund, new and
extended edn., 1991) page 43, 59.
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examine the extent to which the "flow of sympathy"
towards the European principles has enabled their
assimilation within the traditional English
arrangements concerning administrative activity.
Those traditional arrangements consist of the
superiority of established common law principles
for controlling the administration. It is because
of the dominance of the common law tradition that,
in the words of Redlich and Hirst, "there has never
grown on English ground the idea ...that questions
of administration or of disputes between the State
and the citizen should be governed by different
principles from those which are applied to
'private' disputes between one citizen and
another.,,2When Dicey rejected administrative law as
"fundamentally inconsistent" with the English Rule
of Law,3 he was reaffirming the superiority of the
anti-rationalist values and traditions of the
common law. While the common law has had to adapt
to the growth in State activity and recognise an
"administrative law", this has not been accompanied
by the development of distinct principles which
2 J. Redlich and F.W. Hirst Local Government in England
Volume II (London:Macmillan, 1903) page 329.
3 A.V. Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of
the Constitution (London:Macmillan, lOth edn., 1959)
page 203.
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characterise Continental administrative law. To the
extent that an English public law exists, it is in
the systematization of procedural developments
which has served to reveal the absence of a
distinct public law jurisprudence.4 When compared
with the Continental approach to administrative
law, it can be seen just how particular the common
law approach is. In transplanting the principles of
legitimate expectations and proportionality English
judges have struggled to articulate principles
specifically designed for public law adjudication
in a system which lacks a public law jurisprudence.
In other words, the introduction of rational
principles within the anti-rationalist culture of
the common law was always likely to create friction
and difficulties.
With the recognition by Lord Diplock that
English law should assimilate proportionality and
legitimate expectation into English law, there was
an evident "flow of sympathy" toward the
pr-Lnc i.pLes ." While this "flow of sympathy" has been
stronger in regard to legitimate expectations, it
has not enabled complete assimilation. Insofar as
the principle of legitimate expectations reflects
4 See chapter 2, section 1.
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the idea underlying estoppel, it has appealed to
the common law. However, when the courts have been
called upon to articulate a separate principle
between the State and the citizen to determine the
legitimacy of an expectation, they have insisted on
the primacy of the reasonableness test over any
explicit or rational weighing up of the public and
private interests. So while the courts have
recognised the principle of legitimate expectations
to an extent, they have rejected that element of a
balancing test which forms a special principle to
resolve a dispute between the individual and the
State.6 In relation to proportionality such concerns
have prevented even the mention of the principle
without controversy. As the principle essentially
concerns the balancing test itself, those defending
a traditionalist conception of administrative law
have firmly rejected its importation into the
common law. The "flow of sympathy" towards
proportionality has instead come from those who
wish to modernise the common law within a liberal
rights-based framework. Difficulties arise here as
this modernising project is incompatible with the
common law tradition and is an inappropriate
5 See chapter 3, section 1.
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framework in which to transplant the principle of
proportionality.? Principles of Continental
administrative law "make little sense when lifted
out the context of a general philosophy of law and
the state."B This is particularly so in regard to
the principle of proportionality. However, rather
than attempting to understand proportionality as a
principle serving distinct purposes within an
established philosophy of law and government, the
debate has been conducted between two distinct
philosophies - the traditionalists and the
liberalists - for their own ends with consequently
little real debate over whether the adoption of
that principle would be beneficial for English law.
The evidence supports the view that the
English courts have been unable to adequately
transplant the principles into English law. The
courts have recognised the principle of legitimate
expectations but have been unable to guide the
administration in the balancing of the public
interest with private expectation. While it is
highly likely that proportionality will come to be
formally recognised as a principle of English law
6 See chapter 5, section 9.
7 See chapter 7.
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following the passing of the Human Rights Bill,9 it
is doubtful whether the courts will be able to
review the proportionality of administrative
measures when a violation of human rights is not
argued. Furthermore, it seems that the specific
conception of proportionality will markedly differ
from that applied in European Community law.
Without institutional reform the courts lack the
necessary sophisticated knowledge of the
aqministration which the effective application of
the principles require. 10
However, that the English courts have been
able to assimilate the principles within their
language of review has led some to conclude that
the principles have been successfully transplanted,
or that there has at least been "an intriguing
degree of parallel development" between English and
Community law.ll For example, Wade has stated that
"[e]xpressions such as proportionality and
legitimate expectations are becoming familiar as we
e W.J.M. Mackenzie Politics and Social Science
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) page 278.
9 See J. Laws "The Limitations of Human Rights" [1998]
P.L. 254.
10 M. Purdue "The Scope for Fact Finding in Judicial
Review" in G. Hand and J. Macbride (eds.), Droit Sans
Frontieres. Essays in Honour of L. Neville Brown.
(Birmingham: Holdsworth Club, 1991) page 193. See
chapter 7, section 5B.
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translate our rules into European terms."12 In order
to understand this statement, it needs to be
interpreted against the principle of continuity in
the common law tradition.13 In doing so it can be
seen that the myth of continuity is being used in
order to comfortably assimilate what Wade sees as
pre-existing common law rules with European
expressions through a simple process of linguistic
translation. Wade's statement is essentially an
exercise of invention in order to support the view
that English law is fully equal to European law in
its effectiveness in controlling the
administration. Furthermore, this view ignores the
context of the different philosophy of law and the
State in which the principles have developed.14
Alternatively, Sedley has explained that English
law has developed "the still incomplete doctrine of
legitimate expectation; but ... [has] ...not embraced
11 J .A. Usher General Principles of EC Law (London:
Longman, 1998) page 156.
12 H.W.R. Wade "Speech at the Laudatio" (1997) 9 E.R.P.L.
517, 521. See also H.W.R. Wade Constitutional
Fundamentals (London, The Hamlyn Lectures, Revised edn.,
1989) page 95. Cf. Wade's view that problems in
administrative law sternfrom terminological confusion.
13 Cf. Oakeshott, Ope ci t. supra no. 1, page 61.
14 Cf. the warning of J.D.B. Mitchell "Why European
Institutions?" in J.D.B. Mitchell and L.J. Brinkhorst
European Law and Institutions (Edinburgh: University
Press, 1969) page 30, 50 that "[s]uperficiality remains
a real danger which is enhanced by facile but misleading
translation of terms."
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the doctrine of proportionality which our
Continental partners seem at home with" because of
the common law's quandary to be both simultaneously
certain and adaptable and "public law's hesitantly
incremental process of growth". 15 However,
explanations premised on the continuity myth or the
incremental nature of the common law cannot
overshadow the deep-set problems of English law as
regards public administration. As this study shows,
the problems of effectively integrating the
principles into English law are complex and cannot
be remedied by the mere change of language; they
concern the common law model of judicial review.
The difficulties of transplantation resulting
from the underlying differences between English and
Continental administrative law can be demonstrated
by examining the balancing of interests test which
forms an integral part of both principles. 16 The
Continental conception of legality requires the
administrative court to optimize the affected
private interest to the extent that achievement of
the public interest remains factually possible; any
15 S. Sedley "The Common Law and the Constitution" in
Lord Nolan and S. Sedley The Making and Remaking of the
British Constitution (London:Blackstone, 1997) pages
15, 29-30.
16 See chapters 4 and 6.
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interference with private interests must be
indispensable for the achievement of the public
interest. This balancing of interests requires the
administrative court to go beyond the
interpretation of the law and to realise values in
concrete cases. In contrast, in English law the
idea that the courts should undertake a detailed
inquiry in order to balance the interests of the
individual with those of the State is simply
heretical: the role of the court is only to apply
the law as it originates in the will of Parliament
as supplemented by the ordinary common law rules.
Any balancing exercise concerns policy questions
and is therefore to be undertaken by the decision-
maker and not the court. While the language of
balance is sometimes employed,17 it does not signify
a detailed weighing-up exercise, but that the
courts maintain a balance between executive power
and individual liberty articulated through the
accumulated wisdom of the common law. Principles
such as legitimate expectations and proportionality
which require the court to openly engage in a
balancing test are viewed as a means of moving the
17 See D.e.M. Yardley Principles of Administrative Law
(London: Butterworths, 1981) page viii; H.W.R. Wade and
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focus away from questions of law to questions of
policy. The European balancing exercise differs
from the common law test of reasonableness not only
because it involves testing the necessity of a
measure but it also requires explicit
rationalisation. The English courts have found that
such exercises require more knowledge of the
administration than they possess and run counter to
their anti-rationalist common law traditions.
Furthermore, undertaking balancing tests requires
the administrative court to intervene in
administrative processes and make judgments about
the implementation of policy objectives, while the
English courts have always sought to distance
themselves from any association with the
administration.
That the same principle of the balancing of
interests which "is one of the fundamental concepts
of ...[Continental] ...administrative law,
and ...without doubt the chief justification for the
very existence of administrative courts,,18can be
C.F. Forsyth Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 7th edn., 1994) page 25.
18 Case 14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en
Staalfalbrieken N.V. v. High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community [1962] E.C.R. 253, 283 (col. 1)
of the opinion of Advocate General Lagrange.
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labelled as "heresy,,19by the English courts
demonstrates that, in the words of Mitchell, "the
distinction between public and private law, and
between the British and Continental systems, is a
philosophic one, or at least a jurisprudential
one.,,20This difference stems from the failure of
British administrative law to provide an adequate
juridical response to the problems created by the
development of modern government. This has resulted
in a fundamental difference of approach. The
Continental balancing exercise is a means of
facilitating and structuring administrative action
as well as protecting private interests; it serves
the purposive orientation of Continental
administrative law. Whereas in England the dominant
view is that law acts as a control on the
administration and therefore such balancing tests
have been rejected.
This analysis suggests that the critical issue
in the transplantation of the principles into
English law has been the cultural differences
underpinning the English and European conceptions
19 R. v. Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment ex
parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 All E.R. 397, 412h per Hirst
L.J.
20 J.D.B. Mitchell "Administrative Law and Policy
Effectiveness" in J.A.G. Griffith (ed.), From Policy to
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of legality.21 The unreconstructed common law model
of legality has failed to adapt to the vast
increase in statute law-making. The result is that
legality has come to be expressed in a crude
formula whereby public authorities can do as they
please within the limits of their powers so long as
it is not unreasonable. In contrast Continental law
has sought to positively adapt conceptions of
legality to the changing needs of public
administration. The general principles of law have
been developed as a means of guiding and evaluating
administrative action and ensuring protection of
individual interests to be applied by a specialist
court with the necessary institutional confidence
and ability. In attempting to transplant two
principles of Continental administrative law,
English law has been unsuccessful because, in light
of its cultural heritage, it has failed to re-
conceptualise legality in response to the changes
in public administration. To the extent that
English law has adopted the principles it has only
been a linguistic change which has served to skew
their meaning and obfuscate clear understanding of
Administration. Essays in Honour of William A. Robson.
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1976) page 174, 179.
21 See chapter 2.
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the difficulties of effective assimilation.
Problems have been exacerbated when judges have
failed to have regard to comparative materials and
superficial translations of the principles have
been made in order to assimilate them under an all-
encompassing principle of unreasonableness which
has assumed an almost mythical status.22
English law has been unable to assimilate the
principles for precisely the same reasons that
Mitchell argued that England lacks a system of
public law suited to the needs of modern
government: the common law is not sufficiently
purposive and susceptible to the realities of
governance.23 To return to Oakeshott's statement, it
has proven difficult for English law to derive help
from these principles of public law as it has been
conditional on being able to assimilate them to the
traditional arrangements which deny the
distinctiveness of public law. This conclusion
supports the view of those comparative lawyers who
insist that the environment must be carefully
prepared for a transplant24 and that the legal
22 See chapter 5, section 9 and chapter 7.
23 On Mitchell see chapter 3, section 2.
24 P.S. Atiyah and R.S. Summers Form and Substance in
Anglo-American Law. A Comparative Study of Legal
Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions. (Oxford:
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system adopting the transplant must also
incorporate part of the philosophy of the native
system.25 It also cautions against any view that the
adoption of the two principles has led to an
approximation between English and European
administrative law. 26
The relationship between English and European
Community administrative law is then defined by the
different conceptions of the role of law in
relation to the administration. These different
visions of law inform this relationship as seen by
the different approaches taken to the two
principles considered here.
The implications of this conclusion in terms
of the growing challenge of Community law deserve
articulation. Just as Dicey rejected Continental
administrative law as incompatible with the English
Rule of Law, some contemporary judgments are
disdainful and even contemptuous of the "heretical"
European principles. This language suggests that
the dominant view is that the European principles,
Clarendon Press, 1987) page 428. See chapter 1, section
2.
2S F. S.C. Northrop "The Comparative Philosophy of
comparative Law" (1960) 45 Cornell L.Q. 617, 657.
26 J. Schwarze "The Europeanization of National
Administrative Law" in J. Schwarze (ed.), Administrative
Law Under European Influence. On the Convergence of the
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not being grounded on the practical experience of
the common law tradition, are viewed as Continental
contaminants threatening the purity of English
law.27 However, far from reflecting "the complacent
constrast between happy Englishmen free from droit
administratif and unhappy Frenchmen subject to its
terrors,,28 which existed in Dicey's time, the
courts' attitude displays an inability to
appreciate and apply developed principles of
administrative law due to the failure to provide an
adequate juridical response to the development of
governmental activities. Far from celebrating the
lack of a separate administrative law, the
traditional approach now has to act defensively
against the challenge of Community law. In other
words we have turned full circle. The growing
normative importance of Community law will continue
to influence English law. However, rather than
allowing Community law to exercise a positive
influence, the traditional model of judicial review
Administrative Laws of the EU Member States. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) pages 789, 792-794.
27 Cf. M. Oakeshott "Contemporary British Politics"
(1947-48) 1 Cambridge Journal 474, 490 arguing that laws
which are not the fruit of the common law's "own
experience and inventiveness" serve to "confound our
politics and corrupt our minds".
28 W.A. Robson "Administrative Law in England 1918-1948"
in G. Campion (ed.), British Government Since 1918
(London, 1950) page 85, 86.
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if it remains dominant will serve to prevent
improvements being made to English administrative
law. It would be mistaken to assume that all judges
are hostile to the European influence. Clearly Lord
Diplock and other judges have welcomed the
opportunity to learn from European lawyers who had
more experience in resolving problems between the
individual and the State. 29 However, the danger is
that either the European principles are rejected as
Continental contaminants or are welcomed and
inadequately transplanted.
Within this developing inter-relationship
between English and European administrative law it
is likely that such problems and difficulties will
continue to arise because of the very different
approaches to the place of law in government and
the different styles of common law and Continental
legal systems. Through the influence of Community
law and the inevitable differences in legal
protection, English law is now experiencing the
consequences of its approach. Today the challenge
29 See chapter 3, section 1. Consider also the views of
J. Laws "The Judiciary and the Executive" in The Inner
Temple Yearbook 1997/98 (London, 1997) page 12: "[t]he
distinguished philosopher, Professor Roger Scruton,
regards the influx of European legal influence as a
threat to the common law. I do not. Our principles will
develop as they always have: by the accretion of new
ideas age by age."
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of Community law is causing us to question whether
the traditional common law approach is suitable to
explain the judicial review of administrative
action. The Community law challenge, with its
strong tendency towards the judicialisation of
politics, therefore becomes more than a mere
marginal issue but goes to the foundations of our
system of judicial review. In order to be able to
effectively transplant the principles and meet the
challenge of Community law, England needs to
develop an administrative law which is sufficiently
purposive and susceptible to the realities of
modern government. Significant modernisation and
institutional reform will need to be undertaken in
order to develop such an administrative law. It is
with such issues in the foreground that the
profound changes in public power and European
integration will require the accommodation of the
English constitution, being "the fruit not of
abstract theory but of ...instinct" ,30 and the
different Continental constitutional traditions
within the emerging European constitution.ll
30 D' .1cey, op. c~t. supra no. 3, page 3.
31 On the emerging European constitution see T.C. Hartley
"Federalism, courts and legal systems; the emerging
constitution of the European Community" (1986) 34
A.J.C.L. 229; I. Harden "The Constitution of the
European Union" [1994] P.L. 609; N. Walker "European
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Constitutionalism and European Integration" [1996] P.L.
266; P. Allott "The Crisis of European
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Revolution in
Europe" (1997) 34 C.M.L.Rev. 439.
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